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ABSTRACT
Losing Values: Illiquidity, Personhood and the Return of Authoritarianism in Skopje, Macedonia
by
Fabio Mattioli

Advisor: Katherine Verdery

On May 17, 2015, over 50,000 people took to the streets of Skopje, the capital of the Republic of
Macedonia, protesting against Prime Minister Gruevski and his party, the conservative neoliberal
Internal Revolutionary Organization of Macedonia (VMRO). After nine years of authoritarian
government, it was the first significant demonstration in which the population demanded
accountability for Gruevski's despotic system of rule. This dissertation is the story of how
Gruevski's system of power was built and why it lasted for so long. I argue that a series of failing
financial processes, which included the use of illiquidity, created the material and moral conditions
for subjection to this system of power.
This dissertation is also a story of loss. It details how the VMRO regime monopolized the
Macedonian market, forcing companies either to become its cronies or systematically lose money
(that is, Macedonian denars), by accepting partial or no payment for the work they provided. But
it also analyzes the capacity of such monetary illiquidity to redefine what it means to be a person
in Macedonia. Citizens and workers who found their own social worth diminished by illiquidity
were forced to adopt rent-seeking behaviors that over time transformed their social personhood. It
iv

is to this double aspect of subjection, material and existential, economic and political, that I
dedicate the center stage in Losing Values.
Utilizing findings collected during 12 months of fieldwork in Skopje, Losing Values
constitutes a bridge between classical studies in political anthropology and contemporary debates
about finance as a process of subject formation. I see this intellectual work as an intervention into
contemporary political debates. To date, we have many accounts of Eastern European countries'
transitions from socialism, detailing the chaos that plagues the postsocialist condition. There is,
however, very little scholarship about a second transition, which concerns the emergence of
authoritarian politics at the fringe of Europe. Yet at this time of political turbulence, it is crucial to
understand the combination of financial and non-financial techniques of governance that empower
kleptocratic and neopatrimonial regimes. In Putin's Russia, financialization goes hand in hand with
state control of the market; in Erdogan's Turkey, real estate bubbles go hand in hand with internal
militarization. Presenting the case of Macedonia, Losing Values constitutes an insight into
processes of value loss that connect financialization, its failure, and the peculiar resurgence of
authoritarian politics in the region. More importantly, the research bridges the study of different
areas, such as Mediterranean Europe, Western Europe, and Eastern Europe, promoting an
integrated discussion of financialization at a critical point when the European process seems to
have shifted from integration to peripheralization.
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Introduction
1992, 2007/08, 2015: a sequence of dates that Macedonians know very well. In 1992, Macedonia
separated from the crumbling socialist Yugoslavia and began its troubled independence. The years
2007-8 mark the beginning of the global financial crisis, an event that interrupted decades of
financial growth and prosperity and wreaked havoc on major European democracies. Lastly, 2015
defines the crisis of the authoritarian regime built by the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary
Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE, hereafter
referred to as VMRO) in Macedonia, with massive popular protests.
1992, 2007/08, 2015. These dates are relevant beyond Macedonia, as they constitute crucial
moments that articulated the increasing role taken by finance in shaping global politics. The 1990s
marked not only the collapse of actually-existing socialism, but also the crisis of the economic
model that generated growth for the social democracies at the core of the European Union (EU).
As Eastern Europe was ravaged by ethnic wars, shock therapies, and sweeping privatization, the
welfare state was being more or less silently dismantled in the Western world as well. The EU
itself was morphing into a unified market more and more detached from the democratic will of the
people. In parallel, the production of Western manufactured goods was moving massively to
defunct socialist countries or emerging economies, leaving the first world to benefit from/depend
on profits from financial transactions, rather than the actual production of goods, as the engine of
its economy.
Initially, the growing importance of finance generated an unprecedented influx of wealth
in developed countries. The devastation of the former socialist world allowed manufacturers in the
West to expand into new markets, ripe with cheap labor, and hungry for Western brands. Western

1

multinationals invested their enormous profits into the financial sector that boomed, quite literally,
producing myriad new products that absorbed and generated what looked like an endless flow of
cash. Finance quickly took on a life of its own, resembling less and less a way to make production
happen, and instead becoming increasingly auto-referential. Maybe for this reason, very few
anticipated the 2007-2012 financial crisis. When Lehman Brothers went bankrupt and the
mortgage backed securities it had sold as bulletproof turned out to be just bad loans, the game of
finance seemed to have reached its end, finally trumped by the "real" economy.
What made finance so powerful in such a short timespan? As financial companies panicked
in 2007, various public institutions stepped in to save banks they considered too big to fail. But
was that the only moment when finance intersected with politics? If one considers the twentieth
century alone, it seems increasingly the case that financial processes weighed on societies and
shaped their political life. On the microeconomic level, rising levels of household debts,
mortgages, and student loans have allowed financial schemes to dictate very intimate aspects of
our everyday lives. Choices like getting married, having children, or going to college depend
regularly on financial considerations. On a macroeconomic level, the growth of finance has
paralleled a progressive reshaping of democratic institutions worldwide. In the European Union,
for instance, the rise of German finances first fueled the Spanish, Irish, and Greek debt bubbles.
After their collapse, the very same financial powers granted Germany the political leverage to
impose austerity measures, even against the will of elected politicians.
At the edge of the European Union, the progressive importance of finance has gone handin-hand with the rise and consolidation of authoritarian regimes. Putin's Russia, Erdogan's Turkey,
and Orban's Hungary are just a few examples of illiberal regimes that utilize a range of financial
instruments to build non-democratic political structures. But how do they do it? One would expect
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that the reach of local political institutions (such as the state) would be limited, rather than
expanded, as financialization grows. With an increased connection of the local economy to global
finance and a faster circulation of money in society, one would imagine a crisis of local
sovereignty. Why, instead, do we witness its solidification in authoritarian regimes? In this
dissertation, I utilize the case of Macedonia to explore ethnographically the paradoxical connection
of finance and authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe. The small, beautiful, and landlocked
country, once part of socialist Yugoslavia, has been ruled by the VMRO party and its leader,
Nikola Gruevski, since 2006. For about ten years, the country has seen the VMRO increase its
control over the economy, as well as an increased relevance of finance in everyday life. In what
follows, I explore the social relations that emerged from this specific financial landscape in order
to explain how the VMRO regime sustained itself over time.
My analysis starts from a crucial ethnographic phenomenon, the widespread difficulty in
getting paid, which my interlocutors generally called nelikvidnost, that is illiquidity. As I further
investigated the causes of such a lack of money in society, I realized that, according to aggregate
statistics, Macedonia is rather filled with cash. So why were companies and individuals that
participated in my research not able to benefit from this money? My dissertation shows that the
VMRO party has shaped the political economy of Macedonia into a hierarchical structure, whereby
money is structurally syphoned towards the political center, occupied by the party and friendly
oligarchs. Those who are not politically affiliated, such as the companies I researched, are left in
an economic desert, fighting over the very little segments of market not controlled by the
government. Illiquidity, then, is a result of one's structural condition—not a simple consequence
of the presence or absence of money in society. While a postsocialist economy like Macedonia has
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often suffered from lack of capital, it is the new centralization of political authority and control
over the flows of finance that generate structural illiquidity.
The VMRO system of forced credit has been ensured by two large scale processes.
Internationally, Gruevski's rule was fueled by the availability of international credit that followed
the EU flag. Because Macedonia has no natural resources, Gruevski's capacity to control the
country relied on loans. EU countries, interested in utilizing European investments for their own
purposes, considered Gruevski an amenable partner. Private investors and financial institutions,
instead, were convinced that Gruevski's Macedonia was indeed a business-friendly country, from
which they could reap great benefits. Despite the fact that these ideas proved wrong, the inflow of
funds granted Gruevski enough capital to jumpstart investment schemes that directly benefited his
oligarchs. These companies, then, were able to attract other subcontractors and impose very
burdensome deals on them. Ultimately, it was access to international finance that allowed the
VMRO the capacity to attract and force domestic forms of credit. The system proved to be
inherently unstable and did not grant the VMRO complete domination of the society.
Domestically, however, the birth of Gruevski's authoritarianism has been made possible by
the weakening of the urban middle class. During socialism, urban consumption constituted a very
important process of social integration. Yet such a possibility almost entirely disappeared during
the transition, partly because of the collapse of Macedonian factories and partly because of the
mounting level of inequality. Without enough economic or political power to claim their
independence, many urban middle-class families did not oppose the VMRO, even if its power
favored mostly provincial and dispossessed families. With time, many middle-class urban
individuals found themselves facing an impossible choice: either to subject themselves to the
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VMRO and became part of an aspiring rentier class, or to be relegated to the margins of the system
and live in fear of the authoritarian rule.
Regardless of their choice, Macedonians were deeply impacted by the VMRO political
economy. Participants in this research and various other friends lamented that there had been a
shift in social behaviors and possibly even in what kind of persons they had become. Subjection,
as I see it, signals the formation of one's personhood through the deepening of the existential
footprints that make us unique. But it also emerges from the connection that a person's being
establishes with the world around us. It is about being, but in the world, as Arendt (1958) would
put it. In other words, subjection is a deeply political process, whereby an emergent political order
is anchored to specific kinds of personhood that it has contributed to shaping. Subjection embodies
a dialectic with the material world of political changes that can only be comprehended by
examining the interconnections of structure and agency, personhood and political economy,
emotions and materiality.
In this perspective, it is clear why the redefinition of value relations that followed the
VMRO political economy of forced credit caused myriad implications for how individuals relate
to each other and come together to form different collectives. In other words, by capturing and
monopolizing money, the VMRO not only influenced how economic value was apportioned in
society, but it also redefined what it meant to be a person in the eyes of others—that is, shared
social values. In this dissertation I observe two aspects of such an emerging authoritarian
subjection, both related to the workplace. First, I analyze how individuals who have been
dispossessed from their job-related identity try to utilize spaces of uncertainty to generate
individual opportunity. Secondly, I describe the increased tensions generated by the contradictory
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dimensions of class, ethnic, and gender solidarity under the condition of authoritarian
financialization.
Ultimately, I argue that financialization gives the Macedonian elite the tools to generate
new forms of dependencies, not so different from the "wealth in people" observed in many other
societies (Gluckman 1968, Ferguson 2013, Verdery 2003). Individuals, caught within the VMRO
system of forced credit, see their economic and existential value disappear; by becoming
dependents of the VMRO, they try to displace some of their own exploitation onto the shoulders
of others who lack political protection. In other words, authoritarian financialization gives birth to
a domestic set of core-periphery relations, and new forms of subjection center around tentative
relations of interpersonal, gender, and ethnic dependency. Compared to other contemporary
kleptocratic or rentier regimes, however, Gruevski's authoritarian system is inherently unstable.
Not only does it depend on foreign loans, but it is also contingent upon the presence of a periphery
to be exploited, which contrasts with the authoritarian aspiration to rule the totality of Macedonia.
Because value is mostly transferred vertically to elites who are unable or unwilling to generate
economic growth, the VMRO authoritarian financialization looks like a pyramid scheme, which
needs to increasingly phagocytize new members to exploit in order to avoid collapse.
The vertical and horizontal hierarchies of subjection are particularly evident in Skopje's
construction sector, which, since 2010, has been one of the busiest and most lucrative in Europe.
Conducting fieldwork among various companies operating in Skopje's construction trade, I
describe how illiquidity follows the paradoxical inflow of private and European investments and
their capture by companies and individuals close to Prime Minister Gruevski and the VMRO party.
Businessmen and workers without political connections, however, are left drowning in debt.

6

0.1 Macedonia: From Fragmentation to Centralization
Comparing Macedonia to a fruit salad annoys Macedonians enormously, yet the metaphor aptly
describes the first decade of Macedonia's independence. Since the peaceful referendum that
sanctioned the country's independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992,
the small country of approximately two million inhabitants has suffered from dramatic economic,
political, and ethnic fragmentation. With the dissolution of socialism, the formal economy
collapsed. Unemployed citizens turned massively to smuggling and other forms of the informal
economy while ethnic tensions between the Albanian minority and the Slavic-speaking
Macedonian majority exploded in an armed conflict. Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece disputed the
country's very existence, leading to years of economic embargos and the impractical effect of
duplicating its name: Republic of Macedonia domestically; Former Yugoslavian Republic of
Macedonia (FYROM) in many international bodies.
On an economic level, the transition from socialism and the privatization process that
ensued were devastating. Most of Macedonia's production system consisted of heavy industry
integrated in the overall Yugoslav production chain. With the breakup of the country and the wars
in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo, Macedonian industry lost the majority of its market. Many
companies, part of bigger Yugoslav groups, lost their capital in war zones. Others were simply
never paid for their work in different Yugoslav republics or abroad. Without a financially solid
state or a functioning banking system, Macedonian companies were soon outpaced by Western
firms and then sold for very little value to managers who stripped them of assets before
condemning them to bankruptcy (Shajnoski 2015, Slaveski 1997). This resulted in a very high
decline of industrial output, one of the most severe in the overall region.
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As demonstrated by figures 1 and 2, Eastern European gross industrial output declined at
different rates, dividing the region in two rather distinct areas. Countries such as Poland, Hungary,
Czech Republic, and Slovakia constituted a European semi-periphery that became the destination
of substantial European investment and outsourcing relatively early on. The Balkans, on the other
hand, and other small countries such as the Baltic republics, experienced a drastic decline, which
lasted over a decade and generated a veritable new periphery of the European Union.

Figure 1: Real Gross Industrial Output, Eastern Europe Semi-Periphery.

Source: Rathery, Alain. 2003. "Tourism, Trade and Traffic Prospects between the
Enlarged EU and non-EU Countries on the Eurasian Continent."
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Figure 2:Real Gross Industrial Output, Eastern Europe Periphery.

Source: Rathery, Alain. 2003. "Tourism, Trade and Traffic Prospects between the Enlarged
EU and non-EU Countries on the Eurasian Continent."

Despite losing 50% of their industrial capacity almost overnight and reaching a steady
unemployment rate of 30 to 40 percent, Macedonians survived. Citizens used the informal relations
they had developed during socialism to operate small businesses, especially in the service sector.
Smuggling, from cigarettes to oil and gold, created dense networks of exchanges between
Macedonia and the neighboring countries of Kosovo, Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Albania. These
informal activities seldom generated taxable revenues, yet they were crucial to create pockets of
wealth and employment, to the point that the Social Democrat Party (SDSM) remained
conspicuously silent and permissive towards this increasingly fragmented economic landscape. In
power from 1992 to 1998, and then from 2002 to 2006, the SDSM enforced property and fiscal
law only partially, and not bothering to control petty entrepreneurs allowed the SDSM to forge
alliances with some wealthy managers who were left free to accumulate capital at the expenses of
firms in the process of privatization and their workers. Despite their amassed riches, none of these
9

entrepreneurs became a proper oligarch, given the small size of the country's market and its lack
of natural resources and foreign investments. Instead, the austerity policy promoted by the SDSM
to stabilize the Macedonian denar rooted informal relations of local business within the productive
tissue of Macedonia. Macedonians did not thrive, but it was precisely the economic and political
fragmentation that condemned them to macroeconomic stagnation that also allowed them some
degree of micropolitical autonomy.
Ethnically and politically, Macedonia is a highly divided country. The very name of
Macedonia stirs endless debates, both internationally and domestically. Greece does not recognize
the country's constitutional name Republic of Macedonia, arguing that Makedonia is the name of
the Greek region surrounding Thessaloniki. Bulgaria, on the other hand, claims that there is no
Macedonian nation—for Sofia, the Slavic-speaking population of the Republic of Macedonia are
Bulgarians. Because an increasing number of Macedonians declare themselves Bulgarian to obtain
a coveted EU passport, Bulgaria's claim could become bureaucratically true. Serbia, conversely,
does not recognize an autonomous Macedonian Orthodox Church, claiming that it belongs to the
Serbian Patriarchate.
Internally, Macedonia is highly fragmented. Somewhere between 25% to 35% of the
population is ethnically Albanian and in large majority Muslim. While under socialism Albanians
were informally discriminated against, they had a set of recognized cultural rights. After
independence, the Macedonian state was constitutionally defined as a Slavic and Christian
Orthodox space; that is, ethnically Macedonian. This provoked a six-month-long armed conflict
between a paramilitary Albanian formation and the Macedonian Army, which, in 2001, led to the
Ohrid Frame Agreement, an internationally brokered agreement whereby political power became
constitutionally shared along ethnic lines. This peace deal has ensured some degree of stability,
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allowing Albanians (and other minorities) to create autonomous structures of power; as a
consequence, today's institutions and urban spaces are even more divided across ethnic and party
lines.
It is against this backdrop of social, economic, and political fragmentation that Gruevski
and his party, the VMRO, instituted their political economy of subjection. Promising to fight
corruption, to restore dignity and order to the state, and to bring Macedonia out of its economic
stagnation by attracting foreign capital, Gruevski convinced a large part of the rural population to
vote the VMRO party into power in 2006. The VMRO has won every election since, as the Prime
Minister relied on having elections early in order to prevent others from organizing against him.
The VMRO won the 2006 parliamentary election with 33% of the vote, the 2008 parliamentary
election with 48%, the 2011 parliamentary election with 39%, and the 2014 parliamentary election
with 42%. Under Gruevski's rule, the state reversed the route it had taken in previous years,
entering a process of power centralization. Gruevski did essentially eliminate corruption as
Macedonians knew it, although the practice did not disappear in absolute terms. What had once
been an example of an informal and "human" economy became a source of illiquidity, whereby
the VMRO became the only arbiter to determine a company's economic success. Informality
continued to be widespread, but in a centralized form: instead of linking people at the fringe of the
political system, it has been absorbed as the guiding principle for the functioning of the VMRO
state.
Gruevski's centralization did not remain confined to the economic sphere, but spilled over
into other domains of social life. Among these, the VMRO insisted on promoting new, or rather,
traditional moral values. His government endorsed homophobia as an official policy, restricted
women's reproductive rights, encouraged pro-natalist policies, and institutionalized nationalism
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and religious/ethnic exclusivity. However, the conservative character of his social agenda provided
many citizens with an existential anchoring. In fact, many interlocutors saw Gruevski as a
providing father, a "right-wing person who implements left-wing social policies." For this
interlocutor, Gruevski's welcome paternalism was embodied at best by his capacity to provide jobs.
After having destroyed people's economic autonomy by promoting illiquidity, the VMRO emerged
as the provider for both economic and existential value. The VMRO not only implemented an
internationally-backed neoliberal agenda, which is often the case in financialized economies, but
also invested in the public administration, de facto providing economic resources to a part of the
population. Nevertheless, in so doing, the party aimed at cutting off most of Macedonia's workers
from access to money, controlling who did and who did not have access to it.
It is no secret that to get a job in Macedonia one needs the VMRO card. Gruevski
effectively transformed the VMRO into a job reservoir in the hope of creating a new aspiring
rentier class. During his nine years as Prime Minister, Gruevski dismantled the previous state
apparatus by demoting, firing, or replacing most of the influential figures within the state
administration who did not pledge political alliance to his party. He then centralized power within
the VMRO itself, promoting to the highest level of the party and the state a group of energetic,
albeit inexperienced, business-oriented youth. Utilized as his proxies, these young ministers were
frequently replaced with new ones to prevent them from acquiring overwhelming influence in the
party. Finally, he endorsed a massive hiring of (mostly unskilled) public personnel from the ranks
of the VMRO party. Recent analysis shows that the number of public employees in the country
has nearly doubled since 2006 (Kapital 2015).
The breadth of the VMRO's control over the Macedonian society went much further than
simply institutionalizing bribery and patronage. Gruevski took almost complete control over the

12

media by allowing oligarchs close to his government to acquire most of the print newspapers and
television channels. He imprisoned an oligarch who did not support him and closed his TV station,
the major private channel in the country. Journalists were often threatened and in 2014, they were
literally beaten by security guards while asking questions in the national assembly and thrown out.
According to widely circulating rumors regarding reports from US ambassadors posted on
Wikileaks, NGOs critical of the government's operation were called in by the police for
questioning. In 2008 one of the leaders of the opposition and then-mayor of Strumica, Zoran Zaev,
was detained (and then released) for alleged abuse of power.
Since 2015, a massive amount of tapes recording conversations between Gruevski and
other officials have been revealed to the public. In these conversations, we can hear Gruevski and
other officials discuss how to use thugs they hired within the Ministry of the Interior to punish or
terrorize some reluctant businessmen. Gruevski and others discuss how to replace, pressure, or
secure favors from judges. They also discuss how to scrap existing urban regulations to allow for
speculation, how to send inspectors and eventually demolish the building of a businessman who
did not want to conform, and how to disguise the whole affair so as to make it seem legal. The
extensive capacity of the Gruevski regime to spy on and control people's lives was expressed to
me by a heightened fear that my interlocutors had in 2013 and 2014. I had close friends look over
their shoulders and lower the tone of their voices when talking about the government in public.
The widespread fear of and resignation to VMRO domination was actively cultivated by
the party. There was a coordinated effort to generate anxiety about the consequence of not
conforming to the VMRO. This did not mean necessarily "punishing" individuals who did not
conform, although it did happen. By and large, individuals without the VMRO pass just found
themselves stuck, without answer, with their plans delayed. This, I argue, sets Macedonia aside
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from other transitional states, where corruption is a common practice that does not contribute to
solidify an authoritarian ideology of government. Yet I would hesitate to call Gruevki's Macedonia
a form of Fascism, because it seems to lack a clear ideology and direction. The predatory, rather
than modernizing, nature of the VMRO elites and their piecemeal attempts to gain domestic power
by intercepting geopolitical finance seem to set them aside from historical iterations of Fascism,
focused on autarky or colonialism. At the same time, the VMRO did not only empty the state from
within, as Ganev (2007) has remarked for the case of Bulgaria. Instead, the VMRO built a
substantially centralized system, where the aspiration for statehood and rent generated a solid
social cohesion.

0.2 Regional Comparison: A Typology of Authoritarian Regimes
Since the early 2000s, various Emerging European countries have seen the rise of progressively
authoritarian regimes, which I understand as regimes where informal reciprocities (such as bribes
and patronage) generated a widespread sense of fear, control, and intimidation. The 2016 Freedom
Reports characterize Eurasia, overall, as "not free," with the exception of Ukraine, Georgia,
Moldova, and Armenia that are classified as "partly free" together with Macedonia, Kosovo,
Albania, and Turkey. Poland and Hungary, on the other hand, are still ranked among free countries,
albeit with a downward trajectory (Freedom House 2016).
In journalistic accounts and EU policy circles, the resurgence of authoritarian regimes is
described as a populist drift. For instance, on January 13th, 2016, the editorial board of The New
York Times dedicated a lengthy and concerned piece to Poland. The Polish "retreat" and
"deviation" from the "fundamental values of liberal democracy" is seen as "foolish,"
"reprehensible" and "deplorable" (The New York Times 2016). In a similar vein, albeit with a more
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contained style, The Guardian discusses Orban's policies as constructing an "Absurdiland" of
lunatic boutades (The Guardian 2013).
Such accounts suggest that "frightened" (to use The New York Times's words) or
"frustrated" populations are duped by politicians that camouflage their "egotistic goals," to borrow
from the European Commission's own President Tusk (Barker 2016), as national priorities. While
some European elites such as Rupnik (2007) portray authoritarianism and populism as a constant
scapegoating tactic by national elites, few realize that authoritarian regimes are today not only
playing the national issue against Europe: they actually emphasize the growth of economic
inequality and peripheralization that followed the 2007-2012 crisis in Europe (Mudde 2015).
Besides the tense relationship with Brussels, what unites such authoritarian regimes? While
by and large defined by a growth in the powers of the executive government (or president) that
exist in a strong state, the actual forms of government control vary across the region. Generally,
they include various levels of censorship over the media, capture of the economy, influence over
the judiciary, and sabotage of the opposition. Some countries, like Montenegro and Belarus, have
essentially never transitioned to a democratic life. Milo Dukanovic has been the prime minister of
Montenegro since 1991, with only short interruptions in 2006-08 and 2010-12. Dukanovic controls
the country's political and economic systems thanks to his connection to organized crime and the
Italian Mafia (Nuttal 2016). Alexander Lukashenko, on the other hand, has been the president and
de facto dictator of Belarus since 1991, manipulating elections and managing the country's
political, social, and economic life. In Russia, Vladimir Putin rose to power in 1999 as the
designated successor of Yeltsin and has since maintained power together with his proxy,
Medvedev (Gessen 2013, Dawisha 2014). A former KGB official, Putin has been associated with
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a series of political imprisonments and killings that involved dissenting and critical voices from
the media as well as oligarchs, opposition politicians and former operatives in the secret service.
Recep Tayyip Erdogan's rise to power in Turkey has been equally marked by a stronghold
on media and, more recently, by a full-fledged internal war against the regime's most credible
electoral menace—the Kurdish population and parties. While nationalist rhetoric and the creation
of internal enemies have been crucial in cementing the leadership of Viktor Orban in Hungary and
Jaroslaw Kaczynski in Poland, these regimes have not (yet) implicated the country in a bloody
conflict. Instead, both leaders have begun a series of constitutional and economic reforms that aim
to encroach on the parties in power and redress their countries' unequal integration within the
European economic system.
Where is Macedonia located within this spectrum of authoritarian policies? In what
follows, I analyze a series of economic indicators to understand the variation in political choices
across authoritarian regimes. I especially focus on three interconnected areas: first, I discuss the
macroeconomic picture focusing on the kind of resources that dominate the country's economy.
Then I analyze public and household debt, giving particular attention to mortgages. Finally, I focus
on liquidity, measured through the availability of money and reserves in the banking sector.
Data suggest that authoritarian regimes in Russia and Turkey are directly connected to
periods of instability and GDP decrease. In both cases, authoritarianism followed immediately
after financial crises, Russia's liquidity crisis in 1998-9 and Turkey's financial meltdown in 2001,
respectively. In Hungary, the victory of Orban's party followed the 2007-2012 world financial
crisis and EU-imposed austerity, which also constituted the background for the victory of
Kaczynski in Poland. In Macedonia, however, external economic shocks do not seem to be directly
connected to the ascent of Gruevski, who was elected in 2006, at a moment in which the
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Macedonian economy seemed to be recovering from the fifteen years of transition. As we will see
in the dissertation, however, financial crisis and illiquidity will be particularly important for the
structure of Gruevski's regime.
Macedonia is by far the poorest of these economies, although the difference between
Macedonia, Russia, and Turkey is slightly larger or smaller depending on the unit of measure
chosen. On the other hand, the income per capita of Hungary and Poland is almost invariably three
times that of Macedonia. If one looks at how different sectors contribute to add value to the GDP
in Macedonia, Hungary, and Poland, it becomes immediately clear that the two Central European
states present a significantly higher contribution from industry and manufacturing sectors,
composing over 41% of GDP in Hungary and 37% in Poland. These two sectors combine to make
up only 27% of GDP of Macedonia, which instead presents a higher incidence of construction,
real estate, and agriculture (combined 39% of the value added, in contrast to 14% in Hungary and
13% in Poland). While data of comparable detail on Turkey and Russia are not available, my
analysis of exports suggests that Turkey resembles Hungary and Poland, and Russia Macedonia.
This is partly an issue of size: Macedonia does not have a large enough internal market,
qualified workforce, or the historical expertise to support highly lucrative manufacturing. Instead,
the Macedonian economy has been historically dominated by heavy industry (especially iron and
steel), textiles, agriculture, and mineral extraction. The role of exports provides additional insights
into the relative importance of industrial sectors, and therefore the class structure of authoritarian
regimes.
Russia, just like Macedonia and Hungary, presents a low level of diversity, while Poland
and Turkey have developed a wide range of exports in 2014. Natural resources, and especially oil
and gas, dominate the Russian economy and its exports, explaining its extraordinary growth over
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the years and recent decline with the decrease of the price of oil in 2015. Natural resources,
especially minerals such as zinc, lead, and marble are important in Macedonia and to a lesser extent
in Turkey, where gold is more prevalent. The extractive sector, and generally heavy industry, is
typically organized around large conglomerates. While the returns in this industry are high, they
are not often distributed throughout the population; instead, they favor the growth of a class of
oligarchs.
Manufacturing industries are crucial to Hungary, Poland and Turkey. Although with clear
differences, one can see that textile industries, one of the most exploitative and least beneficial for
employees, have become less important in Turkey and have left space to the production of
machinery and other transportation products—industries which have facilitated the rise of a lowermiddle class in Poland and Hungary, thanks to higher salaries and higher tax revenues. On the
contrary, the decrease of the importance of textiles and natural resources in Macedonia has not had
the same benefits; not only because it is very recent, but also because the industries in question are
located in special economic zones, pay very low salaries, are heavily supported by the state, and
pay only a 10% fixed tax.
Examining the rise of income inequality through the GINI index, which measures the
income distribution in a given nation, and the share of wealth owned by the highest percentile, as
presented in the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (Solt 2014), confirms the
suggestions provided by the analysis of exports and the breakdown of the GDP. Macedonia is the
country with the highest level of inequality in the sample and generally in Europe. There have been
two distinct periods where the share of wealth possessed by the top one percent rose significantly:
immediately after the transition (1991) and in the aftermath of the election of Gruevski in 2006.
The spike in 2004 can be associated with the signing of a trade agreement with the EU. In 2010,
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the top one percent possessed 12.2% of the national wealth (in comparison to 11.68% for Russia
and 10.20% for Turkey).

Figure 3: Share of wealth detained by the top 1%, selected Eastern European countries.

Source: Solt, Frederick. 2014. "The Standardized World Income Inequality Database." Working paper.
SWIID Version 5.0, October 2014.
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Figure 4: Inequality share, GINI index, selected Eastern European countries.

Source: Solt, Frederick. 2014. "The Standardized World Income Inequality Database." Working paper.
SWIID Version 5.0, October 2014.

Figure 4 shows that social inequality, as measured by the GINI indicator, escalated rapidly
after the VMRO's ascent to power in 2006. The GINI index reached 42.55 points, slightly less than
Russia's 43 points and more than Turkey's 39 points. This suggests that, until 2006, it was the
SDSM government that had allowed the oligarchs and other members of the urban petty
bourgeoisie to gain their fortune. Gruevski had to fight, replace, or convert many of these oligarchs,
in an attempt to create his own rentier class.
This is not unlike what happened in Russia, where Putin also had to face significant
opposition from oligarchs who controlled the oil industry. But Putin had more resources than
Gruevski: his personal connections in the KGB allowed him to draw from powerful, dangerous,
and often well-funded allies in Russia and beyond, who were able to fund and support his early
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actions (Dawisha 2014). In addition, Putin had the Russian State at his disposal, a powerful and
repressive regulatory system, albeit in considerable disrepair after a decade of transition. Rich with
oil, a prized global commodity, Putin was able to construct a strong authoritarian regime that not
only centralized wealth, but also concentrated power in an institutional way that was harder to
achieve in Macedonia.
Erdogan faced similar challenges compared to both Putin and Gruevski. A prominent
member of the Islamic Welfare Party, Erdogan had been mayor of Istanbul from 1994 to 1998,
when the party, which had then been voted into power, was forced to step down by a non-violent
military coup. After the party was banned, Erdogan was imprisoned. In 2001 he founded a new
party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and won the general election the following year,
despite his opposition to the powerful and wealthy oligarchs such as the Koc and Sabanci families,
among others, which had strong connections to the Turkish Army and the secularist Kemalist
parties. Erdogan's own support came mostly from Islamic groups, including those led by Abdullah
Gul, which had become popular among the emerging entrepreneurial class composed by owners
of small and medium sized companies from Anatolia, usually referred to as the Anatolian Tigers
or Islamic Calvinists (European Stability Initiative 2005). Banking upon the increasing capacity to
intercept offshoring from global multinationals, especially in the textile sector, Erdogan fueled the
development of small, self-exploitative enterprises rooted in family businesses into large-scale
conglomerates. In fact, one can see the share of income of the top one percent augmenting rapidly
in the first period of Erdogan's election, going from 6% in 2002 to 14% in 2007. Some of these
companies then bought out their previous investors (as in the case of Taha textile, which bought
out the French giant LC Waikiki). The Anatolian Tigers cemented Erdogan's power, providing his
regime with not only the resources of large conglomerates, such as Russia's extractive industry,
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but also the backing of myriad emerging small and medium sized companies. This helped an entire
Islamic middle class to emerge, and to rally behind Erdogan at critical times, such as the failed
coup of July 2016. While income inequality is still high in Turkey, one can observe a downward
trajectory in the share held by the top one percent since 2007, potentially linked to the increase in
inflation—a move that helped citizens access credit while also jeopardizing their financial
sustainability.
This is a completely different scenario in comparison with Macedonia, where early
oligarchs built their empires by cannibalizing the (then socialist) middle class. When Gruevski set
out to confront these oligarchs, he could not count on an emerging stratum of small and medium
enterprises, nor an emerging middle class. Urban entrepreneurs in Skopje were surviving, but
mostly thanks to the SDSM's tolerance for the gray market. As will be clear in Chapter 5, the large
majority of the ethnic Macedonian middle class struggled to maintain some of its class privileges.
This probably explains the importance that Gruevski assigned to attracting foreign investments,
which included revamping an agency called Invest in Macedonia and hiring a set of economic
promoters based in different countries that responded directly to him. As shown in the chart above,
the share of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), which captures the participation of foreign
companies in the ownership of local enterprises, has risen constantly since 2007, although not at a
very fast pace compared to the previous ten years. In fact, while Gruevski counted on investors to
generate revenues and solidify his regime, Chapter 1 will show that his rentier strategy proved
counterproductive for many international investors, who decided not to get involved with his
government. Still, the opening of a factory by Johnson Matthey significantly impacted the
Macedonian economy, whose main article of export is now emission control catalysts.
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FDI is particularly high in Hungary, where it reaches 80% of GDP. By comparison, FDI
stocks are around 45% of GDP in Poland and Macedonia and much lower in Turkey and Russia.
In 2014, 48.6% of Hungarian FDI regarded the financial and banking sector, while 35% was
invested in manufacturing. While generally the financial sector is foreign owned throughout the
region, including in Macedonia and Poland, Hungary is peculiar insofar as it has received massive
investments from large global multinationals like General Electric, Audi, Nokia, and Philips
(Santander 2015).

Figure 5: Comparison of FDI stocks in selected Eastern European countries.

Source: Eurostat, Central Banks. Data expressed in Percentage of the GDP.

The different nature of international investors explains why FDI amounts in Poland are a
smaller percentage of GDP, although they are actually double in absolute value. In 2014, Polish
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FDI was worth 245 billion euro and in Hungary, 98 billion euro. If Hungary has become a
production and service hub for global corporations, much of Poland's production is directly
dependent on Germany, either through FDI or offshoring, which explains why Poland has
navigated the global financial crisis somewhat better. German companies and investments have
thus generated a more balanced development in Poland, where FDI is more diversified compared
to Hungary and reaches sectors such as investment in trade (14%), real estate (6%), and research
(5%), together with finance (25%) and manufacturing (30%). This is consistent with the different
structural position of Poland and Hungary, which both constitute semi-peripheries for EU flows of
capital, and Macedonia, whose peripheral position limits the amount and kinds of foreign investors
interested in relocating their production.
Regardless of the share of FDI, however, it is clear that Hungary's and Poland's
manufacturing sectors are structured to fulfill export-oriented production. The relatively low level
of income inequality compared to Russia, Macedonia, or Turkey signals that foreign investments
in manufacturing of medium to high-technology products (including computers and phones) have
supported the emergence of a lower-middle class. Contrary to Turkey's petty entrepreneurial class,
the two Central European countries do not feature a structure of highly interconnected small- and
medium-sized companies. Very few Polish or Hungarian companies have had the upward
trajectory of the Anatolian Tigers, remaining the de facto back office for Western European
conglomerates. That implied a slightly less exploitative labor relation, with higher wages on
average, but also the lack of a concentration of capital from local entrepreneurs. Stuck in this
subordinate position, aspiring middle-class workers in Poland and Hungary resorted to acquiring
debts, rather than salaries, as a viable path for social betterment.
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In the wake of the crisis in Greece, most of the international discussion focused on public
debt, and especially on the debt-to-GDP balance (Duman 2013). However, in the aftermath of a
crisis in which salaries have been blocked by austerity measures, excessive prudency or
bankruptcies in the private sector, households have increased their borrowing to face everyday
payments globally (Mason and Jayadev 2012). In fact, household debt was a crucial element in
determining the beginning of the 2007-2012 financial crisis, with the proliferation of bad loans
and their repackaging and sale (Bellamy Foster 2008). Countries like Poland and Hungary did not
have the same level of household debt at the onset of the crisis. OECD data shows that debt for
US households was 145% of disposable income; for Polish households debts were 39% of
disposable income, while Hungarian households owed 62% of their disposable income. This is
comparatively low in comparison to other European countries hit heavily by the crisis. In Greece,
the debt to household income ratio was 80%, in Ireland 263%, in Portugal 145%.
Yet loans and especially mortgages were generally denominated in foreign currency (FX),
or with FX clauses, which meant that as the crisis progressed, households faced heavier
installments because of the devaluation of the local currency against the Swiss franc or the euro.
In 2003, only 20% of the mortgages had an FX clause; by 2010, it was over 70% (Hungarian
National Bank 2015). The change was partly due to more favorable rates provided by the incoming
euro integration, but also by the cessation of home ownership subsidies in 2003-4 that suddenly
made mortgages denominated in Hungarian forint more expensive and caused an immediate spike
of 30% to 40% in the value of installments of FX mortgages (Harmati 2005, Westerwelt 2012).
Orban made the mortgage issue a central political question. Since 2011, he pushed through
agreements, laws and legal verdicts that shielded customers from bank speculation on FX
mortgages. This included banning FX loans, forcing banks to repay excessive installments
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charged, accept payment of FX mortgages at lower exchange rates and eventually to convert FX
mortgages into Hungarian forint. Orban also extended the moratorium on eviction and instructed
the National Asset Manager (NAMA), the agency in charge of social housing, to purchase
repossessed homes from banks at a substantial market discount (between 30% and 50%), de facto
nationalizing mortgages. Finally, the Fidesz government started an ambitious plan to provide
social housing and loans to families for building their own homes, especially for those who had
lost their homes because of FX mortgages (Lambert 2015, Eddy 2016). These measures proved
effective as the ratio of debt to disposable income decreased to 57% after having reached 81% in
2010.
FX mortgages were a problem in Poland as well, although not as acute as in Hungary given
the overall better performance of the country's economy that buffered the mortgage impact. Since
the 2000s, it has become common to borrow at cheaper rates in mortgages denominated in Swiss
francs rather than in Polish Zloty(PLN) (Laszek, Augustyniak, and Olszewski 2015). As I will
show in Chapter 1, Europeanization in Poland, Hungary, and the rest of emerging Europe allowed
banks lucrative opportunities through various lending instruments. In Poland, FX lending was not
as indiscriminate as in Hungary but mostly targeted a higher middle-class population. In addition,
while in Poland, interest rates followed the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) plus a
premium, in Hungary they were fixed and determined by private banks. When the crisis hit, the
LIBOR went down with the PLN, thus mitigating the impact that currency devaluation had on
interest rates. Interests on Hungarian FX mortgages, instead, were fixed or determined by the
banks, which amplified the impact of forint depreciation and made loans more expensive (Laszek,
Augustyniak, and Olszewski 2015). Possibly because of the more contained nature of the problem,
the Polish state was not as radical in tackling the issue (Barrel et al 2009). While banks did stop
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offering FX lending in 2012, household debt continued to grow—reaching an all-time high of 59%
of disposable income, or 625 billion PLN, in 2013. Kaczynski, after winning the 2015 election,
explicitly proposed following Orban's steps by converting FX loans into Polish zloty, a decision
that has been criticized for its non-liberal and potentially destabilizing nature (Sobczyk 2016). In
Macedonia, 94% of housing loans are FX denominated or with an FX clause, which is generally
in euro. Nevertheless, the MKD is pegged to the euro and has not substantially appreciated or
depreciated throughout the crisis, hence not significantly impacting loan repayment so far. FX
loans and their growing interest rates have been of concern in the region as a whole, as proven by
the creation of an FX loans committee of lawyers engaged in protecting consumer rights.
In Turkey and Russia private debt has quickly risen, yet it is mostly consumer credit that
preoccupies financial analysts. In both countries, loans are mostly denominated in local currency,
resulting in less exposure to the volatility of exchange rates. Following the depreciation of the
ruble that ensued after Russia's recent military interventions in Crimea, Ukraine, and Syria,
Russian banks have further converted a large amount of foreign denominated loans into rubles
(Hirst 2015). The reasons that push families and individuals into debt are, however, not the same
in Turkey and Russia. While real estate seems to have a minor influence in Russian household debt
dynamics, a recent push to transform dwellers of informal settings and citizens into entrepreneurs
(Parmaksizoglu, personal communication) has resulted in a sharp decline in homeownership,
pushing families to become more dependent on consumer credit as disposable income declines
(Duman 2013). Tunc and Yavas (2015) notice a decrease of household saving rates and an increase
in mortgage contracts despite the rise in inflation and salaries. This suggests that Erdogan is
utilizing liquidity, in the form of loans and salary growth, as a tool for political support from an
aspiring middle class.
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In Macedonia it is public, rather than private, debt that shapes the life of the country. In
2003, household debt amounted to 0.2 billion international dollars (I$). By 2015 it had reached an
all-time high of 2.5 billion I$. In this period, Macedonia's household debt increased 13 fold, while
Russia's increased 47 times and Turkey's 26 times. The sheer amount or velocity of increase of
private debt is, however, not telling. Hungary and Poland saw much more contained figures, with
household debt growing only 2.7 and sevenfold respectively, yet, because the increase was
composed mostly of FX mortgages, it created a debt environment much more toxic than in
Macedonia, Turkey, or Russia. Mortgages in Macedonia make up less than a fourth of the overall
household debt, which is dominated by consumer loans. In fact, just as in Turkey and Russia, banks
have generally maintained a more prudent approach to housing loans, with an approval rate
between 70% and 80% for residential mortgages, than for consumer loans, approved well above
the 80% threshold (Hungarian Central Bank 2015).

Figure 6: Household debt in Macedonia.

Source: Macedonian National Bank. Data expressed in billions of MKD.
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Throughout my fieldwork, the Macedonian credit system seemed schizophrenic. While
small consumer loans of up to 5,000 euro were commonly offered at relatively low rates, families
and businesses who wanted money to invest in larger purchases (such as apartments) or new
business activities found it increasingly hard to access bank credit. This is not because of a lack of
funds from Macedonian banks. Quite the contrary, Macedonian banks seem to be holding on to
their liquid assets and cash, as their ratio of liquidity to assets is stable around 25% and has
consistently been one of the highest in Eastern Europe. In 2015, only Hungarian banks had higher
liquidity—probably a consequence of Orban's plan to curb FX lending and to capitalize banks to
provide affordable loans.

Figure 7: Banks' liquid reserve to GDP ratio in selected Eastern European Countries.

Source: World Bank.
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What explains Macedonia's liquidity paradox? Why are banks well-funded and yet the
Macedonian market suffers a chronic lack of money to the point that in-kind transactions such as
kompenzacija, the core of Chapter 2, are widely popular? Certainly the high percentage (over 40%)
of nonperforming loans that plagued Macedonia's banking in the 1990s influenced expectations
about the 2007-2012 financial crisis. On the other hand, such risk aversion, as most of the
economic commentators and researchers I interviewed described it, might stem from a real lack of
profitable opportunities. Banks might have realized that very few companies in Macedonia are
well-positioned to utilize loans in profitable ways. The macroeconomic importance of private
transfers also indicates that Macedonian banks intercept a large section of grey and illegal money
that is not easily invested but is rather maintained on accounts.

Figure 8: Macedonia's trade deficit, private transfers, and account deficit.

Source: National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia and World Bank staff calculations. (Blue
corresponds to trade deficit, red to private transfer, green to account deficit, expressed in percentage
of GDP).
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While all of these factors play a part, it is also important to notice that the lack of liquidity
that is generated by banking policies strengthens the position of the state and the VMRO political
structure as crucial platforms for accessing money. I argue in Chapter 2 that it is then necessary to
understand the relation between banks and the government, in order to capture Macedonia's
selective liquidity, or rather illiquidity. As the whole dissertation makes clear, the configuration of
credit, illiquidity, and authoritarianism that emerged in the country amplified the potential for
exploitation, centralized the Macedonian economy, and promoted personal dependency on the
state.
Macedonia is not the only emerging European society where the state is regaining a
prominent role in the economy, especially in Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. As Turkey and
Russia come under greater international pressure, it is the networks of oligarchs and their
companies that maintain internal control over the workforce by providing jobs or manipulating the
media (Tugal 2016). While Macedonia's social climate was extremely oppressive, the VMRO was
not able to turn into a genuine totalitarian state by institutionalizing control over the economy.
Macedonia did not nationalize its own financial or productive system—mainly because the country
and its middle class have not had the productive resources or the purchasing power to sustain it.
On the contrary, the VMRO strategy has been to utilize public debt, originally from international
investors such as the IMF, EBRD, and FDI to propel the national economy. This has allowed the
Macedonian public debt to skyrocket. Since Gruevski's election, Macedonia's debt increased
threefold from 1.3 billion euro (20% of GDP) in 2006 to the current 4.10 billion euro (46% of
GDP).
A comparison of countries in the region shows that such an increase is significant, but not
quite as dramatic as some. As I highlight in Chapter 1, Slovenia and Albania have seen a much
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higher increase of public and private debt. The selective reliance on foreign finance has
characterized the Gruevski regime with a markedly less anti-imperial rhetoric when compared with
the anti-EU sentiment exuding from Orban's or Kaczynski's governments. In more recent years,
however, as internal protest received international attention, the government shifted its debt to
domestic banks. While the EU remains the overarching authority in political matters, the VMRO
has pursued closer commercial and political ties with Moscow and China, and has promoted an
instrumental approach to EU funds—a pattern of explicitly rent-seeking behaviors that I document
in Chapter 1.

0.3 Financialization and the Urban
Financialization has been defined as the tendency to invest in the stock market rather than in
industrial development in order to achieve quicker profit (Smart and Lee 2003, Sokol 2009, Arrighi
1994, Magdoff and Sweezey 1987, Harvey 1978, Krippner 2005). Thanks to the technological
developments of financial markets, anything can be turned into a financial product: objects,
investments, companies, land, private and public debts, currency spreads, or even food future
prices are securitized. These new products are then bought or sold not because of their productive
capacity, but in relation to the speculative potential, also known as shareholder value (Aglietta
2000, Boyer 2000).
Three aspects seem to be crucial to the workings of financialization. First, financialized
economies experience significant wealth redistribution. Typically, such transfers proceed from the
bottom part of the population to the upper percentile of earners. Whether through wage suppression
or increase of value added (Lapavitsas, 2009), these processes signal the onset of financialization.
The following step is generally constituted by an expansion of lending activities, whereby
32

managers of funds or investment bankers, in constant competition for higher gains, turn to
predatory lending and junk bonds. Scholars who have theorized the mortgage crisis point out that
the housing bubble at the core of the 2007-2012 crisis was generated by the aggressive behaviors
of underwriters, brokers, and investors who earned fees and premiums by convincing working
class citizens to acquire more debt despite having declining or stagnating wages (Ho and
Pennington 2006). Second, financialization percolates across social domains and deeply
transforms social relations. James (2012), Guerin (2014) and Williams (2005) among others have
demonstrated that the spread of financial debts conflicts with other forms of social reciprocities
and transform the habits, behaviors, and even identities of people who contract such debts. This
also affects the banking and financial professionals themselves as they experience the pressure of
debt not as consumer, but as labor forced to forgo most of their personal life and work 110 hours
or more per week in extremely hierarchical environments (Ho 2008). Both groups of people,
consumers and producers, become extremely involved with the risk of finance. Yet while the risk
of being "liquidated" becomes a productive gamble for investors and financial professionals (Ho
2008, Miyazaki 2006), common citizens such as youth of color in inner cities described by
Williams (2005) experience it mostly as a form of loss.
The final point emerges from ethnographic analyses regarding the emerging forms of
comparisons and calculations that sometimes generate illusory conclusions concerning economic
processes and realities. Poon (2012) traces the mortgage crisis to the adoption of the FICO score
by state-backed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The FICO score allowed a wide array of financial
players to evaluate customers without having to actually know their particular situation, and made
it suddenly possible to compare, convert, and exchange mortgages. Such a performativity of
markets, whereby new modes of thinking or technologies generate actual economic shifts, have
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also been crucial in creating an illusory understanding of financial markets, whereby insolvent
debts have been repackaged and by that very act, made magically good assets (Crotty 2009). While
studies have shown that the performances of financialization are based upon specific technological
and cultural structures, I show here that their material and political implications are also extremely
different according to their location. In places like Macedonia, financialization happens through
forced credit, in-kind exchanges, and illiquidity. As such, the Macedonian case is crucial to
highlight the variety in which actually existing financialization operates beyond Wall Street.
Geographically it makes sense to consider the similarities and differences of
financialization at the core and the periphery of a newly constituted global order (Arrighi 1994).
After all, scholars who studied the dynamics of neoliberalism or late capitalism have shown the
spatial movements of capital (Harvey 1989a) and its capacity to follow increasing real estate values
(Smart and Lee 2003, Smith 1979, Whitehead 2008). On the urban level, surprising parallels can
be noticed between the disinvestment of global corporations from industrial centers, their
relocation of production facilities overseas, and their investment into newly-created receptors of
global finance. The creation of the Rust Belt, as well as the fate of Detroit and New York City,
seem to be part of this process. Yet one can argue productively that a similar process has been at
the core of the de-industrialization and transformation of former socialist societies. The collapse
observed in many provincial cities such as Leipzig is not very different from that of Detroit. But
what about the gains of financialization? Do investments in urban spaces in postsocialist societies
look like Bloomberg's New York (Brash 2011)?
While financial investors see their investments in cities as equivalent to other stock or bond
purchases (Charnok, Purcell, and Ribera-Fumaz 2014, Rafferty and Brian 2006), some studies
have shown that the political context matters in promoting or pushing away financial flows.
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Chicago, for instance, has recently attempted to finance the city's infrastructure by issuing bonds
on future tax increments, also known as Tax Increment Financing (Weber 2010). But the reason
why financial investors were so attracted by TIF was the minimal risk presented by having a
powerful city government as their lender, one that could resort to forms of political control to make
urban development happen. Such cases beg for comparative deepening of the intersections
between politics and financialization. What would happen with societies where the market is not
segmented according to corporate power but political oligarchy? It stands to reason that in
emerging European societies, how and why financial credits and debt are managed could highlight
different structures of political control. If, as noted by Rutland (2010), urban development involves
the interests of many actors, then the kind of urban financialization that takes place in small,
capital-poor societies dominated by oligarchies should be different from that of Chicago or New
York.
One of the main points of difference could be in the relation between financialization,
political power, and forms of popular financing, such as mortgages. In fact, while in countries like
Spain, Greece, the US, Ireland, and Hungary, mortgages proliferated before the crisis, that has not
been the case in authoritarian countries such as Russia or Macedonia. Consumer mortgages for
home ownerships in Macedonia have started to become more available, and between 2013 and
2014, I was able to see a significant reduction of interest rates, which declined from eight percent
to six percent for most banks. Nonetheless, that banks were reluctant to give mortgages confirms
that home ownership is located somewhat in between "anchoring wealth in place via property …
[and] facilitating global investment and the extraction of value" (Fields 2014: 148, Aalbers 2008).
Does that suggest an unwillingness from (mostly foreign-owned) banks to risk capital in
the periphery of Europe? Or, conversely, does it suggest that authoritarian governments utilize
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different means of wealth redistribution and credit—in other words, that urban financialization in
authoritarian regimes works differently? We know that flows of money fueled urban investment
in cities like Barcelona (Charnock, Purcell, and Ribera-Fumaz 2014). Why did they not invest so
much in Macedonia? Did it have something to do with the VMRO authoritarian regime? In the
following chapters, I will explain the specificity of urban financialization in Macedonia by
describing its geopolitical relations, internal and non-financial mechanisms of redistribution. But
I will also describe the specific forms in which urban financialization has altered individual
subjectivities and generated a fertile ground for the VMRO regime.
In the Macedonian case, it is not financial institutions or banks that benefits the most from
monetary rents. It is the state that regulates how, and to what extent, private and international
investors can convert their capital into urban development and profit. The lack of extensive
financial capital and the strong presence of the government produce subjection through illiquidity;
that is, by selectively preventing the circulation of money. This is the opposite of what has been
observed in most of the anthropological studies of financialization, in which the ease of borrowing
and circulating money created by predatory lending induces wide sectors of the population into
the debt trap (Williams 2005, Palomera 2014). In fact, as I will show in Chapter 2, Macedonia's
state-driven illiquidity shows the dangers not of debt, but of credit.

0.4 Illiquidity, Personhood, and Political Economy
Illiquidity is often taken as a mere fact that derives from the volatility of financial markets. In this
dissertation, I analyze Macedonia's illiquidity as a result of a system of forced credit, whereby
financialization translates into authoritarian subjection. In fact, my study suggests that there are
radically different kinds of illiquidity, which stem from opposite political and economic factors.
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For instance, chaos and political fragmentation framed illiquidity in Russia in 1998. In 2007-8,
worldwide illiquidity was generated by the fear that a domino effect would lead major global banks
to bankruptcy. This is not the situation in contemporary Macedonia. Instead, illiquidity shadows
centralized political structures that allow the VMRO elites to capture the market and to influence
how people think about themselves. While this dissertation mostly focuses on the mechanisms of
forced credit that cause the transfer of wealth and value from the wider society to the VMRO elites,
illiquidity figures as a relevant existential and economic social fact at the core of authoritarian
financialization. Given the small size of the Macedonian market compared to that of other
predatory regimes such as Turkey or even Bulgaria, the transfer of wealth is dramatic and the
control of the state extensive. Such control rarely takes explicitly violent forms, but those outside
of the machine are left with fewer options to survive. By describing what generates illiquidity and
how people react to the slow pace of monetary payments, then, I capture the weight of the
authoritarian financialization on individuals. Illiquidity is a protracted condition rather than an
event, and it induces subjects to shift their behaviors and values to accommodate opportunistic
behaviors or political control. In the theoretical architecture of this dissertation, illiquidity
constitutes the social context whereby economic and political processes translate into feelings and
personhood.
Despite being mentioned in nearly every analysis concerned with the 2007-8 world
financial crisis, few authors have actually proposed a theoretical take on illiquidity. In Wall Street
jargon, illiquidity generally stands for a lack of cash, or an inability to transform one's capital into
cash. Because in a financialized world most transactions do not use actual money but are based
upon short term credit, illiquidity can also mean the inability to obtain credit. This common-sense
definition is, however, inadequate. Experience shows that even in the direst of crises, it is generally
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possible to sell one's capital, or at worst, to give it away. The mere possibility of exchangeability
is almost never in question. The problem is, of course, that anyone selling during a crisis would
not receive the expected value of the property, let alone realize a profit. Keynes (1936) had this
idea in mind when he suggested that liquidity was maintained by the ability to anticipate the
market, catching the right time to sell and enhancing the value of one's capital. In his definition, it
was the "velocity of exchange" that defined liquidity as a capacity to transform capital maintaining
or augmenting its value. Conversely, it can be deduced that Keynes considered illiquidity the
opposite phenomenon: not the permanence of value through exchange, but its evanescence.
While in some kinds of transactions value might be equally shared between exchange
partners, in a capitalist market, value is typically contentious. In financial transactions, the control
of a company or the ownership of debt is transferred from one shareholder to another, which
engages in such a transaction to multiply the value invested and therefore its power. But what
happens during illiquidity, when such transactions and payments are hard or impossible to make?
Who benefits from illiquidity? Who is able to realize the value of one's labor, when a bubble bursts,
the market crashes, or there is not enough money to pay? In this dissertation, I take a hint from
Donald Trump, who, in 2006, famously declared that if there was a crash in the real estate market,
"People like me would go in and buy like crazy" (quoted in Meckler 2016). Even the most dreadful
of crises does not prevent transfer of values—instead, market crashes become prime opportunities
whereby political elites accumulate incredible shares of wealth. I suggest that by simply invoking
illiquidity, classical economic accounts prevent a full analysis of the predatory mechanisms that
shape finance and make illegible the political structures that frame the market.
In early anthropological work, the issue of value emerged within studies of exchange
practices and networks. Seminal figures in the discipline, including Malinowski (1978), Firth
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(1959), Mauss (2007), and Ortiz (1995), were interested in understanding the social structures and
mechanisms that regulated the exchange of goods, status, and money. In their work, however, the
power dynamics that were engendered by value transfer were left in the background. Early debates
that focused on the rationality of exchange tended to highlight the tension between cultural and
economic values, generally arguing that primitive tribes inclined towards one or the other. Political
hierarchies were often mentioned but rarely considered as a factor that shaped the very architecture
of value transfer, systematically advantaging one group over another.
Jane Guyer (2003) has been particularly important in shifting the debate about value,
exchange, and politics. Re-evaluating Bohannon's classic work, Guyer realized that what were
described as discontinuous and autonomous spheres of exchange were in fact a series of
transactions that had come into being during colonial times. While at the core of the economic
system described by Bohannon, valuables such as brass rods or cloth were not exchanged for
everyday commodities, these exchanges happened at the geographical periphery of the system.
Adopting an historical and regional perspective, Guyer showed that even in strongly organized
cultural systems, value underwent considerable transformation through exchange. The question
thus becomes what kinds of values are convertible, and how are they made equivalent by specific
economic and political configurations, and who benefits from it. In this dissertation, I utilize such
a perspective in describing how financialization generates an economic condition of illiquidity
whereby economic and social values become uncertain. The authoritarian regime becomes a way
to secure one's economic as well as social existence. Seen in this way, authoritarian financialization
is a process of value transformation, whereby economic illiquidity allows for the transformation
of social values such as forms of patriarchal solidarity into individualized fragmentation that favor
the consolidation of the VMRO.
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My study of authoritarian financialization expands on the work of scholars who studied the
emergence of new political configurations through value circulation. Coming from different
theoretical paradigms, authors such as Pedersen (2012), Graeber (2001), Maurer (2012), Ferry
(2005), Rogers (2005) and Strathern (1988) have proposed thinking about the circulation of values
by analyzing how moral and economic values enmesh one another within existing political
structures. While still very much concerned with the cultural logics of value generation and
transfer, these authors have progressively devoted larger analytical spaces to the political aspects
of infrastructures of payments and reflected more intensely upon the consolidation of power that
follows the expansion of financialization. Maurer, for instance, devoted his early work to the study
of practical reasoning embedded in Islamic banking (Maurer 2005), while his most recent writing
focuses on the rent extracted through the privatization of payment networks by credit card
companies (Maurer 2015). Similarly, Graeber (2001) started off with a notion of value as cultural
desire, and more recently developed theories of financial debt centered around domination and
bureaucracies (Graeber 2011).
In this copious body of literature, there is a growing tendency to include, together with
processes of value creation, other mechanisms whereby value is lost, dissipated, or dispossessed.
Ferry (2005), for instance, demonstrated how the circulation of minerals in Mexico and the US
prompted different processes of value creation. In Mexico, the extraction and exchange of nonprecious minerals in silver mines are embedded in a network of social relations. Minerals are at
the center of negotiations between workers, the mine's management, and mutual obligation. Yet,
once exported from Mexico to the US, the minerals lose their social value and acquire a status of
pristine, natural beauty.
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Rogers (2005) is even more explicit, analyzing the social context that produced liquidity
in Russia in the late 1990s. Comparing payments made in moonshine, rubles and reciprocal labor,
Rogers shows the different social values associated with differing means of payment. In the
postsocialist context of social fragmentation and monetary instability, moonshine is cheaper and
more readily available than rubles because it can be produced locally. However, payments received
in the form of moonshine are embedded within the values of male sociality and can be manipulated
by both workers and employers to increase or decrease the labor thus exchanged. In the context of
a postsocialist state, where previously stable socialist and collective values are collapsing,
moonshine appears as the one circulating value that ensures rural Russia's collective survival.
Despite their overall focus on the social production of value, both Ferry and Rogers show
the centrality of loss, risk, and uncertainty in the processes of conversion. In Russia and Eastern
Europe more broadly, the transition from socialism disrupted the value system supported by the
socialist state (Verdery 2003), while in Mexico it is the physical movement of objects that strips
them of their social meanings. However, both accounts focus mostly on the new sets of values that
become associated with the objects that circulate, rather than the process of losing value itself. The
value of the object circulating is, in both accounts, an analytical abstraction resulting from the sum
of the qualitatively different meanings associated with moonshine or minerals by different people.
Because the object's circulation is a narrative device to discuss social positioning, what they
describe as loss is mostly a change in the narrative perspective.
But what happens when people experience intimate kinds of losses, such as the loss of one's
salary, one's respect as worker, or one's possibility to fulfill the gender roles considered ideal? Who
capitalizes upon such unrealized value? In my ethnographic accounts, I show that illiquidity does
not simply mean a dissipation of value, magically lost. Rather, illiquidity testifies to a rapacious
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political economy whereby Macedonia's construction sector is monopolized by the country's elites.
While oligarchs close to the VMRO party accrue their economic value, the rest of the sector
experiences increased uncertainty and risk associated with loss of economic value. Faced with an
increasing amount of financial pressure over time, which they describe as illiquidity, workers and
managers found a space of economic and existential protection in the VMRO. Protected by the
party, they could fend off the increasing competition they faced as a consequence of illiquidity.
As both an economic consequence of financialization and a political process that expands
subjection to the VMRO authoritarian regimes, the illiquidity I observed in Macedonia goes
against a substantive strain of literature that, in the social sciences, has depicted modernity and
finance as a process of continuous acceleration or abstraction. Non-Places (Auge 1992), Timespace compression (Harvey 1989b), or even the opposition between human and debt economies
presented by Graeber have been conceptual tools that associated advanced capitalist exploitation
with impersonal and faster rhythms of value exchange and production. Yet, in this dissertation I
show that financial debt and personal patronage combine in extremely complex ways to generate
different forms of violent oppression and inequality. I show that the "presence of men with
weapons" and the "means to specify numerically how much a debtor owes" discussed by Graeber
(2012: 75) can act together to produce a financial landscape whereby the velocity of value
exchange decreases. In Macedonia, it is precisely such a low intensity of transactions, or illiquidity,
that generates dispossession and domination.
To capture what it means to live and navigate through illiquidity in Macedonia, the
dissertation has to strike a difficult conceptual balance between providing a quantitative
description of economic mechanisms and an empathetic presentation of their subjective and
sometimes contingent lived aspects. The analysis of both the subjective and the material level is,
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for me, the essence of critical political economy. I am aware that subjection is not widely
associated with the tradition of critical analysis of the political economy that started with Marx.
Yet every time I read the most functionalist work inspired by critical political economic thinking,
I am carried back to my grandfather's stories of theft, where he and his brothers climbed trees,
crawled into tunnels, and ran through woods to gather some fruit to eat. I cannot stop feeling their
anger, as they remembered how their landlord preferred to feed his crops, the produce they
cultivated with their labor, to pigs, rather than let them eat. But mostly I remember his hands,
calloused and thin, worn by years of hard work, and yet stronger than mine. Those hands are for
me an intimate argument about the political nature of economical processes and their capacity to
shape humans to the furthest depths of their being.

0.5 Beyond Postsocialism?
Anthropological studies that detail the political, social and economic conditions of Eastern
European countries argue that chaos, fragmentation, and uncertainty constitute the everyday traits
of postsocialism (Shevchenko 2008, Buyandelgeriyn 2012, Burawoy and Verdery 1999). A few
anthropologists have since discussed the centralization and production of power in security states,
but their chronological reach has rarely expanded beyond late socialism (Verdery 2014, Gokariksel
2015). The centralization of power has, however, not gone completely unnoticed: political
scientists have spent rivers of ink analyzing emerging neopatrimonialism (Szelenyi and Csillag
2015), kleptocracies (Dawisha 2014), rentier states (Franke, Gawrich, and Alakbarov 2009) and
authoritarianism in the region.
Political scientists generally describe contemporary Eastern European states such as
Hungary, Russia, Ukraine, Macedonia, Belarus, and Moldova, as "hybrid regimes." This
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conceptualization stresses how states deviate from their expected path to democracy, presenting
authoritarian drives and a weak civil society. Second, hybrid societies are generally seen as
examples of variously embedded economies, whereby neoliberal markets have been captured by
political elites. In this sense, hybrid regimes use state power to direct and distort the market. From
a critical anthropological perspective, this description is laden with normative judgments that
demonstrate the ideological expectation and approaches of Western political scientists and policy
makers rather than the actual facts on the ground. Very early on into the transition, anthropologists
documented that democracy, free market, and other such ideological claims were not the actual
results of the transition, and possibly not even its real goal.
Their prescriptive assumptions notwithstanding, these terms embrace a very restricted
circle of actors, usually located at the top of the power hierarchies. Thus, "kleptocracy" describes
the elites' predatory behavior, whereby state resources are funneled towards private bank accounts.
But what is the rest of the population doing while predatory politicians feast on the few resources
left from the transition? Do they take part in kleptocratic endeavors, or do they simply suffer from
them? This absence in the literature is one of the reasons why I consider my research with workers
in the construction industry a relevant intervention. Showing the tense relations between workers
and elites at the core of Macedonia's political economy, I try to provide a different perspective on
the workings of power within autocratic systems in Eastern Europe.
Macedonia constitutes an interesting case in this respect. The country has had a relatively
uneventful early phase of transition, without major political or humanitarian crises. Macedonians
voted for their independence from socialist Yugoslavia by referendum and negotiated a deal for
the exit of the Yugoslav troops without fighting. Blessed with fertile land and substantial
agricultural production, Macedonians' survival was not completely jeopardized by the collapse of
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the socialist state or its industrial production. Unlike some parts of Russia, which were left literally
without food, Macedonians remember only a handful of days of rationing in the cities and none in
most of the villages. Because the country's population had moved to cities only in the second half
of the 20th century, Macedonian citizens had access to land and agriculture. Macedonians, and the
urban population in particular, benefited during the late socialist years from cheap credit for
purchasing houses, land, and other consumption goods. As the crisis was prolonged and temporary
unemployment became structural, citizens started selling their properties. They survived somewhat
easily compared to other countries, but, left without capital, were unable to transition out of the
transitional survival economy.
If Macedonia's economic fragmentation and agricultural production mitigated the collapse
of socialism, it also burdened the country in the following years. Towards the turn of the twentieth
century, most of the East European countries experienced some form of growth fueled either by
their natural resources (Russia, Central Asia) or their proximity to the EU (Hungary, Poland, Czech
Republic, Romania). Socially far from the EU and with obsolete infrastructures, Macedonia was
largely excluded from these flows of investments. Compared to Macedonia, countries like
Romania and Bulgaria that used to be considerably poorer under socialism looked like advanced
countries in the early 2000s.
This slowing down of economic activity can explain the relative absence of oligarchs in
Macedonia, as economic stagnation reduced the opportunity for private accumulation. Limited by
the size of the country, its closed market, and the substantially declining purchasing power of the
population, few managers were able to become very rich in Macedonia compared to Russia,
Ukraine, or even Turkey after the military dictatorships. While the SDSM government did favor
some urban entrepreneurs and oligarchs, in 2006, the VMRO found it easier to negotiate with
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consolidated economic and political empires, unlike what happened to Putin or Erdogan, who
fought the fierce opposition of the oligarchs during the early years of their mandates (Dawisha
2014).
While Gruevski aimed at centralizing power, the different class composition of
Macedonian society pushed him to utilize methods only partially similar to those utilized by other
emerging authoritarian leaders. Like Putin, Orban, or Erdogan, Gruevski extensively gagged the
media. Dissident businessmen who persisted in publishing and broadcasting critical news were
imprisoned and their television channels shut down. Journalists found their activity increasingly
confined. In one instance they were even beaten by the police while asking questions at a press
conference in the national assembly. The government's constant pressure resulted in what some
described to me in 2013 as self-censorship.
Like most of the other eastern European autocrats, Gruevski's power came to be based on
control over the judiciary, and the security forces. Thanks to the operations of Gruevski's cousin,
Sasho Mijalkov, the budget of the security forces within the Ministry of the Interior increased
nearly tenfold in the past ten years. Part of this budget was used to indiscriminately wiretap the
phones of Macedonia's citizens. Records released in the spring of 2015 show that over 20,000
people had their phones under surveillance in the country, including most foreign businessmen,
dignitaries, journalists, and members of the opposition (Ceka 2015).
While the building of the security apparatus did prompt many to fear expressing their
opinions and created a heavy climate of silence (as a high ranking member of the police confided
to me), political violence never became a civil war like the one organized by Erdogan against the
Kurdish population and their leftist supporters. Journalists and many interlocutors consider
Gruevski responsible for some political imprisonments, various hate-driven beatings of gays and
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other minorities, and possibly the homicide of a journalist. Though police violence seemed mild
compared to what was observed in Turkey or Russia, during the tense protests of May 2015, when
over 50,000 people filled the streets of Skopje for weeks, Gruevski's regime utilized anti-riot
special police forces to disperse the gatherings and beat or arrest at least 30 citizens (Jordanovska
2015). Police officers went so far as to hunt down fleeing crowds in one of the public university
libraries, where they beat and injured many students who were studying and had not participated
in the gatherings (Human Right Watch 2015).
On May 9th, 2015, newspapers across the globe showed the guerrilla-like images of
Kumanovo, a town in northern Macedonia, where the special forces of the Macedonain police and
army had fought a very violent battle against unidentified paramilitary and terrorist Albanian cells.
Most of the commentators saw in these actions an attempt from the Gruevski government to
revamp conflicts between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians—a desperate move to shut
down protests and justify the VMRO regime. Gruevski's use of terror tactics justifies his inclusion
amongst the other autocrats of the region, such as Erdogan or Yanukovych, who also utilized
various degrees of state-sponsored terror. While in 2015, Erdogan banked upon the fear generated
by the Ankara bombing to escalate military actions against the PKK, and Yanukovych backed
orders to shoot protesters during Euromaidan (Channell-Justice, personal communication),
Gruevski did not immediately target his own citizens. Instead, he encouraged fears about extremist
groups coming from Kosovo or other (possibly Muslim) countries.
Gruevski did not cultivate his own personality cult , but preferred to act in informal,
personal ways. Rather than going Putin-style, playing in an All-Star hockey game, fishing with
bare torso, or piloting a submarine (Walker 2015), Gruevski popularized his image as a
hardworking government official, competent, and reachable by the citizens. In order to expand his
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grip on the territory, he relied less on personal charisma and more on the building of his party. The
VMRO became an important reality for the everyday life of Macedonians, de facto mediating jobs,
taxes, and other difficult issues on behalf of its members. Yet while building the party, Gruevski
also made sure that nobody could reach a threatening level of power or popularity, frequently
changing ministers through early elections.
In sum, while the power of Putin, Erdogan, or Orban seems to be based upon explicit and
direct acts of domination, Gruevski's style of government and control is oriented towards
maintaining pervasive authoritarian subjection. This means that subjection is micromanaged,
developed through informal rumors and delays and through uncertain and nebulous issues that sap
one's moral and economic value, rather than directly forcing one to action. Financialization is
central to Gruevski's political economy of subjection. Centralizing resources, and especially
money, and spreading illiquidity in the rest of the economy pushes people to the fringe of the
system, competing among themselves for access to resources and fighting for entry into patronage
relations within the VMRO. Such a system of political control happens through informal channels,
obvious to every party involved but never plainly admitted; thus, bureaucratic sources of power
like laws or urban plans do not constitute real sources of power and authority, but only proxies for
the VMRO political cronies.
In Hungary, or even Turkey, laws had to be changed, or urban plans could be impugned by
citizens' movements (Parmaksizoglou, personal communication). In Macedonia, laws and citizens'
attempt to enforce them did not matter as much. What is a law, or a plan, if there is no political
will to enforce it? In the absence of an independent executive administration to persecute
government abuse, citizens were left alone to deal with the VMRO oppression. Faced with the
explicit and yet informal threat of economic loss and political insignificance, most of my
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interlocutors did not see a tool for emancipation in laws, institutions, or even in collective politics;
their way out of illiquidity was by becoming clients of the VMRO, a party where those ambitious
or desperate enough can thrive. But climbing the illiquidity ladder has the explicit price of living
in fear both of one's superiors and of one's peers. Rent-seeking behaviors allow citizens to recover
some of the economic and social value stolen from them through illiquidity, but it costs them much
of what they value for themselves.

0.6 Notes on Methodology
This dissertation is the product of twelve months of participant observation, which I conducted
between August 2013 and August 2014. It also draws from some twelve additional months of
research I conducted since 2008 in Macedonia. Most of my research is based in Skopje, but it has
important implications for the wider country, considering the fact that the capital has some 800,000
inhabitants, or two fifths of the entire population of the country.
Some anthropologists feel empowered by fieldwork, even in challenging situations. I did
not. Quite frankly, I felt out of place and rather a nuisance most of the time, even when I wasn't.
Most of my participant observation and time was spent in the company of construction workers,
who were not being paid for a long time. They were nervous, preoccupied about their future, but
also stuck in the workplace. This, together with the turnover of people on construction sites, made
my presence not so difficult to accept. While we came to enjoy each other's company and share
intimate moments, I felt generally useless throughout my study. Was my study going to help them?
I wanted workers to discuss details about their household financial conditions and debts with me.
Was it right to find ways around workers' reticence to fulfill my research goals?
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I could not find many justifications for forcing my way into the workers' private sphere.
Yes, following workers at home after shifts in the workplace lasting ten or more hours would have
made for a more complex picture of their lives, an aspect that would have greatly nuanced my
account of gender (Chapter 4). I did not feel that was a decision respectful of workers' wishes,
especially given the actual purpose of this study. This dissertation might be helpful to a community
of scholars who think about power, crisis, and labor. Yet it does not provide any benefit to people
who participated in my study, besides an abstract analysis of the workings of power that is unlikely
to filter through policy circles and impact my interlocutors' lives.
I generally spent a minimum of four and a maximum of ten hours a day on construction
sites and in administrative offices of various companies. I had originally planned to divide my time
between a large, a small, and a medium-sized company. The large construction companies I
contacted, however, decided that my questions were too politically compromising and withdrew
their permission to conduct research. I ultimately decided to spend most of my time at Construx,
where I was able to access not only the company's fifty employees but also its network of
subcontractors (which was constituted at any given time by at least fifty more employees).
Construx had been growing steadily until the spring of 2013, a few months before my arrival. In
the last part of my research, I devoted more time to two additional companies, Ideale, a very
successful company specializing in real estate with over 250 employees, and Planek, the subsidiary
of another construction company specializing in planning. There I mostly focused on
administrative activities, planning, and management techniques—materials that generally inform
my understanding of political relations and that I briefly present in Chapter 5 but do not extensively
discuss here.
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The VMRO party was already in power when I first arrived in Macedonia, and over the
years I have personally experienced the consolidation of social and political control and the
tightening of spaces for dissent. That directly affected me, as I witnessed visa and residence
regulations harden and become the object of increasing police scrutiny. I came to the realization
that political subjection would become a central part of my dissertation rather late in my research.
None of the data collected in the previous years refer explicitly to this process, documenting
instead the transformations of urban space. Until 2013, I did not collect systematic data on political
subjectivities and their connection to the economic situation. It was my interlocutors' fear of talking
to me about financial flows, and especially the root causes of their own illiquidity, that made me
realize the importance of the VMRO in managing networks of political oppression.
Clearly, this lack of comparative historical data poses some challenges to my argument,
according to which the VMRO politics of illiquidity has permeated people's personhood and
embedded it within networks of rent. I am aware of the fact that the VMRO did not build its
political power out of thin air but expanded upon informal reciprocities that accompanied the
economic vagaries of the transition (Berdahl 2010, Verdery 2003, Humphrey 2002). However,
three major indicators suggest to me that the VMRO has had a profound influence on the country's
social life. First, people in Skopje tend to complain that today "there are no people anymore" (nema
covek). This expression suggests that there has been a shift in people's relations to each other, today
described as increasingly exploitative, self-serving, and egoistic. While these kinds of complaints
can be found in different societies, they accurately describe the behavior of public officials I
witnessed. Needless to say, such rent-seeking individuals have been put in their administrative
position thanks to connections with the VMRO leadership.
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Second, the government has promoted discriminatory ideas on topics such as gender,
ethnicity, and religion—ideas that reinforce ethnomasculine hierarchies. I observed and
documented working class men struggling with these ideas, sometimes negotiating them, but most
often reproducing them in their own subjectivity and behaviors. Finally, urban space and
temporality have been materially impacted by the VMRO brand of authoritarian financialization.
The VMRO has literally remade Skopje, both physically and virtually, as I explain in Chapter 5,
and has created havoc in people's working lives, forcing companies without political connections
into endless waits for credit, money, and materials. There, too, I observed social and emotional
reactions that closely followed these material changes.
Although the VMRO inscribes its political domination within a larger history of decline
and economic stagnation, this dissertation avoids a fatalistic vision of Macedonian history. At the
time of writing, it is commonplace in Skopje to complain about the current situation; but at the
moment of singling out its dramatic specificity, and especially of attributing or taking
responsibility, my interlocutors tended to back down, claiming that "it is the same everywhere." I
see this very tendency to relativize as an alarming proof of people's conflicted implications within
the VMRO system of power. It is a tool for emptying everyday relations of their critical charge,
and keeping the status quo, utilized both by common citizens and the VMRO alike. As my
connection to Macedonian society deepens thanks to my new family (my wife is Macedonian), I
find it all the more urgent to single out the specificity of the VMRO political system, rather than
brush it away in a sweeping gesture of relativism; it is my personal and intellectual way of
highlighting the current climate of fear, resignation, and complicity that rules Macedonia's public
life.
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0.7 The Layout of the Dissertation
The dissertation discusses two interlocking phenomena. First, I examine the international and
domestic dynamics of financialization for the case of Macedonia. This includes international flows
of money and domestic hierarchies of monetary redistribution. Second, I detail the extent to which
the primary consequence of financialization in Macedonia, that is, illiquidity, impacts the lives of
people in the construction sector. There, I describe the struggles, dilemmas, and strategies faced
and deployed by individuals, and I stress what that meant for the way they understood their identity
and their relations to others. Specifically, I focus on three pillars of my interlocutors' being, which
other studies have shown to be crucially impacted by financialization: time, identity, and space.
Because I began this research trying to explain how the built environment was produced in Skopje
despite the lack of money, I built this dissertation to explain how financialization produces
authoritarian subjection through illiquidity at the various stages of the building cycle. The layout
specifically shows how illiquidity is produced through international relations, distributed
domestically, negotiated and reproduced by workers, and finally results in new spatial structures.
The dissertation starts with the flows of money that finance the VMRO government and its
illiquidity. Chapter 1 discusses Macedonia's relation with the EU as a form of colonialism that I
name "Neucolonialism." I explore Neucolonialism in practice from the vantage points of Italian
investors in Macedonia, discussing how desperate managers of small firms, well-connected
directors of medium-sized companies, and institutional project leaders face European and local
rent structures. Here, I argue that Neucolonialism fosters rent capturing within the EU, which fuels
but also conflicts with rent-seeking behaviors within Macedonia. I conclude by suggesting some
reasons why the EU might have been complicit in supporting the VMRO regime and why
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Gruevski's authoritarian way of managing financialization has helped shield the country from the
2007-2012 financial crisis.
Chapter 2 discusses how financialization reorganizes payments in Macedonia. I focus on a
class of in-kind exchanges called kompenzacija in order to stress the hierarchies of conversion and
redistribution that are promoted domestically by illiquidity. Here, I show how companies that are
politically distant from the VMRO government are progressively forced to accept goods that they
do not want as payment. These objects, such as apartments or broken eggs, lose value, thus
obligating a chain of companies not connected to the government to lose money. I conclude by
suggesting that kompenzacija constitutes a form of domestic credit that has supplemented external
debt in fueling authoritarianism. Financialization in authoritarian Macedonia has to be understood
as a sequence of formal and informal, monetary and in-kind, international and national credit.
Chapter 3 focuses on the workplace, discussing the impact of illiquidity on temporal
relations. Temporality has long been identified as a prime focus where political and economic
forces impact people's lives. Here, I discuss how illiquidity produced by authoritarian
financialization disrupts rhythms of work sites. The lack of money forces workers to adopt
alternative working strategies, such as contracting additional jobs in their free time. The chapter
describes not only the existential burden of finance-driven uncertainty as workers and companies
spiral into debt, but it also shows the potential created by uncertainty as a space of action, whereby
individuals try to negotiate acceptable compromises.
Gender and ethnicity are the focus of Chapter 4, where I show how VMRO illiquidity
shapes working men's identities. The chapter first shows how contemporary illiquidity renders
heteronormative and patriarchal masculinity impossible, despite the VMRO's insistence on
aggressive masculinity as a fundamental component of Macedonian identity. Faced with
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economically ascendant ethnic Albanians, Macedonian men express their troubled masculinity by
challenging and dominating each other. The chapter shows the dilemmas that workers face and
their struggle to find models of identification that constitute viable political solutions to the
economic challenges brought about by the illiquidity created by authoritarian financialization.
The fifth and final chapter explores the subject position of Skopje's middle class in relation
to space. In this section, I focus on the various spatial transformations that altered the city in recent
years, discussing urban transformations in Skopje's center and peripheral neighborhoods. I discuss
the contemporary debates around aesthetics, focusing on the value of kitsch facades for the
imaginaries of middle-class professionals in the field of construction. Zooming in on practices of
planning, I show how the VMRO utilized urban politics to propagate an illusion of invulnerability
and control. I also discuss the despair of individuals who have to face planning bureaucracies on
their own, and how they try to reach out to the VMRO for support. I conclude the chapter by
showing how, in a climate of increasing fear and control, space itself came to be understood as a
political actor—one that allowed individuals enough stability and protection from the VMRO's
encompassing power to gather collective support.
The conclusion engages with theories of financialization, showing how the Macedonian
case helps a comparative understanding of the political implications of finance in other countries
in the region. I suggest that it was not only Macedonia's relative scarcity of financial capital that
allowed it to navigate the world financial crisis. The VMRO regime, in fact, has been effective in
both attracting as well as taming financial investments and translating them into wealth in people.
But why did the VMRO want people? In the final sections, I analyze some of the implications of
"having" people in Macedonia, providing insights into the oppressive political potential of
financialization. I conclude by stressing that, in Macedonia, accumulating people was one of the
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ways in which the VMRO regime tried to "make something out of nothing"; that is, generating
wealth through rent. While its successes were mixed and mostly favored powerful oligarchs, the
trajectory of the VMRO shows the limited options available to peripheral countries such as
Macedonia, deprived of natural resources and ravaged by large-scale processes of
deindustrialization. Compared to the US and other European societies, where democracy is
questioned by moments of collective effervescence, symbolized in Trump's throwaway
xenophobic lines, authoritarianism in Macedonia seems utterly dull, almost sensible—as long as
one doesn't have to carry its financial and existential burden. For such countries, accumulating
people rather than financial capital becomes an attractive method for survival in an increasingly
financialized global economy.
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1. Neucolonialism Italian Style
Towards the end of our conversation, Sandro grew excited. "Did I tell you that I was about to start
a deal with Italian investors? What was this guy's name…he was from Napoli…let me show you,
you see this? [opening a folder and showing me some pictures] It is a site for shredding and
incinerating trash. He wanted to build a new system, you know, a very innovative one." Sandro
paused for a long second, waiting for my question. "So what happened to that? Well, the minister,
you know, an Albanian guy who I know personally, did not approve it. He was going to, but then
he asked for a commission, you know. Money. A lot of money. And so the Italians decided to let
it go."
It was not the first time I encountered Italian investors in the construction sector. I had
originally thought it was some kind of joke, or an attempt to bond—showing me that people had
had experiences with Italians in the past. With time, I realized that there was a significant number
of Italian expatriates, investments, and projects in Macedonia. This chapter explores some of these
Italian connections in order to understand how the geopolitics of finance embedded in the
European integration process interact with the authoritarian regime in Macedonia. On paper, the
EU should promote democracy and freedom—both of the market and of its people. Yet in recent
years, a number of EU states have taken an authoritarian path, and the EU itself seems to take
popular sovereignty less into account. What is the value of the EU project today? What kind of
economic and social values does it harbor?
The case of Macedonia shows that European institutions and investors supported the
VMRO government's political economy structure until late 2014, not only because of their own
strategic interests. That is to say, while EU institutions and countries benefit directly from
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communitarian money invested in Macedonia, I argue here that EU elites were not concerned with
the development of authoritarian politics in Macedonia because they unfolded along cultural and
economic paradigms the EU had long embraced. In retracing the peripheralization of Eastern
Europe and Macedonia in parallel with that of Southern Europe and Italy, this chapter shows that
financialization and rent-seeking behaviors have become common among elites in both groups of
countries. This change of the EU project shows that monetary transfers, projects, and investments
from the EU to Macedonia are not used to transmit monetary value from the center to the periphery
and promote "democratic values" in exchange. Rather, EU investments are contributing to a
centralization of wealth in the hands of the few, which, in the case of Macedonia, allowed the
VMRO to build a distinctively oppressive authoritarian system.
In this chapter, I examine EU contributions to the VMRO authoritarian regime, mostly in
terms of financial programs. This includes direct loans and credit from international bodies, private
investments, international aid from EU pre-accession funds, and bilateral projects that provide
technical assistance. As a consequence of the 2007-2012 financial crisis, banks divested from what
they perceived of as risky sectors, such as the private construction business, and investment flowed
into what appeared to be a reformist government—the Macedonian regime. The same crisis also
incentivized private Western investors to look eastward as a way to escape mounting economic
stagnation within the EU external core. I present the case of some Italian entrepreneurs who
ventured into Macedonia as they fled the downturn of the Italian economy, and I describe their
frustrated hopes to conquer new markets. I then move to examine institutional flows of money that
took the form of grants and loans awarded from international organizations to the Macedonian
government. There too, I focus on Italian companies in construction trades who compete for
lucrative contracts funded through Macedonia's international development funds and loans.
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Finally, I look at EU institutional projects in order to understand not only monetary flows but also
their governance mechanisms and the political interests of the EU in Macedonia. Reflecting on the
process, I conclude that the EU integration process—a process that I call Neucolonialism—shapes
the political structure of both Italy and Macedonia, fostering rent-seeking behaviors in both
countries.

1.1 Neucolonialism and Parallel Peripheralization
While Macedonia attracts investments that are not coming from EU countries alone, the EU is
certainly Macedonia's most important political and economic interlocutor. In 2015, imports from
European countries (including non-EU Balkan countries, such as Serbia) constituted USD 5.08
billion out of USD 6.41 billion, while exports amounted to USD 3.85 billion of a total of USD
4.35 billion (Simoes and Hidalgo 2011). Before the 2007-2012 crisis, export was linked to a variety
of countries, including Greece and Italy, that suffered enormously from the recession. After the
crisis, Germany became the destination of the majority of Macedonia's exports, a factor that
highlights a significant change within the very structure of the EU core.
The integration of the Macedonian economy into the European market, the adoption of EU
administrative and legal techniques, and the partial reshaping of Macedonian political sovereignty
constitute what I call Neucolonialism. On a conceptual level, Neucolonialism acknowledges what,
in the aftermath of the Greek crisis, has been accepted as fact: the EU is a colonial formation
(Böröcz and Sarkar 2005, Dunn and Bobick 2014, Tlostadanova and Mignolo 2012). This seems
obvious, considering that the EU operates with an executive organ, the Commission, that is not
elected by the population it regulates; the current president of the EU Commission, Junker, was
the Prime Minister of Luxembourg who promoted the country's transformation into a tax haven,
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stripping other EU countries of their tax revenues. Additionally, the EU has been directly or
indirectly involved in the manipulation or disregard of the popular vote in a number of member
states. The most obvious is the case of the referendum on a proposed EU constitution, which failed
because of the majority of nays in France and Ireland but was still pushed through as a treaty. More
recently, the EU has disregarded the Greek people's vote, inflicting economic austerity on the
country and directly trying to influence the vote with public declarations of influential figures; in
Portugal, the current president did not charge the leftist majority in parliament with forming a
government for fear of repercussions from the EU.
While in current critical journalism, academia, and public discourse, the use of colonialism
or neocolonialism indicates a critical approach to European identities and hierarchies (Hansen
2002), these terms are often used without analytical scrutiny. How is EU colonialism linked to
other colonial or imperial formations? Is colonialism in the EU a consequence of its member states'
past, or is it due to its expansion to the East, as suggested by Böröcz (2001)? My choice of
qualifying colonialism with the German preposition "neu" instead of the more common "neo" is
an attempt to bring further clarity to the specificity of EU coloniality. If broken down further,
N/eu/colonialism suggests that within the EU, Germany holds the central political and economic
power, which negates (N) the supposedly horizontal structure of the union, recasting complex
colonial relations even within the EU core countries.
A wide array of scholars has stressed the permanence of imperial, neo-imperial, and
neocolonial structures of power in the world system. Hardt and Negri (2000), for instance, made
the argument that with the expansion of finance and technology, the global system has moved
towards a global, unified empire, regulated not by nation states but by powerful private interests.
Arrighi (2002) has partially corroborated this hypothesis, remarking that, while the expansion of
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finance has certainly unified transnational markets, significant inequalities between countries and
territories remain relevant to understanding geopolitical phenomena. The European Union is a
particularly interesting place to study new financialized core-periphery dynamics because it seems
to embody both a tendency to integrate different political economies while at the same time
increasing inequality.
At its outset, becoming a hegemonic project was not the EU's goal. Rather, the Schuman
Plan of 1950 imagined the European Union as a mechanism to avoid wars between European
countries by creating joint ownership over coal and steel production (Hitchcock 1997). The
creation of a joint market with the Rome Treaty was subsequently followed by a significant push
for greater political and social integration that eventually led to a flourishing of European
institutions, agencies, and treaties. In the wake of the 1991 collapse of the Berlin Wall, however,
the European Union came to be increasingly dominated by neoliberal policies (Van der Pijl,
Holman, Raviv 2011). Even scholars who describe the EU as a project aiming to reinforce their
power by reducing their competition (Agnew 2001, Delors 1991) note that such a project needed
to devote significant attention to the economic inequalities of its members. In 1992, the signing of
the Maastricht Treaty fixed the condition for a new, uniform economic policy throughout Europe,
dominated by deflationary mechanisms that were supposed to generate economic stability and
allow for the creation of a unique currency (Gambarotto and Solari 2015). This choice was also
followed by more or less dramatic waves of privatization, deregulation of labor markets, and cuts
to public spending.
According to scholars of EU integration, this was a crucial point in reorienting the EU from
a redistributive to a neoliberal economic project (Agnew 2011). Countries like Italy, France, and
Germany had to endure significant neoliberal and austerity reforms that provoked "economic harm
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to every country" (Connolly 1995:378), causing a rise in unemployment and accelerating the crisis
of tax-sustained welfare states. The PIIGS, that is Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain, saw
their productive tissue significantly weakened by this transition. Their economic growth had been
mostly fueled by Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), which had low technological value and
profit but benefited from a growing domestic market and various forms of public investments
(Gambarotto Solari 2015). As highlighted below, SMEs in PIIGS countries are about 20% more
than in Germany and 13% more than the EU27 average. With the reduction of state spending, the
introduction of deflationary measures, and the intensification of global competition, such
enterprises became less and less viable or able to export.

Table 1: Relevance of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in selected European economies.

Source: Eurostat, computed by Gambarotto, Francesca, and Stefano Solari. 2015. "The Peripheralization
of Southern European Capitalism within the European Monetary Union."

Other measures included sweeping privatization of formerly state-owned enterprises,
increasing the flexibility of the labor market, and a continuous reduction of welfare spending
(Tridico 2013). Just as in Eastern Europe, new and former private investors have not matched
previous public investments; benefiting from their newly created private monopolies, they have
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generally preferred to cash in on or redirect their investment into the financial sector, or into some
of the same Swiss or offshore accounts that also received money from Eastern European oligarchs
(Borioni 2012). As a result, productive capital has tended to leave PIIGS countries, which have
been left with a weak body of often technologically retrograde SMEs and a dominance of
speculative capital, especially in the construction sector (Gambarotto Solari 2015).
Germany, considered the "sick man of Europe" until the end of the 1990s, embarked on a
growing upward trajectory. Thanks to its lesser reliance on SMEs, sweeping deregulation of its
labor market, and a significant investment by capital owners in technology investment sectors such
as automobiles and chemicals, Germany emerged as a top exporter in the EU. Stalling wages in
relation to labor productivity, German brands eclipsed EU competitors, and German capital gained
prominence in EU economic policies (Van der Pijl, Holman, and Raviv 2011). Maybe more
importantly, by investing in high-priced goods with expanding markets such as new technologies,
Germany has been able to accumulate massive capital that then fueled its banks' financial
investments in the rest of Europe (Storm and Naastepad 2015).

Table 2: Labour productivity and wage increase in selected European economies.

Source: OECD data, computed by Gambarotto, Francesca, and Stefano Solari. 2015. "The
Peripheralization of Southern European Capitalism within the European Monetary Union."
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These transformations of the EU economy have followed what Stockhammer (2011) has
described as a finance-led accumulation regime. Solari and Marangoni (2012) claim that the rise
in debt levels between 2000 and 2007 signals an institutional adaptation of the overall economic
structure of the EU to the interests of institutional investors. While financialization has embraced
the whole of the EU, its impacts have been unequal. Orsi and Solari (2010) claim that finance has
driven growth in northern countries, while it has substantially impaired PIIGS economies by
redirecting credit from production to consumption. In turn, this has generated building bubbles
that have had devastating financial effects after the beginning of the crisis (Palomera 2014),
doubling the financial burden and risks carried by households rather than institutional actors. The
chart below shows how Italy, Spain, Greece, and Portugal have seen an explosion of private debt,
which in some cases has almost doubled, while in Germany it has declined.

Table 3: Stock of household and government debt, selected European and Eastern European countries.

Source: OECD, BiS, Macedonian National Bank. Data expressed in percentage of GDP.

In many policy and EU circles, the 2007-2012 crisis has been blamed on excessive public
spending. In the event of the 2015 general election, for instance, the incumbent British Prime
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Minister David Cameron effectively based his re-election on promising to tame government
deficits (Skidelsky 2014). Similarly, Wolfgang Schaubel, the powerful German minister of
finance, has extensively criticized the Greek government by claiming that it had brought the
disaster upon itself by lacking fiscal discipline. Similarly, public finances have been at the center
of intense political battles between the governments of countries and EU officials. In 2011, Italian
premier Silvio Berlusconi resigned just days after Greek Prime Minister Papandreou had done the
same. In the case of Italy, the resignation came after the spread between Italian bonds and German
bonds had soared enormously. Monti, a former EU commissary, professor of economics, and
advisor to Goldman Sachs, approved austerity measures praised by the Merkel government
(Donadio and Povoledo 2011). In 2015, Portugal's President Aníbal Cavaco Silva reappointed
former Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho to a second term, despite his having lost the
parliamentary elections. The president defended his actions in a public speech, where he publicly
claimed that "it is my duty to do everything I can to make sure that wrong signals aren't sent to
financial institutions, investors and markets, which would put into question the confidence and
credibility the country has been recovering with great effort." In the same speech, he characterized
the reversal of austerity measures advocated for by the left parties during the elections as antiEuropean (Kowsmann 2015).
Few, however, question to whom these countries are indebted (Bofiger 2015). Storm and
Naastepad (2015) show that EU "consensus economists" such as Sinn (2014) have been quick to
blame the EU banking crisis on fiscal profligacy, whereby wage growth has outpaced labor
productivity. As seen in the table above, this is a tautology and comes down to calling into question
the whole model of capitalism found in PIIGS. Operating from a macro-economic perspective,
Stockhammer (2011) shows that the deficit of the public or private sectors in countries like Spain
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or Greece is directly linked to the account surplus of Germany. Put differently, wage suppression
in Germany has generated a surplus of capital that have been invested by German banks in Greek
public debt and in Spanish private housing development. When the newly elected Greek prime
minister Tsipras tried to push for a political solution to its public debt, the EU circles opposed
potential debt forgiveness. After protracted negotiations, they forced Tsipras to accept a USD 93
billion bailout package with a new set of austerity measures that appeared to be more punitive that
the one originally offered (Arvith 2015).
Finance-led processes of peripheralization that originate within the EU not only create or
reinforce center/periphery relations in the union. Eastern Europe is being significantly affected by
them, in a process that many scholars have described as one of re-peripheralization. Agnew (2001)
shows that from very early on, Eastern European countries were ranked upon mental maps of
readiness to join the EU, mostly based upon their capacity to assimilate neoliberal market
mechanisms that included low public deficit and low inflation—that is, the same economic policies
that had initiated the process of economic decline in the PIIGS. Such Eastern European countries,
then, are conceived of as the places of production for companies that are headquartered in the EU
(Horvat and Stiks 2015, Ehrlich, Kiszan and Land 2012, Hardy, et al 1995, Croft, et al 1999). The
rise of power of German companies is evidently connected to their integration into lower-wage
areas of Poland where they have outsourced production (Marin 2006). This, in turn, has made
Eastern European countries dependent upon FDI, as local companies have been generally
outcompeted by EU partners (Vliegenhart 2010). As Böröcz (2014) shows, Eastern Europe has
also been plagued by a substantial emigration towards the EU, which has rendered these countries
dependent on remittances.
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Compared to other colonial processes, including the British system or the US post-World
War II system, the political economy of Neucolonialism seems to promote increasing
interconnection between colonized and colonizer. Economically, but also socially, as will be clear
below, newly peripheralized countries from southern Europe, such as Italy, have much in common
with Eastern European countries like Macedonia.

1.2 Hunting for Investments: VMRO Branding of Macedonia
Since 2006, when the VMRO and Prime Minister Gruevski took power, Macedonia has committed
a significant amount of resources to attracting foreign investors. They created a specific agency,
called Invest in Macedonia, dedicated to creating promotional material for foreign companies and
governments that wanted to relocate production. The company regularly bought airtime on major
international channels such as the BBC, put up billboards at international airports (including
Istanbul Ataturk), and shot and circulated dozens of videos showcasing the attractiveness of
Macedonia. Macedonia's qualities were portrayed mostly through three strategies. First, clips
directed by the world-acclaimed artist Milcho Manchevski branded Macedonia's history as a
continuum between the empire of Alexander the Great and Gruevski's Macedonia. Second, the
center of the capital, Skopje, was completely renovated. The Skopje 2014 plan covered older
socialist buildings with Neo-Baroque and neoclassical facades; a new set of governmental
buildings were constructed, together with two fake galleys, two new bridges over the river Vardar,
hundreds of new statues, a triumphal arc, a panoramic ferry wheel, and other copies of famous
European monuments. Redressing the aesthetics of the city constituted in part a classical attempt
to raise the city's land value as portrayed in rent-gap theory (Smith 1979), but it was also a way to
bring Skopje back onto the tourist and investment map of Europe.
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Aside from beautifying the city, the government subsidized various airline companies,
renovated the Skopje Alexander the Great airport, and promoted the city as a tourist destination.
Turkish Airlines and Wizzair low-cost flights now have daily connections to Istanbul, Paris, Milan,
Venice, and other European cities, and rumors suggest that soon, the European giant Ryanair might
choose Skopje as its Balkan hub. But, more importantly, the government marketed Macedonia as
a source of cheap and qualified labor. Invest in Macedonia insists on the country's high-quality
and inexpensive skilled workforce. A wide array of graphs and charts make clear that Macedonia's
labor is the cheapest and most educated in the region, ready to be exploited.
Attracting foreign direct investment was not left to branding alone: since 2010, "special
economic zones" (SEZ) have been built in the country, starting with one zone in the Skopje area
and spreading throughout the country. At the moment, four zones (two in Skopje, one in in Stip,
and one in Tetovo) are active out of the planned eleven. These areas were conceived for foreign
corporations as tax-free spaces to conduct business for export. Companies that decide to invest in
Macedonia's SEZs can take advantage of a ten-year tax break, discounts on utilities, up to 500,000
euro in incentives, and ready-to-use land with infrastructures. Additionally, companies pay no
customs duties. The government spent considerable time touring the globe in search of interested
investors, achieving only modest success attracting companies—although almost every day,
television channels boast news about deals with companies that will create thousands of new jobs.
Some of the international investors that relocated to Macedonia's SEZs are Johnson Controls,
producing car seat covers, the Belgian bus producer Van Hool, and the multinational chemical
firm Johnson Matthey, which produces emission control catalysts in Macedonia and has become
the most important exporter of goods from the country.
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Business analysts and international organizations hailed the beginning of Gruevski's tenure
as Prime Minister as a positive development. Under his leadership, the country significantly
reduced the bureaucratic steps that companies have to undertake to open a new business and
promoted a flat personal and corporate taxation level of 10%, making it into the top ten best
reformers, according to a 2010 report by the World Bank. Clearly, the world's financial and
economic community expected Gruevski to open up Macedonia's markets to foreign exploitation.
An expert on financial and monetary issues, Gruevski had worked for the World Bank and had
been the Minister of Finance for the only VMRO government during the 1990s, overseeing the
privatization and sale of major state assets to foreign investors. Macedonia's telecommunications
industry and their largest refinery, Okta, are some of the state assets that were transferred to foreign
investors under his leadership as Minister of Finance. After he came to power again in 2006,
Gruevski did not only liberate capital's access to Macedonia. According to widespread rumors, US
diplomatic cables published on Wikileaks show that Gruevski encouraged specific kinds of foreign
investments, principally those he could domesticate. This fact has been confirmed by various
interpreters I interviewed, who told me how VMRO officials were interested in directly managing
meetings with investors. The goal was, according to my interlocutors, to manipulate investors by
inviting them in, forcing them to hire local members of the party, and extracting bribes for the
VMRO officials. When my interlocutors refused to take part in this game, they were forced to
leave in the middle of the negotiations.
But what kind of capital was Gruevski going to use? In his seminal work on the emergence
of Venezuela as a petrostate, Fernando Coronil (1997) distinguished between societies based on
the commodification of labor and others that rely upon the commodification of nature. "In one
case, productive structures must be constantly transformed in order to increase productivity and
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profits; in the other, rents must be maximized and access to their distribution ensured by a variety
of political means" (Coronil 1997:32). The distinction, however, opposes developed core
countries, where capital and labor are located in the same geographical and national space, to
countries that source raw materials. What about countries that do not have natural resources or
capital but only labor? There, production is delocalized and profits flow back into other countries
so that investment and technologies do not really generate development—a process common to
many core-periphery dynamics worldwide (Wallerstein 1979). In these countries, money is
generally scarce, labor is abundant, and any job becomes a prized commodity. In places like
Macedonia, being paid for one's labor becomes akin to a natural resource upon which elites can
extract rent. But because labor constitutes the most obvious way to have access to money, rent can
be extracted both from international investments and from local workers and companies. Thus,
labor constituted a perfect political venue for fostering Gruevski's rentier project, both internally
and externally.
As we shall see, exploiting labor in Gruevski's Macedonia has become both easier and
harder. Foreign investors are actively sought and facilitated by the neoliberal climate and reforms
promoted by Gruevski. Yet Gruevski and his circle try to control foreign (but also domestic)
investments: flows of international money, investments, and aid are required to pass through the
bottleneck of governmental control, which extracts various sums of money in creatively informal
ways. It is not just a question of bribes, of course, but of liquidity. The government uses
Macedonia's liquidity in the international sphere to amplify the effects of internal illiquidity and
create a system of power. As the following sections will show, different international flows of
money, investments, and aid are funneled through state-driven hierarchies created by illiquidity.
The VMRO is available to exchange the Europeanization of institutions and legal systems for
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financial assistance and credit lines from international partners. This liquidity, then, becomes the
basis for increased control on the domestic market that looks increasingly like a web of VMRO
clients. Despite the anthropological views of corruption as local resistance (Dunn 2004), the
VMRO-linked elites are not protecting local workers from international exploitation but doubling
market exploitation with political rent extraction. Illiquidity favors the spread of rent-seeking
relations throughout Macedonian society: as individual foreign entrepreneurs experience directly,
subjection does not stem only from vertical rent extraction, but from a generalization of rentseeking behaviors that I analyze as a consequence of the country's illiquidity. It is one's peers,
friends, and business partners that internalize and reproduce subjection, utilizing social relations
to extract money.

1.3 Semi-peripheries go East: The Italian Context
I distinctly remember the series of lectures that our elementary school teacher gave us about
colonialism. In the end, we were left with a sense of dissatisfaction: why did Italy not become a
great colonial power? Every European nation had found colonies full of natural resources located
in strategic positions; why did we colonize…Albania? When we studied Italian colonialism, up
until the end of high school, we always confronted descriptions of Italian good faith in colonizing.
During the Second World War, Italians were portrayed as good modernizers, who provided poor
Africans in Libya, Eritrea, and Ethiopia with hospitals, roads, and much-needed infrastructures.
Of course, we also used nerve gas to suppress rebellions (Del Boca 2005) and committed some
genocidal acts here and there (Labanca 2000, Burgio 1999), but I had to learn that on my own in
my university years.
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The colonial past of Italy is mostly denied, or otherwise portrayed in the Italian public
sphere as a benevolent, necessary process. This is not simply due to a lack of public scrutiny or a
possible continuation of structural Fascism within Italian institutions. It also reflects a trend
common throughout the EU, perhaps in its most flagrant form. While some countries like France
or the UK have had public and intellectual discussions about their colonial past, mostly thanks to
intellectuals from the global south, such as Fanon, Trouillot, Asad and Cesaire, the EU as a whole
has not. Hansen and Jonsson (2014) suggest that such an erasure is not accidental. On the contrary,
it derives from the parallel between the pre-World War II colonial plans to create a Eurafrica and
the post-1945 integration plans that propagated the very same ideas.
But the EU has very strong ties to colonial enterprises. Historically, the European Union
is the limited merger of former colonial powers. More importantly, many of the politics of the EU,
with respect to its own member states and periphery, have colonial undertones. As many have
stressed for the case of the Balkans, there is an almost institutionalized orientalization of Balkan
subjects (Wolff 1994, Todorova 1997, Aman 2012). Even the official policies of the EU's eastward
enlargement are structured around an unequal subjectification without integration. Citizens of
Romania and Bulgaria who joined the EU in 2007 were subjected to work restrictions in EU
countries until 2014; even after the limitations were officially lifted, individual EU countries
(including the UK, France, Netherlands, and Belgium) have maintained special requirements for
Romanian and Bulgarian citizens, including special applications for work permits (BBC 2014).
One can see and feel a mounting racism expressed against eastern European citizens—Romanians
in Italy, Eastern Germans in Germany, Poles in the UK. Eastern Europeans are often victims of
social and institutional discrimination.
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Analyzing Italian investors and institutions is, then, a very apt method of scrutinizing
Neucolonialism, as it shows the recursive colonial aspect of the EU, whereby a semi-marginal state
like Italy, part of the PIIGS, exploits a further peripheral state like Macedonia. At its fullest, it also
embodies the EU's lack of memory and benevolent mask with regard to colonial processes. Italians
benefit precisely from hiding the complex relation between the bel paese and the Balkans. After
15 years of colonial economic policies, Italy invaded Albania in April 1939. That was just the
beginning of Italian aspirations in the Balkans; in October 1940, Italy invaded Greece, leading to
an inconclusive campaign and forcing Germany to intervene in the Balkans. Italian troops soon
entered Kosovo, Montenegro, and the southwestern part of Macedonia. Some of my older
interlocutors recalled the invasion: Italian soldiers always emerged as the nice faction, more
interested in good food and women, than colonizing. Similarly, Italy was remembered by people
nostalgic for socialism as a good partner of Yugoslavia, a coveted destination for vacations and
shopping. This is interesting, as the relations between Italy and Socialist Yugoslavia were not
always sunny: control over Trst/Trieste, Rijeka/Fiume, and the surrounding territories that had a
complex historical past and mixed population caused a great deal of anxiety and national
preoccupation both on the Italian and the Yugoslavian sides. Similarly, the various crimes against
the Yugoslav population committed before and after the end of the war did not seem to project
onto the Italian people—at least, not in the same way that the conflict with Albanians projected
onto the entire ethnic group.
On the contrary, memories about Italians evoked brotherhood and fraternity. Almost as if
Italy was the parallel of Yugoslavia on the other side of the wall, people remembered Italy as the
dreamland of consumption. Older interlocutors went from Skopje to Trst/Trieste in Italy to buy
jeans and other Western goods, which they would then smuggle and resell in Macedonia. Italian
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companies had collaborations with Yugoslav counterparts. Fiat, the state-subsidized Italian car
manufacturer, had famously licensed Zastava, the Yugoslav car company, to produce some of its
models. Many other Yugoslav companies sold raw materials in Italy and bought technology from
their Italian partners—known to be reliable but cheaper than German or English ones. While the
war in Bosnia and Croatia interrupted these flows of technology and business, Italians did maintain
a strong presence in the former Yugoslav countries.
UniCredit, for instance, has massively invested in Eastern Europe and claims to be the first
bank in Central Eastern Europe with over 163 billion euro of active accounts and over 3,100
branches (Unicredit 2016). Even in the midst of the crisis, Unicredit has been reported to recognize
that Eastern European banking sectors granted a profit of about 10%, double what they are in
Western Europe (Milosevic 2013). The most profitable markets for Unicredit were Russia and
Turkey—two authoritarian states. In 2016, Unicredit envisioned an increase of 20 billion euro of
credits to the region. Its capital allocated to the area should see a projected increase from 27% to
33%. CEE will account for 40% of the growth in profits of the bank (Secolo XIX 2016). This is
not surprising, given that in 2014, foreign banks controlled slightly less than 70% of the total assets
of Eastern European banks. The trend, however, is towards increasing state ownership, either
because of state investments through restructuring the sector, as in Hungary and Poland, or by
bailout, as in Slovenia (Raffeisen 2015).
Since the late 1980s, but especially after the collapse of the eastern bloc, Italian companies
invested massively in former socialist countries. Rassegna ad Est, a web portal specializing in
helping Italian companies to gather information on Eastern European markets, shows that the
number of Italian companies in Eastern Europe increased dramatically prior to the 2008 crisis. In
2011, the total revenue of Italian companies in Central and Eastern Europe (including Russia) was
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about 87 billion euro, about 15% of the overall revenues of Italian companies operating abroad. In
fact, the renewed importance of the Eastern European market was crucial for Italy. Italian exports
correspond to approximately nine percent of the world market in non-EU Europe (Ministry of
Economic Development 2012). Over 350,000 companies operated in CEE countries, about 22%
of the total 1.5 million Italian companies in the world. Most of these companies are located in
Romania (1,992), Poland (772) and Russia (486), with a far lower share in the former Yugoslavia.
Besides banks, other notable investors include Fiat, which decreased its employees in Italy from
77,000 to 61,000 between 2007 and 2012, and relocated, among other places, to Poland and Serbia
(Tamburini 2013). Brembo and other very profitable producers of automotive components are also
reported to be relocating eastwards, a move already completed by Telecom's call centers (in
Albania and Romania) and Geox and other famous textile companies that produce in Romania and
Slovakia (Tamburini 2013). Adriatic SMEs have typically relocated across the sea in former
Yugoslavia. Newer data suggests that in 2015, over 7,000 Italian companies were present in CEE,
two thirds of which were supported by the Italian Bank Unicredit (Il Secolo XIX 2016).
Italy has been hit very hard by the economic crisis. Juvenile unemployment skyrocketed
from 20% in 2007 to over 40% in 2013, while overall unemployment reached 12.5% (Sacchioli
2015). Meanwhile Italian industrial production decreased 28% and the country's debt increased
from around 100% of GDP in 2007 to 130% of GDP in 2014 (Ministry of Economic Development
2015). From 2008 to 2013, over 59,000 companies have closed, with an average of two
bankruptcies every hour (Vesentini 2014). The regions that drove Italian and even European
productivity during the 1990s have struggled to survive, with the whole northeastern section of
Italy coming to a productive halt and experiencing a sudden process of de-industrialization. Not
only did the crisis have a devastating impact on people's immediate financial capacities, but it also
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destroyed prospects for future growth as small and medium-sized companies, unable to navigate
the financial crisis, closed for good.
The world financial crisis had profound consequences on many countries worldwide,
especially in Europe. Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Greece have all been on the edge of bankruptcy
but have been saved thanks to the injection of liquidity from EU countries, the Central European
Bank, and the IMF—at the cost of neoliberal structural adjustments. A similar process has
happened in Italy, too, although not as overtly and on a smaller scale. Although Italy is still
included in the G8 and is considered a world power today, the crisis has almost flattened its
geopolitical influence. While Italy has historically been a semi-peripheral country within the
European continent, the formation of the EU beginning with the Treaty of Rome (1958) seemed
to stabilize its economic and political role. At the moment, however, both Italian investors and
Italian citizens are leaving the country to try their luck in the East—many of them armed with just
a few ideas, modest savings, and many stereotypes. I have met a growing number of Italian expats
who tried to make their fortune in Macedonia, evidence that Macedonia is becoming the outlet for
a specific kind of capital (and investments): spillover from other semi-peripheral areas in crisis.

1.4 Leaving the Sinking Boat: Italian Hopes of an Eastern Eldorado
It was a strange request. The director of Construx, the construction company where I was
conducting research, wanted me to go back to their offices because of something that had to do
with Italians. His assistant wouldn't say more on the phone, so I grew anxious as the taxi drove me
closer to the headquarters. Was it about the purchase of second-hand construction machinery from
Italy? The director had charged me with monitoring Italian bankruptcy auctions to see if there were
used cranes, trucks, steamrollers, and concrete pumps on sale. Even used, this machinery cost a lot
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of money, so he eventually decided to drop the idea for the time being. Had he changed his mind?
Or was it just an excuse to talk to me? Had I told the workers something I should not have?
Much to my surprise, it was actually about Italian businessmen. Marco and Giovanni, two
middle-aged northern Italian men, were sitting in the director's office accompanied by Nikola, a
local Macedonian businessman who seemed to be translating for them. I sat down in the room,
close to the director, and listened to Nikola present some thermal and acoustic insulating mortar
material that they had developed. It was not too clear who was in charge, as it was mostly Nikola
who was talking and answering questions—even if they were directly posed by the director in his
slow but accurate Italian. But it was not the only unclear element: before thinking about striking
any deal, the director wanted to see proof of the characteristics of the materials, with certificates
from Macedonian institutions. Nikola claimed they had certifications, but not with them. "Then
we'll talk again after we see them. Meanwhile, you'll be in touch with Fabio—he's my right hand
in these matters," concluded the director. Before dismissing us, winking at me while I crossed the
threshold of the office he said, "Find out what you can about them, I trust your judgment!"
As much as I was impressed by this assignment, which the director forgot about very
quickly, I was genuinely interested in Marco and Giovanni. The following week, I visited them on
a construction site nearby. They were working with a team of young Albanian men from the nearby
city of Tetovo, where both Marco and Giovanni were living at the moment. Despite the cold and
humidity, the team was finishing the external flooring of a new eight-story housing building. When
we sat down to drink salep, a typical winter drink of Turkish origin, Marco told me he had been in
Macedonia for over a year in order to develop his materials. He was a chemical technician who
worked for an Italian company until its closure around 2010. He then embarked on an exploratory
study with an entrepreneur who wanted to use Macedonia's raw sodium carbonate to produce
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construction materials to build in Georgia. Sometime after Marco moved to Macedonia, however,
the company failed. Realizing that Macedonia did have abundant supplies of high quality sodium
carbonate, Marco had decided to stay and develop his own material. He had moved to Gostivar, a
city in the Western part of the country that had a large Albanian population. There he had found
an intermediary who could work for him, mixing products he bought through local resellers from
different mines—a complex arrangement necessary to preserve the secret of the formula and
circumvent the monopoly on sodium carbonate, whose mines were owned by international
companies. Realizing that the product was not yet ready to hit the market, he relocated to Tetovo
to be closer to the main construction market in Skopje. As Marco was in the middle of his narration,
Giovanni interrupted us, pulling Marco's arm and pointing outside. "I saw him…there, behind… I
think it is him." Marco looked worried for a second, then he waived his hand, "No, it is not. Come
on."
Marco had finally developed a number of products and enlisted Giovanni, a friend from
his hometown, to help him out with the logistics. "I was selling electrical stuff, you know, furniture
and chandeliers. But with the crisis I had to close down, so here I am," joked Giovanni. In the
winter of 2013, they had not yet started full-scale production of their materials and worked mostly
with small quantities. But they were expanding with the help of Nikola, their local partner. The
strategy was simple: they took on some small jobs, mostly related to giving the final touches to
external paving and flooring, which would help them develop their contacts. Meanwhile, they had
recruited and trained a small number of Albanian men from Tetovo, some of whom spoke Italian,
having worked previously abroad. The developer for whom they were working now was also an
Albanian, who had made money working in Italy and then had come back to take advantage of the
construction boom. Soon he arrived as well, and they started discussing problems they were facing.
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In order to realize the external flooring of the building, they needed to cut parts of the sidewalk.
Yet this called for specialized tools and workers they did not have. In fact, he was only the
developer and had hired various firms for each specific job he needed done. After some tense
discussions, Marco and Giovanni gave in and called Lollo, their Macedonian "insurance," as they
called him. Lollo was another Macedonian construction worker whom they had met in Italy when
he was working in the northern city of Ravenna. Lollo was also part of Marco and Giovanni's
company, and he had the responsibility of keeping contacts with the authorities. For the moment,
he seemed to be mostly concerned with allowing them to get along with traffic police and driving
their van with an Italian registration plate around the city for deliveries of material. "I'll get you a
Macedonian plate—just let me call my friend the commissioner in Tetovo, and you'll see," joked
Lollo, after lending them some of the tools they needed.
Macedonia was an opportunity for Marco and Giovanni, who had been able to start a
company with almost no money by exploiting their technical knowledge and the low local wages.
But that was not the only reason why they decided to stay. I understood it one night, when I
accompanied Marco and Giovanni to the opening of an exclusive lounge bar they had contributed
to building and that aspired to gather the high society of (right wing) Skopje. As I squeezed past
the mass of tightly packed bodies, Giovanni pulled unceremoniously at my shirt. "Look at him,"
pointing at Marco and his housemaid hitting it off. "He's happy! Now I have to get lucky too," he
insisted, while writing his number on a piece of paper ripped from a cigarette package, with the
intention to pass it to a woman he had been staring at the whole night. What I had imagined as a
classy business environment had soon turned into a trashy pick-up party. Marco, his maid, and a
friend had left to get a drink at another place, but Giovanni had insisted I stay as his wingman
while he made his move on the woman. Waiting for the right moment, he told me about his

79

daughter, in Italy, and about Marco's family as well. He could not help but be aroused by all the
short dresses and long legs of Macedonian women, which he caressed with his eyes like a teenager
on his first school trip abroad. Finally, he struck up a conversation with the woman, delivered the
piece of paper with nonchalance, and walked away. In our taxi, we kept on talking about the
propriety of the strategy. Had it been a good idea? Would she call? Was it too straightforward?
We examined all possibilities at length, concluding that, indeed, it had been a good move—now
at least he could stop thinking about it. When we reached the rest of the group at a Cuban bar, we
found Marco avidly dancing with his housekeeper, while the other Italian friend was working his
charms on three more barely-legal girls. Hugging me and Giovanni in a comradely gesture, he
introduced us all, and then ordered one more bottle of white wine. "Pretty good, ah!" he screamed
to us, his face red, "Oohohoooo!" answered Giovanni, his glass in hand. I raised my glass too, with
a shadow of shame lurking on my smile.

1.5 Paradise Lost: Entrepreneurs Meet Macedonia's Rent-seeking Behaviors
Marco and Giovanni's good time was going to be over pretty soon. After that night out, the two
Italians disappeared for some months. They had offered to give me a ride back home, since they
were going to drive to Italy for Christmas, but they kept on postponing their departure, and finally
they stopped answering my calls or texts altogether. Some months later I received a call at
Construx's office from an unknown company from Gostivar. It was Marco again, this time alone,
who claimed to have lost his phone and wanted to see me. "It is a long story, I will tell you more
once you come to Gostivar." When we met in Gostivar, he was with Besart, an enthusiastic and
charismatic Albanian investor whose personal story will be explored in Chapter 5. Besart had
become Marco's host and sponsor; he drove Marco around, presented him as the great director of
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his company, and made him sit at the director's position in his own office. But that was a theatrical
move, as Marco told me when we had a chance to speak in private. "Do you remember when
Giovanni was nervous, in the cafe? Well, he thought he had seen our Macedonian partner, Nikola.
Some months before meeting you, we had closed a deal for almost 50,000 euro, but neither
Giovanni nor I had a registered company in Macedonia. So we talked to Nikola: we would use his
company's name to take on the contract, and he would be in charge of finding us clients—you
know, everybody gets a cut, everybody is happy. We started working, but a couple of months into
the contract our workers told us that they had never been paid! We went to the developer and told
him that we needed to be paid. And he showed us the receipts of the deposits on Nikola's account!
The bastard did not pay us, not even the workers! So we went to speak with him, and it turned out
he was full of debts. He could not pay us, because the bank had blocked his account. We gave him
an ultimatum, and he finally scraped together some money in cash, some in euro, even Swiss francs
and US dollars…he probably went door to door to his friends and relatives to get them!"
That was just the beginning of their misadventures. Since then, Nikola had tried to steal
some of the tools they worked with, had organized the meeting at Construx behind their back, and
had harassed them when Marco and Giovanni decided to cut him out of the small job they were
working on when I met them. Although it was a minimal amount of money (around 5,000 euro)
they were desperate for cash to pay for materials they had taken to work on the other bigger
projects. Plus, it was Christmas, and they had no money to pay for gas to go back home. When
they finally got the 5,000 euro, cash, on December 24th, they drove back to their house to pack
their things and leave for Italy. But in the middle of the highway between Skopje and Tetovo a
black car cut them off. It was Nikola with two thugs. "They got out of the car, beat us, and took
the money, plus our phones and watches. You know I was in the military, right? I did not react
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because I was scared they had a gun—so I let them beat the hell out of me." Marco and Giovanni
immediately went to their partner and friend Lollo, whose role was to "insure them" through his
connections with authorities in Tetovo. "And by the end of the day, they find them! You know,
with our money, in cash, our phones, exactly all they had stolen from us! And you know what they
say? Lollo and his friend at the police can't do anything about it. And there I understood. They
fucked us."
Without money, without work, without even the gas to reach Italy, Giovanni and Marco
were broken—physically as well as mentally. It was then that they talked to Besart, who gave them
some money to go home and forget all about their business. Giovanni decided that it was too risky
to do business in Macedonia: he had learned the hard way that the centralization of power that
came with illiquidity left a lot of starving wolves. Because they were not part of the hierarchical
structures of dependency that rule Macedonia's political economy, Marco and Giovanni were fair
game for anybody who was desperate and dishonest enough to use them for extracting rent
revenues.
Marco, on the other hand, had a different investment in Macedonia and a potentially good
receipt for producing a technologically valid material. So he partnered with Besart and went back
to Gostivar—this time in the Albanian social world. "You know, here among Albanians I feel
protected. They have my back, for real. And I know Besart sent word to Nikola and others not to
mess with me again." In fact, Besart did everything he could to present Marco as his revered guest
and partner, partly to make him and everybody else forget about his past misfortune (and
gullibility) but also to cement their partnership. Besart had not only financed the production of
Marco's material and inserted him into his own business network but also managed to build his
own factory for chemicals and other related products. His eyes lit up when he brought me to see
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the site he had bought to build the factory, and he started sparkling with pride and joy, noting that
he had started with nothing to eat, and now he would own a factory that produced things. Adding
a fancy Italian technician to his deck of cards was a way to ensure the quality of his products; that
is, of creating rent.
The different treatment Marco received was not just the result of a different personality.
Clearly Besart was an expansive person, slightly egocentric, who read philosophy and embraced
the possibility of organizing a roundtable with some of the most important professors in the country
(and my help). But more importantly, Besart was able to invest 200,000 euro promptly in their
business venture. The money came partly from his savings, but he also borrowed money from
family, friends, and relatives who also had available cash. Partly isolated from the Macedonian
spheres of power and EU legacies thanks to their influx of cash from their own diaspora in Western
countries, the Albanian community I met in Gostivar was relatively autonomous from the
illiquidity that generated authoritarian subjection. Their own family and friendship sheltered
liquidity from Macedonian rent-seeking behaviors; understanding their social position as
increasingly positive, they were willing to risk, invest, and lend money to each other.
Albanians I spoke with in Gostivar preferred to lend money to friends or trusted
acquaintances, rather than deposit it in banks, which they felt had held discriminatory attitudes
towards their ethnic group in the past. In the Albanian social sphere, the presence of money,
especially cash, allowed for a market of some sort to develop along with a marginal centralization
of liquidity. As a consequence, the rentier class did not emerge as prominently as in the
Macedonian social environment, and when it did, it appeared as an offspring of networks rooted
in household and kinship solidarity. It was through embedding themselves in a self-exploitative
kinship business that my interlocutors gained access to liquidity, rather than rent generated by
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political allegiance. In the case of Besart, he routinely provided services for both Macedonian and
Albanian political structures to whom he was not connected. His company was very profitable
mostly because of the exploitation of his kinship networks. He paid his son, nephews, and other
family members close to nothing and was proud of the way in which Albanians accepted poorly
paid jobs to build up their family income. Once, he pointed to an old guy in a backyard, "I respect
that guy. He goes around picking up copper wires. Then he separates the plastic from the copper,
you know, by hand, and he literally breaks his bones for pennies. See? We Albanians work hard."
In addition, his competitive advantage over other local companies was constituted by his extensive
networks of connections in Italy—a set of acquaintances he had developed thanks to years of
underpaid migrant labor in northern Italy.
Marco and Giovanni's violent encounter with Macedonian rent-seeking behaviors is shared
by many other Italian "adventurer" investors. I have met many other small entrepreneurs who came
to Macedonia seduced by the idea of low labor costs, the slow and human lifestyle, and easy life.
Usually, the first contact with Macedonia's social life confirmed these ideas. Many of them found
Macedonia a nostalgic land: "Macedonia is just like Italy, fifty years ago," they often explained to
me, while relaxing in some restaurant, drinking the cheap but tasty beer and eating delicious local
food. Generally, such entrepreneurs were males who had been deeply unsettled in their personal
and professional fortunes by the European crisis. Marco and Giovanni had both left their families
in Italy and saw Macedonia as a second chance to achieve entrepreneurial maleness. Their
flirtatious encounters with Macedonian women, who embodied the ideal of white, European and
Mediterranean beauty, showed a pattern I often observed among other EU expats, who, in what
they conceived of as the Macedonian "Wild West," were able to reclaim aspects of their identity
they felt unable to express back home.
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Unable to capture the historical and political economic factors behind local Macedonian
socialities, foreign entrepreneurs associated working rhythms to cultural laziness, lack of
experience, and fundamental dishonesty. Such judgments, which include orientalizing local
socialities, hedonism, and a feeling of travelling through time, are common characteristics of expat
life (Cole 2007, Redfield 2012, Royrvik 2011). Nonetheless, compared to expats who are part of
international humanitarian organizations or big corporations, adventurous entrepreneurs like
Marco and Giovanni could not rely on the bureaucratic structures of humanitarian governmentality
to protect and insulate them from local rent-seeking behaviors. In fact, petty entrepreneurs hit the
limits of the Macedonian market relatively quickly and soon become entangled with illiquidity,
both in terms of non-payments or, worse, plain attempts to shave revenues out of their meager
capital. Many leave at this point, disheartened. Those like Giovanni and Marco, who try to force
the situation, often meet the solidified and hardened forms of power that regulate the Macedonian
economy. Then, the loss of value they face becomes not only economic and moral but can also
threaten their very existence. As foreigners, they find themselves on the outside of the concentric
relations of power that sustain or produce illiquidity, which, as will be clear in Chapter 2, exposes
them to violence. Unable to mobilize support from international organizations, few manage to stay
and recover their losses. In the words of another small international entrepreneur, "It is like an
octopus, you know. It is everywhere, it is oppressing you. If you are one of those huge companies,
then you can navigate it. But if you're like us…you start feeling a knot around your neck. And it
is tightening."
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1.6 International Investments and Loans: Development Money
There are other external sources of capital and money in Macedonia besides small-scale
investments from "adventurer" entrepreneurs like Giovanni and Marco. Since 2006, Macedonia
borrowed heavily from international bodies such as the IMF, the World Bank, and other private
international and national banks. Contrary to its predecessors, the VMRO government did not
make fiscal rigor a pillar of its financial, monetary, and economic vision. On the contrary, they
heavily invested in debt. Between 2002 and 2008, the country's debt decreased significantly in
relation to GDP, a consequence of both increased foreign investments and early repayment from
the VMRO government of outstanding international loans (Koczan 2015). Subsequently, the debt
tripled in absolute terms from around 1.3 billion euro (20% of GDP) to the current 4.10 billion
euro (46% of GDP), while it nearly doubled in relation to GDP. This increase in debt has been
slightly higher than in the other countries in the region. In the Western Balkans, the public debt
has increased on average from 33.0% of the GDP in 2008 to 49.9% of the GDP in 2013. In the
same period, Central and Eastern Europe saw its public debt grow from 32.5% of the GDP to
52.8% of the GDP.
The Macedonian debt is scheduled to increase further. As the Central European Bank has
continued to lower interest rates since 2008 to an almost negative rate, the Ministry of Economy
plans to borrow increasingly from domestic and international banks, bringing the debt to 4.65
billion euro, or 48% of GDP, by 2016. Despite the preoccupation evidenced in literature of the
increasing lack of sustainability of Macedonian finances, this scenario shows that under the
VMRO, Macedonia did not face the highest financial imbalances (Raiffeisen 2015).
One can compare Macedonia's 90% loans to deposit ratio to those in figure 9, including
Slovenia's peak of 160% in 2008, and the subsequent bank bailout that generated an explosion in
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public debt from 22% of GDP to 80% of GDP. Mortgage loans, while increasingly at risk, seem
to have been moderately growing in Macedonia (figure 11), compared to the dramatic increase in
Hungary or Romania from 2002 to 2008 (figure 10). Similarly, banking assets in Macedonia
constituted 60% of GDP in 2008 and 76% today, while they increased from 36% to 103% in
Bulgaria and from 36% to 92% in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 2000 and 2014 (table 4).

Figure 9: Loan to deposit ratio in Eastern European countries.

Source: Raiffeisen. 2015. "CEE Banking Sector Report."
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Figure 10: Mortgage loans in Eastern Europe.

Source: Raiffeisen. 2015. "CEE Banking Sector Report." Data expressed in percent of the GDP.
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Figure 11: Composition of household debt in Macedonia.

Source: Macedonian National Bank. Data expressed in billions of MKD.

Table 4: Banks' asset to GDP ratio in selected Eastern European countries.

Source: National Banks and Raiffeisen.
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There were significant reasons why previous governments tried to keep Macedonia's debt
low. The first one is the historical legacy of Yugoslavia's own debt crisis, a chapter often
overlooked when talking about the dissolution of the socialist state and its ensuing wars. As
Woodward (1995) shows, grants, loans, and international aid credit from the US and other Western
institutions were crucial in "keeping Tito afloat" so as to constitute a viable alternative to Soviet
influence on the Eastern bloc (Lees 2005). After the collapse of socialist Yugoslavia, the
Macedonian productive sector shrank about 50%, thus requiring a drastic reduction of debt.
When the VMRO came to power, they were confronted with a sluggish economic
landscape—and, more importantly, with the country's lack of resources. How could they build
their political power without resources that are coveted in the current global economy? Macedonia,
however, had one resource that it could exploit: debt. Especially at a time of uncertainty on the
international market, a promising neoliberal country with a very low level of debt can be attractive
for international financial capital. Having access to money and credit allowed the VMRO to turn
the public administration into a rentier mechanism, with higher stakes compared to those it had
earlier. Borrowing did not follow the greed of a rentier class; instead, it served to create it and to
structure political dependencies.
The elites that support the VMRO today are not the majority of those managers or directors
of former socialist enterprises that had gained control over their assets during the first phase of the
transition. Velja Ramkovski, for instance, was able to create an empire in the aftermath of the
transition, thanks to ownership of the trading company Uniprokom, and had owned, among other
things, the powerful private TV channel A1. After a brief period of flirtation with and support of
Gruevski, Ramkovski was arrested in a raid by Macedonia's Special Forces, which seized assets
and documents of his television company in 2010. Ultimately, A1 was shut down in 2011 (RSF
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2011). Steljo Nakov, owner of the shipping company Fersped and of the TV channel Alfa TV, sold
2.5 million euro worth of shares of his TV company to CHS Invest Group for 150,000 euro. The
sale took place after a Skopje court determined that Fersped's privatization, operated by Nakov,
broke the law. After the sale, Alfa TV changed its editorial policy and became less critical of the
government (Dimovski 2013 ).
Other powerful managers, such as Jordan Kamcev, sensed the potential offered by the
VMRO structure. Jordan's father, Ilja Kamcev, had created Orka holdings, one of Macedonia's
biggest clothing companies, thanks to the privatization of a former state clothing company
(Campbell and Traynor 2006). Jordan Kamcev also owns Mediagroup, the parent company that
owns Macedonia's major daily newspapers—one of the reasons why he has been able to prosper
(Cvetkovska, Jordanovska and Apostolov 2014). The case of Ideale, a competitor of Construx
where I briefly did fieldwork, serves as further proof of such transformismo. Ideale's manager had
been the director of an important heavy industry complex in the final years of Yugoslavia and a
parliamentarian for the SDSM government in the 1990s. His company had allegedly been involved
in a shady deal with Serbia at the time of the NATO embargo, gaining significant sums of money.
Upon leaving the former socialist company, he created Ideale, which, over a span of 10 years, had
become one of the major residential construction companies in the country. While within the
company, workers were not political fanatics of the VMRO, the owner publicly demonstrated his
ideological proximity by funding various major churches.
Of course, gaining support from such powerful oligarchs that had gained power thanks to
the SDSM required significant funds, which means that the VMRO can influence internal
economic decisions, such as a bank's commitment to purchasing government debt. In fact, about
half of the public debt is owned by domestic actors. In 2014, the central government's external
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debt (excluding municipalities and publicly owned companies) was 1.6 billion euro, while overall,
the country's external debt was 6.38 billion euro, or 69.8% of GDP, which was about 8.5 billion
euro. This marked a significant increase compared to 2008, when the external debt stood at 49%
of GDP. In 2015, the external central government debt rose to 1.9 billion euro, and the domestic
debt 1.2 billion euro. Between 2010 and 2013, the Macedonian government took out loans from
multilateral creditors—that is, international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund
(234 million euro), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (229 million euro),
and the International Development Association, an agency within the World Bank, (277 million
euro). Yet, in order to pay back these loans, the government borrowed from commercial banks and
other private creditors, which owned about 616 million euro of the central government debt in
2013 (Ministry of Finance of Macedonia 2014).
The increase of foreign debt also served the Macedonian monetary policy. With a negative
trade balance and a worsening outlook, the Macedonian Central Banks had to drastically intervene
on the currency market at the height of the crisis in order to keep the MKD pegged to the euro.
Classified official documents I have consulted show that government borrowing was the obvious
way to access foreign currency without burning up the banks' gold or currency reserves. In fact,
78% of the government debt is FX denominated (mostly in euro) (Deutsche Bank 2015). Yet the
fixed currency arrangement forces the accumulation of foreign currency reserves, especially at a
time when remittances have been at an historic low due to the European crisis. But illiquidity
follows the Macedonian monetary policy for another reason: if Macedonian citizens had more cash
available, this would open the door to inflation. Inflation would allow the MKD to diverge from
the euro, thus shattering the established low interest for loans. Consequently, the government
would not be able to borrow enough money to finance its rentier structure.
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One fundamental issue haunts the government's strategy: how is Macedonia going to repay
these loans? In theory, money taken out by the government should be repaid by increased taxes or
revenues generated by the government's investments. Typically, investments that aim to stimulate
productivity consist of roads, infrastructure, or research centers. Alternatively, an increase in
taxation from newly developed private enterprises could provide some debt relief. Yet there is
significant evidence that much of the current loans has been used to expand employment in the
public administration by either directly hiring people in governmental or local institutions or
through companies controlled by the state. Recent data show that in the last nine years, the number
of workers employed by the central government has increased by nine percent, in the local
municipalities by 45%, and in state-owned companies by 100%. These companies are mostly
public utility companies and companies that manage infrastructures, such as roads. Today, around
170,000 people in Macedonia work for the public sector, which corresponds to one public
employee for every 11 citizens. In August 2015, Gruevski announced 700 more public jobs
(Kapital 2015).
Despite their lack of economic value, projects such as Skopje 2014 have received
significant amounts of internationally loaned money. These projects have directly helped
companies close to the government (such as the construction companies Beton, Granit, and Bauer,
among others) by providing them with contracts that compensated for what most of the people I
spoke with in the field described as their inability to compete on international markets. Many of
these companies are working with materials, technologies, and knowledge left over from the
Yugoslav era. In the 1990s, these constituted acceptable standards and allowed them to participate
in projects around the world. Companies that built in Russia, Ukraine, Iraq, Iran, and Libya were
progressively forced back to Macedonia, in part because of the collapse of Yugoslavia and the lack
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of financial and military resources that supported them in international deals. More recently these
companies have been outcompeted for foreign markets due to the obsolescence of their technology
and their very limited operative capacity. The graph below shows the decline in Macedonia's
construction companies' ability to win foreign projects.

Figure 12:Value of construction completed abroad by Macedonian companies.

Source: State Statistical Office of Macedonia. Data expressed in thousands of MKD.

Unable to reach international money on the global market, construction companies
knocked on the VMRO's door. Such companies have received a significant transfer of borrowed
money (around 600 million euro for the Skopje 2014 project alone), independent of the productive
potential of such construction projects. In addition, construction companies close to the VMRO
have been the recipients of international aid destined for Macedonia for development purposes.
Institutions such as the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
Europe Aid, and even NATO have invested considerable sums of money in various infrastructural
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and developmental projects. While all of these projects are awarded through a call for offers, there
is ample room for manipulation on the part of the Macedonian government. Construction
companies close to the government have won most of the remunerative projects.

1.7 The Unbearable Transparency of Subjection
"Why is it that a cubic meter of cement costs the same in Macedonia and in Italy? We know that
here in Skopje you pay a worker 300 euro per month, while in Italy it is for sure four times that.
But the price of the cement is the same. "I did not have an answer to Gennaro's question. After all,
he was the expert: he had been managing the Macedonian office of an Italian company that
specialized in the supervision of public work for a year now, after periods in Vietnam and Ukraine.
We had just spent a whole day supervising a major infrastructural project in the country (which I
cannot name here), and we were both tired, but he had this one last pearl of wisdom he wanted to
share in the parking lot. "Because certain costs," said Gennaro, rubbing his thumb and index in a
very Italian gesture alluding to illicit money "cannot be squeezed. In other words, here you pay
less for labor, but you have added costs for…you know…you understood me, right?" I did not
understand him, and I was looking into theories of profit, taking his sophisticated language a tad
too literally. "I mean that you have to bribe them. That money you cannot recover. And it is not
just the bribe for getting the contract. It is all that comes with that! Let me give you an example.
We recently participated in a call for offers regarding an important project. We offered a low price
for our standard. The company that won offered one third of our sum. But for them it makes sense:
once you're the supervisor, you are the person who decides if a finished work is approved or not.
So you can deny the approval, say, if the contractor uses a certain product instead of another.
Usually you need to give technical reasons—like, one product has a given mechanical set of
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properties that the other does not offer, or can guarantee better performances over time. But
sometimes the products are equivalent and you can still force the contractor to choose one, if the
company that sells that product pays you something personally. So even if you get a contract for
zero, as a supervisor you have ways to make money."
Gennaro's revelations show the extent to which rent-seeking behaviors do not simply
involve predatory individual instincts or attitudes; they are actually inscribed into self-exploiting
relations at the core of Macedonia's institutions. Illiquidity is the motor of these rent-seeking
enterprises: as will be clear in Chapter 2, companies that do not affiliate with the government see
their economic value plummet as they have increasing troubles getting paid. On the other hand,
companies that get patronage from the VMRO usually get some money, if not always the entire
agreed-upon sum in the official contracts. The mere knowledge that the government has money,
due to its international loans, is enough to fuel rent-seeking behaviors, whereby companies fight
with each other to affiliate with the government. The VMRO government has capitalized on
international credit by hiding illiquidity at the core of its confusing institutional and financial
politics. In fact, the government counts on the loss of value, skimming value from contracts they
award to companies close to the VMRO. In exchange, these companies can and will exploit other
firms with fewer political connections, generating a veritable cascade of surcharges along the way
for every step of subcontracting. I have been told that, for some recent deals, the surcharge yielded
by the two directors finally reached over 40% of the total sum.
Maintaining such a structure of rent and exploitation demands considerable work and
pressure, especially because the Macedonian government finances illiquidity with money that is
not its own. International organizations, while they might have political reasons for funding the
VMRO and might be inclined to accept corruption, are, in theory, supposed to ensure fair
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competition, especially when a foreign company (of the same country or region of the international
organization) is applying to the call for offers. So how does the VMRO manipulate these
competitions? Different international organizations have different standards for awarding
contracts. While it is the relevant Macedonian ministry that manages the calls for offers, the
requirements vary according to the provenance of the funds. EuropeAid, the international
development and cooperation branch of the EU, requires each call for offers to have both a
technical and a financial component. "That means that if you have a much better technical
proposal, with personnel that is much more qualified than your competitors, you might win even
if you ask for more money. Generally, these EU calls give around 70% weight to the technical
aspect and only 30% to the financial side," said Gennaro, when I met him the following week in
his office. Calls that are financed by other international bodies, in cases of loans or grants, do not
have such requirements. Only financial matters are taken into account, "And in those cases you,
as an international company, cannot win. We simply can't compete with companies willing to work
for zero."
International companies like the one that Gennaro managed did not stand idly by while
being outcompeted by locals. First, every time he had the manpower, he applied for suitable grants,
just to force the competitors to lower prices and to see if it was an organized call or not. "It is easy,
you see. Even for major projects, like the Chinese-sponsored highway, you could see that out of
all the companies that submitted an offer, only some of them were deemed suitable. Usually, only
three offers are retained. Then two withdraw, and only one is left to win the contract. Sometimes
it is company A, sometimes B, other times it is C, but it is all previously settled!" I asked him how
they disqualified the other offers. "Even if the call considers only the financial prospect, they might
still include odd technical qualifications in order to enter the bidding process. Why would you ask
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a supervising company to provide a security in the workplace certificate? The company cannot
have its own rules—it needs to abide by those that the contractor establishes in the workplace!
This is just one example: it is clear that in a market like Macedonia you know very well who can
offer certain certificates or technical requirements, and it is very easy to design calls especially for
them." Much of Gennaro's allegations corresponded to rumors and street knowledge, so I remained
skeptical. Together, we consulted the online records that display winners of public calls for offers,
and we verified that companies known to be affiliated with the VMRO have been awarded the
most lucrative projects.
Gennaro knew that he could mobilize the Neucolonial institutions in order to push for a
more fair ruling on the contract, one for which his Europeanness would count as a political asset
rather than as a form of belonging based upon (democratic) values. This was a tricky issue because,
as every major Italian company knew, Italian institutions were not too engaged and had limited
bargaining power. "It is not like Austria, you know. Italy has minimal investments and little power
in Macedonia. Okay, maybe the ambassador can go and hit his fist on the table. And then?" This
was a serious question for Tullio, a manager of another Italian company that had worked on the
Skopje 2014 project. "It is very hard to be in our situation. Look, I am going to tell you because
you sound like a good guy, smart, and it looks like you do not ask stupid questions. You have to
be careful around here. See, the other day I was in Gevgelija, on my way to Greece, to take a break
from this mess here in Skopje. I enter a grocery shop, and turns out that the daughter of the owner
speaks Italian. She tells me that she is working for the Ministry of the Interior, translating
conversations of Italian businessmen in Macedonia! Our phones are under control, you see! And
yet, I receive calls from the Ministry of Transport or the Ministry of Education, in which the
ministers themselves tell me to come, meet the person they want me to hire if I get the tender, and
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telling me how much money I should give them both! It is so in your face, so transparent!" I asked
him how much we are talking about, and he answered, after a long sip of juice, "Ten percent. It is
the standard rate."
The closed and hierarchical system that allocated international money created widespread
illiquidity, which pressured international companies hardest. But it was not only this systemic issue
that put the Italian managers at odds. It was the openness, obviousness, and rawness of the rentseeking behaviors that were implied. "Look, I'm Italian, right? It is not like these things do not
happen in Italy. But first, you do not get exposed to them so directly. I feel I have learned how
things work better in Italy and Europe after being in Macedonia—because here, you will constantly
be called by the minister in person, in order to get things done the way they want them," confided
Tullio. And yet these phone calls, blatantly manipulated calls for offers, and the continuous need
to be on guard wore the managers down considerably. "You saw how it was the other day on the
worksite," Gennaro recounted. "You know they are going to screw you. You just have to decide
what to pick on and what to allow. What you will accept and what you will not because you'll be
too afraid to tell your children about it. For instance, you saw the plant they proposed to use to
provide us with concrete. It was barely functional. They had no capacity to deliver a consistent
standard. And I would need to use that material for a capital infrastructure? Now the contractor
called the ministry, who is the client on whose behalf I supervise the site, and now they are telling
me that it is okay. But of course they will never write it down in an official letter, it is all this
formal, but really informal, way of saying things, so that you will be the one who makes the
decision. There's a constant pressure." Gennaro then took a deep breath, and entrenched himself
in his black leather desk chair. "They even tried to steal my engineers, offering them almost double
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the sum I give them. But they wouldn't leave us. They know what you have to do once you're
working for one of these big Macedonian companies—the pressure is unbearable."
Gennaro knew that Macedonia's political economy was both oppressive and very closed,
requiring a very specific kind of personality in order to be able to live in it. He did not feel adequate,
as he saw his profession as technical. In contrast with Antonio, for whom belonging to the Italian
ministry had allowed him to be exposed to and to internalize rentier behaviors, Gennaro felt his
position in Macedonia was very close to leading him to a personal crisis. Bribing and pressuring
others was not what he wanted to do for a living. "As for me, I requested a transfer from my
company. I was about to go, but then the whole Ukraine thing happened, and then I could not move
there anymore. But you see, my predecessor could not take it either. You either move, or you end
up like him, with three lovers, spending one week every two in Thessaloniki to fuck them."
Managers like Gennaro and Tullio are stuck in a different situation compared to Giovanni
and Marco. Their social position and working connections allow them to call upon European and
international institutions for support, benefiting from the rent generated by Neucolonialism. Rentseeking behaviors force managers like Gennaro or Tullio to face a difficult choice: they can either
spend their Europeanness as a political value to extract rent, or they can keep their own European
and personal moral values intact and abandon their company's monetary value. Whatever they
choose, they cannot escape the VMRO politics of subjection, as their own source of power,
Neucolonialism, is precisely what empowers the VMRO's capacity to skim, appropriate, and
destroy value. While their class condition allows them to dodge the violence of rent-seeking
behaviors, they still bear the constant pressure of subjection.
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1.8 Institutional Neucolonialism: Projects, Harmonization, and Rent
Macedonia entered the European Union's orbit relatively early. In 2001, its government signed a
Stabilization and Association Agreement, advancing Macedonia to the status of candidate for the
European Union in 2005. Despite its peaceful separation from Yugoslavia, Macedonia's path
towards EU integration was not smooth, partly because of ongoing tensions with its neighbors
Greece and Bulgaria and partly because of the lack of significant progress on some key criteria
that defined EU membership. Recently, Macedonia's slow advancement through the EU Chapters
can be attributed to the VMRO's attempts to manipulate its peripheral position to extract rent from
the EU and, at the same time, constitute an autonomous space of political sovereignty (and
domination). It is clear that in their search for international trade partners and investors, the VMRO
has beaten not only the EU track but also other paths leading eastward to Russia, Turkey, India,
and China, or westward to the USA, Brazil, and the rest of Latin America. The growing influx of
capital from China, which included a credit of 574 million euro at very low rates for the
construction of a significant portion of highway in the country, has allowed the VMRO
government to relativize the growing concern from EU institutions regarding its political
oppressiveness.
Though waning, EU influence is still strong in Macedonia. The EU still provides important
aid through the so-called Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) funds. But the EU also has a host of
other, often smaller, projects nested within Macedonian institutions. These bilateral projects aim
to strengthen and harmonize Macedonian institutions in various sectors (called Chapters in EU
jargon), bringing them up to European standards—a prerequisite for brokering accession to the
EU. Some of the areas involved include digitizing the borders of land plots with GPS technology,
training officials in the environmental sector, building intergovernmental partnerships on issues
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like sex trafficking, and promoting new pieces of legislation in the field of agriculture. While there
are various formats of EU projects that perform the activities I described above, in the following
sections I will focus on a specific kind, called Twinning Projects. Funded through IPA funds,
Twinnings are led by one or more European countries that not only transmit official EU theory
and praxis but also provide valuable insights from the application of EU standards in their own
countries and predict future developments from within the EU. This helps Macedonian institutions
to anticipate EU regulations.
The pairing of EU and candidate countries looking for EU admission is fraught with
tensions, and it is these tensions that I explore in order to outline the similarities and differences
between rentier strategies of EU and Eastern European states like Macedonia. Contrary to other
colonial projects, Neucolonialism entails a high degree of collaboration and mutual exploitation
between elites of the colonizing and colonized countries. In these intergovernmental environments,
I observed expats expressing racialized comments about locals on an everyday basis. Yet Italian
and Macedonian bureaucrats were also able to have very close interactions and collaborations.
Italians sent to Macedonia through EU projects often balance the need to teach locals how to
properly work with the need to keep Macedonian officials satisfied.
The Twinning project I examine aims at capacity building in agriculture by specifically
targeting organic production and enhancing the quality of agricultural products. At the core of the
projects are three people: one Italian Resident Twinning Advisor (RTA) and two Macedonian staff
members, an assistant and a translator. Antonio, the Italian RTA, had been part of the project since
its very beginning, when the Emilia Romagna region (one of the richest regions in Italy that has a
well-developed department for agricultural organic and quality products) built the project in
partnership with the Italian Ministry of Agriculture. He was also an important player in convincing
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the Macedonian Ministry of Agriculture (defined as the beneficiary in EU terminology) to choose
the Italian proposal over those made by other EU states. The Italians had some advantages over
projects from other EU countries: in their team, they had one of the leading European experts in
organic agricultural production, they guaranteed a single country management with streamlined
operations, and they had a better design than the competition. Antonio's interpersonal and
communicative abilities also made a crucial difference during the final presentation and the dinners
that followed.
In designating Antonio as the RTA, the Italian ministry wanted to forge a new course in its
international cooperation policy. With about seven years of experience in the Ministry of
Agriculture, he was a young, energetic, and hardworking official who had served as an expert in a
previous Twinning project in Poland. Antonio was also "the biggest paraculo around" as he
defined himself jokingly. Paraculo (literally, one who is able to cover his/her own ass) defined his
ability to deal with different people and manage unexpected challenges with wit and a nonconfrontational attitude, manipulating the situation and those around him to land on his feet.
Antonio then insisted that his two collaborators had to be female; as he told me, he considered
women easier to work with, more precise, and more accepting of hierarchical roles. Hiring Martina,
whom he considered the right fit for her professional and personal qualities, pitted him against the
Macedonian minister, who had instead promised the job to a protégé. That was Antonio's first
political statement vis-à-vis the Macedonian administration. While he was willing to compromise,
the Italians were still in charge.
The project had a particular form. Most of the team's activity consisted of flying in experts
from Italy to Skopje in order to train local personnel on the development of organic and quality
products in agriculture (a term that, in EU lingo, defined products that are locally grown, certified,
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and from the terroir). The experts were charged with helping Macedonians to design legal
instruments that regulated and promoted these sectors. Antonio, Martina, and Elena, who mostly
worked as a translator, were busy scheduling, organizing, and easing the travel and presence of
Italian agricultural experts in Macedonia, which included not only seminars and meetings with
other professionals in the field but also field trips to see the countryside and the productive capacity
of Macedonia.
However, for Antonio, the value of the project did not reside only in its technical aspect.
He had in mind a much more ambitious plan for the team, which corresponded to Rome's idea of
utilizing the project in the wider perspective of international cooperation. While the team worked
hard and did manage to promote the institutional changes mandated by the project's goals, Antonio,
Martina, and Elena added significant effort to make the project a reference point for investments
between Italy and Macedonia in the field of agriculture. Additionally, the trio spent many hours
establishing themselves in the diplomatic scene of Skopje, earning a reputation as a reliable go-to
team for diplomatic issues. Antonio quickly grew close to the new Italian ambassador, who
suggested contacts and consortia to involve, and invited him to international events. He spent long
hours at cocktail parties, opening ceremonies, and cultural events. Most importantly, he socialized
with both Italians and local actors, bringing them to clubs, fancy ethnic dinners, and making sure
that their wishes could be fulfilled.
Martina and Elena were particularly important in Antonio's diplomatic activities. While
Elena had the task of translating in official and unofficial venues, keeping a low profile, Martina
established herself as the face of the project. Her expansive personality and graceful presence
created a positive atmosphere around the team. Beautiful, young, and speaking perfect Italian, it
was Martina who smoothed the everyday frictions that emerged from different cultural
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expectations, and from Antonio and other EU expatriates' cultural isolation (see Shore 2000).
While she was invested with important responsibilities that occupied her well beyond her working
day, Martina never received the full array of benefits that Antonio did. Her pay of 1,000 euro
before taxes was much lower than what he received, and she was only partially included in the
project's strategic planning. That proved very painful when she had to plan her professional life
beyond the end of the contract, and neither Antonio nor the other managers from Rome or Bologna
proved willing to give her information about their future plans.
Despite the structural exploitation she was subject to, Martina was nonetheless happy to
work for the Italian project. She valued the project because of the possibility of working within
Western standards instead of being pressured by VMRO officials, to whose behavior she could not
always relate. Additionally, Martina appreciated being part of the elusive world of international
diplomacy. With its elegant cocktail parties, and tactical gallantries, the project's nightlife gave
Martina insights into the world of international cooperation, with an aftertaste of political power.
Coming from a single-mother household and struggling financially to achieve an international
education, Martina understood the project as her chance to become part of a different class and
show her true worth. Antonio, certainly not indifferent to Martina's charms, banked on her class
ambition. Although the stakes for each were different, both saw the project as a tool to convert
their personal value into economic and professional advancements.
The beneficiaries had a much more exploitative relation to Antonio's requested generosity
compared to Elena and Martina. Macedonian members of the ministry routinely asked Antonio to
pay for food, drinks, and even highway tickets that were not related to the project. They also used
him to solve internal conflicts that emerged from their own disorganization or lack of dialogue
between different sections of the ministry. While they admired the team's effectiveness and
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professionalism in their everyday work, they resorted to Antonio's deep pockets and mandated
availability to smooth out fights over the project's perks, such as the participation in a study visit
to Italy.
While the visit was presented to EU officials as a learning opportunity, Italians and
Macedonians had a very different idea about its actual value. For the Italians, this was an occasion
to showcase Italian quality products. Hence the study visit was designed to impress, stupefy, and
of course, stuff their Macedonian partners with food, even if many of the agricultural realities they
visited could not easily be replicated in Macedonia because of issues of scale. The Macedonians,
on the other hand, understood the trip as a vacation and an opportunity for sightseeing and
shopping in Italy. This created a huge competition for the few spots available: some of the
supervisors decided to include themselves in the study visit, even if they were scheduled to come
at a later date, excluding other members of the team working on organic products. Once this was
known, a fratricidal war ensued, with allegations, letters to the minister, and such. Antonio had to
step in and offer to pay for the additional tickets, if the Minister approved. The Minister did not
approve and instead decided to reprimand the whole group by circulating the informal news that
nobody would be allowed to go, three days before the scheduled date of departure. Exasperated,
Antonio canceled the visit only to receive the minister's approval the following working day.
The team's extra efforts were partly Antonio's personal initiative, but they were also
dictated by the Ministry of Agriculture in Rome, which made sure to stress the need to appease
certain experts over others and to appease the beneficiaries whenever possible. This approach did
have important results: Macedonian beneficiaries within the Ministry and beyond loved both the
project and Antonio, to the point that they requested him and Italy for a follow up project of two
years once the original one expired. This was not an inevitable result. A German project had been
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stalled by the unwillingness of the beneficiaries (some of whom were the same Antonio dealt with)
to collaborate with the German advisor, whom they thought too strict and not agreeable. While
Antonio had a personal stake in remaining in Macedonia, given his large salary of 8,000 euro per
month (note that other EU advisors in Macedonia earned over 30,000 euro per month, while
Macedonia's average income was less than 400 euro per month in 2013), that was not his ultimate
goal. His objective was to impress Rome and create a network of contacts in order to move to
Brussels in the future. Rent for him and for the Italian ministry did not only mean gaining money
or partaking in a middle-class status—an aspiration for the Macedonian beneficiaries. Antonio and
the Italian ministry saw rent as a political opportunity to appease their internal hierarchies and
make inroads in the Neucolonial bureaucracy. It was no secret that Antonio treated his post in
Macedonia as a way to gain contacts and visibility that would lead him to more lucrative and
powerful positions in Brussels.
Moving to the periphery was, for Antonio, a way to find a space to shine, a possibility he
would never have had in Rome. There, positions of power were already filled or reserved for
people with powerful connections. Antonio's strategy was very reminiscent of older colonial times,
when administrators were sent overseas and looked to further their chances in coming back to the
capital by working in a remote land. But it also corresponded to the more general experience of
international cooperation professionals, required to be in the field before coming back to an
organization's headquarters (Cole 2007). Antonio understood that in multilateral international
settings, which involved EU and Macedonian officials, local administrative personnel, and Italian
ministry supervisors and experts, the best way to further his contacts and chances was to please
everybody. This was not impossible, given that his financial resources were significant for
Macedonian standards. He could afford to satisfy local rent-seeking behaviors.
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The Italian Ministry, on the other hand, had different expectations: officials in Rome used
the trip to Skopje as a bonus for their experts, whose generous travel allowances were paid for
through the project's funds. Pampering important experts in Skopje was particularly useful to
soften hierarchies within the Ministry in Italy. It also granted international visibility to Italian
cooperation and furthered the Ministry's chances to win other projects, securing both money from
Brussels and political influence in Neucolonial circles. Reaching the goal of the project was
important for the EU, but the ultimate goal was spending the budget while granting the EU
visibility as a donor. The EU placed significant emphasis on the project's visibility strategy; while
the project had a budget for things like mugs, agendas, calendars, and other promotional material
with flags and titles of the project, they could not invest in productivity tools such as smartphones,
or research activities. In a way, the EU conceived of the project as a way to legitimize its own
presence, claiming a civilizing value that hid rent processes at the core of Neucolonialism.

1.9 Conclusion: Neucolonialism and Rent-seeking Behaviors
How does one generate resources from a country that does not have many? Macedonia does not
have extensive natural resources, except for some minerals that compose up to nine percent of its
exports. Its productive system had been substantially reduced during the transition, and it was
mostly composed of heavy industry with low value-added production (in Yugoslavia, those were
mostly located in northern republics). At the onset of the financial crisis, just a few years into the
VMRO government, it looked like the best way to generate wealth was to attract foreign
investments that wanted to exploit the country's low salaries, utilize abundant aid packages from
Europe, take out international loans, and transform the economy into a financial haven (a project
that was later abandoned).
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The VMRO, however, was not interested only in promoting richness in Macedonia. Data
about the increase in wealth possessed by the top one percent (from six percent in 2006 to 12% in
2015) suggest that it was mostly interested in siphoning money towards its core. Rumors about the
content of confidential reports from the US embassy posted on WikiLeaks, as well as the
ethnographic data I presented above, suggest the same. The VMRO did not want to attract every
investor but mostly those that could be manipulated and utilized to build its power basis. In fact,
international investors did not flock to Macedonia. While the country's FDI is important, it never
was as flourishing as that of Hungary or Poland. By examining the rentier approach of the VMRO
system, presented here at various levels through the eyes of international investors, we can see
why.
This strategy has had unexpected positive results. Rentier structures are often described as
unproductive, their profit as unearned (Congleton, Hillman, and Konrad 2008) and unconnected
to merit (Yates 1996, Schatzberg 1988). Such a negative portrait of rent structures comes from two
distinct theoretical perspectives. On the one hand, classical and neoclassical political economists
such as Tullock (1974) and Kureger (1974) see rent as antithetical to the market. Rents derive, in
their perspective, from public monopolies and lead to a wasteful utilization of resources. Critical
theorists often agree on this point. Veblen (1934) identifies a "leisure class" that spent money on
generating status rather than on creating wealth. His theory, however, follows more closely Marx
(1993) and describes the predatory schemes with which capital (and capitalists) generate more
capital without investing in actual production.
Two points are not adequately represented in this discussion. The first one is linked to the
idea, suggested by Veblen (1934) and highlighted by Hudson (2012), that rent is a way of
generating something from nothing. While such a critique is extremely valid from the perspective
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of a production system based upon a Calvinist morality, there are situations in which generating
something out of nothing is one of the few options available. This is what Macedonia has had to
face since the transition from socialism in a climate where international competition made attempts
to sustain, revive, or recreate production systems futile. The VMRO won the 2006 elections (and
all those that followed) precisely because it was helping common citizens and businesses create
wealth, albeit by redistributing a small portion and keeping the larger share. The asset it exploited
was one of the few available: the EU. This meant both cashing in on its status of candidate country,
as we saw for the Twinning project, but also cashing in on direct investments for infrastructure.
Creating something from nothing, then, did not only work to empower oligarchs and
generate inequality, as Stiglitz (2015) and others suggest. It did not create a petty bourgeoisie
dedicated to leisure, in the sense highlighted by Veblen (1934). Instead, it opened the possibility
for formerly working-class citizens, especially in the provinces, to become members of an aspiring
rentier class. Such a monetary and existential status was mostly granted through employment in
the public sector, which increased enormously during the VMRO tenure, and further by the
creation of networks of businessmen connected to the government. Working in the public
administration granted substantial resources without the need to prove actual productivity, thanks
to the substantial overemployment in low-skilled positions that I witnessed. Salaries were, after
all, one third higher than in the construction sector and came with various perks. They were often
granted for life and included facilitated access to credit.
At the same time, the aspiring rentier class never quite coalesced into a unitary body with
collective interests (Boone 1990). Apart from fear of the VMRO structure, individual bureaucrats
spent long hours fighting each other. Uninterested in transforming their voters, mostly from poor,
rural areas of the country that had been largely ravaged by the transition, the VMRO appealed to
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nationalism and rent seeking as two existential and economic strategies to mobilize voters.
Nationalism, ethnicity, and the allure of rent, especially in the form of public administration or
public contracts, became the VMRO's basic tool for economic redistribution (Boone 1990).
However, the weak political economic foundations of Macedonia's financialization have made rent
seeking a very unstable process. Even within the VMRO, very few in Skopje have a solid rentier
position, if one excludes Prime Minister Gruevski, his best man and vice Prime Minister for
finance, Zoran Stavrevski, and Gruevki's cousins, the advisor to the customs administration,
Vladimir Mijalkov, and especially the head of the secret services, Sasho Mijalkov. A wealthy
magnate in the Czech Republic, Sasho Mijalkov increased the budget of the Ministry of the Interior
from USD 146 million in 2006 to USD 212 million in 2014; the security apparatus he constructed
resulted in over 30,000 citizens being wiretapped, various political imprisonments, and nearly total
control over the media (Cvetkovska and Holcova 2014).
Entering the VMRO's aspirational rentier class was generated by economic insecurity as
well as by hopes and ideas about social modernization promoted by EU values. Martina and Elena,
the two assistants for the Twinning project, found themselves helping the process of integration of
two rentier structures. Partially, they took such a position because it paid well. In addition,
however, they felt they had the possibility of belonging to a political project. Having both worked
in Macedonian structures before, they wanted to see changes in the efficiency and approach to
work. In order to achieve that goal and to become part of an international elite, they felt
comfortable with mediating the interests of local and international bureaucrats, even if their
primary interest was not the values they believed in but various forms of rent extraction.
This highlights a difference from accounts of the Milosevic regime or other aspiring rentier
or authoritarian regimes (Fischer 2007). As will be clear throughout the dissertation, individuals
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who support the VMRO and smooth the working of the regime are not a crowd of thugs, nor are
they all hardcore, belligerent nationalists. Many of them are impoverished, former working-class
citizens, entrepreneurially minded youth, or fearful bureaucrats who saw in the VMRO an
existential anchor, a financial opportunity, or a fearsome new patron. In general, the level of
conflict and repression, while high, is also hidden from plain sight, and the regime has been both
pervasive and informal; extremely effective in security deals, and unable to attract capital; brutally
repressive in the mobilization of the judiciary and unwilling to conduct raids against protesters.
This shows the peculiar aspect of rent-seeking behaviors in Macedonia as opposed to the famous
hawker culture in Naples, or the "friendship that strangles" observed in Rome (Herzfeld 2009).
Rent-seeking behaviors do not appear in Skopje with the bravado of a young, well-dressed
impostor; instead, they oscillate between the raucous commands uttered by the bulky and boldheaded figure of a VMRO official and the anxious and despairing argument between a company
owner and his worker, who tries to at least extract rent, if not the wages he is owed.
The insistence on the party and the aspiration to recreate a state structure with its distinct
ideology distances the regime from completely relying on a network of underground criminals,
such as in the case of Montenegro (Strazzari 2007), or from simply being a tool for preying on
state resources (Ganev 2007). It is undeniable that the regime has favored new and old oligarchs.
It is also now evident that members of the regime have gained a substantial amount of money
themselves. Yet the regime has also significantly built up state capacity, rather than simply preying
upon its inefficiency like the gang-like politicians that run Bulgaria in the 1990s (Ganev 2007).
This leads directly to the second aspect of Macedonia's rentier structure that is not quite
captured in classical economic understandings of rent. The VMRO has been formidable in
generating domestic political power by taming international and European sources of credit. The
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case of Martina and Elena is again telling. Because they were not hired by the Macedonian
government but by the Italian one, they were freer to act and speak than their local colleagues.
They also did not need to get involved in the internal fighting at the Ministry where they worked—
although they often did by distributing perks to all the parties involved in order to keep them quiet.
Such a position generated jealousy from those other bureaucrats and aspiring rentiers, who instead
had to bear the full weight of the VMRO's oppressive system.
Being part of an oppressive system, where individuals were often pitted against one
another, was a consequence of the VMRO's capacity to mediate international markets. If one
compares Macedonia to other countries, it appears clear that the country has been able to navigate
the crisis better than others. This is not because Macedonia has huge trade surpluses, like Russia,
or has significant household savings, like Italy. I believe the reason for this must be found in the
specific strategy adopted by the VMRO in selecting and attracting foreign capital. My ethnography
and the classified documents I accessed show that the VMRO was interested not only in attracting
money but also, and more importantly, in controlling it. The party purposely mishandled some
high-level meetings with international investors who would have been too big to control (including
major US corporations). This, in combination with domestic forms of credit I describe in Chapter
2, limited the country's exposure to international capital and helped expand it over time without
the need to borrow all at once. In other words, while the VMRO's rent seeking might have saved
the country from financial meltdown, these behaviors condemned it to political oppression.
Why did the emergence of the VMRO not trigger some warnings among EU professionals?
As my ethnography shows, Twinning project officials from the Italian state and local Macedonian
administrators had a lot in common, particularly when it came to skimming EU funds for their
personal or political interests. EU officials and entrepreneurs understood the EU as a pot of money
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to utilize for converting and enhancing their personal value through international connections,
projects, and money. While the Twinning project was ultimately successful, I had the impression
that tackling actual issues and problems fell on a second plane. What was created was a network
of legal "harmonized" structures and a tight system of interdependence and connections—which
could work both to empower some few marginal subjects (like Martina, Elena, and, in a much
more significant way, Antonio and Gennaro) and to reinforce structures of power.
With the tacit approval of EU emissaries, who also use EU funds for funding their own
political goals, the VMRO elites convert European financial aid and private investments into
political credit towards enterprises and personal benefits. I believe this highlights a specific trait
of the Neucolonial regime of governance, one in which different rentier projects come together in
uncanny symbiosis (Langdon 1981) that are, however, often uncomfortable, riddled with conflict
and mutual attempts at exploitation. Such a form of colonialism seems very different from British
domination or even US-based regimes of (under)development, insofar as it involved, directly and
indirectly, a wide array of bureaucrats, elites, and entrepreneurs in common pursuit of rent, rather
than outright domination. In these spheres, rent stops being a gain-oriented activity and begins to
look like a trait of one's subjectivity, which involves a reorientation of one's value as well as
behavior.
Neucolonialism ties together in uncomfortable symbiosis EU elites, authoritarian leaders
from peripheral countries, aspiring middle-class citizens of Eastern European countries, and
entrepreneurs fleeing the crisis in EU semiperipheral states; all of these actors make
Neucolonialism into a multilayered form of governmentality, akin to "humanitarian" regimes
observed in other parts of the world (Pandolfi 2003, 2010). But what is its core mechanism? Dunn
and Bobick (2014) argue that for Putin's Russia, the central technology of domination is occupation
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without occupation: seizing hold of a portion of a neighboring state, Putin mimics the rhetoric of
Western interventionism, rendering the occupied state dysfunctional without actually having to
govern it. In this way, Russia avoids carrying the burden of occupation while still sabotaging the
independence and geopolitical capacity to act (that is, sovereignty) of the (non)occupied state—a
move that for the authors is a direct reaction to the EU's eastward expansion.
The article, written before the dramatic unfolding of the 2015 Greek crisis, argues that this
imperial project stands in contrast with the EU, which instead insists upon transparency, rule of
law, and the building of a Weberian bureaucratic complex (Dunn and Bobick 2014). But that is
not the kind of image of the EU that emerged from the events in Greece. While Putin took hostage
parts of the Moldovan, Georgian, and Ukrainian territories, the EU kidnapped Greek banks using
not the fifth army, but the Central European Bank. The result was the same: Greece, just like
Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova, was put in a state of tension, with its institutions unable to
function. The difference is thus not one of "kind" of governmentality but of a different historical
conjuncture that confronts the two imperial projects. Until now the EU had no competitor in
Eastern Europe and could count on friendly governments. When Greece's leftist party Syriza
confronted the EU with a competing idea of politics, the Eurogroup acted in the same way as
Putin's Russia, crippling the Greek state, draining its monetary means of payments and ensuring
that it will be kept as a dysfunctional, limited sovereign entity for the near future. Note the
difference with Putin's imperialism: Neucolonialism used illiquidity instead of territorial control
to disintegrate Greece's sovereignty.
Flows of money are the crucial tenet of Neucolonial governmentality and correspond to the
EU's aspiration to bypass territorial limitations—a goal that has been reached not through political
government but through currency integration (Shore 2000, Peebles 2011). As I will show here,
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much of the EU's influence is not of a directly territorial kind, except for the rather shortsighted
attempt to fortify its external (and internal) boundaries against the byproducts of its wealth, that is,
migrants (Jansen 2005, Agier 2010, Green 2013, Zontini 2008). By and large, the EU works
through financial institutions: loans, aid packages, assistance funds, and private investments that
aim to shape the receiving's country sovereignty. The ways these funds are received and put to
work show that Neucolonialism is not currently geared towards the construction of a solid
bureaucratic system of a Weberian kind. Instead, it aims to legitimize the EU as a system of
redistribution that encourages rent-seeking activities from elites and citizens in the receiving
country as well as from EU states' bureaucracies.
This mechanism fell out of sync in late 2015. While for about nine years, EU technocrats
and political elites had been complicit in Macedonia's authoritarian financialization, the sudden
explosion of political protest that followed the allegation of widespread wiretapping by the
government and the release of recordings of high-level officials forced them to take a stand. It is
unclear who leaked those tapes to the leader of the opposition, Zoran Zaev, and why. Yet in the
aftermath, EU officials and ambassadors have been united in condemning the VMRO government
and brokered a deal to change the regime. This ultimately led Nikola Gruevki to resign, to the
creation of a special prosecutor for the crimes committed, and to anticipated elections in April
2016. Yet as of the time of writing April 2016, the date of the election has already been postponed
once, given the little progress made in dismantling the VMRO mechanisms of power (which
included false lists of electors, fake I.D.s, etc.). Similarly, the prosecutor's requests to detain
suspects of significant crimes and former VMRO officials or ministries has been denied. This led
the top EU negotiator in Macedonia, Peter Vanhoutte, to declare that "regime change by elections
is not an option anymore" (NeOnline 2016).
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I believe the two are connected. The VMRO regime, while working along and within the
framework of Neucolonialism, did not ultimately want to be part of a complex system of
governance. Nikola Gruevski and his crew aimed to construct an independent, sovereign,
authoritarian state that utilized financial markets opportunistically to create domestic illiquidity
and patronage. So far, they have failed, as Neucolonial forces have pushed them beyond their
ability to control the population. Yet their grip on power remains strong. In what follows, I will
show why.
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2. Financialization Without Liquidity: Alternative Payment Systems
In September 2013, I had a long interview with a very successful businessman who owned a
construction company. Sitting at a café, he looked at me with glassy eyes, wary of sharing details
about his business. The kinds of questions I was asking, focused on finance, were suspicious. He
did not even want to concede that there was a global financial crisis, and certainly not in
Macedonia. He looked at me as if discussing the crisis would be a compromising subject. For the
first time, but not the last, I sensed unexpressed suspicion about my real intents, motives, and
political (or security) allegiances. His fears were understandable. While I was not a spy, an
undercover agent, or a member of the SDSM opposition party, he owed his fortune to the current
right-wing authoritarian government, from whom he had received substantial investments. I
witnessed other companies struggling to pay their employees and get paid by their customers. For
him, that crisis did not exist. Despairing that I would not get an actual answer, I made a passing
comment about the housing market being often prone to bubbles. "The market?" he started
laughing, "Do you think I am crazy? I would never invest in the free market!"
There is no free urban real estate/construction/development market; my Macedonian
interlocutors of different political sides all agreed on that. What there is, instead, is "an urban
mafia," "an octopus that strangles you," "a system that drags you down"—these are only some of
the ways in which inhabitants of Skopje describe the rent-seeking behaviors that I presented in
Chapter 1. Such social relations are organized around a hierarchy that is deeply intertwined with
the financialization of the country's economy. The following figures show that the state, families,
and individuals are experiencing an expansion of financial products, especially loans. Contrary to
what happened in financialized economies such as Spain or the US (Palomera 2014, Aalbers 2008),
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where financial debt generated a wealth effect and a temporary proliferation of money, in
Macedonia, salaries stagnated and inflation went negative.

Figure 13: Inflation rate in Macedonia.

Source: State Statistical Office of Macedonia.

Figure 14: Average salary in Macedonia.

Source: State Statistical office of Macedonia.
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If Macedonia's economy is being financialized, the private and public sectors are heavily
indebted, and money is not flowing into wages or increased spending by the population, where has
it gone? One could imagine that the money has been funneled into savings by individuals. Yet as
the graph clearly shows, household savings have been negative for most of recent history, with a
low of 15.4% in 2007. In addition, while the GDP has certainly expanded, most of this expansion
is due to foreign companies investing in Macedonia. Household debt in Macedonia is around 21%
of the GDP but around 30% of disposable income and 45% of financial net assets. This is certainly
among the lowest in the region. Yet many of my middle- and working-class interlocutors were in
arrears with their installments and often received threatening calls from banks. This is not the only
contradiction unveiled by an examination of aggregate numbers. In 2014, it took on average 234
days to sell properties in the construction sector, up from 193 days in 2013. How can one explain
the presence of excess liquidity and, at the same time, of extreme difficulty in selling newly built
property?
I believe that the discrepancy between aggregate and ethnographic data needs to be
explained by studying the relations between monetary and in-kind payments, as framed by the
VMRO authoritarian government. If financialization is providing liquidity to the Macedonian
society, who is getting this money, and why did a large portion of my interlocutors have a very
hard time getting paid for their efforts? I will begin to answer these questions with a short
ethnographic vignette.

120

Figure 15: Household debt to GDP in selected Eastern European countries.

Source: National Banks.

Figure 16: Disposable income, private consumption, and saving rate of households in Macedonia.

Source: National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia. 2015. Financial Stability Report for the Republic
of Macedonia 2014. On the left, million denars. On the right, percentage of saving rates.
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Figure 17: Indicators for household debt in Macedonia.

Surce: National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia. 2015. Financial Stability Report for the Republic of
Macedonia 2014.

It had been a long conversation. As he unlocked his bike and we were about to part ways,
I mentioned that I was interested in kompenzacija. At first, Ilco gestured dismissively, then looked
at me baffled. "Kompenzacija?" he asked. "Oh, we need to sit down a whole day to talk about this.
You can't imagine how often I did kompenzacija with other people. But most of the time, when
somebody mentions kompenzacija, you immediately know that it is not good. I did it myself, you
know, I also got people screwed with kompenzacija. But let me tell you this: if people who owe
me money want to give me, say, toilet paper, well that's okay. I can place toilet paper in a second.
I make a couple of calls, and bam, it is gone. No problem at all. But nobody wants to give you
toilet paper. They could sell it themselves. So you get stuck with other things… What do you do
then? Listen now—once I did the worst kompenzacija ever. I had sold some stuff to this guy, but
for about six months he hadn't paid me; he always had something coming up—some problem with
the bank, some issue with the family, something. So one day I go to his house, and I tell him that
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I can't wait any longer. I also have my own problems, and I'm about one hundred thousand euro in
debt with other people. So I tell him that I really need to get paid now. He has no money, he tells
me. But then he says, 'I can give you some stuff, we can do kompenzacija.' I ask him, 'What kind
of things?' 'Eggs,' he says."
At this point Ilco stops, turns to me, passing a hand on the bald and sweaty surface of his
head. "Can you imagine that? Fresh eggs! So I get the eggs in the van, there might have been
thousands of them, and I start driving back home. But you know how our villages are—it was far
from Skopje, in the middle of the mountain, and the road was so poor that… You can't imagine
the condition my van was in when I got back here. Half of the eggs were broken, and I spent more
to clean the van than the worth of the whole load." He paused briefly, then he stared at me "THAT
is kompenzacija."
Kompenzacija (literally, "compensation") is the Macedonian answer to financialization
without liquidity. Through kompenzacija, in-kind payments are intertwined with the authoritarian
regime in the Republic of Macedonia and neighboring countries such as Serbia, Bulgaria, and
Kosovo. The data I discuss present cases whereby construction-related goods such as tiles, but
especially apartments, are used to pay for labor and services, including installing parquets,
mounting bathroom appliances, or drawing architectural plans. While some of these transactions
were relatively satisfactory, given the intrinsic social value and status that my interlocutors
associated with objects like cars and apartments, in most of the cases, people were forced to accept
kompenzacija and lost part of the monetary value of their labor. Like in Ilco's story, if you were
paid in kompenzacija you were likely to end up with broken eggs and a van to clean. So why did
people accept kompenzacija?
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My interlocutors claimed that the forms of kompenzacija I observed from 2012 onwards
arose because of the lack of money that Macedonians experience. Chapter 1 has already
emphasized how Macedonia has attracted international flows of money, albeit in insufficient
amounts compared to the VMRO's expectations. Official data show that Macedonian banks have
a capital adequacy ratio of 25% and that the state, the national banks, and some companies have
substantial reserves of cash both in Macedonian denars (MKD) and in other foreign currencies
such as euros or dollars. Yet companies I worked with were unable to get paid and perennially
lacked cash. What explains this paradox? In this chapter, I analyze how illiquidity circulates within
the Macedonian economy, becoming a system of redistribution of value. Far from being a
condition that is determined by the mechanical presence or absence of money, illiquidity signals a
reorganization of political power that regulates equivalences of value(s). It designates the
emergence of a new regime of conversion, whereby the VMRO regulates equivalences in payment
systems, subjecting companies and workers to its rule.
In this chapter, I discuss the emergence of kompenzacija as an ethnographic object that
illustrates the specificity of financialization under authoritarian regimes. The chapter details the
role of kompenzacija payments during socialism and the first years of transition in order to
foreground the affective and material legacies of power that accompany today's emergence of
illiquidity as a tool for financial subjection. Since the ascent to power of the conservative VMRO
government in 2006, kompenzacija has become part of a centralized, highly hierarchical system
of payments. Kompenzacija, then, is utilized by the VMRO as a way to siphon money to its cadres
and business associates and force other companies to subject themselves to political patronage.
I take on several ethnographic questions. Why do we see a resurgence of in-kind payments
in Macedonia in the wake of the global crisis that began in 2007? What makes goods like

124

apartments, eggs, tiles, and cars less valuable than money? Why are certain people paid in MKD
and others in eggs or apartments? Why do many people knowingly accept means of payment that
they do not want, knowing that they will lose monetary value? The answers to these questions lie
in the politics of illiquidity—which I understand not as a mere "fact"; that is, the presence or
absence of money, but as a form of redistribution and control of the money supply that allows the
VMRO government to build its economic and existential support. Examining strategies of
accounting and the hierarchies that make (im)possible the conversion of money into apartments,
cars, and eggs, I show how the VMRO produces authoritarian subjection through different methods
of payments.

2.1 Barter, Payments, and Politics.
The anthropological archive is rich in examples of complex exchange regimes, where different
methods of payment coexisted. Societies as diverse as the Trobriand Islands or the Tiv of Nigeria
ascribed specific methods of payments to different kinds of transactions (Malinowski 1978,
Bohannan and Bohannan 1968). Among the Trobrianders, prestige was marked by kula, or the
exchange of bracelets and necklaces made of cowries and beads, while everyday items of
consumption were bartered. Cowries were probably also traded within such barter transaction; it
was not only the material or object in and of itself that defined its specific social function. Rather,
it was the history of the previous owner of the specific bracelet or necklace that made it meaningful
in the sphere of prestige. According to Guyer (2004), while the Tiv society clearly distinguished
among three spheres of exchange (one for everyday goods and consumables, one for prestige, and
one for rights over women), goods that functioned as currency in one sphere could also move
across others.
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The list goes on, as noted by others who have reviewed existing anthropological studies on
"primitive" money and payments systems (Peebles 2010, Maurer 2006, Parry and Bloch 1989).
Without attempting to be exhaustive, I want to stress here some elements that emerged from the
pioneering studies of Malinowski and Bohannon and that continue to shape the anthropological
canon with regards to multiple methods of payment. First, Malinowski and Bohannon portray
different types of exchange as possessing different forms of abstraction. In the kula ring, objects
are very personal and it is precisely their uniqueness, what Weiner (1992) has identified as a form
of "inalienable wealth," that defines their value. On the contrary, objects transacted in barter
exchanges, both among the Tiv and the Trobrianders, are anonymous. At the same time, barter is
described as qualitatively different from modern market exchanges—a type of transaction that
authors like Graeber (2012) consider more abstracting. In fact, Malinowski and Bohannon (1959)
tended to see the introduction of universal money and values as detrimental to local morality and
society.
In other words, in-kind exchanges that constitute forms of barter have been conceptualized
as part of markets that are neither completely personal nor completely impersonal. Humphrey
(1985) has provided one of the best illustrations of the specific nature of barter exchanges,
describing barter as horizontal transactions between equal and free partners, who exchange goods
(but also services) pertaining to different social domains of value. In other words, barter does fulfill
market needs, but it does so through the conversion of use values, rather than through the use of
impersonal currency. While a competitive, rational, and self-interested calculation is at play in
such exchanges, the reasons that bring each partner to evaluate the other's goods are framed within
ethnic or social boundaries that pre-exist or are created by such transactions (Pedersen 2007,
Ssorin-Chaikov 2000, Cellarius 2000, Humphrey 1985, Björklund Larsen 2013).
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There is, however, no reason to think that every exchange done in kind responds to these
characteristics. While economists tend to identify changes in payment systems with the evolution
of new (and more efficient) methods of payments, many anthropological studies show that
different types of exchanges are defined by their social relations, rather than by the mere objects
utilized. In other words, it is not the material cloth that makes a one-dollar bill money. Rather, a
one-dollar bill is considered different from a rag because of the authority that issued it and the
social context in which we live. Similarly, in-kind exchanges do not need to be horizontal and free
at all. Tributes have historically been transactions where goods were used to signal political
dependency and domination (Brumfiel 1997). Goods can also be given freely or in payment in
order to create dependencies—as is the case with payments in drugs and or other overpriced goods,
so as to create debt-peonage across the globe (Mollona 2005, Bletzer 2004).
The second interconnected point is that systems of payments are directly connected to
specific forms of political power. In the Trobriand Islands, the kula system defines and ranks
chiefs. While barter was not the main aspect of kula exchange, it was, however, crucial to initiate
as well as to keep alive over time, especially if one of the two partners did not yet have a valuable
to donate. While in Tiv society it was rights over women that defined one's "strong heart"
(Bohannan 1959:498), barter of consumption goods could be crucial to solidifying one's reputation
if it led to conversion into goods of higher value. Excess goods could be used to buy prestige goods
that could then be used to buy rights over wives. While noting very different articulations between
different currencies and tokens of exchange, these examples show that in-kind exchanges are not
necessarily linked to horizontal, fragmented political scenarios. The Tiv and Trobriand cases show
that, at least at a local level, in-kind exchanges can favor forms of political centralization and
hierarchies.
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These two considerations notwithstanding, more recent discussions of barter have tended
to discuss in-kind exchanges in relation to political fragmentation. Hence, much of the literature
on barter emerged in connection with dramatic ruptures of nation-states institutions, such as in the
case of postsocialist transitions. In places like Russia in the 1990s, barter has been observed in
parallel with the fragmentation of political power, now exerted by various suzerains (Humphrey
2000, Woodruff 1998, Seabright 2000). Complex networks of in-kind exchanges emerged as local
alternative to ensure the survival of people in a situation of political chaos (Verdery 1996, Dunn
2008). Among the transactions necessary to overcome institutional collapse, a vast literature
documented the diffusion of networks of favors: defined as connections or bribes, anthropologists
have shown the social value and complex morality that make these informal arrangements
acceptable to people caught in the collapse of planned economy and the shock of neoliberal
reforms (Ledeneva 1998, Torsello 2010, Rivkin-Fish 2005, Dunn 2004, Brkovic 2015, Sampson
2005, Rogers 2005).
But if in-kind exchanges signal political fragmentation, why are we experiencing a
resurgence of barter on a global scale? In-kind exchanges have picked up significantly in recent
years. The International Reciprocal Trade Association reports that in 2011, 400,000 companies
used barter to earn over 12 billion USD. We could, of course, concur with economists to explain
contemporary barter as either a survival mechanism or an attempt to place unprofitable stock that
was unsold after the crisis (Keys and Malnight 2012)). Yet this would not explain the qualitative
shift that anthropologists who studied contemporary finance have observed (Ho 2009, Zaloom
2006, Riles 2010, Miyazaki 2013, Maurer 2005, Holmes 2009, Knorr-Cetina and Preda 2007, Poon
2009). In the increasingly fast and abstract world of mobile payments and financial transaction,
money is dematerialized, and its role as a "means of payment" resembles mostly that of a unit of
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account (Maurer 2015). When people pay with plastic cards, money exists mostly as a number on
bank accounts, making purchases looks like a direct conversion of time into goods. In addition,
the multiplication of currencies and means of payments suggests that money is often transformed
and converted multiple times before actually completing a transaction. Just like goods that had to
be converted across domains of values, mobile money undergoes many more transformations than
their modern economies' relative, silver or gold coins.
I believe that kompenzacija can productively be analyzed as a relation between money and
goods that reflects broader political and economic phenomena. My analysis of kompenzacija
shows that financialization and in-kind transactions do not belong to two different worlds. Instead,
they are intertwined with many of the same complex political processes that make goods,
currencies and debts comparable and transactable. In the case of Macedonia, it is the VMRO
authoritarian regime and its capacity to coerce individuals violently and subliminally that frames
the relation between kompenzacija and financialization. This means two things: first, that
economic actors close to the VMRO that can monopolize the system of conversion can extract fees
from others. This is not very different from Maurer's (2012) findings in relation to networks such
as M-Pesa or Paypal. These networks of payments constitute de facto private monopolies of
conversions that extract fees to proceed and operate the various conversions needed to complete
mobile or electronic payments. Such rents (Harvey 1989b), however, do not need to be only
monetary or economic in nature. Historically, a monopoly over means of payments and control
over the system of payments has been crucial for the consolidation of political power. Locke, for
instance, was particularly concerned with the proliferation of clipped money. For him, the
diffusion of a currency whose weight did not respect its official value jeopardized the very
authority of the British Crown (Caffentzis 1989). Quinn and Roberds (2008), in their survey of
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means of payment, show that bills of exchange were widely utilized because they could circulate
without a central authority to guarantee them.
What we see in Macedonia in the 2010s, then, is not a proliferation of in-kind exchanges
as survival tactics between petty, competitive traders, such as the form that dominated the USSR's
landscape in the 1990s (Humphrey 2000). It is also not the accumulation of power and profit
through increasing the pace and volume of transactions, as in the case of financial networks of
payments. On the contrary, conceptually as well as ethnographically, kompenzacija shows the
solidification of the VMRO regime and its capacity to translate international finance into a
domestic system of patronage and, ultimately, control. The VMRO utilized international credit
lines to expand its reach and convince people to support the party in exchange for public contracts
or jobs. In the aftermath of the 2007-2012 crisis, the VMRO strategy proved insufficient to avoid
an economic slowdown in Macedonia's economy, as foreign investors seemed skeptical of
bringing their production to Macedonia—a process I highlighted in Chapter 1. Yet, this shortfall
empowered, rather than jeopardized, the party's political power. Citizens utilized their new public
jobs for mortgages or consumer loans. Companies, on the other hand, reacted to the VMRO's
availability of money by investing. As economic conditions tightened, indebted sectors of the
population turned to the VMRO as the main source of money.
This leads to the second specificity of the authoritarian financialization of Macedonia:
illiquidity. Amateurs and professional analysts of the Macedonian economy hear the word
nelikvidnosta (illiquidity) on a daily basis. Business owners and workers alike lament the delay
with which they are paid. Wholesalers and subcontractors complain that they are often offered to
be paid in kind, rather than in money. Overall, everybody seems to agree: illiquidity stems from a
lack of money in Macedonia's business world. In this chapter, I show that illiquidity is not a mere
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"fact," a negative state caused by the lack of money. On the contrary, illiquidity is a system of
relations that regulates the convertibility and value of different means of payments, whereby
members of the VMRO and their business cronies are empowered at the expense of other citizens.
Illiquidity, then, has political and moral implications and is partially caused by kompenzacija. In
fact, kompenzacija allows the VMRO to expand its power by restricting, rather than dispersing,
citizens' access to money, as happens in other rentier states (Coronil 1997, Boon 1990).
Manipulating the relationship between various methods of payments, the VMRO party has
utilized its coercive power to reconfigure the state as a gigantic pyramid scheme. As Verdery
(1996) has studied, speculative environments such as pyramid schemes have been significant
cultural and economic formations in postsocialist countries. In places like Romania, they emerged
as a consequence of the economic downturn of the transition and the reconfiguration of the social,
religious, and economic meanings of money. In Albania, according to Musaraj (2012), pyramid
schemes emerged in connection with the availability of cash and remittances from international
migration. In the Macedonian construction sector, kompenzacija forces companies not only to
extend credit to others, but effectively to tie their economic fortune to their debtor. As
subcontractors are forced to accept apartments in payments, they pay for contractors' operation
and allow contractors to invest their own money somewhere else. But because apartments take a
long time to build, this means that subcontractors depend on the economic destiny of the
contractor. If the latter fails, their creditors lose everything.
Kompenzacija, one of the main types of exchanges that allow illiquidity to emerge,
connects eggs, cars, apartments, and the global crisis as sources of political power. I argue that,
through kompenzacija, illiquidity structures a political system whereby, with increasing political
distance from the VMRO and their affiliates, individuals lose their certainty of being able to
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convert their resources into economic value. The lack of political support, then, generates
mounting financial pressure on individuals, who find themselves isolated and yet unable to change
their economic situation. The most common solution, for many of these individuals, is to enter the
pyramid of the VMRO party in order to get political support and perpetrate kompenzacija further.
In these conditions, kompenzacija is both an anchor for failing businesses to delay their financial
meltdown and a threat to politically exposed individuals and companies, which risk losing value
by being forced to accept goods as payment. Either ways, kompenzacija pushes people to join the
VMRO party to minimize the risks of losing economic value brought about by authoritarian
financialization.

2.2 The History of Kompenzacija
Kompenzacija was very well known during socialist times. Accounts I collected show that both
institutions and private companies often paid with goods instead of dinars, the socialist Yugoslav
currency. Yet, the context and the function that kompenzacija fulfilled seem to be radically
different from those observed today.
Despite the limited data available on socialist kompenzacija, it is clear that in-kind
exchanges in Yugoslavia differed from what was observed in other socialist countries. The USSR,
Romania, Hungary, and the DDR (Verdery 1996, Humphrey 2002, Kornai 1992) followed a rigid
model of economic planning. This was not the case in Yugoslavia, where central planning existed
until 1952 but was modified with the progressive introduction of market mechanisms in 1964,
which were then extended in the mid-1970s. Companies operated in a limited "market
environment" and were organized around the principle of self-management, whereby a collective
of workers directed the enterprise—although not independently from the Communist Party
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(Bartlett 1997). Because shortages were not as dire and fluctuations in production were not as
extreme as in USSR-linked countries, Yugoslavia's companies had less need to hoard, exchange,
and pay in goods (Estrin 1991, Palairet 1997, Vuckovic 1963, Ribnikar 1989).
While state control of the economy was not as oppressive, it was still extensive. Payments
between enterprises, for instance, happened mostly through the Public Accountancy Office (SOK),
which coordinated the cashless transfer of money from one company to another (Ott 1988). My
interlocutors would go to the Public Accountancy Office with receipts that signaled the amount of
money they needed to receive from a third company. The Office itself would then transfer funds
to the petitioner. Things did not always work smoothly: often companies did not have funds
available, and only personal connections would alert my interlocutors about when it was a
propitious time for collecting dues.
This was more of a hassle than a problem, and lack of money did not force companies to
close or go bankrupt. Because the ultimate value was production, not profit, the state made sure to
redistribute surplus and debt, especially if the financial stability of a company and its
subcontractors were at risk. Money worked as a unit of accounting that "followed after
production," in Woodruff's (1999) brilliant definition, rather than as a goal of production in itself.
Kompenzacija followed a similar path: it was often used to bypass the problems of monetary
scarcity that some companies faced and keep production going. Because ultimately what needed
to be transferred was labor and the goal was production, kompenzacija worked perfectly as a tool
for liquidity in the socialist value system.
In practice, this was a very messy process. The case of the Metallurgic Kombinat
Smederevo described by Palairet (1997) shows how the socialist state mediated intricate schemes
of in-kind payments between firms. The Kombinat was supposed to become an industrial gem of
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the Yugoslav production system and had been designated to receive various technological
upgrades. Meanwhile, partially-worked iron slabs produced in Smederevo were sent to other
Yugoslavian steelworks so that they could refine them and send them back for the final polish.
This temporary solution, however, became the routine, as Yugoslavia broke up before the
Kombinat could integrate its production process. Unsurprisingly, this intricate exchange of goods
between companies grew financially unsustainable. Banks (which were owned by public
enterprises) started lending money at almost negative interest rates. When this proved again
insufficient, the Socialist Republic of Serbia imposed agreements on other companies to buy even
the defective products or to compensate the Kombinat with materials, such as ore, spare parts, or
hard currency—the only gateway to foreign technological fixes. In other words, profitable
companies were used by the communist state to subvert the losses of unprofitable firms, either
with money or with goods. The assumption was that the total value of labor would not decrease
and that the state would balance losses and profits accumulated by different companies, making
sure to find buyers for unwanted goods. In my interlocutors' words, liquidity would be ensured by
the state, which would "close the circles" of payments.
But there is another reason why kompenzacija was not very dramatic during socialism. It
was not uncommon for people who worked in Yugoslavia to have relatively good salaries and yet
to have little money left the very day they received their paycheck. Companies often granted their
employees credit for a large number of transactions, or supplemented workers' wages with nonmonetary benefits, including housing, daycare, and vacation facilities (Furubotn and Pejovich
1972, Bonfiglio 2014, Woodward 2003) recovered directly from the workers' salaries. In such a
system, the crucial strategy for fructifying one's labor was not to obtain a wage; it was more
important to work within one of the state or socially owned enterprises. The liquidity of one's labor
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was not coupled to money but linked to one's professional belonging. Money, on the contrary, was
mostly a unit of account that did not define things through profit, but in relation to their production
process (Bryer 2016, Horvat and Korošec 2015).

2.3 Kompenzacija and Transition
The transition from socialism generated a peculiar kind of illiquidity: if, on the one hand, the
dismantling of the productive system caused a surge in unemployment, on the other, the
privatization process allowed many to strip former state-owned assets for cash. Faced with
heightened expectations for consumption but a fragmented market, Macedonia saw a resurgence
of kompenzacija as a form of exchange through which an emerging class of petty urban
entrepreneurs could conduct transactions and accumulate capital.
"It was simple. My dad knew that he could very easily sell toilet seats here in Macedonia.
But he did not have the money to buy them. So what he did was to go to Serbia, where he found a
company that sold toilet seats. This company was interested in getting door handles—so he went
around until he found another company who would sell him door handles on credit. He got the
handles, went to the first company, exchanged the handles for the seats, brought them back to
Macedonia, sold them, paid back the handles company…and so he became the King of
Kompenzacija." According to his son's recollection, the King of Kompenzacija was able to engage
in in-kind private transaction precisely because of the dismantling of the socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia. In this case, two companies were interested in goods of different kinds but could
not rely on the socialist infrastructure to exchange them. Instead, precisely the borders generated
by the collapse of Yugoslavia into six different republics created different domains of value
relatively distinct from each other. Entrepreneurs like the King of Kompenzacija were then able to
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match desired goods in different national markets and extract profit from it. This was particularly
important in Macedonia, a country with an underdeveloped consumer industry that had previously
provided heavy industry output for other socialist republics. Because Macedonia had maintained
a neutral position during the Balkan Wars and had historically strong connections to Serbia,
kompenzacija flourished alongside other kinds of informal trade and smuggling that connected
Skopje to Nish and Belgrade.
The fall of the socialist system was crucial to this new set of kompenzacija exchanges in a
another sense: postsocialist societies had abundant "gray," illicit, and sometimes illegal capital.
Partly as a consequence of the stripping of previously state- or socially-owned enterprises, partly
because of savings from the Yugoslav era, the Macedonian population had faced dire economic
conditions but was able to mobilize cash on demand. The number of banks declaring bankruptcy,
the unpredictable and sudden blockages to loans or withdrawal, and the vicissitudes linked to
converting socialist dinars into Macedonian denars convinced many citizens to literally sleep on
stacks of cash, often after having converted MKD into more stable foreign currencies such as the
deutschmark. Kompenzacija thus re-emerged not as a tool for supplementing socialist production
and allowing exchange in debt circles closed by the state, but as a profitable business: paying in
kind became a way to get to money. With the collapse of the socialist system and without socialist
companies to finance one's consumption or small investments, money assumed a different role. It
became the measure and storage of labor's value, the preferred type of capital, and a means of
exchange. It radically shifted its role from means to become the true aim of production.
During the early years of the transition, kompenzacija ensured liquidity in the same way
that barter did in other parts of Eastern Europe by matching desires and transferring values at a
time of political fragmentation (Humphrey and Hugh-Jones 1992). It also constituted a way for
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close businesses to help each other, extending credit through in-kind exchanges. Kompenzacija
equivalences also relied on "differences," but not between different moral spheres of value and
evaluation. It relied on different markets, the different availability of supply and demand, or on the
different monetary price paid for a good across newly established national boundaries.
Kompenzacija made possible the social rise of many small entrepreneurs who had no monetary or
economic capital but were able and willing to engage in chains of non-monetary transactions that
eventually let them join the ranks of petty capital owners. Kompenzacija during the transition
supplemented liquidity, allowing for the accumulation of capita and cementing the rise of a
dispersed class of petty postsocialist merchants that benefitted from the SDSM party's tolerance of
informality.

2.4 Late 2000s: Kompenzacija and Precariousness
In the late 2000s, kompenzacija had already assumed a very different form. From a win-win,
horizontal, and sometime moral relation, it became a tool to create and enforce hierarchical
relations within Macedonia's economic sphere. In these conditions, kompenzacija became a
hallmark of illiquidity, of the loss of value caused by one's peripheral political position vis-à-vis
the VMRO party. Kompenzacija was inscribed unexpectedly in working relations as it
progressively devalued the labor of those who were not close to the VMRO party.
I met Marko the first day I arrived on the construction site. He was just hanging around
outside of the elevated container where the supervisor's office was located. I would see him often
in the following days coming and going: either called in to solve some problems by Toni, the
supervisor, or simply stopping by as a courtesy, his roaring voice filling the air. Most strikingly,
he seemed to have a joke ready for everybody; all the other managers or directors of subcontracting
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firms spent time laughing and telling stories with him. Just below the elevated container, Bobi had
a different opinion of Marko. "I worked for him about six months," he told me while anxiously
smoking a cigarette, "and he never paid me. He promised me 500 euro per month, but he was never
on time. 'I do not have the money,' he kept telling me. 'Here is an advance of 100 euro'—and it is
three months that I do not get anything. I am not insured, nor do I claim taxes and social insurance.
What am I supposed to do?"
Ultimately, Bobi left the company. He joined another firm working on the same site along
with seven of Marko's former employees. Reduced to only five operatives, Marko suddenly
disappeared from the site, visiting only on occasion and without announcing himself. Instead, he
intensified his virtual presence in the company's office to solve his kompenzacija issue. He was
scheduled to receive an apartment as kompenzacija for the work he had done on two different
buildings. But as his main company was currently in financial trouble and the bank had blocked
his account, he begged Construx (the contractor company) to pay him on a different account,
belonging to a subsidiary he owned.
For Marko, kompenzacija constituted a problem, although it wasn't as acute and urgent as
it was for Bobi. On the one hand, he would become the owner of a relatively coveted and stable
good, the apartment; on the other, it was unclear when, how, and if that would happen. Almost a
year after that first encounter, I sat down with Marko as he hopelessly explained his difficult
situation to me. "You see, I was supposed to get money for the deal. Then they said, 'can we do
kompenzacija?' I could not really say no, so I accepted. Now it turns out that the apartment is used
as collateral from Construx, and I cannot get the official papers, so I cannot sell it! So I decided,
no more kompenzacija. I could not keep my employees, I needed to restructure the whole
company."
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It was kompenzacija that thwarted Marko's financial stability and strained his relationship
with Bobi. His company had already performed half of the work when Construx offered to pay
him with apartments. While he had a contract for a monetary amount he would not disclose, he
agreed to Construx's terms. In part he felt he ought to support Construx, a company that had been
very loyal to him in the past and that he considered one of the most serious in Macedonia. But this
moral obligation had also darker roots: Marko knew very well that if he did not comply with
Construx, he risked being cut out of the circle of preferred subcontractors. In a small country like
Macedonia with raging unemployment, falling outside of such a circle can be the equivalent of
business exile. So, unsure about how else he could recover at least some money, Marko decided
that kompenzacija was his best call.
Kompenzacija represented a problem for Marko because it did not guarantee a clear
conversion rate between the good he received, the apartment, and the monetary price. It was easy
to do kompenzacija, and many interlocutors recounted to me that they agreed on it at dinners or
drinks. From an accounting perspective, kompenzacija meant simply balancing the contractor's
debt with a transfer of ownership of an asset, generally an apartment, to the creditor. While such a
transfer would have been the end of a monetary transaction, with kompenzacija, it was only the
beginning of a series of other conversions that often failed to materialize. First, subcontractors
often had to wait for the company to actually finish building the apartments. Then they had to
receive legal ownership, a complex and lengthy process, especially if the building had been used
as collateral for a loan. But more importantly, subcontractors like Marko had to deal with the
falling prices of housing.
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Figure 18: Construction volume index.

Source: Eurostat. Data expressed in points (left scale).

Between 2010 and 2013, Macedonia's construction sector went against the overall
European tendency. While countries like Ireland, Spain, or Greece, where financialization had
fueled urban development and middle class debts, saw a significant and steep decrease of
construction activities, Macedonia's construction sector picked up significant steam. If one
excludes civil engineering works, a sector that doubled in 2013 and tripled in 2015 when compared
with 2010, the situation looks a bit different. Macedonia's housing sector today has a productivity
of about 180% of what it was in 2010. This is still a very high index in comparison with other EU
countries. According to the data from Eurostat, Ireland's index in 2007 was at 486 and today is at
115; Spain was at 180 in 2006 and today is at 93. However, Macedonia's intense construction
activity does not guarantee profits. In fact, data from the statistical office suggest that the
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profitability of the sector radically decreased from a net profit margin of 12.3% in 2013 to 5.4%
in 2014. The sector's debt ratio has increased from 50% to 54%. Early analyses (Karajov 2013)
stress that the construction sector is increasingly indebted; sales of apartments have been
increasingly rare, pressing companies like Construx to rely continuously on promotional discounts.
As I highlighted above, the average price of apartments has decreased steadily. Despite the effort
from the government to subsidize housing mortgages for young couples, buyers seem to be unable
to afford the nominal price of around 1,200 euro per square meter in a decently located, averagely
constructed building.
Receiving an apartment as kompenzacija thus becomes a liability. It not only forces the
subcontractor to spend increasing time and energy to place it, but its value is destined to decrease
over time. Instead of being an exchange of goods considered of equal or equivalent value, today,
kompenzacija is an exchange between one good (labor), whose value was supposed constant, and
another (apartments), whose value is shrinking. That is, kompenzacija promotes a new relation
between labor, goods taken as payment, and money—one in which, without the political
connections needed to unload an apartment quickly, the labor and investment put into completing
a job risks losing considerable value. In this case, kompenzacija does not spring out of different
desires regarding objects whose value belongs to alternative spheres of values. It is a forced
transaction that two partners who both aim to collect money cannot complete except with goods.
Yet at least one of the partners, in this case Marko, does not want the good in question. But he is
forced to accept it, as he does not see any other way to ever get paid.
At worst, Marko and most of the companies I met throughout my research could only rely
on a disheartening solution: they could offset the burden of kompenzacija on workers. That meant
firing workers—often hired without regular contracts anyway—or keeping them at work with the
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simple promise of future pay, while providing them just enough money to survive and come to
work. If, for company directors, kompenzacija meant exposing their businesses to the
precariousness of a falling bubble market, workers experienced kompenzacija as an even greater
mechanism of precarity—one through which they entirely lost control over the monetary value of
their labor.
Krste and Bosko, both workers at Construx, were just some of the many other employees
in the construction sector who directly experienced the effects of kompenzacija. For Bosko,
kompenzacija was about a car: "I worked for an architectural firm that got a contract with an
important politician. One day the manager of the company calls me: 'Come out,' he says. I go, and
I see him with three black, medium-sized cars. 'Choose one,' he tells me, 'it is yours.' Instead of
my fee, they turned up with those cars! Eventually I had to close down my own private activity
because of kompenzacija!" Had he not accepted kompenzacija, he would have had no way to
retrieve the money he was promised. Courts are simply unhelpful without the right political
connections, and because his client was an important man, he was perfectly positioned to
manipulate the legal system. Not only did Bosko stand no chance of fighting through institutions,
but he was also facing a more direct and practical threat: the VMRO party. Generally referred to
as THE Party, the VMRO holds Macedonian public life in a steel grip and has been known to use
all sorts of violent means to protect its members. Unable to mobilize political support, Bosko was
eventually stuck with non-movable property that he did not need and did not want, and which
eventually led him to the brink of personal bankruptcy.
Sometimes, the loss of value embedded in kompenzacija happens through more explicit
forms of violence. Krste is one of the most caring construction workers I met. At 1.60 meters tall,
he is known throughout the construction site for taking care of a hamster like his own kid. But
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after a year of begging his previous employer to pay him his six months of overdue salary, he had
had enough. He went to the company's office and sat in the sales room. "Every quarter you make
today selling things, I will take it. And if you do not sell anything, I will take stuff from your store
until the debt is repaid." His face turned red while he remembered, and his body movements
became increasingly nervous, as he continued: "And then I started provoking my former employer.
I insulted him, and his family. And so he punched me in the chest. But then—BAM—I hit him
straight in the face and he fell to the ground. The brother tried to stop me, and so he was able to
flee. But I went after him, made him fall on the street and then BAM BAM, I kept on kicking him
until he was all full of blood!" Eventually Krste got some money back—by transforming a labor
relation into violence, he was able to avoid the threat of kompenzacija and actually convert blood
into money.
There is more violence embedded in kompenzacija than physical assaults or the
psychological and existential insecurity reported above. With temperatures as extreme as -15 and
+45 Celsius, workers operate on 10- to 12-hour long shifts in which they are required to complete
physically demanding tasks with very rudimentary technological help. Despite the dangerous and
unsafe conditions they work in, health insurance comes only with a regular monetary wage—if a
company does not fulfill its tax obligations, the state cuts all of the workers' benefits, including
insurance and pension payments. Kompenzacija thus transfers the burdens of social security and
safety from the employers onto workers' shoulders. Workers paid in kompenzacija or employed
by a company that gets stuck in it cannot access public health care, a service that they dramatically
need because of the risky nature of their labor. While the government has recently tightened
controls over the construction sector, with the goal of reducing workers' health hazards and fighting
workplace accidents, it is clear that the main purpose is to collect fines from companies that employ
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undeclared labor or do not pay taxes regularly. Because almost every company is at fault in some
of these areas, inspections have become the main political weapon to hit entrepreneurs who
stubbornly do not support the VMRO party. While companies like Construx are periodically
inspected and live with the fear of incurring charges and fines, the deaths of many construction
workers that happened on major government-supported projects have been completely ignored.
Within this structure of violence, in-kind payments of kompenzacija appear to be defined
by a landscape of political and labor violence. As a form of forced credit repaid in kind,
kompenzacija shows that money (and monetary debt) are privileged spaces for violence and
exploitation (Graeber 2012). Further, exchanges of kompenzacija, while bypassing the use of
money as a medium of exchange, subject workers to increasingly authoritarian hierarchies, as well
as the threat of (legal or illegal) violence.

2.5 Kompenzacija and the Politics of Illiquidity
Not every company is shoehorned into kompenzacija and precarity. Getting stuck with unwanted
goods is instead the result of one's distance from the center of Macedonia's political-economic
core. In fact, the informal deals of in-kind exchanges of kompenzacija are tightly linked to the
circulation of official money of the country.
While most of the workers and managers I worked with and met lamented an extreme lack
of liquidity in the Macedonian economy, aggregate official data of the Ministry of Finance and the
IMF seem to suggest the opposite. The Macedonian Central Bank holds a stock of 33 billion MKD,
over 7% of GDP—which, for the IMF, is an "excess of liquidity" (IMF 2014: 10). The private
banking sector exhibits similar performances, with a capital-adequacy ratio of 17% and a liquidity
ratio of about 30%. In other words, this is not an equivalent situation with Russia in the 1990s,
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where the ruble was an unreliable currency. The Macedonian denar has been pegged to the euro,
making it both stable and available. Yet, as an influential figure within the IMF mission suggested
to me, money is not circulating. He blamed banks for not having affordable credit lines for medium
and small enterprises. Data I collected within Construx show that banks require collateral up to
three times the value of the loan, and usually the interest rate falls between six and ten percent. By
August 2014, even accessing these conditions had become a challenge, highlighting another of the
implications, which I discussed in Chapter 1, of being a country in the EU semi-periphery.
Banks are just the tip of the iceberg. In Macedonia, the main source of spending and
investment is the central and local government, and most of the companies depend directly or
indirectly on its political fortunes. During the 2014 parliamentary elections, for instance, most
construction sites were blocked. With public investments stopped, they quickly ran out of money.
"So we're stuck—it is like they closed the faucet," the director of another construction enterprise
told me.
There is a veritable struggle to open the government's faucet, entering the circle of
contractors that work with government institutions. Companies know very well that a fixed bribe
of 10% of the gross value of the project is needed to win major tenders. In-kind payments also
figure as a powerful tool for aspiring contractors, generally in the form of "voluntary" contributions
of labor and manpower, but also as free dinners, complementary wellness treatments, sponsorships
for local cultural institutions or sport teams, and gratis luxury goods. In the right-wing, ethnically
Macedonian municipality of Skopje Aerodrom, such payments have taken a surprising form: the
donation of churches.
As one of the fastest growing neighborhoods, locally known as municipality, of Skopje,
Aerodrom has been the destination of many investments, from both local government offices and
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private investors. Recently, a Turkish holding called Cevahir erected the first of four 40-story
towers—a record in seismically cautious Skopje. Immediately after, the municipality sped up the
construction of Christian symbols—including a 20-meter-high iron cross—in order to discourage
Muslim buyers. Meanwhile, private developers and construction companies have started to build
churches. In an area of about one square kilometer, there were four newly built churches just in
the summer of 2014.
"Mito (bribery)—that's what it is," commented the director of Construx who, like many
other professionals in the sector, had no doubt about how to interpret these donations. He himself
had been forced into building a church in a different neighborhood. "It was either that, or money.
But at least a church is useful for people," as another employee at Construx clarified. In fact,
donating a church is compensated by favors from the local and central government, which include
receiving tenders or being able to buy denationalized land at a lower price. But more importantly,
a church can directly appeal to prospective ethnic Macedonian buyers interested in the newly
developed complexes. In donating churches, companies convert labor power and faith into political
capital, which will eventually allow them to access money, both from the government and from
potential buyers, while acquiring an aura of public dignity and responsibility—great for
promotional pamphlets.
Being within the government's sphere of liquidity also has indirect benefits. Companies
can monetize the very fact of having connections to the government and therefore a "secure" source
of money either by subcontracting with burdensome conditions or by obtaining lines of credit from
banks. While the government can force kompenzacija on its own circle of companies, these big
firms are willing to sustain it without too many repercussions, with the promise (or sometimes
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illusion) that the government will award them new deals in the future. After all, they can always
perpetrate kompenzacija further.
If contractors have to carry the burden of "donations" to public authorities, then the
subcontractors' way to enter the sphere of (higher) liquidity consists of competing for exploitative
deals. It is a genuine struggle to get subcontracting deals from companies that are directly
connected to the government, even if this implies accepting very burdensome financial constraints.
Needless to say, kompenzacija is almost always one of these conditions. "The company that won
the tender for elevators, that's quite a story," the supervisor of a very important project developed
in the center of the city by a businessman close to the government told me. "So the deal is for
100,000 euro, and it is 70% kompenzacija. Some are apartments already built close to Vodno [the
mountain that overlooks the city], the rest are other apartments still to be built. But here is the
catch: the elevators are from Germany, and the factory there of course would not take
kompenzacija! So the subcontractor took out a loan using the kompenzacija apartments as
collateral, and then used this cash to start paying for the elevators, waiting and hoping that the rest
of the money would come in time to pay back the loan."
Like the government before them, building companies too have learned how to use in-kind
payments to force such undesirable deals out of their subcontractors. If companies are placed
within the liquidity core of the country and are close to the government, they can easily benefit
from huge tenders and push through deals like the elevator deal described above. If they find
themselves more at the fringes of the political system, then their scope of operation is more limited.
Yet because building companies that build residential units, like Construx, always have the
potential to access cash through private sales, they still maintain sufficient power to impose
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kompenzacija. "We offer them kompenzacija," one of the managers of Construx told me. "If they
do not accept…well, do you think they have a choice?"
For each of these companies, no matter how close to the cash-loaded core of the
Macedonian political economy, the issue is not capital per se but the possibility of realizing that
value in exchange. Construx has many millions of euro frozen in different investments, yet they
are struggling to pay their taxes, their employees, and their subcontractors because they cannot
convert apartments into money. Subcontractors, on the other hand, have very little contact with
private clients and very few sources of cash; for them, becoming embedded in the close circle of
subcontracting firms is a crucial step. Lack of cash thus creates a series of concentric spheres of
liquidity. People who are in higher liquidity spheres can and usually do kompenzacija to their
advantage with companies that are situated further out of this structure of liquidity. And yet,
because of the lack of liquidity itself, companies in the periphery rely even further on those placed
closer to the liquidity core. In other words, kompenzacija creates an unequal and perverse form of
dependency based on conscious exploitation.

2.6 Liquidity and Credit between Global Crisis and Macedonia
The global crisis arrived in Macedonia with some delay. In 2007, neither the state nor the private
sector had had the luxury of accumulating crushing debts, precisely because of their bad economic
outlook since the fall of socialism. The crisis did not lead to an immediate shock, but slowly,
especially in 2012 and 2013, foreign banks that owned almost the entirety of the banking industry
started to withdraw credit lines in areas considered at risk, such as construction. Other international
investors such as the IMF, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and
various private banks, however, remained friendly towards the Macedonian state. Prime Minister
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Gruevski had cultivated international contacts by working at the World Bank, and one of his first
moves had been to pay off outstanding international debts.
This allowed the VMRO government to bank on low short-term credit rates by borrowing
new money and refunding older creditors before the deadline. This strategy allowed the VMRO to
expand the country's debt from about 1.56 billion euro in 2008 to over 4.10 billion in 2015, raising
debt from 23% of GDP to a projection of over 50% in 2016-17 (Janev 2015, IMF 2014, 2015).
Just like household debt, such a ratio of public debt to GDP is not extraordinarily high. In
comparison, public debt in Hungry reaches 80% of GDP and about 130% of GDP in Italy.

Figure 19: Public debt, selected European countries, percent of GDP.

Source: National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia. 2015. Financial Stability Report for the Republic
of Macedonia 2014.

Yet it is important to note that a large part of the Macedonian GDP is absorbed by local
elites. The top one percent of earners has increased its share of wealth from 6.8% in 2007 to over
12% in 2014, the highest in Europe. In addition, over 30% of the GDP contributes to gross capital
formation, an increase of 10 points compared to 2000 and seven points compared to 2007. In
addition, the GDP has been significantly affected by foreign investments that are located in special
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economic zones and contribute little to the local economy. Aggregate numbers, even if correct,
largely underestimate the impact of debt and economic deprivation of a large sector of the
population, which is, in fact, experiencing significant economic hardship (Jovanovic 2015). My
study of kompenzacija shows, however, that the risk and impact of credit are disproportionately
allocated to politically marginal groups of the population within the Macedonian political
economy.
For some analysts, like Lapavitsas (2009), the global economic crisis has been essentially
an issue of liquidity. The low cost of money led banks to extend credits, exponentially increasing
their lending portfolio, without adequate checks and controls on their lending. Banks
overwhelmingly targeted low income, working-class workers whose wages had not increased on
par with their indebtedness. When Lehman Brothers collapsed, banks became wary of lending
money, raising the price of borrowing. As the market panicked, financial institutions that combined
both investment and commercial banking found themselves suddenly insolvent and unable to
borrow funds on the market to cover their losses. Subprime mortgages, until then a very liquid
asset, all of a sudden could not be resold—and that led to an overall contraction of liquidity
throughout the Western world. Places like Greece and Spain immediately felt the impact, as their
risky sovereign and private debt became bad overnight and instantly lost value.
Note that Lapavitsas' argument is twofold. First, the process of financialization has meant
not only an increase of debt but also and especially the augmentation of credit. Banks, in this
perspective, are not only institutions that give out credit, but they are also organizations that siphon
off and centralize money that would have otherwise been dispersed in society. Banks' political as
well as economic power comes precisely from the capacity to monopolize the money supply and
orient it towards investments of their choice. Technically speaking, citizens who deposit their
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money in the accounts of banks become creditors towards that bank—yet in virtue of their political
and economic position, banks charge people activity fees. More importantly, banks do not keep
money deposited in their vaults. Except for a minimum liquidity reserve, generally defined by law,
contemporary banks reinvest the money they receive in the form of loans for profits or in various
other financial products on the market.
In other words, as the 2007-2012 financial crisis has demonstrated, fractional banking and
contemporary investment strategies are not entirely different from pyramid schemes or
kompenzacija in Macedonia. In all three cases, various "investors" are drawn to fuel an expansive
system of financial transactions that function insofar as new members or buyers can be found. That
is, these systems are based upon an expansion of credit. Kompenzacija, as a financial mechanism
through which companies at the periphery of the VMRO political economy finance others at its
core, is not very dissimilar. The contractor company, thanks to its political connections or potential
access to money through sales, is able to pay for its work without using its own money, which can
thus be used to finance other activities of the construction enterprise.
In other words, the issues generally presented as problems of liquidity, that is, of presence
or absence of money, are in fact questions related to the social relations that regulate credit in a
specific economic system. This is interesting, because most of the critical contemporary literature
devotes extensive works to the impacts of financial debts on people's lives (Guerin 2014, James
2012, Han 2012). Yet very little is said about the workings of credit. What I believe emerges from
thinking about credit in relation to illiquidity is an emphasis on the process of giving rather than
having to "return" money or other means of payments. Economic conceptions of liquidity generally
reward the capacity of giving money, even without actually having it, by allowing banks or other
investors to transform their debts from liabilities into assets. By contrast, anthropologists have
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generally discussed the imbalance of power that allows creditors "to pursue debtors with
inexorable swiftness" (James 2014:17) and to radically reshape their lives (Williams 2005, Graeber
2011, Palomera 2014).
But what happens when the power of the debtor is such that he or she can decide how,
when, and if to pay back the creditor—as was often the case with companies that paid part of
workers' salaries with coupons during the transition from socialism? What happens if credit is
forced and extorted rather than freely offered? Considering such different ethnographic contexts,
it becomes clear that the anthropological archive presents far fewer accounts of the working of
credit than debt, as famously noted by Peebles (2010). This chapter on kompenzacija shows
precisely that credit, under authoritarian financialization, can be just as dangerous and violent as
forms of debt observed in other countries. More importantly, the violence and domination that are
employed by the VMRO and its business cronies to force other companies and individuals to
accept payments in kind and extend credit are not generated by the fact that "a creditor has the
means to specify, numerically, exactly how much a debtor owes" (Graeber 2011). Quite the
contrary, it is the impossibility of determining such an equation beyond political and personal
relations that turns creditors into dominated subjects.
From the perspective of most of the subcontracting companies I worked with,
kompenzacija means a significant amount of financial losses. By and large, it is not the hopes of
gaining profit that push entrepreneurs to do kompenzacija, as would be the case in pyramid
schemes or financial investments. Rather, it is the need to avoid financial catastrophe. For instance,
apartments used for kompenzacija are calculated at full price, without the discounts that companies
are forced to give to normal buyers—and they therefore provide (for accounting purposes) a higher
profit. On the other hand, companies that are forced into kompenzacija have to find alternative
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sources of money—often loans, as in the case of the elevators. In most of these cases, they have to
wait for the building company to finish and legally hand over the apartments before actually being
able to sell them. They also have to find buyers, a hard task in the current economic setting, and
convince them to sign informal arrangements to speed up the legal process of titling. Converting
value from one sphere of more liquidity to another sphere of less liquidity, kompenzacija devalues
labor as it gets perpetrated further in less and less liquid spheres.
This chain of devaluation has the direct consequence of inflating prices of kompenzacija
deals. Subcontractors feel that by increasing the prices of their services or goods exchanged by 20,
30 or even 40%, they can counter the loss of time, energy, and ultimately the falling prices of
construction-related products, especially apartments. Yet keeping costs high for building
companies, subcontractors ignite an upward spiral of prices in the real estate market. Despite the
lack of buying power on the consumer side, building companies cannot lower their selling prices
because of the high nominal prices they pay to subcontractors—and the burden of donations and
bribes paid to state officials. Even the deeply indebted Construx only started to publicly lower sale
prices in January 2015, mostly promoting "exceptional" sales or negotiating considerable
discounts in secret with each customer, especially if they were paying in cash.
Because in-kind exchanges of kompenzacija lead companies to lose value, kompenzacija
ultimately leads to the appreciation of money. Money as a commodity is an extremely scarce
resource for most of Macedonia's population. The construction sector, with its booming returns of
up to 60% during the golden years of the early 2000s and its unregulated business environment,
attracted many with the promise of easy money. As it happens, the Klondike gold rush has dried
up and money has been substituted by kompenzacija. Yet in a financialized economy like
Macedonia's, one cannot pay bills, taxes, or groceries with kompenzacija. Macedonians still need
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money as a means of payment for most of their daily transactions—kompenzacija cannot be a
substitute for money the same way that barter was in Russia in the 1990s. Even if kompenzacija is
regulated by law and accountants duly register and account for kompenzacija deals, the state does
not usually accept kompenzacija. Apartments have not become a new currency. On the contrary,
kompenzacija caused a hike in the value of cash. The by-product of kompenzacija is obviously the
appreciation of money as a commodity and the consequent increase in the power of the cash-loaded
core of the Macedonian political-economy, the VMRO party and its connected businesses. With
no intention of closing the circles of debts, kompenzacija drops the burden of illiquidity on the
shoulders of the last link of the chain: workers and companies not connected to the VMRO party.

2.7 Conclusion: Kompenzacija, Illiquidity, and the World Crisis
When I asked the son of the King of Kompenzacija what his plans were for the future, he sipped
his imported beer and looked out the window for a moment. Then he answered "I tried to work
with my dad. But it is impossible. He does not realize that he's just losing money. We now have
three apartments that we do not know how to use, and we can't sell them to anybody. And look,
you see my black Golf car parked outside? That was also kompenzacija. He got it because he knew
the guy would never pay him back. I tried to stop him from doing more kompenzacija; he did not
realize that all his work, all his capital spread around, all his energy spent not sleeping at night and
spinning around have a cost. You work more, and you barely break even."
These words sum up the role that kompenzacija plays today. It constitutes an agent of a
specific kind of illiquidity, whereby a powerful authoritarian state intercepts international flows of
capital, bending the country into a credit machine. In-kind payments as conducted through
kompenzacija thus configure a relation whereby more and more input has to be provided in order
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to generate output. Labor loses its convertibility into value with increasing distance from the ruling
party.
In such a system, the conversion of labor into money via goods follows unequal rates. But
this does not always matter for businessmen. If this is the only way to turn some money around,
so be it. The King of Kompenzacija and many other company owners are aware of the nefarious
effects of kompenzacija only too late, when they have accumulated a crushing amount of monetary
credit, which will be paid by apartments they cannot sell. Until then, kompenzacija has a somewhat
dream-like quality; like a future derivative, it is just a sign on paper that balances a column of
minuses with a single plus, a handshake with a smile, or a disquieting thought that keeps one awake
at night. Either way, if the value of kompenzacija seems somewhat stable, though cloudy, at the
beginning of the deal, some months later, it becomes clear that the material correspondence of that
number, or handshake, is very elusive. The Golf cars, apartments, and churches do not tell stories
of social status, but rather dramas of monetary loss and forced labor.
Companies literally fight to get into poisonous kompenzacija deals that carry some mirage
of money. In this sense, kompenzacija signals not a fragmentation and proliferation of different
and smaller political authorities, as most of the literature on postsocialist political systems argues
(Verdery 1996, Woodruff 1999, Humphrey 2002, Rogers 2014, Dunn 2008), but the reconstitution
of a party-state-like structure that dominates Macedonia's life economically and politically. Built
upon the emotive and material legacies of socialist in-kind payment systems, today's illiquidity
marks a radically new articulation of money, value, and the state, generating a regime of
conversion based on financial subjection. This new political economy is a hybrid combination of
socialist and neoliberal techniques of power, whereby the productive tissue is forced to extend
credit to the government or to companies connected to the governing VMRO party. Anchored in

155

some collective expectations of state paternalism voided from hopes of equality, the party built its
authoritarian regime on neoliberal financialization and forced credits.
Illiquidity in Macedonia anchors value transmission into the political hierarchy at a
moment when the world crisis causes the pyramid schemes of investment in the construction sector
(Musaraj 2012) to crumble. For some, this is a relief. The director of a company close to the VMRO
party commented aptly that only fools rely on the market. He, and many others, chose political
domination over illiquidity. Construx is no "fool," but it has been pushed further and further away
from the political-economic center because of its moderate allegiance to a different political party.
And so, with time, Construx has been forced to rely more and more on kompenzacija, dangerously
approaching the chasm of bankruptcy. As I have shown, kompenzacija positively impacts
companies close to the VMRO government while dumping economic risks and uncertainty on the
shoulders of companies that are not politically close. Kompenzacija is not simply an exchange of
two goods that partners want; interlocutors transact goods and labor as temporary means to be
ultimately converted in money. Yet the value stored in kompenzacija items is not stable, nor is it
assured at what rate it will be convertible into money—unless, of course, one finds adequate
political connections.
When my interlocutors were faced with kompenzacija, they felt powerless. Most of them
knew, or figured out quite early, that kompenzacija would force them to lose money and time. Yet
they also felt they had no other choice. Kompenzacija threw individuals and business owners
against the proverbial wall, where they directly faced the specter of financial collapse. As
Construx's director put it, his subcontractors had de facto already invested in the company by
working or providing materials for a future pay—if they did not accept kompenzacija, they faced
the risks of financialization alone. If they did accept kompenzacija, on the other hand, they became
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directly involved in the destiny of the company—a Faustian bargain, which could lead to even
further economic disaster. The VMRO banked upon the feeling of powerlessness that was
generated by kompenzacija. For many entrepreneurs, joining the VMRO's pyramidal system
transcended simple economic necessity. It became a way to find an existential footing against the
tidal wave of illiquidity and financialization, even if it was precisely the VMRO system that made
it so threatening.
Illiquidity, as it appears in Macedonia, is linked to but not dependent on the global financial
crisis. In fact, reticence to lending money impacted the private sector of Macedonia but not the
public one. On the contrary, international banking institutions entrusted the VMRO authoritarian
government with credit as a secure source of profit. As the global financial crisis unfolded, banks
withdrew their support from the construction sector; local companies fell deeper and deeper into
the concentric politics of illiquidity orchestrated by the government. Illiquidity, in Macedonia, is
reinforced and banked upon by the VMRO government that utilizes it as a source of political
power. In these economic conditions, kompenzacija reorganizes the convertibility of labor, goods,
and money according to political connections. Kompenzacija denotes the emergence of a system
of forced exchanges that gives Macedonia's working life its disquieting shape. As the director of
Construx puts it, "There's no way to survive outside of [the system]. But once you're in it, God
help you."
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3. Temporality, Uncertainty, and Meaning
What is the impact of authoritarian financialization in the workplace? How do forced credit and
illiquidity affect everyday activities and identities there? Starting with this chapter, I discuss how
Macedonia's financialization translates into authoritarian politics by showing the transformations
of workers' value system and subjectivities that follow Macedonia's system of forced credit. In
what follows, I show that illiquidity upsets existential categories like time and gender/ethnic
identities and forces people to resort to different models of action and identity. My interlocutors
perceived this new articulation of subjectivity and economic life as a shift in their moral horizons;
reconfigured as rentier subjects, workers and managers found comfort and meaning in the VMRO's
hierarchical rule and moral system.
In this chapter, I describe the connection between subjection and time, focusing on the
meaning of uncertainty. At the worksite, the financial precariousness of companies like Construx
translates into volatile working rhythms. Workers not only find themselves without money, but
their work schedule is also made unpredictable, with longer shifts, unexpected pauses, and
uncertain decisions about their future. This shift implies both a quantitative and a qualitative
change in workers' relations to time. Unpaid work time loses both its social and existential value,
as workers' activity becomes more and more marginal to Construx's own priorities, which are now
devoted to repaying financial debt rather than constructing buildings. Timing, rather than clock
time, comes to rule the temporality of the workplace as an essential source of value. Manipulating
time in order to find opportunities, rather than abiding by a temporal structuring of their labor,
workers and managers find both monetary and existential value. By stopping work, producing
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uncertainty, and exploiting opportunities, they regain forms of agency and meaning over their own
lives.
Conceiving and utilizing timing as a source of value is a morally complex endeavor.
Workers and managers turn opportunistic timing into a new modality of action, thus extracting
value from time, rather than generating it, as they did laboring. Timing becomes an ambiguous
moral behavior not only because of residual socialist ideas about the value of work, but also
because it reproduces Construx's structural dependency. While actions that could be understood in
moral terms as opportunistic actions appeal to individuals as a means to affirm their own existential
and economic values, these forms of temporal agency impoverish Construx's capacity to cope with
increased financial pressure or replicate the VMRO's hold on its activity. Focusing on individual
actions and reactions, this chapter discusses the domestication of illiquidity in an intimate
expression, temporality, and the implication that this has on people's subjectivity.
I find it useful to think through a term introduced by Kathleen Millar (2015) in her paper
on catadores, the Brazilian super-poor who pick up recyclable items from one of Rio's biggest
dumps. Observing how breaks, gossiping, and social relations constituted an integral part of
catadores' working rhythms, Millar suggests that post-Fordist economies do not separate leisure
and working times, as E.P. Thompson has argued for the birth of modern capitalism; rather, postFordist labor is characterized by the interaction of different kinds of activities, and temporalities.
Time, in our contemporary world, is not separated into clock and leisure time, but rather woven in
a continuum, a new temporal experience that affects a deeply post-Fordist understanding of work
and personhood. At Construx, workers resorted to woven time as a last resort to conciliate the
rhythms of finance, life, and work.
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The chapter starts with an ethnographic voyage through the everyday rhythms of work on
construction sites. As Construx becomes unable to keep up the tempo of its financial repayments,
the company decides to stretch working hours, holding workers on the site for longer periods.
Focusing on workers' temporal experience, I argue that illiquidity creates a surplus of empty work
hours (which I refer to as clock time), which sucks free time into commodified relations. As the
relation between working and free time becomes blurred, a new paradigm of action comes into
being, based on a new tempo: woven time.
Examining time, timing, and ways of embodying temporality is a crucial element for
understanding how economic regimes translate into the living reality of workers. Since the work
of E.P. Thompson, temporality has been considered a key factor in understanding how power
shapes workers' subjectivities through temporal discipline. With financialization, new ideas about
time, timing, and temporality circulate and produce different orientations towards the future and
actions in the present. Financial trading futures, for instance, are based upon a strong belief about
the imminence of profit and the teleology of the market. It is precisely such a vision of the future
that shapes financial realities in the present and generates both markets and subjects performatively
(Calıskan and Callon 2009, Callon, Milo and Muniesa 2007, Leyshon and Thrift 1999, Zaloom
2004, 2006, Poon 2009, Knorr-Cetina and Preda 2007). As Guyer (2007) has noted, this is not
unlike Christian temporal teleology: the endgame, the advent of profit, is assumed and projected
in an undetermined but always incumbent future, thus rendering every moment precious. The
apocalypse can come overnight, and so does financial gain—in Guyer's words, "a fantasy futurism
and enforced presentism" has caused a "decline of the near future," the preferred domain for human
agency and political change (Guyer 2007: 2010). Clearly, the ability to seize the moment populates
the world of finance, as does the ability to jump in and out of the right flows of money. It regards
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the capacity of reading, interpreting, and seconding the market, a limited, non-human, and
collective form of agency, according to many contemporary theorists (Calışkan and Callon 2009).
The near future has long declined in the Balkans, and not just because of financialization.
But that has not meant the demise of agency altogether—just the temporary renunciation of
collective progressive action. Kurtovic (2012) documents the importance of waiting, as an agential
alternative to near futurity, in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The stalling of the future in Bosnia and
Herzegovina is a structural condition, caused by the paradoxical fragmentation of power along
ethnic lines and the unrealistic expectation of the international community to witness the rebirth
of democracy. But it is also a more intimate and subjective experience that translates into waiting
as a mode of being. In Eastern Europe, waiting is not just the febrile and anxious goal-oriented
activity that precedes the fulfillment of a wish, as described by Crapanzano (1985) in the case of
white South Africans. On the contrary, waiting means finding ways to fill time with actions that
are not planning to achieve a substantial change, but that accept the unavoidability of the stalling
and at most try to provide momentary relief. Seizing the moment emerges as the counterpoint of
waiting, exploiting political connections (veze/stela/blat, as documented extensively in the
literature, [Brkovic 2015, Torsello 2010, Humphrey 2000, Ledeneva 1998]) in order to speed up
the stagnating time of waiting.
Macedonia partakes of both worlds. While financialization permeates the productive and
political life in Macedonia, it does not bring about the same certainty about future gains described
in the Western, functioning financial system. On the other hand, the Macedonian future has a clear
orientation: it does not appear like a stuck present, or a returning of the same, as in Kurtovic's
(2012) description of Bosnia. On the contrary, the future proposed by Macedonia's failed
financialization is filled with debts to be paid and with the looming shadow of crisis. The endgame
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for companies like Construx is financial meltdown and bankruptcy. In this configuration, timing
is a necessity that grants breathing room to individuals fighting to postpone doomsday for yet
another fortnight, filling their less and less important activities with meaning.
I advance two hypotheses here. From an existential perspective, timing merges the
uncertainty born out of the postsocialist transition with the uncertainty derived from
financialization and constitutes a bridge of agency over the emergence of authoritarianism in
Macedonia. The capacity to seize the moment, seen as an act of weaving time, grants meaning to
people who walk the tightrope of financialized postsocialism. Workers at Construx jumped upon
opportunities not only as viable strategies but also as a way to affirm their own existence. They
manipulated the moment, extending present pauses beyond the allowed time, in order to affirm
their own worth, which had been called into question by the temporal discrepancies between
financial obligations and construction work schedules. Workers at Construx conciliated the erratic
temporality of illiquidity and their existential needs not by making history, allowing time to pass
and inscribing their existence in continuity, but by blocking time—by exploiting opportunities to
protract the present, slowing down work.
On a meta level, weaving time signals a different temporal regime compared to the lines of
bodies on hold that constituted the temporal hallmark of etatized time during socialism (Verdery
1996); it is also distinct from the erratic accelerations of institutional figures attempting to avoid
citizens that embodied the temporal ruptures and social fragmentation of postsocialism (Greenberg
2013). With the hardening and centralizing of liquidity and the spreading of financial obligations
throughout the productive sector, uncertainty did not constitute a problem to navigate, an
impediment to action; on the contrary, people actively engaged in weaving time in order to stretch

162

it. Paradoxically, uncertainty granted individuals a way to stabilize time—a time that otherwise
seemed lost (see also Halawa 2015).
I believe this point to be of great comparative interest. Uncertainty is a central issue in
current analyses of capitalism, both in postsocialist and post-Fordist societies. Generally,
uncertainty is understood as a negative condition, characterized by the disappearance of the
mechanisms of collective care that made life regular under welfare states, capitalism, or paternalist
redistributive regimes like socialism. Production has become globalized, economic and social
transactions have increased in speed, and risk is increasingly unloaded from the state's (or
corporation's) shoulder onto the workers. These factors contribute to the perception that
uncertainty in the workplace constitutes a new condition of existential precarity in the age of
financial capitalism (Harvey 1989b, Ong 1987).
While the political economy of financial capitalism can often be oppressive, the sweeping
equation of uncertainty with a dehumanizing, negative condition is generally made from the
normative viewpoint of welfarism. Human beings have dealt with different kinds of uncertainty
well before welfare states, developing specific social mechanisms to approach the unknown.
Writing about witchcraft, Malinowski (1948) shows how Trobrianders have an acute
understanding of uncertainty as risk, which indeed rules a consistent part of their daily life. Yet he
does not see uncertainty as a petrifying condition but as yet another historical component of his
interlocutors' subjectivities. Similarly, the capacity to mobilize spatial uncertainty, modulating
time and space, has been crucial for protest movements like the red shirt taxi drivers in Thailand.
Without the capacity to make mobility in the city uncertain, the movement would have not lasted
through brutal political repression (Sopranzetti 2013). On the other hand, analyses of neoliberalism
forget that Fordism itself was not a great time to live in for everybody. As Blim (1990) and others
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have shown, a wealth of small industries were deep into the business of precariousness and selfexploitation, while Ford, Fiat, and other colossal companies granted certainty to a small fraction
of the workforce. Similarly, socialist production forced individuals to face constant breakdowns
of work time and to devise workarounds to the current social arrangements (Verdery 1996).
Going beyond the moralized perspective of welfare capitalism to describe uncertainty
means analyzing the conditions of liquidity that foreground it. Important theorists like David
Harvey (1989b), Zygmunt Bauman (2000), and Georg Simmel (2011[1907]) assume that
uncertainty is produced by an increase in connectivity. Because more and more things are
connected and made convertible through monetization and the removal of social protections, our
society becomes uncertain. Financial flows are central in this process, and they are portrayed as
the chief mechanisms that reduce various domains of social life to their monetary value, to assets.
As social and cultural specificities are erased, finance ensures not only that highly paid whitecollar workers are "liquidated" (Ho 2009), but also that especially vulnerable populations around
the world experience liquidity as increased uncertainty and precariousness (Han 2012, Karim
2011, Williams 2005, Bletzer 2004, Buckley 2013, Allison 2013, Dore 2003, Graeber 2011,
Elyachar 2005).
In each of these accounts, uncertainty presupposes liquidity—that is, the equivalence and
permanence of value throughout exchange. But this is not an automatic outcome of
financialization. On the contrary, as already observed in Chapter 2, the Macedonian case shows
that liquidity depends upon hierarchies of conversion. In Skopje, financialization provided a small
political elite the opportunity to become liquid at the expense of the rest of the country, which is
now financially and politically oppressed. In a scenario in which financialization has been hijacked
by authoritarian state structures to strip the majority of the country's population of their own
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economic value, uncertainty assumes a radically different meaning. A condition well known by
the population since socialism and its collapse, uncertainty today collides with new state-driven
hierarchies of conversion and a newly minted political subjection. In a social landscape that is
tightening, uncertainty appears at times as a welcomed opportunity, whereby it is possible to
individually negotiate the hardship of financial collapse and stabilize the temporal schizophrenia
of political and financial subjection. Yet uncertainty and woven time produce only a momentary
escape from the temporal lockdown of politically marginalized companies and individuals. By
adopting opportunistic strategies, individuals become much closer to the VMRO's morals and rent
hierarchies—to whom they turn for emotional and economic support.

3.1 Incongruities Explained: Temporal Cycles Falling Apart
At 5:30 a.m., the alarm rings. Six o'clock a.m., breakfast. Six thirty a.m., meeting other workers to
drive to the construction site. Seven o'clock a.m., the workday starts. Eleven o'clock a.m., lunch
time. Two o'clock p.m., coffee break. Five o'clock p.m.: end of the shift.
Construction workers often described their life as a succession of different cycles. First,
their workday is marked by the change of the seasons: during the bright days of summer, Construx
requires them to start working at 7 a.m. and finish at 5 p.m. When the nights become long and
cold, their shifts shrink to 4 p.m. or even 3 p.m., sometimes starting at 8 a.m. The weather strictly
regulates their presence on the site and the activities they can perform. If the temperature is below
-15 Celsius (c.a. 5 F) or above 40 C (c.a. 104 F), work activity is stopped by law—although the
actual enforcement of such provisions of safety depends greatly on the goodwill of the contractor.
Excessive rain or frost can impede the casting of concrete or other outdoor activities.
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Other temporal cycles regulate life on the construction site. The week is clearly marked by
the ritual calendar of saints, house festivities (slavi), and periods of fast, observed every Friday or
in preparation for major Christian celebrations with abstinence from fat, dairy and meat. The dust
and dirt of the workplace were constantly infused with religious transcendence through social
rituals. Often, workers were not present in the workplace in observance of one of the many
Christian Orthodox festivities, or they brought along homemade wine, brandy (rakija), sodas, or
other sweets celebrating their "onomastic" (imenden) or household saint's day. The occasions to
inscribe the everyday into a more solemn or special cycle of events went well beyond the religious
sphere. Any trip or major event in a worker's life was signaled by offering (chastanje) treats to
their colleagues—a social event that I will discuss further in Chapter 5 from a gendered
perspective. Customary social obligations, such as weekly visits to relatives in Skopje and yearly
meetings with other relatives in Serbia (or abroad in other countries) completed the ritual, social,
and work scheduling of time: hour after hour, day after day, year after year, a worker's lifetime
flows regularly like a river.
Despite these cyclical temporal relations, time at Construx became increasingly oriented
towards one goal: money. "Is there anything new?" Pietro, the director of field operations, asked
Folco, one of the workers' leaders. "Nothing," replied Folco, shrugging his head and lowering his
glance. "Everything is like before." Such coded exchanges had a very clear goal: workers wanted
to know if something specific had changed. They wanted to know if they were about to get paid.
By September 2013, when I was granted access to Construx's working site in the neighborhood of
Skopje Aerodrom, workers were waiting for the salary of the previous month. In the following
months, the delay in salaries increased dramatically, reaching a maximum of six months of arrears
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by March 2014. Every day workers would recount collectively the number of months, and days,
that they had not been paid and then ask, "Is there anything new?"
Although many of them still celebrated major religious and social occasions, they felt
particularly embarrassed by not being able to do so properly. Their calendar, a cyclical temporal
schedule, depended upon money-oriented time, and the current discrepancy put them in a difficult
spot. Easter became an especially painful moment; promised to receive some, if not all, of their
monthly salary, they were given nothing. Every day that passed and brought them closer to the
festivity, a major one in the Christian Orthodox calendar, their nervousness increased, and it
eventually exploded in the only case of open rebellion I witnessed, which I describe in detail in
Chapter 5. Tired, frustrated, and without hope, they felt humiliated in front of their families for not
being able to provide proper food and gifts, despite being at work every day. As one of the workers
told me, "Every year I buy myself a new shirt for Easter. That is not much, but I always do it. This
year I could not afford it." His eyes were red, his voice low, and he was about to break down. "And
this weekend is my daughter's birthday. What am I supposed to do? You know, a cake costs money.
What can I get her? Not to mention a party! But she's a kid, how can she understand that I have no
money?" As the social and religious calendar entered in collision, it became clear that there was
one element that kept all these temporal relations in synchrony: money. With the spread of
illiquidity, various temporal relations fell apart and started colliding with each other.
In fact, the temporality of the work sites that I observed from the fall of 2013 bore very
little resemblance to a cyclical routine or to the repetitive and normalized cycle of events that
workers recounted to me and that I transcribed at the beginning of this chapter. Their working
rhythms, for instance, were mostly organized around moments of intense activity or others of
extreme inactivity. Workers complained about the long hours of the work day, but at the same
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time, they also felt they had very few tasks to complete. That also was a constant source of
complaint: they privately objected to and criticized the decision of Construx to engage
subcontractors and reserve the longtime expertise of their own twenty manual laborers for the
details. But it was never just about details and never about what they were supposed to do.
Inevitably, something would happen—a task that needed to be completed immediately, a problem
with some subcontractor who did not show up or did not complete the job as anticipated—and then
Construx's workers would be summoned and asked to finish the job. It often happened that
managers decided to "speed up" (da se forsira) the activities and work throughout the weekend,
despite the obvious lack of materials or anything to be done (front). Workers were in the
paradoxical situation of not having much to do but being asked to work extra hours.

3.2 Finance and Clock Time
The chasm between the duration and the quality of workers' temporal engagements increased as
Construx found itself engaged with the temporal horizon of finance, which increasingly diverged
from the clock time of construction. In the 2011 fiscal year, Construx had risen to the attention of
the Macedonian public. Ranked the fourth-fastest growing and most successful construction
company, Construx had shifted from long term slow and sure investments for international
investors, such as embassies and banks, to more lucrative and faster construction on the local
market. In 1991, the company had started with just two friends "who met in a dark basement, with
two broken chairs and a bucket," according to Construx's director. The company began designing
small projects until the beginning of the 2000s, when it took on some major construction projects
with Alpha Bank and some foreign embassies. In 2004, Construx had started building in the
municipality of Kisela Voda, its first of four multi-dwelling units, completing various
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infrastructures for the same municipality. Since 2008, the year when the VMRO took power, the
company received fewer public works and mostly relied on its own investment in dwelling units.
In 2013, the company had three nine-story buildings under construction and completed a process
of hiring thirteen new high-level workers (four engineers, three land surveyors, one architect, two
financial experts, and three planners)—effectively doubling its administrative cadres. The
buildings were scheduled to be completed at different times in the near future. The building in the
"Novo Lisice" neighborhood (hereinafter the Den) was receiving the finishing touches; the
building at "Aerodrom" (that I will call the Pool) was expected to be completed by October 2013;
and the third in "Kisela Voda" (hereinafter the Nest) was scheduled for completion during the
summer of 2014, but it was not yet completed at the time of writing (December 2015). Construx
used to employ its own workers for most construction activities, relying on subcontractors only
for highly specialized phases, such as electrical, plumbing, or steelworks. With only twenty-five
manual workers, Construx opted for delegating most of the positions in the three buildings to
subcontractors. The expectation was, of course, that the market was ripe to absorb new housing
units and that it was necessary to build faster to maximize the profit. There were also other
motivations behind this move, including family links between some of the subcontractors and the
directors that might have pushed the management to adopt a more expansive politics. After all, if
one can profit, so can more partners.
Construx did not have the liquidity to support such a wide spectrum of investments. The
company thus decided to increment its credit lines and rely more than before on banks. Thanks to
a number of building plots Construx had bought cheaply, the company had enough collateral to
obtain the loans necessary to begin the construction. To build the Pool, the company contracted a
progressive loan with a major player in the Macedonian banking industry, Stopanska Banka.
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Because banks in Macedonia are owned by foreign investors, with the notable exception of
Komercijalna Banka, the 2008-09 global crisis had a very immediate effect on their lending
policies. Stopanska Banka, founded in 1944 and active during socialism, was bought in 2000 by
the National Bank of Greece. Scared by the international chaos in the real estate market, banks
grew stricter with deadlines and less flexible with payments. Alpha Bank, also a Greek bank, was
a very close partner of Construx, and it was Construx that built most of the bank's offices in Skopje.
Yet Alpha Bank almost completely ceased to finance the company's operations; Stopanska Banka,
on the other hand, augmented the pressure to increase collateral and respect the construction plan.
As a result, Construx was forced to accept loans with more burdensome conditions. By the fall of
2013, Construx had put up an ample portion of the buildings under construction as collateral,
agreeing to a clause according to which the entirety of the income from the sales of apartments
would be destined to pay back the loan; only after fulfilling the loan would Construx be able to
generate profit. Construx's only resource of liquidity, the sale of apartments, went directly to the
banks, depriving Construx of income early in the construction process.
When the crisis manifested itself on the Macedonian market in the spring 2013, Construx
was stuck in a very vulnerable position. It had very few cash reserves, three buildings to complete,
and, suddenly, few buyers. More dramatically, the company was without political support, as the
directors had always refused to align with the VMRO party despite making concessions to local
municipal mayors—including sponsorship for a local basketball team and the building of a church.
While other companies rose to prominence thanks to their political allegiance, the VMRO capture
of the state forced Construx towards the periphery of the political economic structure. With the
decrease of liquidity came kompenzacija—as I described in Chapter 2, the progressive loss of
value. Construx was less and less able to provide materials to subcontractors on time or to pay
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them their salaries. With time, subcontractors stopped working or became so unreliable that they
could not be trusted to complete the tasks with the standards of quality for which Construx had
worked so hard to be known. So the company turned to its own workers: they were suddenly called
in to complete most of the positions. Forced to abide by the tight schedule of loan repayment, the
company struggled to speed up the completion of the projects, although it lacked the financial
infrastructure to compensate its workers' labor. During the winter of 2013 and the early months of
2014, Construx became less and less able to pull together the temporality of its own work and that
of financial obligations—completely upsetting the temporal horizon with which workers had to
negotiate. The more the pressure of repaying financial obligation oriented Construx towards the
progressive goal of creating profit, the more erratic its work schedule became.

3.3 Temporal Subjection
Every worksite has very peculiar temporal arrangements. Between twelve and fifteen of Construx's
own workers were needed to complete the earlier stage of construction of the Nest; there, the pace
of work was more intense and workers had a more constant flow of activities. Workers still took
breaks and sneaked out of the worksite to conduct personal business, but they had to be more
careful. Although often they lacked the proper construction materials or did not have the machinery
or specialized workers to complete the scheduled work for the day, workers could always be asked
to switch to other tasks. In that worksite, breaks were clearly linked to conscious rebellions
motivated by the lack of salaries, and they therefore carried a direct political meaning—as we shall
see in Chapter 5. Additionally, the presence of the Brigadir, the workers' foreman, and of a set of
security cameras implemented another collective dynamic at the Nest compared to the Pool. In the
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Nest's dustier, messier, open, and unfinished hallways, not working was a charged activity, done
either in secret or with a collective resonance and approval from within the workers' hierarchy.
At the Pool, work was more diluted, and workers ended up stretching any given task to
cover the entirety of the day and leave something for the day after, "because tomorrow too we have
to work," as Aleksandar used to say. But this slow tempo could be reversed into intense and
randomly urgent working patterns at any time. During the various weeks I remained with them,
Folco and his group could be called at any moment by the site director, Toni. From emptying a
truck of heavy wooden boards to fixing broken tiles to measuring, leveling, and excavating
canalizations, they had to have a wide range of expertise. Even if they did not, they were still
required to find a way to do a given task. They switched from killing time during self-proclaimed
breaks to dragging out normal working activities, speeding up and down the various buildings to
complete an urgent task. They switched from imagining being the owners of some apartments to
digging in the mud cursing saints and patrons. They were sleeping in empty, hidden apartments,
and, a moment later, they would find themselves running with angry buyers that shouted and
promised legal consequences for the whole company. Every day, new problems would need
solutions and urgent tasks would need to be solved with overtime work, substituting the required
materials or specialists with improvisation.
Workers did not like this temporal arrangement. Why were they forced to come to work on
Saturdays and Sundays when they did not have the material conditions to complete their tasks?
The issue was not that workers did not want to work, sweat, or be tired. They were not afraid of
painful, long days. On the contrary, they welcomed long days, because working longer hours
would raise their paychecks, reducing their expenses for coming to work. And they often came to
work even with fevers or in debilitating conditions, shrugging off the idea of going to a doctor.
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But coming to work without being able to accomplish much and without being paid—that was
absurd. As their unpaid checks accumulated, they started to receive calls from banks and other
creditors. One worker feared he would lose his own mortgaged apartments; another did not know
how to pay the small consumer loan he had taken out to pay for renovations on the house, for their
kids' university books, or their family doctors' appointments; one could not pay his family's rent.
Most of the workers had their own houses, built by their fathers in a small village some thirty
minutes northeast of Skopje, close to the airport. Ironically, the village had a Turkish and Muslim
name, as it used to be inhabited by Ottoman subjects until the beginning of the 1950s, when they
relocated en masse to Turkey, in a partially forced process that I will explore more in depth in
Chapter 4. As the previous population left the area, the workers' families were able to acquire (or
occupy) some agricultural land; it was that land that today eased workers' survival, providing a
minimal amount of produce and often allowing them to raise some chickens or pigs for household
consumption. Stores were no longer willing to do rabush (store credit), however, and there was
very little chance for bartering produce for other goods. They needed money for everything else
beyond subsistence.
At first, workers cut back on every expense not directly needed for survival. They
eliminated presents for little kids, negotiated the purchase of university supplies or pocket money
for older children and reduced purchases of clothes. Some even stopped betting on sports. But with
time, such austerity measures proved to be insufficient and workers were forced to find new
sources of money. The most popular option was to accept private side jobs, something that workers
had done routinely since socialism but during the years of construction boom had stopped doing.
Long days and weekend shifts were suddenly no longer just meaningless words, but they became
real problems, as Construx kept them chained to a worksite while they needed to be in private
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homes or on other construction sites to find some alternative sources of liquidity. Workers would
often complain: "You see, I am at work 10 hours. That already leaves me very little time with my
family. I get home at 5:30 p.m. I take a shower, change, eat, and it is already 6:30 or 7:00 p.m. Just
some time to play with the kids, maybe to fix something, and it is already time to go to bed."
Matei was a case in point. Without a father and with a retired mother, he needed extra
income to support the family. He tried to make a living out of betting on sport events—especially
soccer. But that did not go as well as planned, and after a few months he lost count of his own
profits or losses. So he started waiting tables at a local restaurant specialized in weddings and other
celebrations; that forced him to work until two or three in the morning on Fridays, Saturdays, and
Sundays. Working at Construx seven days a week with shifts of ten hours a day (eight on the
weekend) for the whole summer, and for a good part of the winter 2013, he was exhausted. Monday
mornings, especially during the cold days of November, were excruciating. With only two or three
hours of sleep, he was never late. He did not complain, nor did he stop pacing around the workplace
with a quickness and dexterity appropriate for a cruise ship waiter. But not everybody was able to
maintain such a high morale, and over time, the preoccupation with money affected workers'
productivity. Thus, workers ended up increasingly avoiding their shifts of labor-intensive
activities, if they were not urgent, in order to save the core of their energy for their free time, when
they would actually be paid for their time and efforts. "We work, but let's be honest, we do not
really work," one day one of the workers admitted, as they collectively discussed the option of
going on strike.
Saving energy during the workday to invest in after-shift private jobs is a common temporal
tactic in the Macedonian construction industry, especially among ethnic Macedonians. Most of the
big formerly socialist companies such as Beton or Granit pay skilled workers as little as 200 USD
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per moth (9,000 MKD) for eight- or nine-hour shifts, without additional money to pay for lunches
or transportation. General calculations show that a family of four needs about 700 USD (30,000
MKD) to survive; workers need additional income and thus devote only part of their energy to
their official employer.
Successful and liquid companies such as the one that I will call Imagine exhibit a very
different temporal regime. The majority of these companies combine legal and illegal work—
hiring workers completely without contracts, benefits, or insurance, forcing them not to take paid
vacation leave, but also declaring to tax agencies only part of their workers' income. Workers are
then paid in cash for whatever sum exceeds the minimum wage of 9,000 MKD, even if their
agreed-upon wage is often around 20,000 MKD. The problem with cash payments reflects another
temporal aspect: the future. The undeclared part will not count towards the worker's pension, thus
leaving him with enormous worries about his future. Additionally, if by any chance the company
conveniently forgets to pay taxes on the minimum wage, workers find themselves to be without
any health insurance whatsoever. "I thought about it, I asked around, you know," confided Marko
to me on a cold night in January. "But there you do not count for anything, the owner bullies you,
you have no machine to help you bring heavy weight up and down. There, you're just a piece of
meat that moves." Thanks to the VMRO system of forced credit, money gives liquid companies'
owners tremendous power over their own workers. Imagine, for instance, is known for its brutal
working conditions. On a new construction site, their work begins at 5 o'clock a.m. and continues
without interruption until late in the afternoon, despite a temperature of around 45 degrees Celsius.
The owner is often present on the site, shouting orders and insults to motivate workers and to spur
them to work faster. As one of Imagine's workers told me "Every time he is on the site, I hide. I
can't take being shouted at, so I try to find a place to avoid him."
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Workers at Construx knew the temporal tyranny of other employers very well. The
protracted crisis at Construx gave them doubts about the very future of the company. But most of
them had worked there for more than ten years and had a high level of respect for the owner and
the cadres. They were torn between prognoses of unavoidable decline and hopes of sudden rebirth.
On one thing they all agreed: there were no good days ahead of them, and there was no future in
Macedonia. "Leave, you who can. Take your girl, marry her, and leave," they continuously
suggested to me, "and if you find work outside, call me. You know it is easy money: you find us
work, we work, and we give you a cut. You do not even have to do anything."
At this point, they were faced with two opposite choices; either to keep their current job,
waiting at work and working at night, or to rush around on the construction site trading their dignity
for a bully-owner's cash. It was what they imagined about their future options that pushed them to
take one direction or the other; workers who were young and saw no future in front of them, let
alone retirement, chose to go and try their luck on the closed and stagnating job market. They had
nothing to lose, and they found it useless to sacrifice their present for an uncertain future. After
dealing with increasingly delayed wages for six months, between April 2014 and April 2015, seven
among the youngest workers resigned; one found work as a truck driver, another in a gas station,
two migrated to Germany, and one found a job in a foreign-owned company that produces vehicles.
Two more, however, changed their minds and went back to Construx one day later. From what I
am told, they resigned again in the fall of 2015, but were back to working with Construx in the
summer of 2016 when I visited the company again.
Resigning from Construx was not an easy decision. The company paid workers decently
by Macedonian standards; unskilled workers made 300 euro per month, while skilled maistori had
salaries up to 500 euro. The company declared the whole salary for tax purposes, which meant that
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workers would receive welfare benefits, such as health insurance, and especially a pension based
on the whole 500 euro once they retired. While the lack of salary affected workers' health
insurance, given that the Macedonian Health Fund gives workers vouchers for medical services
every month only if the employer has paid his dues (which are linked to salaries), pensions were
not affected by actual payments. The months of work, even without pay, counted towards the total
they needed to reach the benefits from state pensions. Those older workers who could envision
retiring in their (not-so-distant) future decided to stay—they chose the security of a safe pension
to help them traverse the dark and uncertain future ahead, even if that meant working additionally
with some side jobs. In fact, workers were convinced that the director would eventually pay, even
if the company went bankrupt. While they claimed not to know the director's intentions, with time,
they increasingly discussed the company's finances in public, calculating the assets the company
had in land, buildings, and the profit that they should have made. Something was not right, as their
approximate calculations were unable to account for the current crisis; yet they were more fearful
that if they left Construx, they would be condemned to work even longer hours, with no future
security.

3.4 Holding Time to Exist: Uncertainty as Blocked Flow of Time
While workers thought about the drastic decision to leave, they still had to negotiate everyday
temporal requirements at Construx. At the beginning of my fieldwork in September of 2013, their
opinion of the director and the fortunes of the company was cautious but somewhat optimistic. As
the salary delay increased, they became more and more convinced of Construx's financial collapse.
Construx started to question workers' temporal discipline, and the director insinuated that they
were not working well—which was actually true but also informally allowed by the cadres who
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did not want to exasperate workers. Meanwhile, their long hours of work had become less and less
important—they were not in charge of the main building activities and received materials only
after the credit installments were paid. The paradox of working longer hours while not being
central for the company's fortune reduced workers' worth and filled their days with empty time. It
is in this context that they resorted to uncertainty as a temporal tactic to block the expected flow
of time, creating pockets of existential meaning.
It is a warm day in October, and I am duly conducting field observation at the Pool. The
building is almost completed and was supposed to be handed over to buyers on October 1st. My
friends at Construx tell me that it will be finished any day now, but workers suggest otherwise:
they hope to be done by the end of the month, although they swear that they will still be there at
the end of the year. The building is composed of a ground floor designated for shops, most of
which have not yet been sold; on top of that are nine more residential floors and one last lofted
floor. While the roof diminishes the volume of some of the last floor's apartments, in the central
part, they have the opportunity for additional lofted (and illegal) surfaces. The building has two
entrances and is constituted by about seventy apartments of various sizes, with the smallest one
being around forty square meters and the biggest one about one hundred square meters. Despite
being in a relatively central and coveted location, there is no paved street servicing the building.
The entire neighborhood is being developed anew out of a former training ground for the army.
Increasingly, green or abandoned urban spaces that used to be fairly common in Skopje are being
turned into construction sites with the investments of building companies.
After a customary visit to Toni, the director of the worksite, I climb up the stairs to meet
Folco and Marco, who had been working to fix an apartment's wall. As I approach the fifth floor,
I can't hear any noise, just the echo of my footsteps that accompany my footprint on the dusty
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granite hallways. I find Dino smoking a cigarette on the balcony, while Folco is lying down in the
hallway, his eyes closed. We start talking about wine and brandy, when suddenly Dino hears some
voices and swiftly moves from the banister into the apartment. He then peeks out again to check
if Toni, the worksite's director, has seen him. Reassured, he resumes drilling the wall, and Folco
proceeds to fix it with plaster. Then they go back to placing laths to cover the fissure between the
parquet and other surfaces. Folco, more experienced, measures and tells Dino the sizes and angles
to cut the pieces; Dino operates a medium-sized circular saw to model the parts of lath to the
desired length or form. It is light work, which usually facilitates joking and exchanges. But not
today—Folco's mind is full of troubles about his salary. Dino is exceedingly, frustrated as none of
the pieces they cut seems to work immediately, given the poor leveling of the surfaces that requires
constant reshaping of the laths.
Aleksandar shows up. He starts talking about Dylan Dog, Corto Maltese, and other
comics—he himself is an author and used to be a hotel executive before his structure was closed
down by a political decision. He had no other option but to take up a position as a manual worker.
After a good thirty minutes of discussion he looks at the clock, realizes that it is 10:30 a.m., and
decides it is time to do a little task, "just to work on something" before lunch, and then heads
directly into the break. Over time, I will see this pattern over and over again from different workers,
who would time their pace so as to slow down until about thirty minutes before any given break.
With gravity, they would accomplish a small task before calling it a day. After all, it would make
no more sense to start a new task with the break so close. And anyway, there is no urgency; as
Folco puts it, they "have little work left now. Before we were running like crazy. But now—you
see—details! There is not much to do."
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At 10:40 a.m., most of the seven manual workers present on site are already in the small,
unfinished shop that serves as their dressing and eating room. The room is bare, to use a
euphemism. Exposed bricks all around us with a worn table that exhibits years of carvings; small
handmade wooden hangers for clothes; and, most importantly, seats, made of upside-down plastic
buckets, wooden benches, or actual old rusty chairs. Workers have turned all sorts of different
materials into seats. They constantly create seats in the workplace, looking to rest their legs after
hours of going up and down the stairs and standing around carrying weight. Anything can become
a seat: a package of tiles or parquet, a stone, a step—as long as there is some plastic on it. It will
take me a long time to learn this—and much embarrassment after being forced to take the seat a
tired worker offered me when I just sat on the floor. I, as a foreigner, was required to sit on the
piece of plastic they had put on their own spot. Such a technique, they claim, is necessary to avoid
the workers' main preoccupation in the workplace: dust. Using a piece of PVC or putting a slate
of expanded plastic under our buttocks would insulate us from the dusty surfaces, shield us from
the pernicious volatile particles. But dust kept on coming back. It was in the food, inside our cloths,
under our fingernails. After some weeks everything had the specific smell and taste of dust—and
it would take even me, a passive observer, a long time and repeated showering to get clean.
Once seated around the table (on our plastic slates), we eat. There is very little adornment,
just some plastic cups, and we summarily wash the residuals of the previous owners' drinks with
"construction" water, some dirty metal forks and knives, what was once a cinnamon container that
is now filled with salt, and, if we are lucky, vegetables from somebody's garden. But ceremony
makes up for the frugality of the setting. And the master of it is certainly Matei, the deputy
warehouseman. Earlier in the day, Matei had scouted our various working stations, as well as our
hiding places, to gather food orders and secure our wishes (or something similar, anyway) at a
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local supermarket or deli. At lunch time, he methodically extracts the various white plastic
containers and wraps that are passed around with jokes and frivolous observations until they reach
the destined owner. Those containers, maybe embellished with plastic bags he packaged the food
in, will be our plates. Meanwhile somebody, usually Aleksandar, has filled everybody's cups with
a round of "juice" (unbranded coca cola or orange soda), even if the person will not contribute to
the common expenses for drinks.
Suddenly, there's silence. The continuous swish of makeshift plates fills the environment,
interrupted by the occasional grunt of somebody dropping one of their ten small kebapacinja
(ground meat sticks) on the floor. Those of us who eat beef soup solemnly part the bread, while
whoever ordered a cheap cold cut fills his own bread with sour cream before passing it on to
another comrade. Soon the deed is accomplished: we look at each other, relieved. It might be time
for some wine, or homemade brandy (rakija). On some particular occasion, we might have sweets.
We talk again, usually making fun of each other. If a wife calls in, that might be the joke for the
rest of our day. If not, it will soon turn to politics, sports, or possibly the old days. Maybe Igor, an
older man who used to be a professional waiter, will tell us of when he served in Tito's guard—
especially if he had a few drinks the night before.
No matter what the order of events is, Matei will direct us once again when it is time to
wrap up the plastic; then he will sit, take out a pen, and, looking at the receipt, he will call out
names, foods, and numbers. "Fabio, soup and bread, 90 [2 USD]. Boris, sour cream and mortadella,
half a bread, juice, 120 [3 USD]. Folco, ten kebapcinja…" The list goes on and on. Every day we
change the menu, but the prices are always there, between 70 and 150 MKD. By now, it is ten
minutes into the official break time (but a good half an hour since we sat down). Time to discuss
if we are going to bet today, and if yes, how much. Matei has his own schemes, and he will not
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share them. Igor can't write and read properly, especially after a drink or two, so we often do it
together. Somebody is lying on the bench, pretending with admirable determination to rest or sleep.
Sometime he's so determined that he's snoring. By the time we blacken the last box of the betting
card, somebody will have mentioned some major political events. There's still time for a major
political disagreement, with occasional bumping of fists, collegial laughter, and choleric excess.
11:30 a.m. never fails to show up. Time to stand up: we divide into teams of two or three again,
and we all head back to our different positions.
And then it is laths again, over and over. This afternoon, we do not work among white,
empty walls. This apartment has been partly furnished, and the owners' spatial decisions quickly
become a matter of interest. We cannot understand why they decided to build a closet on top of
the buzzer. The chairs and the dining table do not convince us, either. Folco sits on a chair covered
in plastic and looks around. "I do not think it makes sense to have the table here," he says to Dino.
"Well, it depends were the TV is—see, if you put it there," he moves where the TV should be,
"then…No you can't really see it. So no, it is stupid." It is empowering to wander around in the
place, to touch everything like it was your own, to outsmart the actual owner of the apartment you
will never be able to afford. Folco looks at me: "Sit, Fabio. Anyway, it is useless now, it doesn't
serve anybody."
I sit, wondering how much human energy, time, and life has been infused into those empty
apartments. As they work, workers leave signs of their presence—marks that will need to be
erased, cigarettes that will need to be picked up, and images that will need to be forgotten in order
for the apartment to be sold. Everything in the workplace is makeshift and reminds workers of
their precariousness: they have to use plastic, portable toilets, even if they are installing actual
toilet seats all day long. Their eating tools are plastic containers, soon to be thrown away. Seats
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made of broken pieces of plastic that will cease to exist as soon as the worker stands up. Traces of
the workers' presence are everywhere and yet will not last. Workers' presence must be eliminated
from the spaces they built; in fact, the management engages in veritable struggles to ensure that
newly built apartments become pristine, because they certainly are not built so. That temporality,
the temporality of building, will need to wither away, because it antedates the date of completion,
whence an apartment's time is supposed to start. It is about that temporality that buyers will
insistently inquire with Toni. It is that moment that will be marked as the beginning of history for
each apartment. What is before, be it weeks, months, or years, doesn't count.
But as I sit on that plastic-wrapped chair, it does count. Workers, who feel useless because
of their lack of real work, start wondering "What if?" They, we, feel the space in a different way.
We are part of it, in this suspended moment of urgent waiting. Dino now is enjoying his temporary
ownership of the apartment. He refuses to go back to work. Folco tells him some new numbers
that describe where to cut the lath, but Marko answers, "No." Folco has little patience today, but
Dino wants to provoke him. He throws some pieces on the floor, shouting, "NOOO!" Folco
jokingly takes him by the ear, and they begin to hit each other with the materials they have at
hands. "Come on, don't be stupid, it is late. Where were we? 176, 170. Come on now." Dino laughs,
and turns on the saw. Back to "real" time.
I am not inclined to see any of these moments, where the normative rhythm of work is
subverted, as spaces of resistance or as "weapons of the weak" (Scott 1987). On the other hand,
workers take a particular pride in holding on to the present just a moment longer, with an additional
joke, an extra cigarette, or an extra minute sitting in empty apartments before rushing to work.
They could stretch time and block the normal flow of work precisely because of the uncertainty,
created by the discrepancy between clock time and financial repayments, that upsets their
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workdays. Deprived of the possibility to identify with their work—increasingly useless and
structurally not of good quality—workers saw in the capacity of slowing down their activity an
agential act, a space for claiming meaning for themselves. The resigned care associated with their
ritual meals, their constant attempts to sit and produce "clean" plastic surfaces testify to just such
a meaning production, aimed not at subverting or resisting but simply at affirming their existence,
if nothing else, in their own eyes.

3.5 Uncertainty as Emergency
Inspector (I): So what about the lights?
Toni (site director) (T): As you saw, there is electricity in the apartments.
I: But there was no electricity in the hall—are there lights in the hall?
T: I don't know, maybe something happened with the lifesaver.
T: What about in the other halls? If I go there, will I find electricity? Let me go to the next door
and see [starting to move].
T: I don't know, I don't know much about electricity, but maybe there's no light.
I: So there's no electricity in the halls, right. You did not give it electricity there?
T: We did not give it electricity there.
I: But there is electricity in the apartments that are inhabited.
T: That's right, we gave electricity only to the apartments that are inhabited.
I: So how many are those?
T: I do not know
I: Just give me a number, so I can tell them…some [nekolku]?
T: Some.
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I: Ok, so then let me go now…Oh, give me your number.
T: Here it is…
I: Not you, him [pointing at the anthropologist].
Fabio (F): Oh, ok, so it is…
I: So ok, so if I contact you then…you're together right?
T: Yes, he's my right hand. I do not want him to leave Macedonia, I will never let him leave!

As she goes outside of the site, we both let out a huge sigh of relief. Toni turns to me and starts
crossing himself again, as he did when the Inspector entered the first apartment. "I lie, how much
I lie…let me cross myself again. Oh my God I can't lie, I do not know how to lie…and you helped
me! So you know, you helped me a lot, speaking about Italy—that she could contact you to help
her niece studying there…I was thinking, okay, let them speak about Italy!"
Despite his thirty-seven years of experience as director of work sites, the encounter with
the Inspector left Toni literally shaking. The Inspector, a middle aged woman, had been sent by
Stopanska Banka to verify the conditions of the worksite and confirm that the work was proceeding
according to the plan. Based on her report, the Bank would approve or deny the release of the last
tier of the credit upon which they had agreed. Construx could not afford to be late in the bank's
eyes and miss this much-needed injection of cash. But we were late, and when the Inspector called
her boss to confirm that everything was fine, it seemed that Toni had pulled off a miracle. The
building had neither electricity nor running water, partially due to Construx's own delay but mostly
as a consequence of the municipality's ineffectiveness in digging the infrastructure. Upon releasing
the building permit, each investor has to pay the local administration a fixed municipal tax (around
10-12% of the overall value of the building) for such infrastructural work. Because this was a
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former military site and the paperwork regarding the measurement and localization of old
infrastructure was either classified or lost in the dismantling of the Yugoslav Army, the
municipality had not even started to address these issues. That wasn't unheard of—Construx had
faced similar delays from municipal authorities before, and managers from other construction
companies complained about long, unjustified waits. In the following weeks, we would observe
the municipality's engineers and planners on the site. Sometime they would ask us about what they
were supposed to build. To everyone's dismay, we would realize that they had no clue about where
the infrastructure should be, nor how they would connect our building to the existing street
network.
The urban plan used by Construx and other investors had been approved by the
municipality, even if it did not respect the actual built reality, a common phenomenon in
Macedonian planning, as I show in Chapter 4. The discrepancy between plan and reality also
increased because investors had the tendency to implement makeshift variations. As a result, the
municipality had no idea how to conciliate plan and reality. When local authorities devised some
sort of solution and actually built the fecal canalization, new problems arose. Buildings on the
south side of the pipeline were unable to plug their canalization in because their pipes were too
low, while buildings on the north site had pipes built too high. Every time a new problem was
discovered, dictated either by Construx's own shortcomings or by bureaucratic inefficiencies of
the municipality, workers had to rush to fix it. Ultimately each of these issues would weigh on
Toni's shoulders. He needed to come up with alternative solutions. As the director of the work site,
his main duty had been to supervise and plan the operation. Now, in the time of illiquidity, he was
dedicated to keeping everything from falling apart. That involved reassuring buyers that the
deadline would be met, and once it was not, reconciling with their demands to the best of his
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ability. This involved finding impossible compromises. Some apartments came to be inhabited
despite the building being unfinished, with makeshift electric and water arrangements. Toni also
negotiated the infrastructures (water, gas, and fecal pipelines, as well as streets) with municipal
engineers' or subcontractors' mounting discontent. In sum, Toni lived in a temporal horizon
punctuated by emergencies; each could be neither postponed nor resolved. Most of these
emergencies needed to be addressed by subcontractors, but that itself was a problem. Because
Construx did not pay regularly, Toni needed to rely on all sorts of personal connections to make
contractors complete their work or come back to fix their mistakes. I would often see Toni sitting
at his desk, slowly smoking a cigarette with a blank stare, suddenly throwing out a joke at me to
chase away the nervousness and maybe discuss a new idea to keep everything from falling apart.
The state of emergency that punctuated Toni's temporal horizon was not the consequence
of classical postsocialist uncertainty. Toni did not know the details of Construx's financial
problems, subcontractors' own reactions to lack of payments, and buyers' expectations. Yet he
could see most of the problems coming. Problems were often born out of other people's lack of
precision or professionalism, yet he certainly knew how to solve them. But he could not. He did
not have the materials, tools, or resources to fabricate permanent solutions. And even if he did, the
problems were the consequences of larger issues deeply nested in the functioning of institutions.
What Toni could do was to implement some temporary solution that would momentarily postpone
the problem. But how do you convince frustrated subcontractors, angry buyers, or suspicious
inspectors to postpone the issue?

3.6 Uncertainty as Woven Time
In the workplace, emergencies are handled by weaving time, that is, by stretching, shortening, or
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otherwise connecting various domains of activity in a temporal continuum. Time is woven in three
different senses. First, the weaving of time corresponds to the capacity to rhetorically manipulate
the tempo of the dialogue. This includes changing topics, conjuring personal and intimate
temporalities, and shortening or lengthening the window available for articulating one's request.
Second, weaving time refers to the capacity of isolating or connecting past and present,
rediscovering promises long forgotten or instead confining them to the remote time of history,
while evoking a future full of possibilities. Third, weaving time constitutes the capacity to produce
a shared space of uncertainty, which both interlocutors uncomfortably inhabit in the hope of its
undisclosed potential.
Toni artfully wove time and intersected these three dimensions at once. When it became
clear that Construx would not be able to deliver the apartments on time, he deflected angry buyers
by conjuring their personal shared past or intimacy and by promising future solutions. When that
was not possible, he created makeshift arrangements for those who had already sold their previous
properties and had nowhere else to go. Some "lucky" (or desperate) buyers found themselves in a
quite literal temporal bubble: while everywhere else the building lagged behind the schedule, their
living rooms were already furnished. At night, most of the hallways were dark and filled with
echoes; theirs, however, resounded with laughter and the smells of home-made dishes.
It was those time-warped apartments that the Inspector visited. Toni managed to prevent
her from wandering into other rooms, dark and waterless, by weaving the tempo of the
conversation, so as to co-opt the Inspector's protestations and distract her from other incriminating
details. He used his powerful laughter as a way to interrupt the professional examination of the
building, and insisted on asking me questions about my Italian connections as soon as he learned
that she had a nephew interested in studying in Milan. He even admitted that "they did not give
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electricity" to the halls, in a desperate attempt to prevent her from discovering that they had no
electricity at all. Toni jumped on any glimpse of opening towards personal topics that could reroute
our exchanges towards genuinely funny pranks and shorten the Inspector's window of opportunity
to ask questions. For instance, Toni eavesdropped on the Inspector's phone call where she
confirmed to the bank's headquarters that the building was on schedule and that she was off to
dinner: "Oh that one? It is a great place to eat frog's legs. Now you'll go there right away—you
know, you can't waste any more time here, frog's legs can't wait." Conjuring the intimate and
personal temporality of a relaxed family dinner with an admiring and almost jealous voice, Toni
wove the Inspector's future into our present and gave her a good reason to leave the site without
additional inquiries. The end of the conversation is indicative of woven time's results in
Macedonia: both parties settled on a (un)comfortable middle ground of uncertainty. Not all of the
apartments have light. But some do. The reasons are unclear and we'll both leave it at that.
In most interactions I observed, weaving time resulted in a sense of uncertainty.
Subcontractors waited for hours in front of the Construx director's door without being told if the
director was going to receive them, or even if he was really there. The director used uncertainty as
a way to postpone their requests for money, never providing a firm answer (or even an answer at
all) to their inquiries and pleas for payment. Buyers, uncertain about the status of their apartments,
presented themselves at the construction site with Turkish delights (lokum), coffee, and sodas.
Toni joked, talked about the old days and the weather, anything except what they wanted. But
sometimes he was not able to avoid confrontation. In these cases, he mostly professed ignorance.
Surprisingly, claiming not to know was concurrently unrealistic (after all, he was the construction
site's director) but also morally acceptable. Reminiscent of earlier socialist times as well as
postsocialist uncertainty, "I do not know" (ne znam) could be used as a last resource to show one's
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powerless position within the company's hierarchy. In fact, it was Construx's internal policy to
refer every question up the chain of command. That, too, was a temporal strategy to defer and
diffuse emergencies, which had the unpleasant downside of crowding the administrative offices
with inquirers in search of answers. In sum, the temporal incongruity of finance and construction
work was addressed through uncertainty as a temporal tactic to postpone issues.
But why would anybody accept uncertainty? If it is clear why Construx used uncertainty
to keep debtors at bay, why did debtors buy into it? Consider the Inspector's visit. On her way out,
she pressed questions that, without a doubt, she had had since the beginning. But she raised them
at a time when it was already clear that she would not get answers. Toni mobilized uncertainty as
a discursive trope again, claiming not to know enough about electricity. At that point, it became
clear to me and Toni that the Inspector had understood, but instead of pushing it further, she offered
Toni a way out suggesting that "some" apartments had lights. She preferred uncertainty, in the
form of an Italian contact for her niece, rather than throwing Toni against the proverbial wall.
Weaving time bought Construx some time, while it provided the Inspector with some potential
future benefits.
I witnessed many other construction directors try their luck: they would stalk Construx's
managers at the office or at their favorite restaurant and talk to them for hours. The conversation
often developed as I expected. Construx's director led it round and round, while the inquirer
seconded him until he or she found a way to bring about his or her requests. Yet these inquiries
sometimes succeeded. I saw Mr. Construx pick up the phone to authorize payments for at least
some of the sums requested. Weaving time together, interlocutors in Macedonia conducted
elaborate negotiations where both partners participated in the production of uncertainty, albeit with
different agendas and interests. Construx's director gave in to some of these cunning rhetorical
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plays, evocations of a shared past, or promises of future joint ventures. In the same way, the
Inspector accepted a vague answer, took my number, and set off to eat frog's legs. Weaving time
is "what you do," confirmed a director of another company. "You go there, pray, cry, and they
might give you something."
Ultimately, uncertainty rests upon the recognition of each other's agency in navigating a
political economy in which one has to generate something out of nothing—on the acceptance of
one's temporary limitations in exchange for future or imaginary benefits. It rests upon the
knowledge that illiquidity (and the incongruence of finance and work) is a threat for both the
creditor and the debtor and that accepting one's limited agency is better than pushing oneself to the
edge of the abyss. Both partners recognize uncertainty as a generative process that is both produced
and productive of action. My interlocutors did not need to overcome uncertainty. While they still
felt some anxiety and they generally found the process humiliating, they still saw in weaving time
a transformative and generative space. More importantly, they gave up planning and exhibited a
specific, open-ended intentionality—one that had qualities very similar to what Miyazaki (2006)
describes for hope. If we take the example of Toni, it is clear that he had a goal in mind, a rationally
defined problem he wanted to solve. But how to get there, what to do, and how far to push his lies
was a much messier, improvisational, and not completely rational process. He was very genuinely
emotional throughout the interaction, to the point that he felt the need to cross himself over and
over again. The production of uncertainty is thus not just the result of strategies; its (forced)
improvisation and performance relies at times upon deep emotional involvement. Toni, a 64-yearold engineer, one of eight children of an Orthodox priest, was struggling to justify his own
behavior, which he considered immoral. He placed a high value on working, and he genuinely
enjoyed discussing the technical difficulties and solutions he had to face in his long career. He had
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learned how to solve urgent problems thanks to his experience in socialist construction companies.
Yet the alternatives he invented then appeared as qualitatively different compared to those of
today. In present-day Macedonia, he simply could not find good solutions, because solving an
immediate problem did not reconcile the imperative of financial profit with that of work. While
makeshift solutions were conducive to production during socialism, today's gimmicks remained
only tricks, very hard to justify in his own morality. He called his current temporal actions a lie.
And he did not like lying.

3.7 Conclusion: Uncertainty as Precarious Stability
This chapter has traced the subjective implications of authoritarian financialization in Skopje by
discussing how individuals generated new courses of actions and evaluated differently their
temporal options in conditions of illiquidity. It has shown that lack of money renders temporal
relations divergent. The need to repay financial obligations forces companies like Construx to
spend their work time in operations that are largely ineffectual. That, in turn, pushes workers to
dilute their labor intensity in order to save energies for side jobs. As the crisis deepens, workers
face very hard choices in regard to their future strategies. Their age and proximity to retirement
influence their decision to look for different opportunities or remain at Construx. Managers, on the
other hand, face a continuous set of emergencies that they cannot permanently solve but struggle
to postpone in order to make things work. As clock time becomes less important with respect to
financial repayments, workers and managers try to find meaning and agency through uncertainty.
In substance, we are back to the lack of planned, foreseeable, near future described by
Guyer (2007) and into the open terrain of the temporary gimmick or stopgap measure. Planning
the future was not possible for any of the workers I spoke with, whose plans were all indefinitely
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on hold. For those who had enough years of work, the future they hoped to achieve was retirement.
For others, the future looked like a foreclosed dimension that they could not take into account;
they retreated into the present, leaving the company for more liquid forms of exploitation. But
even the present was a very tricky time to live in; to get the job done (da se zavrshi rabota)—any
job done—was an extremely time-consuming process. This is due in part to the uncertain set of
circumstances in which Macedonian society, and especially its economy, lies—a point well
stressed and explored by studies of postsocialist uncertainty and fluidity (Shevchenko 2009).
Compared to classic postsocialist uncertainty, however, there are new social forces and
political hierarchies that generate temporal paradoxes in contemporary Macedonia. A block of
entrepreneurs and politicians solidified around the VMRO has monopolized power in the country,
creating a new set of internal core-periphery relations. This is no longer a case in which solid social
structures, such as socialist institutions, are torn to pieces, leading to a chaotic loss of power and
piecemeal restructuring of the economy. We are witnessing the birth of a centralized political
economy in which an authoritarian state uses a financial mechanism to build its power. As a
consequence, more and more companies, workers, and ultimately citizens are sliding down the
country's social ladder and find themselves unable to grapple with the larger dynamics, let alone
change them. What they are left with is clever solutions, rhetorical changes of subject, and other
temporary arrangements—that is, uncertainty as a space of action. Unable to be part of progressive,
medium-term actions, citizens can only try to seize an opportunity and defer the ultimate collapse
for yet another moment.
Such temporal arrangements resulted in the constant multilateral production of uncertainty
in the workplace. Instead of being simply the result of macroeconomic restructuring, workplace
uncertainty in Macedonia is constantly produced in an attempt to negotiate the postponement or
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the solution of impossible issues. As increasingly centralized and hierarchical political structures
come into place, people produce uncertainty as an individual attempt to negotiate agency and
meaning in a temporally schizophrenic landscape.
Workplace uncertainty is the direct consequence of Macedonia's authoritarian
financialization. With the lack of liquidity that characterized Construx's political marginality,
workers lost not only money, but also their existential value as workers. This loss manifested itself
through schizophrenic working rhythms that increasingly affected workers' lives and their
perceptions of the future. Forced to face impossible challenges, workers used various rhetorical
and labor strategies to recover forms of agency. These included switching between different
discursive registers, postponing or slowing down work, and evading their supervisors' scrutiny.
For those familiar with state socialism, this sounds like an old story. Even my interlocutors
mentioned, with a bit of shame, that "we pretend to work and they pretend to pay us." In fact, just
as in socialist times, contemporary Macedonia is witnessing a centralization of power, whereby a
party (the VMRO now, the communist party then) controls the majority of the economy. Yet,
today's context is very different from the pre-1989 era, first because wealth is redistributed only in
marginal amounts. Such differences between the two systems are reflected in the actual experience
of uncertainty. If one takes Burawoy's (1992) ethnographic study of a Hungarian steel factory as
paradigmatic of working rhythms under market-socialism, it seems clear that workers were largely
able to avoid bursts of activity. Burawoy explicitly compares his work in a similar factory in the
US, where the very oppressive work regimes and tight scheduling created constant scrap materials,
"hot" periods of work, and impressively long hours around the holiday season. Burawoy did not
have to rush to finish his quotas in the Hungarian firm not because the work was easier, but because
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of the horizontal forms of solidarity and flexibility that allowed workers to cooperate by
apportioning piece rates and activities autonomously.
In the same piece, Burawoy notices that the real dictator, the problem that challenges
workers' rhythms in a socialist workplace, is the norm that defines the amount of time per operation
planned by the socialist management. Most socialist norms were, by definition, very hard to
achieve and aspirational in general. In fact, many other workers had secondary jobs that paid more
than their work in the steel factory, which held true for the ethnographer himself, given his status
as a professor at Berkeley. So, he asks, "Why do I calculate how many hours' work, 'real work' at
100 percent, I complete by the end of the shift? [...] Yes, money is an underlying factor, but there
is something else in getting through the workday. It turns out to be much more exhausting to work
slowly or irregularly" (Burawoy 1992:44).
Burawoy is not straightforward in portraying what that "something else" is. Partly it is the
lack of other options. Partly the solidarity among colleagues. But a large component is also the
pride in being a socialist worker who brings home results despite the challenging work
environment. This is a crucial difference from Construx's situation. Working at Construx did not
generate pride for employees. Because of the specific position that the company occupied in the
Macedonian political economy, financialization had translated into illiquidity for Construx. That
meant that what workers did or did not accomplish in the workplace did not really matter. The
construction company was stuck independent of workers' activities. They could have worked hard,
or just waited, or combined both strategies. Their work could not fulfill a norm or a plan, and it
did not result in successful production. While, by using kompenzacija, Construx was able to soften
its financial budget constraints, it did not resolve its financial problems. In the long run, they were
stuck.
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In such conditions, it is not surprising that workers tried to utilize temporal tactics
reminiscent of socialist times. I described extensively how they took breaks, professed ignorance,
worked two jobs, and adapted to extended work time when needed. Yet none of these strategies
worked well under financialized conditions, because the workplace solidarity that allowed socialist
workers to strategize was definitely less present at the time of my research—a fact I explore in
Chapter 4. As workers tried to find opportunities to exploit, they had to be mindful of the fact that,
compared to the early transition, informal activities were often considered illegal in the country,
despite being extensively practiced. In authoritarian Macedonia, it was potentially dangerous to
bribe an inspector, for instance. The VMRO party had been very effective in utilizing the
widespread informality in the construction sector either to fine and punish or reward companies,
depending on their political standing. In other words, workers could not count on informality as a
horizontal space of solidarity. This translated into an increased attention to safety protections, such
as helmets, especially when in public. But it also translated into significant circumspection when
trying to exploit potential opportunities, as noted in the careful and casual way with which the
inspector and Toni conducted their conversation. After all, in an authoritarian state, the law exists,
albeit not for everybody.
These constraints framed the moral meaning of uncertainty. It was not always clear how
two interlocutors evaluated their attempt to produce uncertainty. Enclosed between the negative
connotation of opportunism and the positive one of getting the job done, uncertainty generated a
space of potential collaboration. Workers felt less and less useful on their daily routines and more
and more marginalized in their economic potential. Uncertainty, by contrast, generated a space
whereby individuals could produce and play with empathy. In sum, uncertainty, rather than
representing a mere transposition of the vagaries of the financial market (Ho 2009) or an
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impediment to action (Bauman 2000), constituted a new temporal dimension, oriented towards
woven time rather than clock time.
From the perspective of woven time, uncertainty is not the opposite of action, negation of
the future, or impossibility of the past. Rather, uncertainty is a particular form of weaving time, of
connecting past and present, and of prefiguring action. When workers wove their time on the
construction site where I conducted research, they often crafted holes in it—carefully including
uncertainty in their time continuum. Uncertainty became a room to maneuver and a space of
agency that allowed them to reclaim their value as persons and agents, a value that they had lost
in Macedonia's increasingly rigid and hierarchical political economic scenario.
Uncertainty and woven time are very effective in creating spaces for empathy that act as
existential defenses against the increasing uselessness of work under authoritarian financialization.
Yet they do not always help individuals or their company to regain a healthier position in the
financialization process in a material sense. Financial obligations stipulate a very clear schedule
of repayment, and while uncertainty might postpone the inspector's negative report or a worker's
demand, it does not lead to substantial debt restructuring. Toni was successful in deploying
uncertainty on this occasion, but financial constraints are not amenable to being solved by means
of uncertainty; in the long run, Construx was obliged to increase the amount of resources destined
to paying back financial obligations. Deprived of more and more liquidity, workers kept on
experiencing uncertainty without its potentiality. While weaving time created spaces of agency
filled with existential meaning, the even slower rhythm of work did not help Construx's overall
situation. Uncertainty began to look more and more like precariousness, a labor relation of intense
economic deprivation, that oppressed workers well beyond the potential opportunity it presented.
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Weaving time and producing uncertainty did not solve the loss of value(s) experienced by
my interlocutors and other marginalized groups. What it did was to provide an appearance of
existential meaning and control. Weaving time destined one's activity towards unproductive
actions that exhausted people's energies in attempts to postpone catastrophe rather than resolve it.
More importantly, such a temporal strategy produced a rapprochement between subjects at the
periphery of the Macedonian political economy and the behaviors promoted by the VMRO, which
has made opportunism and lack of productivity a hallmark of its administration. As my
interlocutors' subjectivity became increasingly embedded in opportunistic behaviors, they found it
harder to locate common interests and engage in collective forms of solidarity. When the spaces
of empathy and agency generated by weaving time proved to be illusory, workers and other
subjects I observed found themselves isolated and more vulnerable to direct hierarchical
domination.
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4. Ethnomasculinity and Solidarity
Since 2010, a walk on the main square of Skopje, Plostad Makedonija, is a strange experience: a
host of cheap bronze and copper statues of male heroes teleports the passerby back to ancient
times. For some, it feels like having crossed the threshold of a wax museum, in which the divide
between the parody of a dystopian future and the promises of historical drama is not clearly
marked. The VMRO narrative of heteronormative patriarchy culminates at the feet of a colossal,
35-meter high statue of Alexander the Great. The exaggerated masculine body of a warrior astride
his pawing horse tops a singing fountain, whence fierce hoplites emerge amidst a cloud of waterjets, ready to stick their long spears into the heart of the nation's enemies and to sacrifice their
athletic, semi-naked bodies for the freedom of the Macedonian people.
The bronze shapes of these masculine heroes are empty. What is supposed to bring them
to life is their capacity to penetrate the hearts and souls of Macedonian patriots with their
spectacular, almost erotic, sensualization (Mostov 2000). Since the VMRO came to power, the
Macedonian body politic has increasingly been represented with almost seductive precision as
male, aggressively masculine, and ethnically Macedonian—a new form of heteronormative
patriarchy that I call ethnomasculinity. While the nation was engraved in the muscular body of
heroes, however, male citizens did not morph into hoplites or demi-gods in suits of armor. Male
Macedonian workers, and especially those I encountered at Construx, were slightly overweight,
often idle or hanging around with sly gazes. They did not exhibit the dynamic, menacing, and
fierce poise that characterized the masculinity branded by the VMRO government. Rather than
standing as a solid cohort of Macedonian Hoplites against the enemy, workers had a hard time
coming together as a group or finding a coherent way to embody their masculinity. Oscillating
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between different masculine ideologies, workers often became docile with their managers and
moderately belligerent against each other.
This chapter analyzes the complexity of workers' gender identification by discussing the
intersection of ethnicity, gender, and economic marginalization. With the VMRO, patriarchal
heteronormativity came to be defined by the aggressive and dominant exclusion of ethnicized
"others." Such symbolic domination was generally signaled by men's economic status: luxury
items, such as German-branded cars or Italian sunglasses, lavishly decorated new apartments, and
the consumption of foreign-branded alcohol and food defined ethnomasculinity. Workers,
however, had a difficult time achieving ethnomasculinity, especially given that many of them were
experiencing the downturn of authoritarian financialization.
The VMRO's propensity to utilize ethnomasculinity as a model for manhood corroborated
the ideological emergence of a new rentier class as its building block, a process I already outlined
in Chapter 1. Yet this model conflicted with the material experiences of marginalized workingclass men. Workers at politically peripheral companies such as Construx could not appropriately
provide for their families or dominate other men in public performances, especially if those were
based on consumption. More importantly, ethnomasculinity did not provide such workers with
gendered tools to address their economic marginality. Stuck in this impasse, workers tried to
resuscitate various historical forms of gender identification that allowed them to conjugate
masculinity with illiquidity.
This chapter discusses working-class men's choices and challenges in finding a model of
masculinity appropriate for the conditions of authoritarian financialization and illiquidity. What
follows explores the dissolution of shop-floor solidarities. I document the relation between the loss
of economic power experienced by heads of households or firms and their failure to live up to
postsocialist patriarchal ideas, rooted in a set of material responsibilities. As working-class men
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feel abandoned by their leaders and under constant threat from their peers, women, and other ethnic
groups, docility emerges as a new configuration of social values.
Ethnomasculinity and docility have a complex genealogy. In what follows, I analyze the
intersection of gender and ethnic hierarchies by discussing their articulation under the political
economy of socialism, postsocialism, and financialized authoritarianism. By applying
intersectionality (see Mullings 2002) to the historical development of masculinity, I emphasize the
role that ethnicity and nationalism, rather than race, have had in shaping gender. Building on the
work of scholars who have studied the reconfiguration of ethnic boundaries (Barth 1969) and
perceptions of the "other" (Said 1977, Todorova, 1997) in postsocialist and nationalist regimes
(Verdery 1995, Brubaker 2006, Gellner 1997, Hayden 1992), I stress the overall reduction of
porosity throughout Macedonian society. In the West, financialization has often coincided with an
opening towards multiple gender and sexual roles (including the rise of LGBT rights). In an
authoritarian regime, however, financialization seems to restrict the potential for alternative gender
identifications.
The substantial corpus of literature that describes the intersections of gender and
nationalism generally deconstructs the historical, social, and cultural processes that made possible
their emergence. It is widely recognized that women are oppressed by nationalist gender ideologies
by being turned into passive subjects who should reproduce the nation, a condition that they often
resist in both overt and covert ways (Hemment 2007, Helms 2013, Verdery 1996, Gal and Kligman
2000, Mostov 2000, Bringa 1995, Nagel 1998). Men, on the contrary, are rarely viewed as
oppressed by nationalist gender constructs. Even when they are forced to face intense and
dangerous competition, or are pushed to deny their own sexual preferences for "the nation," they
are seen as fitting into established moral/gender categories and subsequently cast in active, if not
positive terms (Herzfeld 1985, Neofotistos 2010, Brandes 1980, Creed 2012). This is not my
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personal experience, nor the one I observed on the ground in Skopje. Competing for achieving
manhood can be, and often is, highly demeaning for the winner as much as it is for the loser. This
is especially true in Macedonia, where illiquidity has turned the ethnomasculinity game into a
competition without winners, whereby men not only oppress other competitors but also oppress
themselves.
I propose studying ethnomasculinity in relation to political-economic factors, a theoretical
framework that has long been received in gender analyses concerned with women (Rubin 1975,
Engstrom 2008, Davis 1983, Susser 2009). The case of Macedonia is particularly useful to
understand how masculinity can be entangled with economic changes. In the past twenty years,
the country faced a radical transformation from socialism to a (supposedly) market economy and
was radically reshaped by financialization projects. If ethnomasculinity, as noticed by many
scholars (Dimova 2013, Vetta 2011, Thiessen 2007, Kim 2015), has been a response to the
frustration of former socialist men stripped of their resources during the transition, then the failure
to reach, attract, and keep financial capital that made ethnomasculinity impossible has important
political significance. In this chapter, I argue that men employed gendered strategies that, in the
long run, proved unsustainable. As a consequence, working-class, marginalized men came to
inhabit a contradictory gender identity that resonated with the rentier subjectivities promoted by
the VMRO.
During the transition, patriarchal domination was made possible by the economic and
political contraction of postsocialist societies. As men and women were recast in traditional roles,
men could achieve patriarchal domination in families or firms. Under the VMRO, however, such
independent spaces have ceased to exist or have been radically re-incorporated into new national
hierarchies. Economic and symbolic power is now reserved for members of the VMRO structure.
In such a context, achieving ethnomasculinity is a strenuous burden that breaks working-class
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solidarity and increases men's socio-political precariousness. Increasingly, working-class men's
ethnomasculinity is defined by subordination to superiors and animosity towards competing peers.
Paradoxically, while ethnomasculinity urged men to be heroes, fighters, and harbingers of
independence, men found themselves to be increasingly embedded in hierarchies of dependence
and stuck in relations of subjugation that they have come to naturalize as morally right.
We possess ample evidence that delineates the constructed, historical, and ideological
nature of masculinities (Gutmann 1996) and the ways in which marginal groups try to resist them
(Creed 2012). As has been observed by other theorists of working-class masculinities, such as
Willis (1981) and King (1997), masculinity constitutes not only a site of resistance through which
working class "lads" displace bourgeois ideologies but also a reason for their lack of class mobility.
Others, like Kalb (2011), have interpreted ethnomasculinity as a return of the "repressed"—as a
new, distorted way to bring back class interests, identity, and solidarity. My question, however, is
rather different: what happens when working class men fail to embrace an explicit (and rather
clunky) model of masculinity, such as VMRO ethnomasculinity? What does the inapplicability of
different models of masculinity generate in terms of power relations and belonging? How does it
intersect with the emergence of a financialized authoritarian regime? This chapter does not focus
on the VMRO definition of ethnomasculinity per se. Rather, it describes how working-class men
came to be attracted by the VMRO authoritarian regime precisely because they struggled, and
largely failed, to become fully ethnomasculine or to produce a non-hegemonic model of
masculinity (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005, Willis 1981).
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4.1 Three Macedonian Men, or Different Masculinities in Perspective
Goran is in his mid-thirties. Every time I see him, he is wearing formal clothes. I remember a brand
new Brooks Brothers green flannel sport coat, proudly bought on sale at the Woodbury Outlet just
outside of New York City. He has recently joined a Macedonian institution in NYC, but he seems
weary of non-Macedonians. At cocktail parties, he doesn't mingle much with representatives from
other international organizations or governments, even if that is part of his formal duties. Instead,
he passes his work time on the phone with Skopje, talking about the political unrest against the
VMRO government that started in October 2015. At times, he even refuses to conduct daily
administrative activities, which he delegates to his female colleagues who are forced to cover for
his lack of efficiency. People I speak with describe him as rather harsh, a bit racist, and ready to
blame people around him for his own mistakes. Eventually, he got into a verbal fight with a coworker after having repeatedly harassed her with unwanted advances and insinuations about her
weak morality. Nobody from the office, however, reprimanded him—not even his supervisor, who
witnessed the whole scene. Goran is a VMRO party member.
Darko is in his mid-forties. Every day, he wears blue overalls with Construx's logo over a
dusty t-shirt or, if it is cold, a discolored heavy turtleneck sweater. He always changes before and
after work and devotes significant attention to keeping a proper "civil" attire when away from the
construction site: nothing fancy, usually a clean pair of jeans and a polo shirt. He often uses a
VMRO cap at work. He supports the party because, as he tells me, "it is a right wing party that
employs left-leaning social policies." Darko is hardworking and experienced, and other workers
listen to him for work and life advice. He sometimes incites but more often stops arguments,
double-entendres, and challenges—not disdaining wrestling playfully with other workers when
they do not fall in line. While he occasionally joins in when a group of workers stare at some
passing young woman, Darko rarely shares graphic details of his sexual adventures. He addresses
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female buyers, managers, or dwellers who pass through the working site with respect and is often
smiling or playing down tensions. On the other hand, Darko holds negative views about Albanians,
although not quite as offensive as some of his other colleagues of the same age. Despite his
increasing sadness and nervousness, he strongly opposes open protest against the director.
Aleksandar is in his mid-sixties. A former hotel manager and a producer of comics,
Aleksandar was demoted to busboy after the hotel was privatized and sold to a VMRO-connected
company. Eventually, he was fired. Aleksandar also wears blue overalls at work, but his goatee
and glasses earned him the nickname of "professor." Left-leaning and slightly nostalgic,
Aleksandar is known for his liberal stance toward Albanians, his critiques of capitalism, and his
pearls of wisdom. Once, he enlightened me about the meaning of life: "You know what the
meaning of life is? A hole (dupka). We come from a hole, we want to get into a hole, and we will
end inside of a hole." He is one of the newest recruits of Construx, and his pay grade as well as his
influence are minimal. Nevertheless, he took me in with sympathy when I first arrived at Construx,
explaining things I did not understand and minimizing jokes I did not know how to address.
Aleksandar commuted every day for over four hours in total from the nearby city of Veles. He
used to buy a piece of bread from a local shop where it was cheaper and often commented to
himself while preparing his side of the table during lunches. "Here is the fork, dobro, where is the
bread? Oh here it is, dobro…and today we will eat as well." At the height of Construx's crisis,
Aleksandar quit to work for a secondhand shop. In his last days on the site, other workers teased
him and giggled about his future under a new and much more demanding boss—his wife.
Goran, Darko, and Aleksandar exhibit three rather different ways of embodying and
performing masculinity in Macedonia. All three men operate within a patriarchal and
heteronormative horizon which they see as the right set of values to be pursued. However, they
understand and perform masculine domination differently. Among them, Goran is definitely the
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most powerful (he is a VMRO official) and is in a better financial position, given his guaranteed
public salary, which is 30% higher than private-sector salaries. Goran is also the most aggressive
and suspicious man, especially towards people who are not members of the party. His behavior is
sometimes nasty and aimed at hurting rather than challenging people around him. Confronted with
nationals from other countries in NYC, including diplomats from African missions, he does not
refrain from insulting them with racist slurs. Similarly, his attitude toward Albanians and women
is demeaning at best. He keeps his distance from other white men, including myself or other
Macedonians he meets, while he is engaged in constant chitchat with other VMRO representatives
in the city.
Darko and Aleksandar are not saints, either. As we will see below, Darko opposed an
attempt to call into being a cohesive workers' body to force a reaction from Construx's director. I
was told that, after being presented with an offer for a "private" job, Darko quarreled with other
workers (also from Construx) and preferred to stall rather than accept dividing the pay equally.
Aleksandar's use of rather explicit language was not limited to the "hole" joke; he used to giggle
when young and attractive women passed. Darko and Aleksandar quarreled mostly among
themselves or with their peers.
I believe that historical sedimentations of masculinity can account for the different
behaviors exhibited by the three men. From what I could tell, Aleksandar was the least inclined of
the three to engage in confrontation. I had observed his propensity to avoid open confrontation
from other managers, functionaries, and workers in his age group. While some like Aleksandar
were keen on discussing economic issues and the problems of capitalism, most tended not to
comment on controversial topics, or they shied away from overtly providing opinions on concrete
issues. On the other hand, they were keen on sharing jokes, tales of their technical achievements,
or stories from their families. In fact, most of them quite enjoyed the camaraderie that existed in
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the workplace, and seemed much more open to engaging in genuinely horizontal exchanges of
food, wine or brandy. This was the case of Ilco, too, the supervisor of the Pool site, who abstained
from discussing subjects that could create disagreement in public, and yet enjoyed spending time
with many buyers or other non-workers, whom he generally entertained by offering coffee and
other treats.
VMRO members and sympathizers I spoke with suggested that men like Aleksandar lacked
aggression because they had been emasculated by the communist regime. For VMRO supporters,
Aleksandar and his peers were trained to be cowards, to yield or "bend" to external pressure. While
it misrepresents the complexity of Yugoslav socialism and the very vibrant internal critiques that
generated extensive public protests (Zabic 2010), this assessment uncovers an important point.
The socialist machine encouraged working-class men to fulfill plans whose goals were set by
central committees rather than develop their own, more realistic objectives (Verdery 1996). Middle
managers like Ilco or Aleksandar could not often shape the objectives or metrics of success of their
work; yet they still had to find practical solutions to make impractical decisions work. Their
masculinity, thus, did not consist of openly challenging others. Rather, it was their ability to
balance official and unofficial realities that was rewarded and respected.
For Ilco and Aleksandar, balancing objectives and reality was not dictated by pragmatic
considerations alone. They felt it was an ethical duty, which could only be accomplished thanks to
the help (or connivance) of others around them. Such a pragmatic solidarity was encouraged by
socialist ideology, which operated from a perspective of relative equality. In such a system, being
the executor of someone else's decisions was not a threat to one's masculine prowess but instead
was the consequence of a good working social order. In other words, men like Aleksandar and Ilco
did not see their lack of open contestation or authorship as a problem, because they assumed a
degree of social equality whereby each worker played a role in the advance toward a common
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goal. Disagreements between workers did not generate challenges to one's position, which rested
upon a shared belief in social progress.
Hierarchies and inequality were, of course, abundant in the socialist workplace. Yet
individuals like Ilco and Aleksandar could easily consider them as mere setbacks on a quest for
equality and progress. Their gender, sexual, and ethnic identification shielded them from
confronting some of the harsh and semi-hidden realities of socialism. Ilco, Aleksandar and other
Slavic-speaking Orthodox men fit easily into the patriarchal structure of state socialism, in which
the state assumed the role of a caring, although obsessive, father (Verdery 1996, Bureychack 2011,
Siegelbaum 1998). When they came home after a long day at work, they were still entitled to a
warm meal and a prominent role in their family's decisions—a nicer condition compared to that of
women, who had to work daily jobs, care for their children, attend to domestic chores, and still
accept a subordinate role in the family (Ghodsee 2004, 2005; Verdery 1996).
Despite the rhetoric of equality and the actual material rights granted by socialist states,
the social reproduction of households remained a woman's task (Oates-Indruchová 2008). Older
women I spoke with explicitly confirmed that they had been able to enjoy socialist equality only
in the very short period of their lives after being employed but before being married. Obtaining a
job emancipated women temporarily from their paternal control at home. Once they were married,
young brides were faced with new forms of practical and ethical subordination. As many older
men and women made clear, women rarely rose to prominent positions in the political or economic
life of socialist countries. Oates-Indruchová (2008) signals that in the Czech case, official
discourses that referred to work often expunged women from the narrative. Similarly, Fodor (2002)
shows Hungarian women were treated as if their commitment to the household, itself dictated by
the socialist policies, prevented them from devoting total loyalty to the party.
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This also included a subordinate equality in sexual matters. Many older women I spoke
with did not have access to or were not informed about safe sex practices that could allow them to
control their own sexuality. Their sexuality was rigidly scrutinized, especially in Skopje—a city
that was more traditional than Belgrade or Zagreb. This is perhaps not so surprising, given the
relative aura of modesty that shrouded bodies in socialist propaganda. While images of masculinity
circulating through the Eastern Bloc and especially Russia emphasized the dynamic figure and
muscular bodies of male workers with great realism (Haynes 2003), these images did not really
translate into a sexualization of men, nor to a sexualized dominance over women. As Borenstein
(2008) shows, while a pornographic genre existed in Russia since the Czarist era, it had very little
to do with erotic appeal. Configured as an intellectual exercise that utilized foul language and
forbidden imaginary, it was soon pushed underground by the moralizing censorship of the Soviet
regime. Because the socialist state conceived of the social and aesthetic dominance of males as
being in tension with the egalitarian charge of the industrial worker, the Soviet representation of
men was moralized, rather than inscribed in a sexual context.
Despite these hierarchies, socialist rhetoric and rights were not just a facade. In socialist
societies, women had access to political and economic rights that were comparable to those
available in the "first world" (Brainerd 2000). A close scrutiny of women's positions reveals a
complex set of checks and balances that ascribed to women a position of subordinate equality to
men (Meznaric 1985). Women figured in socialist propaganda not only as mothers but as heroines.
Female partisans or athletes were very present in the Yugoslav imaginary and were granted
important, albeit not leading, roles in the cultural imagination of the nation (see for instance the
film about Delfina, the first Macedonian woman to swim the English Channel). In other words,
the socialist aspiration to achieve equality was very influential in mediating and structuring gender
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relations, orienting the definition of masculinity or femininity towards a shared horizon: that of
the worker, an ideally non-gendered being.
The industrial worker was the ideological model when it came to national and ethnic
divisions, as well. Socialism stressed departure from an ethnic model of belonging, common to
pre-World War II polities, to favor a redistributive attachment to the state as an equal provider.
Socialist subjects were entitled to wealth redistribution by working in collective or state-owned
enterprises, thus contributing to the country's progress and modernity. While, in theory, everyone
was equally involved in the socialist project, the preference for modernist, urban, and heavy
industry models of development created implicit (or explicit) hierarchies between different
socialist subjects. In Macedonia, Roma were widely employed in state-run companies. Yet they
often occupied entry-level positions in hard industry sectors, such as steel mills or construction,
and rarely proceeded to leadership or management jobs. Albanians in Yugoslavia, with the notable
exception of Kosovo, also had limited access to qualified positions in state-run companies or
institutions. Yugoslavian socialism, in practice, discriminated against ethnic (or religious) groups
that did not share an urban, modern identity.
Ethnicity, just like gender, constituted a disguised hierarchy throughout the eastern bloc.
In Romania, for instance, Germans were excluded from major political roles within the country
and suspected to be allies with Western powers (Verdery 1991). Scholars who have studied the
role of ethnicity and nationalism in the USSR such as Hirsch (2005) describe how the process of
Sovietization, that is, the building of a multinational Soviet Union, was also one of co-opting
existing national ideologies or governments. In Ukraine, for instance, the Bolsheviks gained
control over ethnic groups by nominating a representative from the same group as their leader
(Slezkine 1994, Channell-Justice nd). While this process was reversed with Stalin's centralizing
policies, which promoted the "russification" of various republics, ethnicity has been utilized as a
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tool to control populations by introducing or pandering to national hierarchies, even if that
constituted a counterpoint to official progress towards equality (Brubaker 1994).
The very articulation of Yugoslavia rested upon ethnicity. While there is abundant evidence
that the outbreak of ethnic violence after its collapse was heavily engineered by political elites and
other ethnic entrepreneurs (Klanišek and Flere 2011, Crawford 1998, Oberschall 2000, Brown
2003), the infrastructure for ethnic relations had a longer and more complex history that intersected
with the very fabric of socialist power. During the so-called "administrative phase" (1945-1952),
the Yugoslav leadership tried to promote a centralized Yugoslav nationhood (Bertsch 1977). After
the split with Stalin, however, Yugoslavia abandoned a strictly planned political economy and
reconsidered its stance towards ethnicities. Issues of ethnicity and nationality became crucial in
shaping communist policies and promoting economic and administrative decentralization. First in
1952-3, then in 1963, and finally in 1974, the Yugoslav constitution was reformed and autonomous
regions (such as Vojvodina and Kosovo) as well as constitutive republics (Slovenia, Croatia,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia) progressively gained power. These
reforms tried to address the large economic inequalities that existed between different republics.
In 1953, for instance, GDP per capita in Slovenia was 34 times that of Kosovo. The Yugoslav
leadership hoped to address such developmental gaps with the expansion of a semi-autonomous
market (Gregory 1973). They hoped that shifting responsibilities from the federal state to workers'
councils (Dunn 1975) and local administrations would generate a market-friendly form of
socialism. Susan Woodward (2003) clearly demonstrates how decentralization was a Yugoslav
response to the need for rationalized labor. By decentralizing power over salaries, employment
benefits, and other matters of production to local councils and territorial organizations (that were
also ethnically defined), the leadership attempted to raise production levels without having to lay
off workers. With time, republics were given control over crucial aspects of social redistribution,
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including social housing (Le Normand 2008) and sovereignty in financial matters, including the
ability to contract financial debt with foreign countries (Vejvoda 1996). Yet with economic
decentralization also came conflict between ethnic groups. Leaders of republics or autonomous
regions represented the interests of the ethnic majority at the republic or regional level. At the same
time, these very leaders were part of, and vetted by, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia
(what used to be the Communist Party). The power of the LCY and of strong security services was
supposed to balance out centrifugal forces and keep the federation united. In practice, this
generated a constant tension, whereby ethnicity was at times repressed and generally muffled
under the aegis of equality.
Because of its increased economic and political decentralization, Yugoslav socialism
stressed brotherhood and unity among different ethnic groups. This meant supporting ethnonational claims to self-determination, such as in the case of Macedonia—a country whose identity,
language, and history were fiercely affirmed during the socialist period (Brunnbauer 2005). At the
same time, Yugoslav socialism and especially the central organs, such as the LCY, embedded
modernist aspirations to erase ethnic specificities (Mattioli 2014b). The contrast between these
two tendencies was intense and constantly preoccupied the Yugoslav leadership. In a high level
meeting in 1972, a significant and influential portion of the LCY that included Kardelj lashed out
against two kinds of nationalism: separatism and unitarism (Bertsch 1977). Ethnicity, therefore,
had to conform to such a federated model and was framed by the very tension between bratsvo i
jedinstvo. Not every kind of ethnicity was admitted. Instead, national identifications were publicly
acceptable insofar as they fit within the secular and developmental imprint of the Yugoslav state—
the very imprint that gave birth to the identity and material conditions of industrial workers.
This translated into specific urban politics across the republics that first erased (in the years
between 1945-1952) and then reshaped (in the following years) the presence and aesthetics of post212

Ottoman subjects. Similarly, rural post-Ottoman subjects—usually Muslim Slavic speakers and
Albanians—were given some limited opportunities to "become" socialist industrial workers. But
if they refused to blend their ethnicity into this mediating, equalizing, and modern figure, they
were forced to leave (Dimova 2013, Mattioli 2014, Ellis 2003). In fact, in 1953, Turkey and
Yugoslavia signed an agreement that allowed "voluntary" departures and resettlement of Yugoslav
Muslims in Turkey. For instance, the village that was inhabited by some of Construx's workers
was until the 1950s inhabited by Turks, who left Macedonia for Turkey. The name of the village
still reflects this specific post-Ottoman and Islamic heritage.
This was not a new policy: already in 1938, 200,000 post-Ottoman subjects who had
declared themselves to be ethnic "Turks" had been resettled, mostly from the areas of Kosovo,
Macedonia, and Montenegro (Kirisici 1995, Rajkovic 2012, Ivanovski 2008). Rajkovic estimates
that the process touched 170,000 people in the period between 1953 and 1968. While some
individuals left of their own free will, many felt implicit political pressure as a consequence of
laws and trials that prohibited Quranic schools, forbade wearing headscarves, nationalized Vakufs,
and outlawed circumcisions. Historically, Bosnian Muslims had been less prone to rebellion
against the Ottoman state and its political successors, as Iseni (2008) and others (Poulton 1993)
argue. Because of its peaceful history, which allowed them to navigate modernization attempts by
the Hapsburg and the Ottoman Empires, and because of their economic stability, Bosnian Muslims
constituted a well-suited example for Yugoslav brotherhood and unity.
The collapse of socialism revitalized the importance of ethnicity and nationality. In
Macedonia, ethnic divisions and discrimination became an item of contention, also thanks to
Albanians’ increasing political and economic power. As we will see below, this greatly impacted
Macedonian men who grew up in late socialism and who felt betrayed by the state and the process
of democratization. Men born in the late 1960s and early 1970s, like Darko, faced the disjunction
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between proclamations of democracy as freedom and the reality of economic disempowerment
that ethnic Macedonians experienced after the transition. While some of this frustration was also
shared also by older men like Ilco or Aleksandar, I generally observed a less pronounced
disposition toward aggressive public behaviors in such a demographic. Instead, Ilco, Aleksandar
and other workers of their age I am familiar with retrenched to "hospitality" as a nostalgic domain
where the equality of socialism could still be remembered. When I spent time in the company of
older workers, I was often amazed by the depth of their cordiality. They were willing to pick me
up by car, to bring me to the mountains with their friends, and spend entire days drinking or making
homemade rakija. Stories of their socialist youth were a common thread in such convivial
gatherings. One of the workers must have recounted his encounter with Tito to me at least 10 times.
As a ceremonial guard, he even opened the elevator for him, and wished Drugar Tito a good
afternoon.
It was not just the nostalgia of youth that reverberated through these moments of collective
drinking and storytelling. What many workers were painfully proud of was the equality, the
community, that they felt in these days. In telling me about Tito, my interlocutor always took
particular care in stressing the word drugar, comrade. That word attested, maybe deceptively, that
even the most powerful man in Yugoslavia was equal to a poor, working-class man from Skopje.
That feeling of equality was mostly gone in postsocialist public spaces and certainly in current
ideologies of ethnomasculinity. Older workers could, however, retreat to private spaces where the
"beauty" (ubavina) of domestic comfort and simple sensual pleasure eclipsed their economic
distress and social losses. There, with their wives continuously bringing food from the kitchen,
workers were able to be equal again.
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4.2 With or Without Money: Postsocialist Masculinities
Men who came of age in the late 1980s saw their masculinity radically impacted by the transition.
With the collapse of socialism, industrial workers lost their symbolic and material dominance. As
industrial production plummeted, former socialist heroes turned into unemployed masses. Elites
that emerged from the privatization process were not interested in supporting ideas of equality.
Instead, they based their political legitimacy on identities defined by ethnic uniqueness (Clayer
2001, Gagnon 2004). In some parts of Yugoslavia, the nexus between masculinity and ethnicity
emerged as a consequence of the wars, where the use of rape as a common war tactic fueled the
notion that only hyper-masculine subjects could protect the feminized nation (Zarkov 2003, Sofos
1996). In Macedonia, however, masculinity and ethnicity became particularly entangled as a
consequence of changes in a group's access to consumption.
Not every ethnicity was equally impacted by the introduction of free market reforms. In
Macedonia, for instance, groups that had been marginalized under socialism gained political and
economic power after 1992. As Dimova (2013) shows, Albanian men had extensive knowledge of
market operations and could rely on vast international networks of relatives who had emigrated
abroad. Foreign remittances allowed Albanian men to invest in the private sector and to increase
their level of consumption. Their ability to mobilize kinship relations to create very exploitative
but lucrative companies allowed many to generate substantial capital even through Macedonia's
multiple crises.
"You know, I feel sorry for them, Macedonian men," Besart once told me, while driving
home. An Albanian businessmen located in Gostivar, Besart had worked in Italy for 20 years,
starting as a dishwasher until ultimately buying a luxury bed and breakfast hotel. When the crisis
hit the Italian tourist industry in late 2010, Besart decided to come back to Macedonia. He felt that
business opportunities were opening up for the Albanian community. "You know, here, people
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have money. See that guy? He has 10,000 euro in his pockets right now. If I need any money, I
just need to ask. It is not always legal money, but we will put it down for each other if there is a
good idea. Thirty years ago we were poor, we had no running water. Now we can build a new
future." After dealing for several years with Italian companies that produced construction
materials, he had decided to build his own factory in Macedonia in partnership with an Italian
technician. Besart had invested several hundred thousand dollars, a sum that many of my
Macedonian interlocutors could not quickly gather or invest at the time. He could not understand
why Macedonian men were so angry with Albanian men. Successful Albanian entrepreneurs like
himself cared more about money than nationality—so why be bitter with them? After recounting
various anecdotes of situations in which he had been openly or unconsciously discriminated
against, he paused for a second, watching the road in silence. "Imagine that their girls, you know,
20, 21 years old, they go with me, a 50-year-old Albanian, just for 2,000 MKD (50 USD). I can
basically fuck any young Macedonian, if I want to." I must have made a shocked or skeptical face,
because Besart pulled out a phone, connected it to the speakers, and dialed a number. He pointed
at the screen, where the name of a Macedonian woman appeared. Soon, a Macedonian woman
answered. Besart, while gesticulating at me, excused himself for not having called her recently.
As she insisted that she wanted to see him more, he promised that they would meet over the
weekend. Then he said, "but you have to tell me that you like me more than all of the others." The
girl laughed briefly, then answered: "You know that I do." As the conversation ended, he
commented: “They would come with me for anything, just to have some money to eat. And it is a
shame. It is really sad that such young girls do this, and there are many of them. Now look at the
irony: they despise me, as an Albanian, but I fuck their girls."
The conversation between Besart and his Macedonian lover shows that the shifts in
economic prosperity documented by Dimova (2013) and Neofotistos (2015) almost a decade ago
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play a role today in structuring gender relations between Albanians and Macedonians. Neofotistos
(2010) shows that Albanian men who engage in interethnic extramarital affairs face intense public
scrutiny from their Macedonian counterparts. Here, masculinity does not allow for camaraderie
and intimacy across ethnic lines: Albanian men systematically refuse to share testimonies of their
sexual prowess with curious Macedonian men. Dimova shows a clear gap between Macedonian
and Albanian men's capacity to consume—one that is not absolute (most of the oligarchs are still
Macedonian) but that has quickly been reversed since the transition. If the current economic
conditions allow Albanian men to fuck Macedonian women, what is left of Macedonian patriarchal
masculinity? Considering the tendency of political parties to define the homeland as a feminine
entity in need of protection (Verdery 1996, Bureychak 2011, Papic 1994), Macedonian men's
inability to control the sexuality of their own women challenged their capacity not just to be men,
but to be real Macedonians.
Macedonian men like Darko, who came of age in the 1990s, faced these mounting
challenges by developing an entrepreneurial spirit and retreating to the domain of the household.
While Darko had inherited the socialist aspiration to equality, this reverberated predominantly
through his pride in technical expertise and professionalism. After graduating from a high school
for machinery, he had gotten a job for a construction company that worked in the local gray
economy. The 1990s constituted a chaotic moment for him, where periods of economic downturn
followed unexpected moments of plentitude. Among these, he fondly remembers his stints
working (without permits) for Macedonian companies in Russia and elsewhere in the former
Eastern bloc. There, he saved money and conquered girls. More importantly, informal conditions
of work during the early transition allowed him to bond and network with other men—workers,
supervisors, and managers that were able to find him new jobs back in Macedonia. Once home,
Darko seamlessly transitioned to "private" contracting with two workers from the same village.
217

Soon, they were hired at Construx, where they came to monopolize the hiring process. Darko and
his group, under the leadership of the Brigadir, hired workers that lived in their own village or to
whom they were connected by reciprocity or kinship. As Construx grew in the volatile market of
the early transition, so did Darko's masculine and patriarchal influence in the company.
While they were not all as lucky as Darko, men overwhelmingly managed to translate their
gender identity into an asset for navigating the economic hardship of the transition. Those who did
not, however, had a last resort—they could still rely on the household as a safe space that
safeguarded their patriarchal prerogatives. It has been widely demonstrated that the transition
helped to re-traditionalize women's role (Goven 1993). In fact, starting in late socialism, attempts
to open the Eastern bloc to market forces promoted the re-traditionalization of women. Woodward
(2003) shows that women and youth were among the first to be laid off in attempts to rationalize
socialist companies because of the assumption that they could rely on others as their main
providers. As the transition morphed into recession, as was the case for Russia in the late 1990s, it
was the rise of a survival economy that forced many women to invest most of their energy within
the household. With their husband unemployed and scarce access to items of primary consumption,
women were forced to find creative ways to stretch limited food supplies or to contain their
husband's disruptive drinking sociality (Ries 2009, Rogers 2005). In some cases, this was a
welcome change. Snajdr (2007) describes the re-traditionalization of Kazakh society as a result of
women's preference for non-modern identities that privileged strong, patriarchal families. In other
cases, women's retrenchment into the private sphere followed the erasure of socialist institutions
(Verdery 1996, Watson 1993).
In public, women lost their appearance as heroines and became increasingly portrayed as
caregivers, objects of sexual conquests, or frail individuals in need of protection. Ibroscheva
(2007) finds that Bulgarian advertisements overwhelmingly portray women as either economically
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dependent or sexually provocative. Eastern European women flooded the mail-order bride industry
(Johnson 2007) as well as the porn and escort service industries. Budapest and Prague, especially,
acquired international fame as European red-light districts. While for many Eastern European
subjects, this represented a form of sexual liberation (Goscilo 1996), it also set the stage for sexwork migratory patterns that extensively affected the life of women in countries like Romania or
Russia (Huges 2001, Malarek 2004, Gulcur and Ilkkaracan 2002, Gal and Kligman 2000. See also
Cojocaru 2015 for a critique of anti-trafficking discourses).
Women who managed to remain employed in the formal economy saw their roles and
wages plummet (Fodor 1997). Of course, there were exceptions: those segments of the female
workforce that had been highly educated during socialism found it relatively easy to integrate into
a capitalist market economy, at least at its early stages when state structures still mattered (Emigh
and Szelenyi 2001, Orazem and Vodopivec 1995, Lafont 2001). Integration into the market
economy was also easier for women who belonged to marginal but not stigmatized groups that did
not depend on the state for their social and economic reproduction, such as Gorale villagers in
mountainous areas of Poland described by Frances Pine (1998).
Although foreign-owned companies provided employment for Eastern European women,
this did not always empower their lives. Women employed in global corporations were confronted
with Western stereotypes that depicted socialist subjects as lazy or incompetent. Dunn (2002)
shows how the US giant Gerber forced its female employees to assume new identities by imposing
new ways of working that did not leave room for support and solidarity among the workforce. Free
labor and reciprocities that had become part of women's personhood during socialist times were
replaced with discipline, self-assertiveness, and accountability. Women resisted this
transformation, however, by appealing to a language of kinship and motherhood that mobilized an
ethic of responsibility to mediated Western expectations of individualism. While Dunn claims that
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the women's fight eventually softened the impact of the transition, recent work suggests that the
opposite might be true. Polish women might have been able to avoid massive layoffs and fare
slightly better compared to women in Bulgaria or Macedonia. Yet, Fodor and Horn (2015) show
that, throughout the Eastern bloc, feminine labor has been relegated to lesser remunerative
positions (see also Bonfiglioli 2014). Eastern European countries that experienced a rapid growth
did so at the expense of an increase in gender inequality. In countries like Estonia, the Czech
Republic, or Bulgaria, women's docility and nimble fingers were a crucial factor in attracting FDI
(Ong 1987, Mies 1999). On the contrary, the less abrupt growth of Poland and Hungary and the
relatively stronger role of the welfare state in these countries have contributed to keeping a low
level of gender inequality, at least until the Euro crisis. It is unclear if women in Bulgaria, Estonia
or the Czech Republic mobilized kinship and maternal ideologies to mitigate their work conditions
(Dunn 2004). Yet precisely such ideologies might have pushed women to accept increasing
exploitation voluntarily, which might have reinforced their marginalization in the labor market.
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide an exhaustive review of women's
experiences during the transition. The perspectives I summarized above help understand why men
like Darko were likely to find their patriarchal role reinforced, rather than challenged, by the
transition. Pushed to assume a domestic role in survival economies, poorly paid jobs in foreignowned companies, or more remunerative forms of sexual labor, women's condition in transitional
economies did not pose a threat to male domination. While males were impacted by the collapse
of socialism, the rhetoric that accompanied the reduction of the welfare state confirmed their
dominance in the household. Goven (1993), for instance, shows that in postsocialist Hungary many
political texts encouraged men to become independent from the corrupting effect of women and
regain their authority over the family. In such an increasingly nationalist context, male political
capital, informal networks, and ultimately migration patterns allowed them to recast their
220

masculinity as a form of patriarchal domination in the private sphere of their households and their
firms.

4.3 Ethnomasculinity, Women, and LGBT Rights
Younger generations like Goran's faced a new set of challenges as a consequence of the VMRO
masculine ideology. Take, for instance, a major speech delivered on January 31, 2015, by Prime
Minister Nikola Gruevski to downplay the upcoming release of phone recordings that implicated
him and his government in criminal activities. In the speech, Gruevski publicly denounced the
anti-patriotic machinations of the opposition party SDSM and its leader Zoran Zaev. According to
Gruevski, Zaev had obtained sensitive materials from foreign secret services, including recordings
of phone conversations between government officials, businessmen and journalists. Gruevski
described how Zaev attempted to blackmail the government and force him to resign, a behavior
that he portrayed as subservient of foreign powers, immoral, and proper to a powerless person.
The VMRO government would never concede to such plots, concluded Gruevski. "Because we
are Macedonians, not little Macedonians (nie sme Makedonci, ne Makedoncinja)."
Gruevski's speech utilized nationalist rhetoric to counter the upcoming exposure of his
government's pervasive corruption schemes. But the insistence on defining who the "real"
Macedonians are reflects the fragile geopolitical history of the country and its multicultural
character. As I stressed in the introduction, Macedonia is a small country of about two million
inhabitants, of which, according to the census of 2002, 25-35% are ethnic Albanians, 65-55%
ethnic Macedonians, 4% Turks, and 3% Romani. These figures are highly unreliable. Ever since
the 2001 conflict between ethnic Albanian paramilitary and the Macedonian army, census data
have become a source of political power and are thus subject to serious manipulation (Brunnbauer
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2004). Given the political tensions surrounding issues of ethnicity, the state has not organized a
new census. Internationally, the very existence of the "Macedonian" people is highly contested:
the Slavic language classified as "Macedonian" was standardized mostly during the Socialist
period, and many Macedonians speak with accents or vocabulary very close to Bulgarian or
Serbian. While every nation is a historical construct, the process of "building" Macedonia has been
scrutinized and challenged by other nation-states (such as Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia), or ethnic
and religious groups within the Macedonian state. As a result, the Macedonian identity has a very
unsettling nature for many Macedonians, who are constantly forced to face the arbitrariness of
their own national belonging.
The VMRO contributed to creating and exploiting the political capital of uncertainty
surrounding the definition of Macedonian-ness. The party came to power pledging to reinstate
Macedonia as a grand nation, against the claim of any neighboring country. Revamping the
political tensions with Greece about the use of the name Macedonia, the VMRO laid a series of
claims as to who the "real" Macedonians were, which climaxed in the creation of the gigantic
statue of Alexander the Great (The Macedonian) mounted in the central square of Skopje. This
huge monument celebrates the most admired traits of ethnicity as imagined by the VMRO: a
masculine warrior, known for his military ability, who relentlessly fought his enemies. It is this
image that Gruevski evoked in his speech. He and his party were the true ethnomasculine
descendents of Alexander the Great. Zaev, on the contrary, was a "little" Macedonian, an
emasculated subject. How could a "little" Macedonian be taken seriously? He was not a man, he
operated in secret, and he plotted with foreign powers instead of fighting for the fatherland. The
anti-national portrayal of Zaev coalesced around the contrasting image of the "real" Macedonian.
Zaev, in short, was not a Macedonian, and by extension, not a man at all.
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The display of ethnomasculinity is ubiquitous in Macedonia's public spaces today, both
physical and virtual. The most obvious manifestation of the attempt to build up and define
ethnomasculinity is certainly the Skopje 2014 project. This urban renewal plan was launched in
2010 with the explicit goal of re-establishing the European character and the grandeur of Skopje
as a pre-communist, mono-ethnic capital (Mattioli 2014b, Graan 2013, Janev 2011). The sheer
quantity of statues that have been built since then is astonishing. Almost all of the historical figures
ever mentioned in connection with Macedonian history are represented, even if their actual ethnic
identification is doubtful. The statues are not historically accurate. Brigands are portrayed as horsemounted captains, and religious leaders have traits that evoke popes more than hermits. All of the
heroes represented are men belonging to the categories of warriors, saints, or intellectuals who
have been reinterpreted as supporters of the national cause. The only exceptions are Mother Teresa,
a nun who spent most of her life caring for others, and Olympia, the mother of Alexander,
portrayed in another fountain between the statues of Alexander and Philippe II (his father).
Olympia is captured in four different poses that symbolize the various phases of her pregnancy.
The message is unmistakable: women contribute to the nation only as caregivers and mothers of
future ethnomasculine subjects.
Other feminine images are heavily discouraged by the VMRO government. One of the
latest films produced by Milcho Manchevski, an internationally acclaimed film director who won
a Golden Lion for his movie Before the Rain, dislodged the easy equivalence of women as mothers
of heroes. The feature film was essentially censored in Macedonia. In a related assertion of
patriarchal power, since June 2013, it became mandatory to obtain the approval of a commission
before having an abortion. Women have to file a petition, inform the spouse, and wait for the
Macedonian bureaucracy, not known for its efficiency, to decide on their own future lives.
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If the VMRO rhetoric emphasized a hyper-aggressive model of masculinity, patriarchal
heteronormativity was increasingly under threat. Macedonian men faced stiff competition from
Albanian men, but also young Macedonian women who had been able to rise among the ranks of
the public administration and (some) private companies. In recent years, women have been
achieving greater prominence in public life. In 1990, four out of 80 Members of Parliament were
women. The number did not change in 1994 despite the enlargement of the assembly to 120 seats.
Thanks to the increased mobilization of local organizations supported by international funds from
USAID and UNWOMEN, eight women were elected to the assembly in 2000. In 2006, after the
approval of a law that forced political parties to reserve a quota for women, 36 women were elected
to the parliament (USAID 2009, Greenberg and Macdonald 2000).
Gruevski nominated several women to leadership positions in the government, including
the crucial role of Minister of the Interior. Similarly, the government was lobbied by the
international community into passing various anti-discrimination laws that included provisions
about gender-sensitive measures supported by the Austrian Development Agency (UNWOMEN
2012). This did not mean that the VMRO embraced women's emancipation. Many of the women
hired through the VMRO ranks have little political power; rather, they are cast in a supporting role
by male politicians. The head of the state anti-discrimination body, a VMRO party member,
blamed the rise in the divorce rate on the "wave of emancipation coming from Western countries"
that allegedly had influenced Macedonian women (Marusic 2013). Interestingly, he failed to notice
how the divorce rate had followed the country's economic performance and the spread of
illiquidity. In fact, divorces had decreased from 11% in 2004 to 8% in 2009, only to drastically
rise in 2010 to 12% and gradually climb to 16% in 2015, according to data from the State Statistical
Office.
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While several companies (including Construx and one of its biggest competitors, Ideale)
have women in key leadership positions, high-level female managers struggle to be taken seriously
on the shop floor. Data show that the gender gap remained essentially the same since 2006.
According to the Global Gender Gaps Index, Macedonia ranks 69th, with Russia 75th and Turkey
130th (World Economic Forum 2015). According to the State Statistical Office, in 2006, 11,727
women were employed in the central public administration (CPA) against 27,616 men; in 2014,
the CPA employed 15,557 women and 32,806 men. This means a slight increase in the number of
women employed in the CPA (29.8% to 32.2%), which had an overall increase of 9,000 employees,
or 18% or the workforce (unfortunately, no data about publically controlled companies are
available). Women have also increased their presence in other public sectors that were, however,
already predominantly female. This includes education (56.1% to 60.6%), social work and
healthcare (60% to 70.3%). In the private sector, the ratio between women and men employed in
the manufacturing sector did not change between 2006 and 2014, while women increased their
participation in the wholesale and retail sector (from 38.3% to 43.2%).
Partly as a consequence of the Europeanization process and the diffusion of ideas about
gender and sexual equality, LGBT identities also gained traction in Macedonia's public spaces.
The first organization to openly support LGBT rights opened in 2002, in a climate where 80% of
Macedonians saw homosexuality as a threat to the family and a psychiatric disorder (Petruseva
and Jovanov 2005). Homosexuality had been outlawed until 1996, when the government amended
the civil code as a prerequisite for becoming part of the Council of Europe. In 2010, an LGBT bar
opened in Skopje, in the upcoming and quickly gentrifying space of the old town. While the bar
regularly hosted flamboyant parties that included Eurovision parodies, costume themes, and waterpistol battles, the organizer never explicitly used LGBT language. Although themed nights were
clearly an excuse to dress up in drag, organizers and bar-goers were scared of being beaten if they
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made their LGBT identity too public. Other explicitly LGBT groups or individuals had in fact been
raided, a disturbing trend that still continues.
While their actual economic and political power remained limited, non-heterosexual and
non-patriarchal subjects that used to be hidden have gained some public visibility. This might
explain why some younger men like Goran felt the need to adopt increasingly aggressive behaviors
to fend off mounting challenges to the deep roots of Macedonian patriarchy and heteronormativity.
Such examples of aggression and violence are not limited to everyday interactions, such as those
I described for Goran above. On March 28, 2009, a group of about 200 students and citizens came
together on the main square to protest against the government's plan to build a church on Plostad
Makedonija. The group planned to create a human chain that would occupy as much space on the
square as was planned for the church, showing how cramped their beloved public space would
become. Portraying Skopje as a woman, the group displayed banners that invited the public and
the VMRO government to "stop raping Skopje." But as soon as protesters arrived on the square,
they were assaulted and pushed back by about a thousand self-identified Orthodox Christians. It
soon came to light that those Orthodox protesters were thugs recruited in nearby provinces by the
VMRO party, shipped to Skopje by bus, and rewarded with some 20 euro and a sandwich. Some
of the most violent ones were subsequently brought to trial, judged not guilty, and then hired in
some low-level state or church positions. Symbolically, the state justified the "raping" of the city,
and reinforced the patriarchal notion according to which "real" men were to aggressively defend
the nation from queering forces. In the VMRO-controlled media, protesters were painted as proEU liberals, whose liberal conceptions of gender equality, public space, and anti-violence
corrupted the strength of the Macedonian people.
This was not the only way in which the state's increasingly repressive power co-opted men
to assert ethno-masculine acts of violence. In 2010, the government passed a law against
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discrimination that explicitly overlooked sexual or gender discrimination. In addition, the VMRO
government granted practical impunity to male hooligans (including fans of the soccer team
Vardar) who insulted, vandalized, and beat ethnic Albanians (and other random bystanders). The
LGBT community was also the target of these gangs. On various occasions, "spontaneously"
gathered mobs of angry men attacked the LGBT rights center in the old bazaar and the LGBT bar
in the same area of town. The VMRO government led a campaign to restrict the legal definition
of marriage—a clear reaction to the increasing acceptance of same-sex unions or marriage in
Europe and the US. In 2015, the parliament modified the marriage law, changing the socialist
definition of marriage as a union between two persons into a union of a man and a woman.
Meanwhile, VMRO officials blamed the mounting civil unrest against their government on
Sorosoids (i.e. people instigated by the liberal think tank Open Society Foundations, created by
George Soros) and pederi (gays). Protests such as the gatherings of 2010 against the project
"Skopje 2014" or the marches against police brutality of 2012 were portrayed as the result of
secretive machinations by an international organization, whose goal was to queer and weaken the
Macedonian nation. Casting queer subjects as failed and deficient citizens, the VMRO effectively
incited violence against the LGBT community in ways that recalled the public support for crushing
the gay parade in Belgrade (Greenberg 2006). Unsurprisingly, a recent report considers Macedonia
the worst Balkan country for the protection of gay rights, ranking 43rd of 49, in good company
with other authoritarian states like Russia (46) and Turkey (48), and well below Hungary (19),
Italy (33) or Poland (34) (Rainbow Europe 2015).
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4.4 Navigating ethnomasculinity in the workplace
Many workers had ambivalent reactions towards the aggressive rhetoric of the VMRO. If on the
one hand they could relate to the VMRO's general intolerance toward minorities (i.e., Albanians,
LGBT, women), on the other, they had a hard time redefining Macedonian patriarchal identity as
separate from other Slav "brothers" of the Yugo-sphere. Working-class men seem especially
unsettled by the VMRO's use of pre-Hellenic imperial figures, such as Alexander the Great, as
their founding figure and model for masculinity. "And now, Alexander the Great? Are you crazy?
What does a Greek guy have to do with us? You know, I wish I was Serbian," I was once told by
a worker at Construx, who said, "At least they know who they are."
On the worksite, Macedonian men were perplexed about the scale, naïveté, and historical
arbitrariness with which the VMRO propagandized its project. At the same time, they vindicated
some form of aggressive, revanchist, and proud identity for Macedonians, especially against
Greeks and Albanians. As a dear friend of mine once put it: "We are Macedonians. And if the
Greeks force us to change our name, I'll burn my passport and take up weapons. That's enough."
The wide range of similar comments that I collected suggests that the improvised yet hyped origin
of Macedonian nationhood and masculinity pushed by the VMRO's appeal to the existential
uncertainty in the heart of Macedonian men. Such uncertainty is amplified by the economic crisis
that working class men like Construx workers experience at the margins of the VMRO political
economy,. Taken together, these factors presented individuals with arduous choices about how to
negotiate their maleness.
Such nationalist and patriarchal rhetoric evokes that of the early days of the transition. Yet
the mutated economic conditions render men unable to find solace from their existential and
gender uncertainty in private spaces like the household or the firm. In the early 1990s, households
and private firms constituted spaces where specific patriarchal ideologies could sediment thanks
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to the economic fragmentation of the transition. Today, one of the consequences of illiquidity is
an increasing dependency on individuals from the VMRO regime. This interdependence
significantly impacts men's gender identification. Women, partially empowered by the party, are
not always willing to sustain a triple burden. Increasingly, "gray" jobs are unavailable without the
right political connections that shield workers from inspections—and that plunge companies like
Construx further into illiquidity. While some highly educated men emigrate, this is not an option
for blue collar workers such as Construx's masons.
The social and physical separation of the construction site and the predominance of male
construction workers made men's expressions and negotiations of their masculinity particularly
explicit. As Macedonian interlocutors put it, "What happens on the construction site stays on the
construction site." Construx's construction team for the Nest (usually referred to as a "brigade")
was composed of 14 men, but their number increased to 17 men after December 2013. These allpurpose workers were able to complete most specialized activities, except for electrical work, but
they usually collaborated or coordinated with subcontractors. At the beginning of construction,
steel workers set and bent bars to reinforce the concrete structures of the building; then masons
built the external walls, leaving the interiors to specialists of plasterboard and drywalls; as each
floor was completed, plumbers, electricians, window and door specialists came in; finally, it was
the turn of parquet workers, painters, and cleaners—the only female group. For over a year, the
bare walls of the Nest resounded with the metallic noises of drills and hammers, interposed by the
jokes, laughter, and shouts of two-dozen sweating men.
It was the site's manager who made me aware of the specific masculinity that permeated
the Nest and that I subsequently also found at the Pool. Natalia, a woman in her mid-fifties, was
by far the best site manager I ever met—and also one of the very few women who had over 30
years of experience directing sites. She was called sometimes "aunt" by her workers, who made
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fun of her ability to speak constantly and without interruption for long stretches of time. Despite
such constant jokes, she was highly respected, and workers listened to her words very carefully,
even if they downplayed or fussed about her decisions. Natalia took special care of her workers:
"I try to help them. If they need some extra job, and somebody from the neighborhood comes and
sees me for any problem, I hook them up. What can I do? They are my workers!"
But gaining respect hadn't come cheaply. "As a woman on the construction site, you are
disadvantaged. You need to know twice as much as a man knows in order to be taken seriously.
And it is a constant fight! Oh, oh—you can't imagine the labor [maka] that it entails. My brain has
to go twice as fast, and I need to be one step ahead of them. I need to know beforehand what they
will think once I give them directions! Over the years, I have learned how to do it, and how to play
the game. You know, construction workers play games all the time. Did you notice? With you too!
They test you all the time—but I have learned how to play it, and now I can turn them around on
their head if I want to."
It was true. Being in the workplace was a constant tease, aimed at establishing one's
masculinity. "Hey Fabio," the Brigadir (foreman) once asked me while we were all sitting idly
after (or before) a break. "So, do you like sex with men? You know gnaca gnaca gnaca [hitting
one hand closed as a fist with the palm of the other open hand, as to signify anal intercourse]." As
workers turned to look at me, with slight smiles on their faces, I laughed. "I do not know. I never
tried! If you want we can go and find out together, shall we?" There was a second of suspense,
while everyone present looked at the Brigadir's surprised face, and pondered if my spicy rebuttal
wasn't in fact too direct. But then, everybody laughed together, stressing that the inexperienced
and mildly masculine foreigner scored a point at the construction workers' game of masculinity.
Amused, the Brigadir patted me on the shoulder and shook my hand approvingly. "You know I
am joking, right?" Others echoed the sentiment, "We're only joking."
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Joking about one's masculinity was so constant and continuous that it came to constitute
part of my everyday life. I started to expect to be provoked jocularly and to have to prove my
manly prowess, as every other worker did, in the multiple occasions when it was called into
question. The topics that were generally evoked by these challenges usually were connected with
sexual prowess or drinking, but basically anything could be used to ridicule one another,
establishing a masculine hierarchy valid in the workplace. For instance, as soon as I started joining
workers on their breaks, they began offering various alcoholic beverages to drink. At Construx
this was a common occurrence: the director drank with clients (and the occasional anthropologist)
during meetings, administrative cadres had occasional "inhalation" meetings (which meant salads
with rakija, a strong grape brandy), and construction workers routinely drank small quantities of
alcoholic beverages during breaks. Drinking meant different things. It was a way to celebrate
important occasions, and often workers brought wine or rakija to share with others when they left
or came back from vacation. Workers also drank to celebrate some holidays, such as a family's
slava (house saint), or whenever their batches of homemade wine were ready for consumption.
But drinking could also follow a hierarchical structure. When the Brigadir decided it was
a good moment for drinking, the bottle was to be passed around and people had to drink from it,
no matter what their preferences were. Refusing to drink without serious reasons (like a sickness,
or a religious motivation) was made fun of and lowered one's degree of masculinity. Natalia, the
site supervisor, was also tested in the same way: "They always try to get me drunk. They pass me
the rakija, and observe if I drink. So I drink. A little sip. But then they pass it to me again—and
then I do not drink. I fake it. The same way you do it—I saw you!" For Natalia, as for me,
masculinity was not a given. It was supposed to be there because of our social role. Natalia was
the workers’ supervisor, and my appearance and sexual preferences qualified me as a man. But my
status as a foreigner and her femininity forced us to be tested routinely.
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Over time, Natalia came to curb her femininity and reserve it for private occasions. "When
I was younger, I wanted to dress nicely. I wanted to look gorgeous. But I was on construction sites
every day! How can you dress pretty here? It is not just because of the dirt, although of course you
do not want to ruin your dresses like that. You cannot wear a skirt in here. You see them? How
can I be respected with a skirt? Or with a sleeveless blouse? You know what they would say or
think? I can't do that—and with time I lost the habit of dressing up. Now I only dress up at
weddings." Natalia always recalled her youth, when she sometimes came to work with heels. Now
she wears a long gray apron, and woolen sweatshirts that hide her body; but she stood out when
dressed beautifully at my wedding, where she led the dances for a good part of the night.
Despite these limitations on her appearance and sexual identity, Natalia was respected.
Workers complained copiously behind her back, but I never heard or observed any rowdy behavior
towards her. Workers like Darko or the Brigadir were the first to set the tone for gendered
interactions with women on the working site. Except for a drunkard worker who was dismissed
some years back, I have never seen nor heard of workers explicitly harassing women on any
Construx site, as seems common in British construction firms (Watts 2009). While an employee
at Construx might have joked about women's roles or skills with a patriarchal undertone, I have
never witnessed a single claim stating that women were biologically inept for working in the trade,
an opinion apparently common among construction workers surveyed by Agapiou (2002). While
someone had hung a Playboy-style calendar in one of their break-rooms, most of the workers
purposely covered it when I asked them to strike a pose for a portrait. In fact, most of the workers
chose serious, solemn expressions for the photo session. The poses they assumed for the "official"
photo did not transmit aggressiveness and did not represent the macho, threatening, stances that
are otherwise widespread in Macedonian public spheres.
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Compared to materials gathered by other scholars working with construction workers in
England, Sweden, the US, and Poland, Construx's men displayed relatively more jovial and less
threatening challenges to each other's masculinities. While generally conservative and pro-VMRO,
none of them took part in any violent manifestation in support of the government. Often jokes
translated into mock fights (as seen with Darko), but I never witnessed workers push it beyond the
boundaries of acceptable playfulness. In addition, workers at Construx did not rank each other on
the basis of the physical stress of the job they conducted, which constitutes a significant difference
with how physical masculinity is defined on British construction sites (Ness 2012). Quite on the
contrary, they were happy to conduct less physically demanding jobs and systematically tried to
avoid strenuous tasks. It was professionalism and specialization, rather than brute strength, that
was associated with leadership.
While I suspect workers were lighter when they joked with me, I have experienced my fair
share of teasing and jokes in establishing my masculinity. In fact, workers were slightly puzzled
by my middle-class gender ethos, influenced by years of female-dominated education that lacked
manly camaraderie. I looked like a man, for sure. My beard provided a reassuring clue, and the
fact that I insisted on having a worker's outfit also suggested that I was on the right track. But I did
not provoke people, and I did not recount with other workers any intimate sexual experience. What
was the matter with me? Workers never stopped testing me, asking me constantly about my sexual
prowess and sharing theirs with me. "Have you ever fucked a black woman?" an otherwise
reserved worker once asked, with his eyes stuck between smile and lust. "That is something I
would do if I lived in America. They must be incredible." Another would keep on reminding us of
the good old times: "Back then during the transition, that was a good time. I was in Ukraine,
working for a construction company there. You know, then they had nothing—they were hungry,
and they literally had nothing to eat. But the women—ufff, they were so beautiful! Slim, slender,
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tall, blonde…and they would come with you just for a piece of bread! We used to go to a restaurant,
throw the bouncer a few dollars, and close it up for the night. And then women would come, and
we could choose whether to let them in or not." As exaggerated as this account might sound, other
workers confirmed their past sexual activity with impoverished Ukrainian or Russian women.
"You remember that one who was in love with you?" a worker asked once the Brigadir. "Oh yes.
She was an incredible woman. I was with her when I was in Ukraine, you know. She fell in love
with me, and she wanted me to be with her, and move to the USA when she got an American green
card. She still calls me from time to time!"
These narratives awaited approval and prompted other narratives. Workers used them to
challenge other workers. "I too had a lot of women when I worked abroad," insisted Kutliac. "You
know, I was working for a very important construction company, Mavrovo. Did you see the
Olympic games? There, we worked in Sochi. And back then I was responsible for feeding them
all, you know, I was the cook there. But, oh man, we would have weekends free, we would sail in
a boat across the Black Sea, and you can imagine the girls there! Oh! I fucked there as well!"
Others weren't too impressed by Kutliac's story: "Yeah right, you did," commented other workers
while leaving us for their ordinary activities. Such challenges to one's sexual ability were crucial
to establishing hierarchical relations within the company, between masculine and non-masculine
workers. They operated in conjuncture with other jokes and puns, not directly about sexuality or
masculinity, but that still aimed to prove one's ability in the eyes of others.
The hierarchies generated by challenging each other's masculinity did not generate a sense
of community, solidarity, or conviviality. Talking about the most exotic sexual encounters did not
change a worker's problems. They were still without pay, and without a clear idea of how to solve
these issues. More importantly, the leaders who affirmed their masculinity were unable or
unwilling to offer significant leadership on practical issues—except for inviting everyone to think
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for themselves and be calm. Instead, what the Brigadir or Darko did was to seek out private jobs
for themselves, leaving other workers to find their own. Thus, proving one's masculinity through
jokes or other challenges did not empower men structurally. Winning at the masculine game, at
Construx, did not generate strong, confident, men who could monetize their reputation as fierce
and strong competitors, as in the case of Herzfeld's (1985) sheepherders. Simply put, there was
nothing to win behind these performances. Competing only contributed to eroding the trust that
workers had in each other every day. Unable to better their economic and social conditions,
winners and losers alike came to naturalize the very presence of hierarchies. In a strange way,
these challenges emptied the space for critical, supportive, collective action. Instead, they pitted
workers against each other and created collectivity only through the constant downplaying of each
other's masculinity.
Jokes rendered acceptable the soft form of social fragmentation that shaped workers' daily
routines. They helped the Brigadir not only to prove his leadership on the site but also to make it
acceptable. These forms of social challenges failed to construct solid "alliances" as well as solid
hierarchies of the sort narrated by Herzfeld. Workers like Cigan or Kutliac, who were often
targeted by jokes, took enough offense to be annoyed and to not want to collaborate with others in
crucial moments, but not enough to surrender their own actions to the patriarchal authority of the
Brigadir. Compared to other forms of teasing in the workplace (Nayak 2003, Ghannam 2013),
challenges at Construx were relatively benign and, as we will see below, they encouraged a
peculiar combination of fragmentation and docility.
Kutliac's attempt to establish himself as a real man who did have multiple sexual
experiences with foreign women was generally disbelieved, and he was often contemptuously
called a gypsy. Maybe because of his slightly darker skin or because of his specific accent, people
on the worksite referred to him as cigan (a pejorative word for gypsy). But he wasn't the only one.
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A different worker was officially nicknamed Cigan and generally addressed as "the one that likes
to take it from behind," which reflected stereotypes about the ethnic and gender ambiguity of
gypsies in Macedonia. He was one of the most educated construction workers and one of the few
who constantly worked privately. His monetary resources, education, and relation to the union
allowed him to ignore or circumvent some of the workplace hierarchies; as such, he was looked at
with suspicion, as somebody whose ethnicity and masculinity did not fall squarely within the
hierarchical expectations.
Irrespective of their political affiliations, workers on the construction site embodied many
characteristics of the ethnomasculinity sponsored by the VMRO party. They exhibited some forms
of aggressive, competing masculinities and used such challenges to force each other into
hierarchical roles. Maintaining their masculinity forced them to show off, drink, shut up, or joke,
even when they did not feel like it. Yet, despite all of their references to Albanians and gays,
workers were never quite as aggressive as Goran, the VMRO man I described above. While they
challenged each other, their jokes retained a level or appearance of play and a regard for one's
personal worth.
Authors that have approached the historical development of masculinity on construction
sites such as Nayak (2003) or Freeman (1993) suggest that, in the UK or the USA, workers'
aggression was a consequence of a peculiar combination of confidence and anxiety. In the US, for
instance, "hardhats" who used to strive to embody forms of middle-class respectability became
progressively more sexualized, conservative, and misogynistic. This was not a consequence of an
economic downturn; in the 1970s construction workers were benefiting from relatively high wages
and decent working conditions. Yet they had been replaced as a symbol of masculinity in pop
culture and had lost symbolic importance—a fact that is also common in post-industrial England
(Nayak 2003). Workers at Construx, however, faced the opposite economic and political
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conjuncture. While economically under stress, they are pushed towards the symbolic core of the
VMRO project not as workers, but as men. Workers' uncertainty and docility were attempts to
negotiate such a difficult structural position, where lack of liquidity makes masculinity an
unwinnable game.

4.5 The Letter: Docility between Patriarchy and Class
It was the middle of January, right after the Orthodox Old New Year, a holiday still celebrated by
workers at the Nest. I arrived at the worksite after lunchtime, which workers usually had between
11:00 and 11:30 a.m. Workers seemed happy to see me, but they did not greet me as warmly as
they had previously. They seemed particularly frustrated. Someone erupted: "What is going on?
Nothing. Nothing at all. There is no money, that is what is going on. The company is doomed—
we all think that. And now the director tells us that those who do not want to stay should just
resign, and he will pay them the arrears." Workers were so infuriated that they had called a meeting
after the workday to discuss the matter.
I walked up the stairs of the skeletal building to meet Bojan, a young construction worker
who was about my age and who enjoyed discussing all sorts of things with me. From the ninth
floor we could see the parking lot and the movement of people below us. "Look, here is the
director's daughter!" I expected him to tease me. She and I were friends and workers often
suggested, half joking, that I should marry her. But this time Bojan was not in the mood to test my
masculinity. He was angry with the director and with his daughter, who, according to him, had
more interest in feeding stray dogs than them. Then he suddenly turned to me. "And you heard
what the Moustache (a nickname for the director) said? Pederska Rabota (what a gay thing!)." As
we gathered for a break, workers' frustration turned towards me. "How come you are back [from
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a trip to Italy] without anything for us? You should "offer a round" (treba da ne chastis)! Taken
aback by the confrontational tone and request, I mumbled that I did not know where to go. So they
dispatched a worker to come with me and supervise my purchases as a proper host. We came back
with four liters of wine, sodas, snacks, and other sweets, and as they enjoyed the relatively rich
treat, they complimented the worker: he had been a real domakin, a real man who knows how to
be hospitable.
At 4:00 p.m., workers from each of the three construction sites gathered in a small office
room. Given the tension, frustration, and aggressive display of masculinity, I expected the worst.
Standing by Natalia, I listened to the Brigadir's speech summing up the current situation and the
director's much-criticized statement of indifference. Then Cigan took the floor, reading two letters
he had written as their representative to the Construction Workers Union. "Because the director
told me that he wants everything in writing, we will write to him," he argued. The first letter
officially convened the workers' assembly; the second was a statement, written in legal and unionstandardized language, in which workers demanded to be informed of the status of the company's
finances and especially why they were experiencing delays in payment.
As soon as he finished reading, workers started mumbling. Darko jumped in: "This is too
strong. We cannot make demands; it is his company. We cannot impose things!" Quickly, Natalia
made the same point: "Exactly, this is absurd. We need to ask him, but not in such a confrontational
way!" The Brigadir agreed: Yes, indeed, we need to beg him (da go zamolime) to tell us." Uneasy,
Cigan looked around, and seeing that most of the workers agreed, walked out to smoke a cigarette.
Eventually, Bojan sat down on the table, took on the pencil, and said, "How about this. Respected
Director, we depend on you." The sound of positive commentaries came from the room, while
workers, now comfortable with the familiar tone and language of patriarchal relations, offered
alternative formulations. The atmosphere quickly became cordial and jovial, and workers
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unanimously (and chaotically) applauded the final text with satisfaction. "Respected Director, we
depend on you. We all have a family (familiarni lugje) and debts. We know that you are
temporarily in crisis, but we beg you (ve zamoluvame) to tell us when you will pay us." As they
slowly walked out, Darko told me: "You see? That is the problem with having a union in a private
company. That simply does not work; the patron (gazda) is the one that decides, we simply work
for the money."
I found it interesting that as soon as they switched language, from a vocabulary based on
rights to a statement organized around "begging," the tension disappeared. It seems that they were
uneasy not with their own terrible conditions, which they could bear, but with the idea of fighting
for their rights. In this case, workers tried to negotiate different models of masculinity that were
colliding because of their economic precariousness. On the one hand, they had an ethnomasculine
model, according to which the inability to fight meant renouncing one's masculinity. On the other
hand, workers were embedded within a postsocialist model of patriarchy within the family and, by
extension, the firm, which granted the director the role of the domakin, the head of the household.
Finally, there was the socialist-sounding language of rights and equality, embedded in Cigan's
draft.
As they abandoned the everyday joking animosity and tried to build upon their shared
condition of exploitation and masculinity, they failed to find a common ground to articulate their
demands and conduct actions. What they eventually came up with was a not-quite-so-masculine
attempt to elicit transformation by reiterating their belonging to the paternalistic order that had
worked so well in the company during the postsocialist transition. By utilizing a patriarchal vision
of political and economic functioning, workers did not challenge but reinforced the director's
hierarchical position, while also feeding internal fragmentation and infighting.

239

Clearly, this spontaneous reaffirmation of subordination was a result of the lack of money
within Construx. In such conditions of dire need and existential precariousness, workers felt unable
to take up the fight and instead voluntarily submitted themselves to a hierarchized vision of
masculinity, whereby the owner was to be recognized as the chief patriarch on whom they all
depended. But this is not the only way in which patriarchy works: in the case of Cretan
sheepherders described by Herzfeld, one's challenges to another's masculinity resulted in the
creation of equally competing and recognized masculine identities; that is, of alliances between
equally dangerous men. In the case of Skopje, however, illiquidity had turned masculinity into a
zero-sum game, not only because one's capacity to provide for his group economically came at the
expense of others, but mostly because masculinity per se could not provide economic resources.
As economic power is centralized, masculinity matters—but only for those who find ways to insert
themselves into the VMRO pyramid. For the others, masculinity is only a game of appearances,
only present so as to sugarcoat a structural subordination. In this system the domain of masculinity
changes radically. While the masculinity of the owner resides in his economic power, the
masculinity of workers is located in their bodily behavior, in jokes that are always being
reassessed. In other words, while ethnomasculinity did prescribe men to be domakini, what that
meant and how individuals were able to embody it depended on their class position.

4.6 Kuti, Traj, Praj: The Masculinity of Doubt and Silences
The letter, despite its patriarchal appeal, did not bring good results. The director grew furious
because of the inclusion of the word "crisis," which admitted publicly what everybody already
knew: the company was in a critical situation. Angry, the director called Cigan. He threatened to
fire him if he did not reveal who wrote the letter. Cigan nominated Natalia, Darko and the Brigadir,
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who were then summoned for a meeting. "So Cigan, the coward, implicated me, us, you see, even
if we were those who tried to calm the waters," Natalia told me. "So we went, and the Director
started shouting, aggressively, before repeating the same things he had told us before."
The director had already addressed the problem of delay in salaries. In a previous meeting
he told workers that, as a consequence of the current financial problems, he had thought about
restructuring the company and dissolving its operative arm. But he felt too responsible and proud
of his workers and had decided against it. Then, when the delay had continued, he had avoided
meetings and called Cigan, challenging unhappy workers to resign—with the promise that he
would immediately honor their arrears. This time, he had simply shouted at workers and accused
them of purposefully sabotaging the company. The Brigadir, among the most nervous and vocal
in criticizing the director, now looked like a schoolboy and was pushing everyone to work hard
and seriously. For the next few days they all kept their grievances to a minimum and instead
accelerated their work pace.
Although I was not present for the last phone call, I did observe the first meeting and other
individual discussions that were similar in content, tone, and results. Overall, workers utilized a
patriarchal approach when they confronted the director. Embodying the domakin ethics, workers
had extreme respect bordering on deference towards the director. They also attributed to him, the
gazda, a superior knowledge of the situation and the power to make decisions they would not
contest. In private, they often criticized his actions and sometimes even cursed him. But in general,
workers felt strongly that in a private company like Construx, their role was limited. The director
was both responsible for and entitled to making decisions. While the recognition of the power of
the director evoked workers' subordination to the communist party (Verdery 1996), the stakes were
radically different. During socialism, workers occupied a subordinate position but had a stake in
the overall well-being of the company, which was supposed to operate for the advancement of the
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common good. Today, workers commented that their role was to do whatever the gazda said. They
were paid to be subordinate to the authority of the domakin.
Obviously, positioning themselves within the postsocialist ethics of masculine patriarchy
evoked reciprocal responsibilities on the director's side. Workers who wrote the letter explicitly
presented themselves as powerless, also hoping to trigger the director's implicit duty to care for
and protect them—or at least to inform them. Much like Bourdieu's bachelors (2002), whose
habitus was superseded by the changing economic relations, workers' appeal to the ethics and
reciprocity of postsocialism backfired. Financialized authoritarianism and the hierarchies of
illiquidity had transformed the morality of masculine domination. Contrary to what workers
expected, the director exploited his position of strength. While he did not fire workers, as managers
at other companies such as Ideale would do, he still utilized the letter to put workers in their place.
As his assistant told me later on, he focused on the use of the word "crisis" not because it was an
actual issue, but just as a pretext to turn the table and cast doubts on the workers' loyalty and their
masculinity. How could they snitch on Construx's hardship? In the first meetings he assured them
they would have money soon, but that overall, workers needed to be productive and work with
discipline. He challenged them to show their manly strength and their masculine honor while
reminding them that he was the patriarch. He would give [money] only whenever he decided to do
so. Begging was not tolerated among men—a circumstance that closely reminds one of the
definition of manhood by giving, argued in the case of Travesti (Kulick 1998).
In the weeks following the meeting, however, workers were assailed by doubts about
themselves, the company, and the director. On the spot, the director had emerged as the only
uncontested manly figure. Yet, illiquidity had prevented him from fulfilling his patriarchal duties
that consisted of caring for the workers economically. The director could only perform his domakin
masculinity rather than act accordingly. Slowly, the meeting represented a switch from a
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reciprocal, albeit unequal, relation based on domakin ethics of masculine domination to another
hierarchy—best described by the popular saying "kuti, traj, praj." Literally translated as "shut up,
endure, and do," kuti, traj, praj was offered to me as a commentary by many interlocutors with
whom I discussed the letter incident. When pressed further, the same interlocutors explained that
Macedonian-ness, and especially masculinity, is shaped by the capacity to endure humiliation,
vexations, and abuse. Macedonians do not fight—they keep calm and carry on, only not quite as
gloriously as in the famed motto.
Workers too seemed to adopt such a reaction. For a while, this translated into an increased
reticence to speak in the workplace. By remaining silent vis-à-vis my inquiries (but also those of
potential buyers or subcontractors), workers fell into line with the director's requests. They
defended Construx's image and their honor. But silence was hardly a solution and further
aggravated their own problems, now completely eliminated from the public eye and therefore not
an element of pressure. In addition, silence and reticence in sharing information about the
building's status did not appeal to customers, effectively discouraging potential purchases.
Silence also fueled internal frustration. Instead of collectively discussing the situation, the
Brigadir and others briskly briefed the others and urged everybody to keep on working. With time,
workers cast all the blame for the failure of the letter onto the Cigan, who now more than ever was
considered as an outsider, a peder (gay), and metaphorically emasculated. Instead of recognizing
the failure of patriarchal and postsocialist masculinity under illiquidity, workers claimed that it
was his attempt to act and to evoke socialist legacies that had gotten them in trouble. As Darko
and others saw it, the problem was the union, not their deployment of an outdated domakin
masculinity. Some months later, with the company still in unclear financial conditions, Cigan was
one of the first to quit and find work in Germany. Workers on the construction site were now
speaking of leaving the union, as "the union does nothing for us." They felt they were constantly
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duped by the Cigan and started having some paranoid discussions about whether he stole money
from them or from the common union fund. Doubts about each other's masculinity spread like
wildfire.
The suspicions about the union and its representative signal the workers' intuitive attempts
to rework their gender identification away from postsocialist patriarchal models and in line with
ethnomasculinity. Just like Goran from the VMRO, workers started suspecting other men around
them to be working against their individual interests. Cigan was, of course, the first target of such
suspicion; soon, Brigadir, Darko, and Natalia followed. They felt they could always be "fucked"
by somebody else: "This is a Macedonian job (makedonska rabota). It means that the Macedonian
(man) will always try to fuck you!" Towards the end of my fieldwork, and in my subsequent visits
in the winter of 2014 and summer of 2015, I noticed workers' increased doubts and hostility
towards each other. Darko and his patriarchal approach were now the target of younger workers'
grouches. Workers also complained that the Brigadir lacked "real" leadership and did not know
how to stand up to the director. The situation had become explosive once one of the older workers
had retired and they had to nominate a new night-shift keeper for the Nest. The private security
firm that used to be engaged by Construx had stolen drills and other machinery from the workplace.
Hence, the director had decided to hire on some workers as night-shift keeper. While inconvenient,
as it required staying up all night, the job allowed workers to have free hours during the day that
could be used to work on private jobs. Plus, it was not a physically demanding task, compared to
the daily routine of the construction site. Workers aggressively contested various candidates, and
when, finally, Natalia picked one of them, it created a massive train of misunderstandings and
complaints.
It is important to note here the tentative nature of workers' increased aggression, which did
not exactly fit workers into the official model of ethnomasculinity. Contrary to Goran, who was
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secure in his political and economic position and had to be on guard only against external enemies,
the workers did not know whence challenges to their identity and position could come. Unable to
fully embody ethnomasculinity, they were increasingly fragmented and pushed to make individual
decisions about their future. Recall that the director had challenged them to quit, individually.
While some workers entertained the idea of quitting together, the Brigadir and Darko, among
others, were strongly opposed to the idea. Instead, they forcefully convinced others that "each and
every one of us needs to make their own decision. You might want to stay, you might want to go,
but it is your choice." Some workers came to believe that his stance was not entirely genuine: by
letting others go, the Brigadir, Darko, and other older employees could improve their chances of
getting paid. On the other hand, Construx's situation was so desperate that downsizing would not
substantially contribute to the company's finances. Eventually, I was told that workers organized
a march, where all 25 workers walked the whole eight kilometers that separated the Nest from the
administrative offices. Clad in blue overalls, iron-pointed shoes, and helmets, workers were not
admitted to see the director and had to go back under the summer sun, without even receiving
money for the bus.
In such a condition of economic marginality and uncertainty, the inability to fully embody
any of the ideological models of masculinity multiplied workers' fragmentation. Individually,
workers found their situation resonant with some aspects of the paranoid character of
ethnomasculinity. The assumption that forces external to the nation are threatening its members
and that the nation needs tough, aggressive, and economically powerful men to protect it became
slowly assimilated by Construx's workers. In formal rhetoric, enemies are usually international
antagonists (such as the Greek state), but also closer foes (such as the ethnic Albanians, with their
American allies). But it is a slippery slope to identify more dangerous and intimate enemies: former
communists, pernicious Sorosoids and contagious gays pollute Macedonia with queer propaganda
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and dangerous Western ideals. In a context in which more and more men are set up for failure to
achieve this ideal of ethnomasculinity, the competition to access resources tends to recast these
perceived enemies onto closer ground. Everyone who exhibits success can be suspected of being
touched by such evil influences. Thus calling a fellow worker peder is not just an emasculating
joke, it also becomes a way to test the suspicion that the less masculine could be involved with
obscure forces (and powerful people) in trying to climb the social ladder.
The struggle to reconcile their shifting economic conditions with different models of
patriarchal and heteronormative domination pushed workers to make choices that reinforced their
own marginality. Kuti, praj, traj became a model of collective subordination without vertical
reciprocity (with the director) and with scant horizontal solidarity (with other workers). Workers
autonomously dismantled the few spaces of collective action and solidarity that could have been
mobilized, becoming increasingly fragmented and suspicious of each other. Besides going hand in
hand with the increasing reliance on rent throughout the Macedonian economy, workers' attempts
to negotiate masculinity plunged them into inaction. On the one hand, workers could not do much,
because there was little work on the construction site and no money to pay for materials or
subcontractors. On the other hand, they did not know how to help the company solve its issues,
nor to whom to turn in order to get paid. The director escaped his patriarchal duties; they could not
rely on others for deciding when and if to quit—as one's resignation could have benefited others;
their union (or more accurately, the Cigan) was sneaky and unwilling to stand up for them—
although they wouldn't have let him do it anyway. The only institution that seemed solid in such a
fragmented landscape was the VMRO. Paradoxically, men who had been struggling to make ends
meet because of VMRO economic and political hierarchies found themselves cherishing the idea
of becoming dependent on the VMRO. In their experience, ethnomasculinity did not mean an
aggressive form of agency, but instead a fragmented kind of docile dependency.
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4.7 Conclusion: Ethnomasculinity, Subjection, and Docility
Social sciences have widely demonstrated that masculinity, like other aspects of one's identity, is
not a fixed quality. Instead, it is constituted of different sides, and it is subjected to changing
performances and understandings in conversation with larger social issues. This chapter has
discussed the historical evolution of models of hegemonic masculinity, and it has highlighted the
evolution of patriarchal heteronormativity in relation to Macedonia's political economy. I
described how the socialist model of hegemonic normativity hid the hierarchies between men and
women and various ethnic groups behind a pretense of equality embedded in the celebration of the
worker. In theory, the worker was a universal human being that was supposed to emancipate
everyone. In practice, it remained a male heterosexual and generally non-Islamic subject.
With the collapse of socialism, hegemonic masculinities were neither sanctified by the state
nor balanced by inspiration to equality. While men could not anchor their dominance on a solid
political and economic structure, they managed to reaffirm their supremacy in private spheres,
which included the firm and the household. Supported by nationalist and neo-traditional
ideologies, men re-claimed their traditional role of heads of households, or domakin.
In the past ten years, however, many countries throughout the Eastern bloc have seen the
development of financialized authoritarian regimes. While oligarchs and illiberal regimes utilized
financial mechanisms to strip resources from society, the nation as a whole was increasingly
identified with powerful masculine images. From Putin's hunting trips to Erdogan's lavish palace
to Gruevski's statues of Alexander the Great, the idiom of masculinity proposed a new state-driven
definition of hegemonic gender roles. Masculinity was no longer defined privately by a set of
reciprocal albeit unequal obligations (the domakin model). As the state moved to control the
market, only those heads of households or directors of firms in the VMRO constellation could
secure their patriarchal role.
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Transformations in the economic structure have heavily influenced the configuration of
masculinity in other authoritarian and repressive regimes. Hafez (2012) notes that it is precisely
the deterioration of men's economic conditions and the crisis of the patriarchal bargain that fueled
the Tahrir Square uprising. Macedonia's protests against the VMRO, however, were often led by
women and lacked the misogynistic character present in other recent protests against dictators,
including Ukraine's Maidan (Channell-Justice forthcoming). The fact that women rather than men
proved to be the belligerent figures in the protests corroborates my hypothesis about the difficulty
of achieving masculinity in Macedonia.
This chapter has argued that the eclipse of socialist notions of equality, the crisis of the
patriarchal model (domakin), and the consequent difficulty in reaching the state-driven model of
aggressive ethnomasculinity left workers in a precarious situation. Marginalized workers had to
improvise their own gender identity. Marginalized Macedonian men negotiated their inscription
in conflicting models of hegemonic masculinity privately and individually by mixing together
socialist ethics, postsocialist patriarchal bargains and VMRO-sponsored ethnomasculinity.
Uncertain about how to adapt to the economic constraints they suffered as a consequence of
authoritarian financialization, workers mobilized improvisational tactics that drew from the
multiple historical repertoires of gender roles.
Economic illiquidity disoriented workers, who found it difficult to identify with VMROsponsored ethnomasculinity, as well as with previous socialist and postsocialist models. By and
large, workers felt confused about how to reclaim their own manhood. Instead of standing up
against the director, they assumed a passive stance towards the company's management and an
aggressive one towards their peers. Unable to come together as a group to influence their own
economic destiny, they focused their claims to masculinity in sexual, bodily, and rhetorical arenas.
It is in this climate that suspicions about one's fortunes became rampant, stimulated by workers'
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exaggerated reverence of the VMRO as the only resource of masculine and economic power. Such
paranoia fuels workers' challenges in the workplace even if they never have a real victor, as
workers' own structural position never allows them to establish themselves as real men.
Continuous challenges to manhood have often been described in anthropological works.
Michael Herzfeld (1985), in his well-known study of manhood in Crete, stresses that stealing sheep
is a meaningful activity through which Glendiotes acquire a reputation. The more cunningly one
steals, the fiercer he will be considered; fierce sheepherders make for prized allies, thus acquiring
high social status and economic possibilities. In Herzfeld's writing, the Glendi society operates in
relative autonomy from the monetary logic of the state, managing such social competition through
community dynamics; because of their capacity to work through the wider political economy, men
manage to generate economically powerful social bonds and alliances through masculinity.
Such a community dynamic is very far from the context I observed at Construx.
Challenging others at the game of masculinity had the temporary result of establishing hierarchies
in the workplace. Yet, these hierarchies were almost always set a priori. The director was to remain
the director, the Brigadir stayed the dominant figure in the workplace, and those without money
could make some semblance of being more masculine, but at the end of the day they would still
be lacking in some fundamental definition of their manhood. The relatively jovial attitude with
which challenges were made highlighted the low stakes in winning or losing respect in the
workplace, as well as the fundamental fragmentation of the workers' community under the
condition of illiquidity. This is in net contrast with men like Goran, the VMRO acolyte described
at the beginning of the chapter, for whom embodying ethnomasculinity has real economic and
social consequences. It is, however, also in net contrast with socialist masculinity as embodied by
Aleksandar, where individual subordination to the hierarchies of the workplace was balanced by
extensive solidarity between colleagues.
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When workers challenged each other, they did not create new alliances based on the
subversion of national power, like the uncanny intimacy between sheepherders feeding stolen
sheep meat to police officers. Performances did (Butler 2009) and undid (Kelan 2009) masculinity
in the workplace, producing short-lived effects. On the contrary, they reaffirmed their own
marginality and inability to significantly impact their condition, while assuming that only the
VMRO would be able to change it. The ultimate conclusion of many informal discussions,
meetings, and sometimes arguments, was that each of the workers had to watch out for himself
and make the appropriate decisions. Only if the director joined the VMRO, continued workers,
could the company be saved.
Hence, docility. Despite the official rhetoric of ethnomasculinity, the current postsocialist
world is increasingly hostile to unskilled working-class males. Men in Macedonia find it hard to
change profession, given the worldwide contraction of the heavy and construction industry
(Mollona 2009) that relocated semi-peripheries like Macedonia to the backwater of the world
system. While Macedonia did enjoy some foreign investments, these new jobs parallel the
worldwide shift to a service economy. Foreign direct investment generates opportunities for docile
women, to be employed in low-paying jobs such as textiles or hospitality (see Ong 1987, Salzinger
2003), or highly-skilled, white-collar males. Either way, working-class men feel left out—an
explosive mixture of economic and symbolic marginalization that in other places has fueled
masculine suspicions about the ethnic and gendered "other" (Braun 2016).
Unsettled and frustrated, the workers respond first to a situation they feel they cannot solve,
with docility. However, as Ferguson (2013) has argued, docility constitutes also a form of uneasy
and existential comfort. In a condition where workers are increasingly fragmented, docility
evacuates the anxiety of solidarity and allows them to contain their workplace mock fights. Similar
to the Kabyle sharecroppers described in the opening of Bourdieu's Outline of a Theory of Practice
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(1977), workers often exaggerate their own dependence and docility as a strategy to encourage the
patriarchal authority to take care of them. But in a situation in which workers' collective and
individual gender identification is threatened by the lack of liquidity, and the inadequacy of
previous models of patriarchal domination, docility goes well beyond a simple strategic ruse: it
becomes a significant space of meaning through which men can come together and overcome their
frustration and paranoid suspicions. Docility transformed resilience from an exploitative condition
into an ethical engagement, a habitus (Bourdieu 2002) that made bearable but also justified
workers' marginality and recast their performances of crisis as an attempt to reclaim masculinity
(Walsh 2000, Robertson 1998).
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5. Urban Financialization and Authoritarianism: The Middle Class
On March 14, 2016, Panco, a middle class interlocutor with whom I am very close, shared an
article on his Facebook page that described Orban's new urban projects in Hungary. He wrote:
"The Skopje 2014 virus is spreading northwards." Like many other middle class professionals
working in the construction and architecture industries, Panco had been a fierce opponent of the
Skopje 2014 redevelopment plan. Launched in 2010, the Skopje 2014 plan was programmed to
give the city a "face-lift" and systematically erase traces of socialist aesthetics from central public
spaces. Month after month, construction companies close to the government built Neo-Baroquelooking buildings that hid socialist ones, or workers glued neoclassical facades made of cheap
plaster on older socialist residential blocks. The masterpieces of socialist and brutalist architecture,
including the EVN glass tower, the Parliament building, and the residential blocks around the
central square vanished: their rigid silhouettes became hidden by marble columns and white
neoclassical neoprene.
From January 2010 onwards, architects, activists, and common citizens took to the streets
in growing numbers to oppose various phases of the project. Initially, it was only a core of 20
activists gathering crowds of some hundreds of urban intellectuals. As time passed, more and more
people came to oppose the VMRO urban policy, and in 2016, daily protests gathered more than
20,000 people. Middle-class citizens, some of whom initially thought of Skopje 2014 as a project
that added value to urban life by restoring dignity to spaces they perceived as empty or decaying,
came to see it as a loss—a loss of public money, public spaces, and finally, of their own political
agency. Despite the fact that 67.3% of the population opposed the project, according to a local poll
taken in 2013 (Kjuka 2013), the VMRO did not stop. More statues representing very questionable
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heroes of the Macedonian past were erected; new facades were built; more trees and public spaces
were eradicated—often at night, under heavy police escort.
This chapter focuses on the political context, implications, and impacts that urban
transformations had on Skopje's urban middle class. The chapter discusses the importance of the
urban during socialism and the ways in which urban consumption and public spaces were
articulated to mediate and construct a specific kind of urban middle class. Then, the chapter
analyzes the transition and the Skopje 2014 plan as structural changes in urban politics that led to
the disempowerment and entanglement of the middle class with the VMRO regime.
Urban spaces have a long and complex role in shaping the class basis of political regimes.
Athenian squares, the agoras, have been identified as crucial for the development of democracy
(Arendt 1958), a form of rule which supported the birth of an urban artisanal class against the
interests of landowners. Authoritarian or totalitarian regimes, including Fascism, Nazism, and
Stalinism, mastered urban theatrics and made urban aesthetics and city planning crucial tools to
build consensus and subjection among newly created masses. Similarly, rebellions against nondemocratic rulers have taken place in public spaces such as Cairo's Tahrir Square or Kyiv's Maidan
Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square)—instrumental in shaping uprisings like the Arab Spring and
various regime changes in Eastern European through Colored Revolutions (Sharp and Panetta
2015) by calling nationalist subjects into being. In more recent times, however, a different push to
remodel the urban has come from the financialization of cities. Investments by financial
corporations have radically altered the structure of cities, which they presented as playgrounds for
new upper middle classes. Public spaces have been privatized; winding skyscrapers have replaced
low-income housing; glamorous shops and restaurants have hidden the decline in living and
working standards in cities like New York, London, and Hong Kong.
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Skopje, just like Istanbul, Budapest, Perm, or Tashkent, is an important political arena for
authoritarian financialization. Analyzing the specificity of urban politics is crucial to my overall
endeavor of understanding the nature of subjection in contemporary Macedonia. In what follows,
I focus on urban aesthetics and planning as a way to understand the social mechanisms that make
the urban a tool by which authoritarian regimes defuse the potential for contestation among the
middle class. I especially focus on the importance of spatial theatrics in the context of the
postsocialist states that have survived a process of economic decline and spatial centralization of
power. I contrast the appreciation of Neo-Baroque spaces by working-class individuals with the
irony employed by middle-class interlocutors to stress the class basis of the VMRO regime.
In the second part of the chapter, I move to examine the impact of the Skopje 2014 project
on middle-class professionals working in the fields of architecture and construction. This section
deals mostly with women who designed buildings, interiors, and urban plans at Construx, Ideale,
and Planek, a third firm specialized in planning. I argue that, for them, the financialization of urban
spaces meant a change in the values they associated with the profession. Constrained by the need
to reduce costs and increase profits in a stagnating market, middle-class architects and planners
found their abilities to function as professionals as well as citizens severely impaired. I detail how,
for middle-class professionals, planning and design became illusions, just like the facades being
erected overnight in the city. While they were asked to respect myriad laws and regulations,
planners and architects witnessed how such bureaucratic fictions were applied selectively on a
regular basis. Disheartened by the bureaucratic and economic constraints to their professional
expertise, middle-class female professionals were torn between disillusioned inaction and the hope
of becoming part of the rentier VMRO class. Through their dilemmas, I describe the climate of
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fear and insecurity that contributed to limiting public opposition of the VMRO among middleclass professionals.
In the final parts of the chapter, I focus on the emergence and traction gained by protests
around urban matters in Skopje. What started in 2010 as the "first architectural uprising in history"
by the mobilization of a small group of students under the leadership of groups such as Prva
Archibridaga, Raspeani Skopjani, or Plostad Sloboda became the basis for massive anti-VMRO
protests in 2015. Among various protests, a massive grassroots campaign mobilized citizens in
defense of the GTC, an old socialist mall in the center of Skopje. Under the slogan "go sakam gtc"
("I love GTC"), the campaign called on citizens to vote against the proposed measure to apply
baroque facades to what was until then an open mall. While the campaign ultimately failed, having
mobilized only 45% of voters, the GTC gained over 16,807 votes, according to the Meta News
Agency, by far more than any politician ever elected in that municipality. I conclude with the
suggestion that, in the eyes of middle-class Skopjotes, authoritarian financialization of space
reconfigured the meaning of urban politics among Skopjotes. If, on the one hand, it promoted
social fragmentation, on the other it called into being a new political actor: space.

5.1 Urban Spectacle between Authoritarianism and Financialization
Discussions about the prominence of spectacles, especially in urban settings, have raged in the
past century. Guy Debord, for instance, wrote that "the whole life of those societies in which
modern conditions of production prevail presents itself as an immense accumulation of spectacles;
all that once was directly lived has become mere representation" (2000:12). In his interpretation,
the change in the production system that other authors have associated with the rise of finance
(Harvey 1989) transformed social relationships between people into abstract forms mediated by
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images. Urban theatrics, however, have long figured within the calculations of political regimes.
Here, I am particularly interested in understanding how specific authoritarian, totalitarian, and
non-liberal regimes of the twentieth century deployed urban theatrics to call into being or control
specific social groups, in comparison with contemporary financialized urban redevelopment.
Most commentators remark upon the crucial importance of urban theatrics for Italian
Fascism. An example is the Altar of the Nation, also known as Il Vittoriano, "the typewriter," as
it was labeled by American troops in 1945, or the "wedding cake," according to local residents.
The building was conceived of in 1885 as a place to remember soldiers who had fallen to defend
the fatherland. The Italian capital had moved from Turin to Florence and finally to Rome,
prompting a series of spatial interventions that aimed to build a national identity around the new
political unity of the country. Among these, the Altar inserted the dead bodies of citizens in an
international imperial style, that of the beaux arts utilized in Paris, London, and other colonial
centers, to glorify the power of the international bourgeoisie (Atkinson 1998, Caprotti 2007).
Mussolini recuperated and expanded the nationalist meaning of the Altar. While it is true
that the Altar magnified the bourgeois ideology, Fascism rather appealed to a diagonal class,
composed of working-class, former socialist, and some bourgeois subjects. Such a syncretic class
base was reflected in the regime's approach to aesthetic expression (Caprottti 2005), especially in
urban matters. Fascism was strongly linked to the futurist movement and its exaltation of dynamic
movement and heroism; yet Mussolini also embraced Rationalism, Bauhaus, Neoimpressionism
and other forms of European avant-gardisms (Stone 1993). Atkinson (1998) suggests that such
variety in aesthetic forms derived from fascist awareness of urban theatrics. Occupying the streets
and conducting a symbolic fight over public spaces was important for fascists to display its power
and to organize its own sympathizers into a cohesive paramilitary organization. Though space,
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Fascism overcame its failures to unite the financial, religious, and army elites; unable to seize
complete control over the country, Mussolini settled for the illusion of spatial totalitarianism.
While the Italian bourgeoisie and elites maintained a contradictory relation with the regime, spatial
totalitarianism was very effective in calling into being a transient and class-less mass.
Besides embedding fascist nationalism in space (Atkinson and Cosgrove 1998), the Altar
became the culminating point of a project to literally disembowel the city (Atkinson 1998, Caprotti
2007) and control its class structure. Entire neighborhoods around it fell victim to the mistrust that
Fascism placed on uncontrolled urban spaces, where workers could spontaneously organize.
Working-class neighborhoods in central Rome, designated as slums in official propaganda, were
cleared and razed to make space for boulevards that connected the Altar to other monumental
places. Via del Mare was yet another case of gutting the city, whereby the regime created not only
easy access to the sea (a way to get out of the "corruption" of the city) but also relocated the
working classes to more controllable peripheral Borgate (working-class projects, see Caprotti
2005). Tirana and other colonial cities conquered by Fascism followed a similar destiny (Pojani
2015).
A number of authors have suggested that the creation of boulevards and the resettlement
of urban working classes have been stepping stones for the construction of authoritarian regimes
(Harvey 2005, Cavalcanti 1997). Stalin, for instance, promoted a new urban design for Moscow
in 1935, whereby the city was to adopt a radial design in which straight boulevards constituted the
connecting lines. Boulevards were as important in Speer's plans for renovating Berlin, where the
light-rail rings that were supposed to connect the growing city were to be intersected by large
boulevards. Some of these arteries constituted a celebratory trajectory organized around a
gargantuan Volkshalle, designed to host 150,000 people standing. In a similar vein, Ceausescu
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utilized the earthquake that hit parts of the city in 1977 to reconstruct entire sections of Bucharest.
His project consisted largely of replacing single family houses with multi-family buildings—a
process that allowed him to displace the older bourgeois intelligentsia. In addition, Ceausescu
decided to redevelop a section of the city center with a complex of government buildings that
culminated in his residence (Cavalcanti 1977). Contrary to Hitler's plans, which were not
completely realized, Ceausescu's redevelopment was carried out, resulting in over 7,278 people
being expelled from their former dwellings. By breaking down place-based solidarities among the
working class and expelling the bourgeoisie from prestigious locations, authoritarian regimes tried
to instill new forms of subjection among urban working and middle classes.
Urban aesthetics in fascist Italy and Nazi Germany was also charged to generate new
subjects, whose political perspective bypassed liberal representation (Da Costa and Kabriola
1999). The artistic value of new spaces was articulated around the creation of a new post-rational
political subject: the masses, whose irrational and pre-discursive will was poised to coincide with
that of the totalitarian leader (Mandoki 1999) and whose political affiliation transcended class
allegiances. Quasi-religious buildings, such as the House of German Art built in Munich under
Hitler's rule, were a way to connect the Fuhrer directly with the masses without help from
traditional religion or political structures. To rephrase Benjamin (1973), with Fascism, political
power utilized the technical capacity of reproduction to generate an aura of mysticism around its
modernist and developmental projects.
Caprotti (2007, 2005) argues that precisely the intrinsic contradiction between modernist
aspirations and anti-capitalist and anti-consumerist rhetoric highlighted the importance of
spectacle for Fascism and Nazism. While both regimes depicted the (working-class) city as a place
of vices and encouraged resettlement in rural areas (consider land reclaimed for Fascism and the
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promotion of urban parks in Berlin), both regimes invested heavily in urban development and
industrialization, generating spaces where relocated working classes could become masses. Both
Nazism and Fascism promoted electrification and infrastructures such as trains and railways. For
Caprotti, then, urban spectacle reconciled these two opposite processes and legitimized what
Barrington Moore (1971) has called a form of conservative modernization. This modernizing
perspective, absent today, was probably important in generating a respectable image of the regime,
acceptable for the urban bourgeois class.
Radically different and yet equally important is the role of urban theatrics for
financialization. Today, urban finance is not a by-product of urban development and
modernization. Rather, the importance of the two factors is reversed: urban infrastructures matter
principally because they generate, consume, and reproduce financial products (Weber 2010).
Financial investors have little interest in developing or modernizing societies in which they invest,
seeing them instead as a mechanism on which to speculate. Karen Ho's (2008) description of
spatial politics within financial firms portrays an astonishing and clear picture of the lack of
commitment that financial elites have to spaces, including their own. Trading floors, associate
halls, and cubicles where analysts work are ill-maintained, old, and bare. The only spaces that are
highly cared for and receive significant investments are the partners' floors, the halls, and possibly
the exteriors of the buildings. Data I am collecting with regards to financial professionals in New
York City suggest that this is still the case.
Urban aesthetics and consumption, rather than modernization, are what financial elites use
as a way to ensure consent from urban middle class. Some recent works on finance-led
gentrification show the importance of aesthetic and beautification in driving real estate (Brash
2011, Kruglova 2013). In part, cities promote beautification projects in order to "brand" themselves
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and attract international investors or tourists (Graan 2013, Cervinkova 2013). Interestingly, current
financialized democracies relocate the urban poor in a manner not so different from authoritarian
regimes of the previous century. What they lack, however, is the commitment to urban
development, often substituted by consumption as a mirage to gain legitimacy in the eyes of urban
middle classes. The financialized urban spectacle is not a moralistic project to modernize the
masses under the benevolent eye of a ruling bourgeoisie but an elitist dream of hiding them by
concentrating the view on opulent hyper-consumption.
As Halawa (2014) and others have suggested, in the contemporary financialized city, such
a dream of (upper) middle-class consumption is increasingly produced through illusory
mechanisms. Among these, one can count various kinds of facades. Elegant halls, skyscrapers, and
other markers of wealth and success have the function of attracting customers and workers alike
with the promise of accessing the same wealth. In St. Petersburg, Dresden, Warsaw, and Sibiu,
local governments attempted to renovate the facades of local buildings in the hope of generating
revenue. When they failed, gigantic billboards advertising for global brands have covered the
entire surfaces of run-down buildings (Gendelman and Aiello 2010). Similarly, financial products
promise to generate profits and money through a constant process of repackaging, where debts
become assets and liabilities sources of leverage.

5.2 The Theatrics of Solidarity and Urban Consumption in Skopje
In the 20th century alone, Skopje has grown at least twelvefold. Estimates from Ottoman,
Yugoslav, and Macedonian sources (including various censuses) collocate the city's population at
33,000 citizens in 1902-3; 43,847 in 1913; 102,604 in 1958; 197,341 in 1961; 408,143 in 1981;
and 506,926 in 2004 (Ivanovski 2008, Todorov 2013). Current estimates oscillate between 550,000
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inhabitants, according to the state statistical office, and the more realistic figure of 800,000
dwellers that was generally given to me by urban planners.
Skopje's fast expansion has radically impacted its physiognomy and the power relations
between various classes and ethnic groups. As architect Jovan Ivanovski (2008) comments, the
continuous enlargement of Skopje transformed its urban tissue into an incoherent set of
architectural fragments. Ivanovski suggests that "the city of today is nothing but an incomplete
materialization of various tabula rasa models applied over its territory" (2008:31). Bakalchev,
Bakalchev, and Tasic (2015:75) similarly suggest that Skopje demonstrates "evident
fragmentariness, superimposition, and juxtaposition of different layers."
But the heterogeneity of Skopje's urban landscape is not only the consequence of its
growth. Instead, it reveals complex attempts to utilize the urban as a tool for social control, through
either ethnic or class politics. Originally a Roman settlement, Scupi / Uskup / Skopja / Skopje
expanded, contracted, and morphed according to changing economic and political projects. Under
Ottoman rule, Skopje was not as prominent as other neighboring cities such as Thessaloniki or
Bitola. Still, its bazaar had regional relevance and was well-documented in travelers' writing. Its
apex is generally located in the seventeenth century when the famous Evlija Celebi reported that
the city had about 10,000 houses and over 2,000 shops (Krstikj 2011). Soon after, however, Skopje
declined. In 1689, Skopje was burned to the ground by the Austro-Hungarian army, remaining a
small town until the late 19th century. A comparison of a wide array of demographic sources made
available by Todorov (2013) shows that in the 19th century, the overall population of Skopje
remained between 10,000 and 20,000 inhabitants.
Ottoman Skopje was mostly located on the north (the left bank) of the river Vardar and did
not follow geometric planning. Its curved, winding streets were often unpaved and irregular
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(Marina and Pencic 2012). In 1890, the city appears to have been organized in about 40 Maala,
agglomerates of urban blocs often defined by religious or ethnic identities. Under the Ottoman
Millet system, urban and political affairs were regulated through religious communities, which
sometimes intersected with ethnicity, rather than class structures. Between 1903 and 1910, 65 to
70 percent of households were Muslim. This included various ethnicities such as Slav Muslim or
Torbeshi, Muslim Roma, Muslim Turks, and Muslim Albanians. According to Todorov (2013),
there is room for interpretation in determining the ethnic breakdown of each religious community.
Sources that claim that one third of the Muslim population was of Albanian ethnicity offer no
explicit evidence to back their assertions. To complicate matters further, the political and cultural
organization of the Ottoman Empire pressured Muslim subjects who lived in cities to become
Turkish, at least publicly. As Todorov puts it, "being Muslim Urban subjects meant implicitly
being Turks" (Todorov 2013: 80, my translation). The remaining 25 to 29 percent of the
households were Christian Orthodox, and a small minority of about four percent of the households
was Jewish (Todorov 2013).
After the Ottoman defeat in the Balkan wars (1912-1913), the Ottoman region of
Macedonia was divided among Bulgaria, Greece, and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes
(also known as first Yugoslavia, or Kingdom of Yugoslavia). Rather quickly, the new political
project of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was reflected in urban spaces. Skopje started to grow and
to accumulate neoclassical architecture, a typical attempt to call into being a bourgeois class. The
Kingdom commissioned a new urban plan from architect Dimitrie Leko, the second to be drawn
for Skopje after that of 1890. Leko's plan (1914) began an attempt to modernize the city that would
continue with Mihajlovic's plan of 1929 and Kubesh's plan of 1948, and which would finally be
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implemented at a large scale after Tange's masterplan of 1964 (Bakalchev, Bakalchev, and Tasic
2015).
The basic idea shared by these plans was to radically transform the existing Ottoman urban
environment in favor of a European city model. Among the changes brought about by Leko's plan
and what followed was the introduction of a circular street pattern, or "city ring," that delimited
and contained the city center. According to Marina and Pencic (2012), the "city ring" was derived
from Vienna's model of a Ringstrasse conceived by Foster. The concept was to replace the current
"substandard" urban structure with a pattern that clearly identified a center. That area, designed to
host the government buildings, was to be located on both sides of the Vardar so as to radiate into
the rest of the city, now conceived of as its periphery, just as in walled European cities. While the
1914 plan mostly tackled the marginal areas of the city, the 1929 plan directly reorganized
residential areas in the city center, taking inspiration from Haussman's model for Paris (Marina
and Pencic 2012). With the goal of centralizing the city structure, square and public buildings that
recalled the style of other European capitals were planned and subsequently realized. The National
Theatre and the Army Hall, built with 19th-century European aesthetics, were among the most
famous ones and were recalled by my interlocutors (who usually had never seen them except on
old postcards) as symbols that made Skopje truly European.
The attempt to tame the Ottoman city also touched other spheres of urban life. Preliminary
data I collected from the State National Archives show that Vakufs, that is, estates and buildings
left as religious endowments to provide public goods to the Islamic Community, were confiscated
or nationalized. In addition, the Kingdom encouraged army officers and Serbian citizens to settle
in the neighborhood of Debar Maalo, a coveted residential spot today. One of my interlocutors
eloquently traced the history of the buildings and families around his house. Most had been
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inhabited by construction workers and skilled masons migrating from Western Macedonia
(including the city of Debar). During the Kingdom's rule, however, a number of officers and
military personnel of Serb origin were relocated into this zone, and some of their families still
lived there.
World War II did not significantly alter Skopje's urban environment, except for the near
total extermination of its Jewish community, nor did the early years of the communist regime.
While the 1948 plan was drawn with the goal of cleaning out the Ottoman heritage in Skopje, as
Marina and Pencic (2012:7) put it, the project was not thoroughly followed up, at least in
comparison with Sarajevo and Belgrade (Alić and Gushesh 1999, Abram 2015). These politics
radically changed after July 26, 1963, when a devastating earthquake destroyed between 70% and
80% of the city center (Despeyroux 1968). In the aftermath of the devastation, Ottoman heritage
assumed a different meaning. It represented an opportunity to show the world the inclusiveness
and multicultural character of the socialist regime. While devastating, the earthquake represented
a colossal political opportunity for Tito and his regime to promote Yugoslavia's third way as a
symbol for international cooperation (Ivanovski 2008, Tolic 2011). What could be a better sign of
international solidarity than pooling resources and knowledge from the East and the West to
reconstruct a city? The communist leadership then made a drastic decision: Skopje would
showcase the convergence of international solidarity, as embedded in the UN, and bratsvo i
jedinstvo, the social values of brotherhood and unity that were at the core of Yugoslav selfmanagement.
It should be noted that the different orientation towards Ottoman heritage followed an
internal evolution of Yugoslav communism. Not only did the system abandon centralized planning
for a controlled socialist market economy, but it also focused on consumption as a tool of social
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governance. While not officially glorified as in other parts of the West, the objective progressively
became to generate enough wealth and consumption to appease workers. Those who worked in
administrative, qualified positions benefited greatly from this economic transformation and started
to think of themselves as a middle class, as many of them told me in countless hours of interviews.
The reconstruction of Skopje was then not only a testament to international solidarity and
Yugoslavia's middle way, but also a way to enshrine the birth of a quasi-middle class in one of the
poorest regions of the socialist federation.
The plan worked. International aid, coming from both Western and Socialist countries,
made the political climate unsuitable to continuing the destruction of the Ottoman heritage. Under
the pressure of the international community, some of the parts of the Old Town that were still
standing were designated as monuments and historically significant buildings (Tolic 2011). A
specific directorate to protect them was created, although without the appropriate funding and
political will, its actions were limited to maintaining the look of the old town. Its social and urban
tissue was, instead, disregarded (Shoot 2000). Most of the Ottoman structures were destroyed and
replaced with a rational grid of boulevards, streets, and building blocks; what was left, the section
around the bazaar, became the "old town" and came to signify an Orientalized "other" to the city's
modern identity. Particularly significant was the erasure of older Maala, replaced by homogeneous
socialist blocks, and the completion of the "city ring," which radically severed the connections
between parts of the Old Town that maintained their Ottoman appearance, either by surviving or
being reconstructed in their immediate surroundings (Krstikj 2011, Mattioli 2014b).
The city that emerged from the plans and sketches of Kenzo Tange, Radovan Mischevik
and Fedor Wenzler aimed to redraw the very boundaries of human life. Future citizens of Skopje
were supposed to emancipate themselves from individualist and bourgeois lifestyles and embrace
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a new, social dimension of being—one that both Western and Eastern architects imagined to be
filled with consumption and social progress. Skopjotes were to be integrated into a singular social
body, inspired by ideals of solidarity that were supposed to be shared by the Yugoslav and UN
elites. At the same time, Skopjotes were to become modern consumers, provided with individual
cars, washing machines, and other technological wonders. According to the models employed by
architects such as Le Corbousier and other proponents of rationalist planning, the urban form was
a crucial factor in promoting such new subjectivities.
In the specific case of Skopje, Kenzo Tange and other planners identified a characteristic
useful for restructuring sociality in the sequence and structure of urban blocks. The blocks that
were to constitute the basis of the city's structure were made of eight- to 12-story dwellings that
enclosed a shared space—often a park, a playground, or some sort of common area. While these
blocks replicated the Ottoman concept of enclosure embedded in Maala, they also radically
transformed it by making such spaces openly accessible and traversable through myriad public
passages. In fact, in its modernist shape, the city was conceived primarily as open and connected—
that is, a space where social connections were not generated by rootedness in tradition or locality,
but by movement and the ability to inhabit the public. The central square, the pedestrian walkways
along the river Vardar, the central boulevards, the new train station, and the new GTC shopping
center were all designed with the idea of maximizing interconnectivity.
The train station, for instance, had the form of a concrete balloon floating in the air. Train
tracks were elevated so as to host other activities below, including what is today a bus station.
Spaces like the main square or the GTC commercial center were conceived as points within a
network of passages and crossings of the city. Their radical openness transmitted the socialist idea
of equality and solidarity—an aspect that was also stressed by the building's aesthetics. Imposing
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buildings, like the seat of the government and its adjacent park, the city archive, the central post
offices, or the student dorm Goce Delcev presented a brutalist look that made extensive use of raw
surfaces of concrete, glass, and metal. With their sharp, geometric shapes, these spaces not only
communicated the grandeur of the socialist regime, but they also stripped buildings down to bare
functionality, free from any elaborate frills. Brutalist aesthetics, together with open public spaces,
promoted a theatrics of radical equality, where individuals of different ethnicities and different
geopolitical positions could find common ground.
Many of my middle-class interlocutors remembered with pride the reconstruction of Skopje
and many of the socialist masterpieces that had been built. They told me that the new city, modern,
open, and enlarged, embodied the kind of solidarity that kept Yugoslavia together, which coalesced
in the ideal of brotherhood and unity. Indeed, the resurgent city exhibited signs of international
and local solidarity at every corner, including names of streets and commemorative spaces. Yet
such solidarity was hardly neutral: it targeted a specific kind of modern, rational, and quasi-middle
class subject. What happened, then, to those individuals or groups who did not fit the subject of
solidarity?
Officials and architects I interviewed claim that every decision regarding urban
reconstruction was made only on the basis of need or personal preference. Albanians and Roma I
spoke with swear that they had little access to public housing, and only in specific neighborhoods.
The documents I was able to retrieve from the archive of the city of Skopje show that Albanians,
Roma, Vlahs, and other minorities did benefit from the millions of dollars and dinars that were
donated to reconstruct the city. Yet the newly built urban environment created fault lines in the
spatial geography of the city that effectively began a process of ethnic segregation on a larger
scale. The distribution of ethnic groups in the city was significantly shifted by decisions made
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during the resettlement and housing process. In the cases I was able to track down, the communist
leadership tended to provide temporary housing (which is still used today), clustering ethnic
groups together. In the neighborhoods of Kozle, Taftalidze and Madzari, out of the 106 families I
found documents for, only five had non-Slavic surnames. In the neighborhood of Suto Orizari,
which today hosts one of the largest Roma communities in Europe, out of 60 families receiving
US-donated prefabricated housing (Amerikanski Baraki), 40 could be recognized by ethnic Roma
surnames. In addition, the names recorded on lists of citizens who had urgent need to be relocated
were mostly Slavic, despite the fact that destroyed buildings were located in an area with
significant Muslim population. While my data are partial, they seem to indicate that the
reconstruction of the city proved disadvantageous for Albanian, Muslim, and Roma citizens, who
were resettled on the outskirt of the city, even if they used to live in central areas.
The more modern and open spaces of the city proved not so accommodating to different
Islamic identities—a fact that has been explored by other scholars of modernism and secularism
(Asad 2003). The charshija, the old "Turkish" town, came into being as a separated, "other," and
non-modern part of town, significantly severed from the remaining parts of the city by immense
boulevards and marked by planners such as Kenzo Tange as a "monumental" area—a leftover from
the past. As I argue elsewhere (Mattioli 2014b), this spatial division stratified over time and
became increasingly meaningful as the conflict between Albanians and Macedonians grew in
intensity.
While urban planning might have been perceived by post-Ottoman subjects as a form of
ethnic segregation, other urban theatrics exerted a centripetal traction that fulfilled the integration
promised by "brotherhood and unity." Among these, the performance of neighborhood conviviality
was crucial. Interlocutors mentioned taking care of a neighbor's children or attending reciprocal
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religious holidays as the most obvious examples of how socialist solidarity was performed. Note
that the same people who performed such acts of interethnic neighborhood solidarity maintained
very negative stereotypes of other ethnic groups. Solidarity also meant a particular form of
reciprocity with the state, whereby citizens sacrificed parts of their time and energy and accepted
sometimes corrupt and inefficient working conditions but received a wide array of social
entitlements and benefits.
In some socialist countries more closely linked to the USSR, such a redistributive power
disenfranchised citizens (Verdery 1996) who feared the powerful hand of the paternalist state. In
Yugoslavia, however, it was rather cherished. Rather than wages, what made one's work and labor
meaningful was the capacity to access other benefits, such as housing, vacation, retirement, credits,
family time, and especially consumption items. Spaces of consumption, as well as the consumption
of space, were expected as a consequence of socialist redistribution and remembered fondly by
then middle-class Skopjotes. Middle-class architects I interviewed remembered their first credit
with nostalgia: "I bought my car that way. During socialism you got credits through the company—
you did not need collateral, it was the firm that guaranteed for you, and rates were very low. So
we all got credits." Conceived not as a result of individualized hard work but as a consequence of
Yugoslav solidarity and collective effort, consumption enshrined the urban tissue of the city
beyond ethnicity and provided the illusion of attainable comfort for urban subjects—what in the
West was generally considered a middle-class dream. Socialist malls, such as Beogradanka in
Belgrade, or Sarajka in Sarajevo (Badescu, personal communication), were among the most
important public spaces and evoked the fondest memories. In Skopje, spaces of shopping and
consumption like the Gradski Trgovski Centar (GTC) and the connected Stokovna Kuka (also
known as NAroden MAgazin, or NAMA) became part of the everyday routine of Skopjotes by
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showcasing consumption items from every republic in Yugoslavia. More importantly, planners
explicitly detailed in many documents the need to include retail shops in the ground floor of
virtually every new building as a way to stimulate the birth of what they considered, surprisingly,
a free market.
As many scholars have demonstrated (Berdahl 2010, Klumbyte 2010, Fehervhary 2002,
2009, Gille 2007, Patico 2005, 2008, Lampland 1995), socialism promoted consumption and
embedded in it its own social meaning. In Yugoslavia, a country deeply divided across ethnic lines,
consumption cemented the union of differences ideologically and practically—even if goods were
not equally available to everyone (see Dimova 2013). Interlocutors who presented themselves as
middle class, including Albanians, designed consumption as a crucial part of belonging to Skopje
and one of the ways in which socialist solidarity was made real. It was having access to "jeans,
technology, and housing," as one put it, that made Yugoslavia an example of socialism. A different
middle-class interlocutor recalls her ardent desire to own a baby doll: for her, going to shop at the
GTC in Skopje was like a religious experience. Through her young eyes, the shelves of the
Naroden Magazen seemed filled with shiny goods and amazing objects. Older architects I spoke
with suggested that the consumption they were granted through the socialist regime had changed
their lives. "We had nothing. No electricity, no jeans, no water. And suddenly, we could afford
nice clothes and goods."
After the 1950s, achieving a significant degree of consumption became an official policy
of the Yugoslav Federation. In a 1955 speech, Tito declared a shift from capital investment to the
production of consumer goods. As a result, consumption increased by 8.5% on average from 1957
to 1965 (Le Normand 2008). In an attempt to reduce the housing crisis, housing and space came
to be conceived as a commodity, built by funds managed by Yugoslav cities (Le Normand 2008)
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for citizens' consumption. Consuming spaces made solidarity and equality sensible and embedded
new meanings into brutalist architecture and Yugoslav planning , contributing to a specific kind
of urban quasi middle-class subject. Urban consumption mediated the fractures created by
modernist planning and ethnic divisions—fractures that exploded during the transition with the
decline of the middle class. Similarly, urban subjects grew with an expectation of state-linked
consumption, one that the VMRO was able to bank upon years later. The picture below, taken
from a Facebook group of people remembering the old Skopje and originally published in a
Macedonian newspaper, portrays the splendor of the modern Stokovna Kuka in Skopje; it also
prominently features an Albanian family, with women wearing headscarves and men the typical
Albanian beret while engaging in conspicuous consumption.

Image 1: Shopping in Skopje's Naroden Magazen.

Source: Efremovski, Martin. 2015. "Stokovna kuka 'NAMA' Skopje: Slavko Brezovski 1959 Стоковна
куќа "НАМА" Скопје: Славко Брезовски 1959." MARH. Accessed on August 23rd, 2016.
http://marh.mk/стоковна-куќа-нама-скопје-славко-б/.
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5.3 "Wonderful Neglect" and the Decline of the Urban Middle Class
The transition after 1992 radically changed the economic conditions of urban middle classes and
their relation to the city. Over time, the theatrics of Yugoslav solidarity, equality, and openness
lost traction with my interlocutors, who described brutalist buildings as extremely uncomfortable
to use, work, or live in. Workers from the archives of the city of Skopje, for instance, complained
that the concrete used to build their offices and the actual archives made them too hot during the
summer and too cold during the winter. Because of the construction technique utilized, they found
it almost impossible to modify the spaces according to their needs.
Maybe more importantly, socialist spaces started to decay rapidly after the country's
independence from Yugoslavia. Concluding the 2009 Architecture Forum Skopje, architect and
scholar Srdjan Jovanovic-Weiss observed that "what is really wonderful about Skopje is that some
of its most futuristic public spaces are in such wonderful neglect that they remain what they are no
matter what happens to them." Capturing a perspective common among foreign observers,
Jovanovic-Weiss seemed in awe of Skopjotes' freedom of movement and extensive relations with
a neglected public sphere. My urban interlocutors, especially middle-class youngster or elderly
folks, spent a considerable amount of their days in grassless parks, or skating on decrepit concrete
banisters. They knew the ins and outs of the (non-Muslim) city where they circulated, greeting
people at every step.
Despite the feeling of being grounded in the decaying built environment, which welcomed
and nourished their rich sociality, my interlocutors complained that their seemingly worry-free
urban socialities were, in fact, burdensome. "Everything is possible in Skopje. You wait for the
bus, and it does not stop. You walk by the street, and the sidewalks are full of cars so that you have
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to walk on the street. If it rains, forget it. Lakes—that's what you'll see everywhere. Not to mention
the buildings, they are falling apart! That's because we are not a real state, it is a catastrophe."
Ivana was one of the architects that designed and planned Construx's buildings. Of a middle class
background, Ivana had been heavily impacted by the transition. Her father had died a few years
after the country's independence, and her sister had relocated to Australia in search of a better
economic future. Ivana had also tried to move abroad. She briefly worked in Qatar but could not
adapt to the lifestyle. "There, it is incredible. You have an unlimited budget, and they have no idea
what they want. My boss used to simply copy famous buildings, say San Marco's square in Venice,
and these rich Qataris would pay for them!" Contrary to Qatar, Macedonia and Construx did not
have much in the way of available funds. Ivana often lamented that there was nothing happening
in the city, and although she enjoyed its social life, she felt economically and professionally
limited. I could feel her internal tension, which she tried to limit by keeping a low profile and a
conciliatory attitude.
Ivana's comment ties together three crucial aspects of the middle-class perception of urban
politics in Macedonia. For my urban, middle-class, professional interlocutors, ruination was
synonymous with urban potential. Children growing up during the chaotic years of the transition
had unprecedented access to spaces in Skopje: the open architecture of socialism, without the
"invisible rules" dictated by socialist policing, had allowed many of them to roam free in the city.
The city park, for youngsters growing up in the 1990s, was a crucial place where small groups of
youth met drinking beer, playing music, skateboarding, and roller-skating. Couples used its
intimate spaces and dark corners to make love, unafraid of the ruined emptiness that surrounded
them. The fact that "everything was possible in Skopje," however, also marked an unpredictable
urban life, collapsing infrastructure, and a decaying beauty.
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Before the advent of the VMRO administration, the fiscal policy of the country had been
modeled on classic transitional austerity. Public institutions had to cut their budgets and did not
have resources for urban maintenance. Similarly, individual families had little money to carry out
important renovations on their buildings. Soon, the concrete that composed external facades started
to erode. Interior spaces, plumbing, and heating wore out and began to work intermittently. I
observed daily leaks in the radio and television building, one of the most prestigious spaces built
under socialism, where I worked as a host for a satirical Albanian radio show in 2010. The
technology was old, the windows poorly insulated, and the carpet stained. Water regularly fell
from the ceilings due to various leaks that were generally disregarded or only temporarily fixed.
Residential buildings around the main square and other spaces in central Skopje, on the other hand,
had a persistent bad smell coming from sewages lines. The building where I lived for a part of
2013, right on the main square, had recently been renovated after the government had remade its
facades. The issues, however, had persisted. Student dorms, including the famous Goce Delcev
building as well as others I visited, were also in very bad shape. A close interlocutor who lived in
a centrally located dorm, very coveted by the provincial student population, experienced daily lack
of heating and hot water even in the dead of the winter. This was partly the fault of outstanding
debts accumulated by the management and partly the failure of the central heating system. Her
room was tiny, dark, and right next to a noisy old elevator. She had made it welcoming with
mementos and cozy with warm clothes and colors, but she still felt ashamed by the conditions that
she was forced to endure.
Ivana's words captured the potential of Skopje, both its ruination and its openness. The
"wonderful neglect" referred to by Jovanovic-Weiss was a visible symbol for what he and many
other called the "absence of a state" (nema drzava). Even when they enjoyed some of the freedom
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granted by unregulated spaces, middle-class citizens felt deeply embarrassed by the lack of state
investment. Interlocutors from Skopje and especially middle-class professionals have been directly
involved in the rebuilding process and the outpouring of international and local solidarity that
followed in 1963. They had been able to inhabit spaces of consumption that were now out of their
reach. Natalia, the Nest's supervisor, lamented that she had always been able to eat out. Now, cafés
and other spaces of consumption were absolutely out of her reach (especially after she had
married). "Nema drzava (there's no state)," she often concluded. "What can you do?"
By commenting that "there was no state," middle-class interlocutors implicitly drew
comparisons with the importance of the urban during socialism. The ruination of urban spaces
paralleled their own downward trajectory as a class; more importantly, urban ruination had taken
from them the promise of social cohesion and consumption assumed or experienced under
socialism. Urban decay implied a sense of existential loss (Dimova 2013) and fragmentation
(Ivanovic 2013), which has prompted some middle-class architects to call Skopje the "World's
Bastard" (Mijalkovic and Urbanek 2011). More importantly, it also provoked a distinct feeling of
estrangement from the political realm. Feeling abandoned by a state that had disappeared during
the transition, middle-class citizens of Skopje regarded urban spaces as flagrant proof of a political
catastrophe—their own. Public spaces were neglected, and new private spaces were dominated by
a class of nouveaux riches. Unsurprisingly, Ivana interpreted these urban facts as a consequence
of widespread corruption and ineptitude of officials. In such conditions, she added, there was not
much to be done, except take care of one's own affairs in the private realm.
Ivana's comment suggests that the collapse of public spaces made the rise of inequality
during the transition spatially evident. But there is another reason why middle-class subjects like
Ivana were so preoccupied with the condition of the city. During socialism, urban spaces and
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especially apartments had been crucial social benefits that allowed for a quasi-middle-class status.
In socialist Yugoslavia, private and residential buildings were built and allocated with a very
complex set of rules that changed significantly over time. Yet housing had been a priority both for
my interlocutors and for the socialist state. Le Normand (2008), for instance, documents the public
outrage that arose after realizing that only 5.2% of newly built public housing was destined for
members of the working class. According to journalistic sources that analyzed Belgrade's housing
question (Le Normand 2008), 167,000 people lived in inhabitable buildings and 50,000 of the
city's household shared an apartment with a different family in the mid-1960s.
During the transition, the same urban middle-class citizens who had lost most of their
economic and social worth with the collapse of the socialist system were able to survive precisely
because of the spatial benefits they had accumulated. If they had had to rent an apartment, most of
my middle-class interlocutors would have been starving. In 1994, one family of three I know had
the option to buy the one-bedroom apartment of 60 square meters in which they lived. The
apartment, which belonged to the Yugoslav Army, was estimated at a Yugoslav dinar price
corresponding to 1,000 euro, well below the market price of apartments in the area. In Skopje,
entire sectors of the Aerodrom neighborhood and of city's center had been developed to house
military personnel. Aware of the fact that Yugoslavia was threatened by both the East and the
West, the military had developed a Total National Defense Strategy (Woodward 1995). By housing
officers in key urban areas, the Yugoslav Army aimed to embed guerrilla capabilities into the city's
tissue. Should a Soviet or NATO invasion happen, citizens would rally around their local officers
and fight against the aggressor. Locally known as "army buildings," these structures conformed to
the highest construction and durability standards. Not only did the buildings degrade less during
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the transition, but officers and their families were also able to purchase them at deeply discounted
rates.
Although its cost was significantly lower than the market price, the family did not have
enough money to pay it off all at once. Yet they still managed to sign a prorated contracted,
whereby the fund for military buildings of the Republic of Macedonia would accept installments
of about five euro per month. Surviving for a long time on a single salary of about 200 euro, my
interlocutors were unable to conduct the proper repairs; but they at least had a roof over their heads.
For twenty years, they kept on paying in installments, although not regularly, and with time lost
track of the apartment's financial status. It was only by chance that, in 2014, they discovered they
could buy the apartment in full for only 1,000 euro, in addition to the nearly 500 they had already
paid. Because its original price was in Yugoslav dinar, a currency that still existed under
Milosevic's Serbia, the price was adjusted for inflation each year until 1998. Yet for that specific
apartment, the fund had conducted re-valuations only in 1995 and 1996, skipping the following
years.
Unequal access to urban resources did not just enable the survival of impoverished middleclass families, such as this one, whose resources had been dilapidated during the transition. A small
number of urban entrepreneurs managed to take advantage of the "wonderful neglect" of both
urban spaces and urban regulations. Between 1985 and 1997, Skopje did not have a general urban
plan, and according to most actors I spoke with, very few urban regulations were actually enforced
by either the central or the local municipality. Many local entrepreneurs, including Construx' own
director, had benefited from the "gray" urban regulations of the 1990s, developing quasi-legal
projects as subcontractors. In the case of Construx, these projects developed into buildings for the
Greek Alpha Bank as well as renovating consulates and embassies. Others had invested in real
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estate, by either building up their own plot or selling properties they could not maintain in
exchange for new ones.
Martina, whom we met in Chapter 1, had lived through the contradictions of gray urban
development during the transition. Her grandfather's father, whose side of the family was from
Debar, had emigrated to Skopje in the early 1900s and settled in what was then the outskirts of the
city, Debar Maalo. This district was one of the few among the flurry of post-1963 redevelopments
that had maintained a single-house urban pattern with tree-lined streets. Martina's family owned a
beautiful, albeit modest, three-story house, to which they were very sentimentally attached.
Martina's mother, for instance, remembers the electricity in the air on the early morning of July
26, 1963, when she had been awake telling stories to her younger sister on an apricot tree. At about
five a.m., the earthquake began. Members of the family told me with pride about their efforts to
rebuild the house without money or support from the state, a process that Martina's mother ascribed
to her father's stoic and "old school" morality. Other members of the family, however, suggested
that the problem was political: he had been forced to become a communist to get a job, and he was
wary of asking the regime for help. The result of their self-funded reconstruction was a modest yet
intimate space with many architectural shortcomings but filled with trees, roses, and family
memories. Martina, born in the mid 1980s, had often stayed at the house, and she remembered
with great nostalgia the smell of her grandfather's flowers and grandmother's homemade jams.
In the mid 1990s, her grandfather was approached by a longtime friend who proposed to
redevelop their plot. In exchange for their property, the family would receive three apartments in
a new condominium. Struggling financially to maintain the house, and with three daughters whose
middle-class jobs and statuses had been obliterated by the transition, Martina's grandfather agreed.
Martina's mother and each of the two sisters received one apartment, which they either moved into
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or rented out. Soon after, Martina's mother had to face other financial challenges. Hoping to grant
her daughter a brighter future, she sent her to a private American high school and sold the
apartment to pay the tuition. In a few years, however, the property value of the building
skyrocketed. The area became the hotspot for the city, and the developer realized an incredible
profit.
Such stories are very common in Debar Maalo but also in other neighborhoods.
Unscrupulous developers exploited the lack of regulations and the "wonderful neglect" of urban
spaces to turn ruins into assets. A recent study called "Skopje Grows" shows that in the
neighborhoods of Debar Maalo and Bunjakovec alone, the green area was 21% of the total surface
in 1991, 13.8% in 2012, and is projected to be 4.5% in 2020 (Reactor and Arhitrektri 2013).
Similarly, the work of Ivanovic (2009) shows the proliferation of illegal construction, often
prompted by small-scale investors, who either redeveloped plots like Martina's anew or "fattened"
existing multi-family buildings. In such cases, the investor added one floor, a loft, and an additional
external room to the existing building. Families that had often bought their apartments during
privatization at discounted prices but were then unable to buy new dwellings for their growing
families were happy to gain an extra room. These added rooms were, however, hardly a bargain:
many of those I visited had structural and construction problems, were not very well insulated, had
poor air circulation, and blocked the natural light of the original apartment. Families often had to
invest considerable resources in fixing these issues, yet because these rooms did not exist in the
cadastral documentation, they could not be legally sold nor factored into the overall price of the
apartment.
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5.4 Disneyland, between Irony and Selfies
It is against this backdrop that one has to understand the social meaning of the Skopje 2014 project.
The project involves a complete makeover and re-contextualization of space in central Skopje. A
non-exhaustive review of the project includes four multi-story Neo-Baroque parking lots, three
hotels, and over 12 public interest buildings such as the Macedonian Philharmonic, the Museum
of Archeology, the Museum of the Macedonian Struggle, the National Theatre, the Agency for
Electronic Communication, the Criminal Court Building, the Financial Police Building, the
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Water Management Building, the Mother
Theresa Museum, and a new Orthodox Church. Also connected with the project are a new VMRO
Party building, the renovation of the parliament and the seat of government, and the remaking of
the facade of most of the blocks on the main squares. Beside the hundreds of statues, other
monuments comprise a Parisian-style triumphal arch (with a gift shop inside), a 35-meter high
statue of Alexander the Great, a pedestrian bridge filled with statues, a set of fountains in various
squares and, in the river Vardar, a Ferris wheel inspired by the London Eye, with three concrete
galleys that jut out from the river.
The plan, already underway, was unveiled in a spectacular manner on February 8th, 2010.
The following day, I was at the Department of Architecture of Skopje's public university, where I
was co-tutoring students. I remember that my colleagues gathered to watch the video online and
commented in disbelief about its absurdity. They were shocked primarily by three aspects of the
project: first, they decried its patchwork and improvisational aesthetics, which awkwardly recalled
baroque and neoclassical styles and mixed them with other random designs. Architects I was
working with strongly disapproved of the plan's attempt to hide, cover, or outright destroy previous
socialist buildings, which they felt expressed an innovative, avant-gardist way of thinking about

280

the city. Second, planners strongly opposed the demise of the open city in favor of a claustrophobic
urban environment. Identifying with socialist rhetoric rather than the complex planning politics of
Yugoslavia, architects claimed socialist spaces and planning had created a dispersed political
structure, while Skopje 2014 ranked Skopje and its center as the core of the country's political life.
In addition, they critiqued the poor execution of the plan. The new bridges did not lead anywhere,
spaces between buildings were too narrow to allow for fire trucks to effectively maneuver in case
of emergencies, and the construction was planned in an area that was at risk for flooding. Sure
enough, soon after being built, the basements of many of these buildings, including the Archive,
were flooded. Finally, architects opposed the procedures with which the buildings had been chosen
and the contracts awarded.
Architects did not reject the idea that Skopje needed a radical architectural and urban
facelift. Quite the contrary: both faculty members and students, whom I witnessed become
professional planners and designers in 2013 and 2014, agreed that Skopje needed one. Interlocutors
nostalgic for socialism welcomed the fact that the VMRO state was again investing in the city.
What they disagreed upon were the forms, procedures, and philosophy used to revamp Skopje.
Architects and other middle-class professionals I spoke with highlighted the kitsch aesthetics of
the Skopje 2014 as one of its most disturbing factors. As an example, some of them referred to
Tirana: "Even in Albania they use more forward thinking. Their current renovation plan has been
awarded through international competition!" In fact, Tirana's plan involves the design of
skyscrapers as a way to rebrand the city. Yet, these plans have been seriously criticized by local
scholars and activists for failing to involve the local population and take into account the previous
urban heritage (Pojani 2015). Instead of going forward, architects and middle-class professionals
argued that the Skopje 2014 pushed the country backwards toward a fake past. International media
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and analyses followed similar lines and portrayed Skopje as "the failing European capital of kitsch"
(Mayer 2013), a "tragedy or farce" (Zantvoort 2014), a "theme park" (Davis 2011) or a form of
nationalist branding (Graan 2014).
But what is so wrong with kitsch, understood in urban environments as an aesthetic that
fuses together multiple styles, with a predilection to exaggerate and an appetite for disintegrating
the existing context? Why did architects oppose kitsch aesthetics so thoroughly? Dimova's (2013)
work is illuminating in this regard. In the postsocialist period, kitsch furniture and aesthetics
became appealing to a stratum of the population that was gaining political and economic power.
Among these were the emerging Albanian middle classes, as well as certain categories of workingclass individuals, such as construction workers, who had moved from the province to Skopje and
had taken advantages of the grey economy of the transition. Neo-Baroque furniture and kitsch
designs became a symbolic space for identifying their class position through the exaggeration and
uniqueness of kitsch aesthetics and locating it in the world of European luxury rather than in the
postsocialist context of Skopje. For them, taking a picture (or a selfie) in front of the statue of
Alexander became a symbol of a renewed urban identity. "Before you had nothing to see in Skopje,
nothing to take pictures of," one of them commented, while taking a snapshot of her daughter for
Instagram. A similar process has been observed by Borenstein (personal communication) in
Western China, where kitschy skyscrapers designed to look like German folk architecture appealed
to people's imaginations thanks to their "international" luster.
Kitsch aesthetics and the Skopje 2014 project had a peculiar fascination for construction
workers. In 2014, I interviewed a number of specialized workers from large building companies,
such as Beton or Granit, who had participated in the construction of the arts bridge and the Mother
Theresa museum. While they were all critical of the VMRO's general positions and of the overall
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cost of the project, they found its aesthetics interesting. One of the architects, whom I will call
Konstadin, was candid about it. "It was a hard project. It had different surfaces, different materials,
and we needed to use particular techniques. I enjoyed the challenges of the project, it was
stimulating." As a follow-up, he continued to tell me about some makeshift solutions he had to
invent in that case, and then he suddenly shifted to other ingenious fixes he had elaborated in the
past during the Yugoslav era. Buzo, a specialized construction worker, commented that "making
some of the electrical wiring inside the bridge was hard. We were working suspended, in very
uncomfortable positions. But it was also interesting. It is not often that you get to create such a
different project, so I enjoyed it."
Young and middle-age architects were very careful to avoid confusion about their class
status. Dubravka, a close friend of mine, explicitly avoided bars and cafes that were generally
frequented by what she called seliaci, a term used by the urban middle class in Skopje to designate
provincial working-class newcomers. Instead, her middle-class architect friends almost regularly
congregated in two or three social spots, which were distinguished by their hip décor. Marija,
Construx's architect, looked at me with disgust as I proposed to meet later at a spot frequented by
seliaci. Middle-class architects were very preoccupied with distancing themselves aesthetically
from both older socialist impoverished apparatchiks as well as the nouveaux riches. In that, they
often adopted aesthetic trends that in cities like New York, Detroit, Barcelona, and Berlin have
been known to drive urban gentrification (Brash 2011, Zukin 1991).
Such a symbolic definition paralleled architects' feeling of dispossession. Marija, for
instance, was clearly feeling underappreciated at Construx, where her duty was to fit standardized
designs to the size of the plot. The rationale that guided her work was achieving maximum profit.
Construx operated in the upper segment of the real estate market, with official retail prices that
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exceeded 1,250 euro per square meters. Cheaper companies offered apartments with a starting
price of 800 euro per square meter in comparable areas of Skopje. Yet the actual sale price was
significantly lower, especially in 2013 and 2014, when the real estate market was sapped by
overproduction and illiquidity. In order to be competitive on a market plagued by illiquidity,
Construx banked on two factors: reputation and optimization of spaces. Rather than luring clients
through advertising or fancy halls, Construx promised superior building quality and innovative
materials. In addition, Construx's architects were charged with the task of restricting the space of
each room so as to squeeze as many rooms as possible in a small space. Marija did not have much
opportunity to invest, design, or otherwise think through various architectural possibilities. Her
job consisted mostly of turning around the design to minimize the loss of space.
Largely because of the specific condition of urban financialization present in Skopje,
architects had lost much of the flair and prestige that accompanied their profession during
socialism. Although in the planning bureau of Construx the climate was relatively serene, the five
female architects who worked there knew full well that they could be replaced easily. This further
exacerbated architects' incapacity to complete their work according to their ideas: their structural
weakness discouraged architects I worked with from actively pursuing more elaborate architectural
solutions that could avoid increasing sales prices. At Ideale, it was not resignation but fear of the
director's absolute power over architects that stopped middle-class architects from stepping up and
trying to conduct their work according to their architectural ideals. His bad temper, screams, and
despotic character joined middle-class professionals' structural precariousness to make workers
more suspicious and more cynical about themselves. "Look, I know that some of these things are
not particularly great. But here I have to meet the interests of the company, you know? So, if I
have to plan an urban space, I need to make sure it is as profitable as possible," the chief of Ideale's
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design office once told me. Back at Construx, a colleague of Marija used to look at me with a
despairing air. "Get away from Macedonia, if you can. There's nothing for you here." That last
sentence was completed by a lingering glance, heavy with unfulfilled hopes. Single, in substantial
debt, her underwhelming job at Construx was the icing on the cake of her stagnating career. A
different architect at the bureau, known for her smiley presence, was not faring any better. Her
husband had been laid off, and her daughter was about to get married. A third architect was
supporting her family, which included a disabled child, with only her salary.

5.6 Ambiguity, Illusions, and Bureaucracy
Despite feeling the downward pressure of reduced career options and a general aversion towards
the VMRO plans, architects and especially planners find themselves at the core of the politics of
illiquidity. In fact, Skopje 2014 constituted both a direct and an indirect economic opportunity.
According to newly released data, the project has represented an investment of over 633 million
euro (BIRN 2015). In the period between 2010 and 2014, the entire value of completed
construction projects was 870 million euro. According to data available from the Macedonian
Statistical office, the estimated total value for all the building permit issues for the entire country
in the period from 2010-2015 was approximately one billion euro, of which the Skopje 2014
project represents 16%.
Yet the meaning of the Skopje 2014 project goes beyond its actual direct impact. Analyzing
the trends of the Macedonian construction sector, it appears that the industry faced a significant
recession in 2010. In 2008, the country had issued over 2,800 building permits, while in 2010, the
number was down to 2,170. The number of completed residential dwellings had been down from
a peak of 6,494 in 2006 to a minimum of 4,710 in 2009. Average prices in Skopje in 2009 were
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also stagnating compared to 2008 and fixed at slightly more than 900 euro per square meter. Skopje
2014 countered that downward tendency by transferring publicly contracted debts into the pockets
of construction companies close to the government. Eventually, some of that wealth would trickle
down through the subcontracting chain, and stimulate the forms of kompenzacija that I examined
in Chapter 2.
Skopje 2014 stimulated the overall sector, increasing property prices, which in 2010 rose
to over 1,000 euro per square meters and in 2011 and 2012 did not go below 950 euro per square
meter despite the obvious deepening of the European recession. Thanks to government money, or
the illusion thereof, companies were able to complete their current investments, and the number of
completed dwellings was augmented to 5,151 in 2010, 6,433 in 2012 and 6,528 in 2013. However,
the conditions attached to gaining government money proved to be taxing. Not every company
was able or willing to establish political patronage relations with the VMRO. As a consequence,
the number of building permits issued, which highlight a company's abilities to invest for the
future, collapsed to an all-time low of 2,269 (614 for Skopje) in 2013 before picking up again in
2014 and 2015.
It was in 2013 that the Macedonian construction sector experienced the worst of the crisis.
In the same year, the government allowed municipalities to borrow on the market, although with
the oversight and approval of the Ministry of Finance. Such a move did not result in the issuance
of securities based on future revenues such as the Tax Increment Financing used by the city of
Chicago (Weber 2010). Despite the legal possibility of contracting their own debts, municipalities
kept on being financed mostly by the Macedonian central government (Lyon 2013). My
interlocutors suggested that a significant part of the remainder derived from taxes levied on new
constructions or sale of real estate.
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Starting in 2013, the VMRO government launched a program called "kupi kuka kupi stan"
(buy a house, buy an apartment), designed to subsidize the sale of real estate property. Individuals
or households that do not earn more than 900 euro (1,300 for households) per month and do not
own properties can apply to one of two sets of benefits: (1) receiving a subvention of 50% of the
monthly installment (75% in case of houses) for five years on credits with an interest rate fixed
between 3.5 and 4.5%; (2) receiving a contribution of up to 6,250 euro (9,375 for a house) on a
credit of no more than 50,000 euro. The program comes with a set of limitations prohibiting,
among other things, the rental of the property and a price ceiling of 900 euro per square meter. The
program clearly shows how in Macedonia, contrary to real estate in Bulgaria, Hungary, or Poland,
the problem was not the excessive liquidity generated by predatory lending. Governments that had
to tackle excessive indebtedness, such as was the case in Hungary, opted instead for measures that
bailed out or bought back properties from insolvent citizens. On the contrary, the program shows
the lack of liquidity in the Macedonian real estate market, where citizens could not put down the
required down payment, afford the mortgage, or access credit at a relatively low interest rate.
The results of the program were mixed. While kupi kuka kupi stan stimulated the market
during the recession, it also had the paradoxical result of pushing prices down. Companies like
Construx, which built apartments for a higher price, found themselves outflanked by others, like
Ideale, who had most of their investment in the 900-euro range. As a result, Construx was forced
either to create fake deals whereby parts of the transaction were omitted or to take a hit on its
already ill-shaped finances. Ideale, on the contrary, was able to capitalize on its large scale
investments on the periphery of the city and even built up its brand's value. There, the company
had built an entire neighborhood that fit perfectly within the parameters for government-sponsored
loans. Rumors circulated that the low prices Ideale offered were a consequence of the privileged
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prices they paid on denationalized land. In response, Ideale published a monograph with financial
details on prices, profits, and loans. The company's public relations office, headed by a former
journalist, went so far as to publish a screenshot of an offer about to be made for a plot of land in
an online auction, supposedly designating the actual buying price. In a separate graph, the company
listed the money paid for land, including that of the screenshot. Yet the prices are provided in US
dollars—a curious fact, given that the currency of choice for real estate deals is the euro. The US
dollar, however, had a quite volatile exchange rate compared to the euro and the Macedonian
denar. Once the exchange rate is factored in, then, the prices expressed in dollars on the graph and
the prices from the screenshot in Macedonian denars did not coincide.
The relative impunity with which companies like Ideale can publicly assert their
dominance follows their connection to the VMRO. The director of Ideale previously owned a state
company and was a former SDSM party member. During the 1998 conflict in Kosovo, the
company he managed had been linked to shady deals with Serbian companies to circumvent the
embargo rules. Soon after, he had parted ways with the SDSM, whose cadres he had accused of
plotting to assassinate him. The owner disappeared from the public scene for a period and some
years later founded a construction company with a few family members. In a few years, after
appearing in public events linked to the Orthodox church, his company had become a prominent
player in the country's real estate market and employed over 200 workers.
Besides acquiring land at preferential prices, one of the key mechanisms with which Ideale
was able to squeeze high profits from its investment was the ability to plan entire sections of the
neighborhood. The reasoning was that if one could plan where services, public buildings, parks,
or other infrastructures were located, a location could easily become attractive to buyers. In fact,
various other companies found it profitable to create sister companies to manage urban plans
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directly. The director of Construx had drawn detailed urban plans on behalf of the municipalities
in which the Nest and the Pool were built. At another company, which I will call Planek, the person
in charge of public offers admitted that "sometimes we can go as low as zero, if the manager really
wants that plan. It really depends on what kind of interests he has on that land."
Spending time at Planek and following the everyday work of Sanja, a planner in her mid30s, I realized that planning, just like the aesthetic dimension of Skopje 2014, was a crucial
mechanism through which authoritarian financialization shaped the political subjectivities of
Skopje's middle class. Sanja had decided to become an urban planner and follow in the footsteps
of her father, who had been a planner for a Yugoslav state company. Sanja believed that urbanism
had an important function in society and that her expertise provided technical knowledge to create
better living conditions.
Yet her actual work as a planner had shaken her faith in progress. In January 2015, when I
came back to visit her, I noticed a new sign on the door. It read "Entrance forbidden to nonemployees." Sanja appeared tired and lamented that her work was really terrible and constantly
gave her trouble. Since she had started working on a new neighborhood in central Skopje, citizens,
investors, and entrepreneurs had started coming into her office to plead their cases and influence
her decisions. "They come here because they asked at the municipality, and somebody there told
them that I am the one drawing the plan. So what do they do? They come here to see if I can give
them some more space, or if I can change the construction line…it is crazy! Because they can't
agree with each other, they think that they can come here, and I will help them," she explained,
pulling out the big drawings of the plan she was working on.
The problem was very complex. First, the area she had to plan was a very attractive one,
very close to the center and to Vodno Mountain overlooking Skopje, where the price of land had
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mounted steadily in the past years. As revealed by evidence from tapped phones, even Prime
Minister Gruevski put pressure on the local municipality and the Ministry of Transport to change
the current urban plan in order to maximize profit on a parcel of land he owned. Similar to what
happened in the neighborhood of Debar Maalo, the fluctuating enforcement of urban regulations
during the 1990s had generated an urban sprawl of what Sanja called "substandard" housing,
mostly small shacks or self-constructed family homes. Few of these buildings respected the zoning
regulations and many occupied more than 70% of the total surface of the plot. Sanja's plan was
responsible for deliberating upon these existing violations. While the plan she proposed had to be
approved by the municipality first and by the Ministry of Transport second, she had no fixed
guidelines or support to negotiate the different interests at play. Sanja felt she could not just ignore
the built reality and condemn delinquent houses to demolitions. On the other hand, she feared that
if she simply condoned the current buildings, people might take advantage of her good faith by
building additional floors that perpetrated the violations further. Finding an equitable solution
while constantly being under pressure took a toll on her. Finally, she came up with her own rule.
The current state of affairs would be accepted as it was; if the owners wanted to build further they
would have to destroy the parts of the houses in violation of the code before proceeding.
Sanja was not only supposed to normalize urban sprawl and informal buildings but also to
plan the expansion of this neighborhood. Whatever perimeter she would draw would become the
maximum size and location of any future building on that plot. But how was she supposed to do
that? Residents came to see her, pleading to obtain the maximum building surface, in order to be
able to get investors interested for the potential economic return. Drawing big buildings meant
including more owners, as very few plots of land were owned by one single person. The
denationalization of land had only recently been completed, thus reconstituting a new system of
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ownership relations (Verdery 2003) in the neighborhood. Some extensive plots of land had been
assigned to multiple owners, sometimes because the original owner had died and the parcel had
been redistributed among relatives, or in other cases because the plots had been formed by
consolidating smaller parcels belonging to multiple households. In addition, a big building would
cross over more plots owned by different stakeholders, and that would make the gain from each
resident smaller. Additionally, with more stakeholders it would be much harder to come to an
agreement about which offer to accept.
Sanja could sometimes work around that issue, playing with the shape and height of
buildings: she knew some technical tricks to have the same amount of square meters distributed
over more or less surface, thus making the investment attractive for developers but including or
excluding more or fewer landowners. But whom should she choose to benefit? Owners came to
her office after having talked to their friends and connections at local municipalities, whom they
often enlisted as allies in pressuring Sanja. Sometime these pressures took direct form: at a public
discussion of a proposed plan organized by the local municipality I attended, some local residents
tried to persuade her to exclude one specific owner on the basis that he was unreasonable and
would block all other interested parties. "But that would not be fair," she commented later, "I
cannot give to some people and not to others." Sanja clearly understood that her planning
techniques were not just about planning, they were also about creating rent, radically shifting the
value of land simply by moving a line some millimeters in one direction on a piece of paper. Sanja
felt the burden of having to take sides all the time in a profession that she had previously
understood as technical and uncontroversial. Financialization, however, made planning anything
but a technical exercise. In a context of illiquidity, where money was not circulating, planning
became a way to turn space into a resource for monetary or even non-monetary gains. Newly
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drawn building plots would then be exchanged in poisonous kompenzacija deals for apartments
yet to be built; paradoxically, local citizens fought for self-depreciating goods.
Back at the meeting, Sanja discussed various issues with the few citizens who were present,
and then she joined the representative from the municipality who was examining the plan. There
had not been an official public presentation and discussion of the plan, but rather an informal one
that the municipality had summoned to take the pulse of the citizenry. After a moment of reflection,
the municipal representative and Sanja pointed at different buildings and exchanged views. "So
that's not good—this solution of three towers does not work here," said the municipal
representative. Sanja agreed and asked how she would like to proceed instead. "Nothing, we'll go
back to longer buildings, and we'll give them some more space. What should we do? But we won't
do it now—we'll let them depose official grievances. You draw it, but we will concede only after
the official procedure—you know that by law we have to have at least 50% positive answers to
petition in the public hearing. And then I do not know about this other part…" After discussing
some additional changes, Sanja and I went back to the office. "You see? Sometimes the
municipality does not know what they want. They ask me to draw something, then somewhere
somebody changes his or her mind, and we have to amend everything. Maybe even after making
these changes they will ask me to draw it again with some different specifications—which are
often against the law. And you never know if it is because a resident has said something, because
of some unofficial remarks by higher ranks within the Ministry of Transport, or maybe there is a
political interest at stake. There is no way they will tell me that in writing! They call me, they tell
me, they organize these events—but there is nothing official."
Sanja felt that she was often between a rock and a hard place. Her solutions were contested
by citizens or stalled by endless discussions at local municipalities. When the local bureaucracy

292

approved her plans, it was the Ministry that raised objections, suggested corrections, or proposed
alternatives. Were these changes good, or even legal? Sanja was not always sure, and the informal
way (calls, half-words in hurried meetings, and long, angry arguments) were not helping her in
deciding which side to take. The owner of her company, a businessman from a provincial city, had
enough political and economic power outside of the capital to allow her company some degree of
autonomy. But she knew that her principles and moral decisions had to fight their way through
multiple interests, inefficiencies, and opaque levels of planning bureaucracy. She was willing to
fight, for the time being, but only for her own sense of justice—that is, for maintaining her sense
of personal worth and professional integrity. She had no energy left to engage in wider political
battles—such as publicly supporting protests against the Skopje 2014 plan, or engaging in
contentious politics.
There was more than physical exhaustion affecting Sanja's decision not to engage in
classical forms of politics. After the revelation that Prime Minister Gruevski had put pressure on
some of the planners, her plans ended up on the internet. Luckily, she had not been implicated, but
the company (and the municipality) decided to stall the projects on that neighborhood. Sanja's
example shows that planning was part of a rigged bureaucratic system, where risk could be
transferred unpredictably across bureaucratic hierarchies. Before 2015, when a series of scandals
and protests undermined the authoritarian government of Prime Minister Gruevski, it was typically
planners or other middle-class professionals like Sanja that bore the burden of illegal planning.
Not all planners abstained from taking on politically relevant positions against the Skopje
2014 project and the VMRO's urban politics because of fear of repercussions or moral exhaustion.
Some, like the planners at the Agency of Spatial Planning of the Republic of Macedonia that
elaborated the GUP (general urban plan) of Skopje, found in the VMRO's urban politics a
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possibility to redeem their profession. When I interviewed two managing directors of the agency,
it became clear that the GUP they had designed was their living testament against the current state
of affairs in Macedonia. Disgruntled by the poor planning that was done after the transition and by
the "commercialization of space that comes with capitalism," as they put it, they presented their
plans as an antidote that would redeem the city. By reiterating the importance of socialist
infrastructure and especially the dominance of the road grid over the rest of the city, the two
architects envisioned planning as a form of punitive social justice. "They can do what they want
with it. They can create an underpass, build a flyover, or simply tear apart the houses that were
built there illegally. I do not care. But now it is on the plan: they HAVE to make that route the way
it is supposed to be!"
For the client, the city of Skopje, the goal of the GUP was much more pragmatic. First of
all, there was the question of regulating areas of the city that had not yet been planned. Much to
my surprise, the areas covered by the GUP did not correspond to the actual limits of the built
environment of Skopje, nor to the administrative units in which the city of Skopje itself is divided,
its various municipalities. Then there was the question of new urban development. Smog is an
increasing problem in Skopje, and pollution-linked fog stagnated in the city for months in 2014,
making it difficult to fly in and out of the country. The city of Skopje wanted to resettle industrial
areas outside of the urban perimeter and increase the green areas of the city. At the same time, the
city government, and even more so the local municipalities, relied upon the taxes levied on
building permits in order to provide standard maintenance; with a property tax close to zero, Skopje
cannot function without new urban developments. Faced with these challenging and conflicting
demands, the agency for urban planning found simple answers in planning technology: they made
abstract drawings. As they told me, they would stop pollution by limiting urban density (the
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number of inhabitants per square kilometer) and relocating factories outside the city. Yet they also
increased the number of dwellings, transforming previously green or unused areas into housing.
Imagine you have a bottle full of expired milk. Imagine that your customer asked for a
glass of milk because of his recent stomach-ache. What would happen if you changed the label on
the bottle, putting a new expiration date further in the future? Designing the current GUP of Skopje
the agency just changed the label, applying unrealistic numbers and solutions through wishful
planning: the plan is unreliable, contradicts actual reality, and increases current problems that it is
supposed to solve. As such, planners who have to operate on a smaller scale and produce more
detailed plans are faced with a number of conundrums. How they are to allow development while
at the same time decreasing the density of the population is among the crucial ones. But this is not
the GUP planners' concern: they have complied with their duty and formulated a plan that formally
respects the requirements.
A number of additional measures inscribed in the GUP are clearly unrealistic. The GUP is
based upon a wide array of ill-gathered documentation and data. For instance, nobody really knows
the number of inhabitants of Skopje or of its municipalities. This is not to say that plans are based
on estimated population size, as per urban planning theory; what I mean here is that GUP planners
did not utilize scientific data to project inhabitants' numbers. As the planning division of the
territory does not correspond to the administrative one, planners cannot just use the census data
for municipalities or even for the city of Skopje. Additionally, the latest attempt to produce an
accurate census of Macedonia's population failed because of ethnic tensions, caused by the
political consequences of recognizing 20% or more of any given "minority" in a municipality.
When I asked the two directors about these problems, which had been raised by every planner I
had spoken to, they presented me with a thick set of documents: these were ISO 9000 and ISO
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9001 standard procedures—that is, a quality control protocol usually required and applied in
productive processes in Europe. In other words, their solution to planning problems was to abide
by a different plan: a plan for planning.
This planocentric vision of bureaucracy, whereby built-world problems are subsumed into
the (un)reality of the bureaucratic process, is not just a residue of the socialist production system.
The two directors were certainly nostalgic for the social and political weight that planning held
during socialism. Yet today, plans like the GUP do not regulate the core of Macedonia's political
economy and are certainly not the goal for production or even urban development. On the contrary,
plans like the GUP function as a bureaucratic facade that appears coherent, respectable, and
necessary by those who sit on the outside—and malleable to those who are on the inside. In
practice, plans are drawn to be violated by the powerful elite who control Macedonia's illiquidity.
As an important planner within the city government put it, "There is a reason why plans are so
contradictory and full of holes. That gives advantages to politicians and those who made the plan,
who can always play one thing against the other and find a loophole. They do not want to solve
these issues!" And yet, elites do want the plan to assume the aura of bureaucratic authority to keep
citizens dependent on their authority to solve problems. Not only do plans allow exploitation to
take place, but they also produce authority for those very people who are causing it, and are called
upon to solve the very problems they created. More importantly, plans are developed with
conspicuous holes in them—absences that can be exploited with the right political connections and
will.
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5.7 Conclusion: Risk, Hypocrisy, and the Birth of Spatial Agency
Utilizing cases of professionals in the construction and planning sectors, this chapter has shown
how authoritarian financialization generated a specific middle-class subjectivity. Overall, the
chapter has shown the values embedded in urban space during the socialist period. Solidarity and
consumption emerged as forces that co-opted urban development to bridge ethnic fractures into an
integrated political space. With the transition, the middle class and especially architects and
engineers lost much of their symbolic and economic power. This downward class trajectory
explains why middle-class professionals found their position vis-à-vis Skopje 2014 and the
VMRO's urban politics to be so ambiguous.
Middle-class professionals I spoke with felt deeply embarrassed by Skopje 2014 and its
aesthetics, which they associated with the emergent working class and want-to-be rentier class at
the core of the VMRO project. At the same time, middle-class professionals had been entangled
with VMRO urban development and their bureaucratic initiatives. Companies like Ideale most
likely benefited from preferential channels with the VMRO in the denationalization process, while
others like Construx indirectly benefited from the unexpected boom in construction that was
largely fueled by the VMRO. In addition, the government's economic intervention for buyers (and
sellers) under the program kupi kuka kupi stan, while not ideal for companies like Construx,
constituted important incentives to avoid openly taking contentious stances. While many
professionals had lost much during the 1990s, they had also survived thanks to the gray economy
or loopholes in the "wonderful decay" of institutions that regulated urban politics. Architects I
knew regularly "rented" their stamp for projects that existed only on paper so that individuals could
renovate their houses however they wanted. Others, instead, provided projects that lent a facade
of legality of developments that were completely illegal.
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With the rise to power of the VMRO, the involvement of the middle class and especially
of professionals in urban planning and architecture shifted its stakes. Plans and facades clearly
demarcated a new state power that did not eliminate "gray" and informal dealings but rather
redefined the boundaries of risk. The message was clear: those within the bureaucratic fiction of
planning who stood behind the new urban aesthetics were shielded from past and present legal
implications. Those who did not were exposed to the risks of dealing with the inefficiencies and
legal consequences of a rigged urban politics. Many middle class professionals, already shaken in
their professional identity, felt unable to stand up and oppose such an oppressive system in public.
Others felt that their professional worth could be restored by embracing the inherent injustices in
the VMRO's planning. Fear, and economic profits, often more promised than real, convinced a
large section of the middle class that it was not worth it to go against the VMRO. Urban politics
figured as a key part of making such a set of promises, fears, and hopes concrete.
As an important actor at the heart of Skopje's urban politics, Sanja struggled with the
individualization of power and rent-seeking behaviors that followed authoritarian financialization.
Convinced by the government's fierce commitment to urban renewal and by the correlated
mushrooming of private developments, individuals believed that their land, too, could become a
source of rent. Instead of considering the ownership of land as part of a responsibility to engage in
public contentious politics, Macedonians who had received or were fighting to receive plots of
land bought into the illusion of the VMRO's urban policy. The party was too strong to be fought,
and it could grant wealth to those wise enough to seek its patronage. Individuals forsook their
claims to solidarity and politics, favoring instead personal relations that operated beyond the
authoritative facade of institution and plans. I spoke with several landowners who had entered into

298

patronage relations and had still run into a mounting number of problems. Plans and institutions
were inefficient—and purposely so.
Ultimately, exchanging political freedom for patronage did not generate revenues for most
of the people with whom I spoke. On the contrary, landowners who enlisted the support of
politicians clashed with one other, as one's rents were directly correlated to another's loss of value.
Because of the scarcity of Macedonia's monetary supply, based on forced credit, real estate cannot
accommodate a large rentier class—citizens found themselves fighting against each other to
revalue their own pieces of land through gray planning practices. This dynamic had a clear
mathematic dimension. The price of apartments remained constant throughout my fieldwork
because of kompenzacija, which avoided the monetary devaluation of nominal prices; because of
the lack of inflation and a scarce monetary supply, apartments could not become more expensive
either, thus limiting the range of profitable investments for developers. That meant that having
multiple owners would kill a deal. Rather than working around this issue through agreements and
discussions, citizens divided by individualized political dependencies tried to secure a monopoly
of some sort over the contested land—granting it a specific function, shape, or size that would
bypass the necessity of solidarity. Sanja told me dozens of stories in which she received the owners
of contiguous pieces of land in the same day, each trying to enlarge their construction parcel at the
expense of other rightful owners.
Some architects, however, did not accept such a compromise and actively fought to create
spaces of collective action. Members of the faculty of architecture of Skopje were very vocal in
condemning the Skopje 2014 project, although they did not always engage in acts of public protests
or expose the bureaucratic shortfalls they took part in on a daily basis. Originally it was mostly a
small group of students who mounted the protest, with very little open support from the urban
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middle class, which instead resigned itself to cynical jokes and long tirades against the current
state of affairs. After a number of small protests, they were able to mobilize a large amount of
people against the baroquization of a socialist consumption space: the GTC. Strong popular
participation pushed the SDSM councilors of the center municipality of Skopje, which in 2015
held a non-VMRO majority for the first time since 2006, to vote for a referendum. Since early
2015, many activists organized an extremely effective fundraising and awareness campaign under
the slogan of "I love GTC" (go sakam GTC), recalling the central role of this space in shaping the
identity of Skopje as a progressive and modern city as well as the individual memories and
meanings that citizens associated with the socialist mall.
For activists and for many of my interlocutors among the urban educated elite, the GTC
embodied intimate aspects of their urban identity as a space of consumption that connected various
domains of social life: through the GTC, people found themselves deeply connected to the wider
social body. The VMRO government, on the other hand, saw in the commodification of these
spaces a central tenet of its governing strategy. Determined to crush any opposition and to bring
socialist open spaces under its control, the VMRO employed all sorts of means to sabotage
protesters and their mobilization efforts. Thugs were dispatched to intimidate activists; fake
architects spread false rumors about the referendum; and news about the referendum was banned
from most of the media. While the referendum ultimately failed, achieving five percent less than
the voting quorum, an astonishing 95% of those who voted were against the VMRO Neo-Baroque
renewal plan of the GTC. The shopping mall thus resulted in the most voted-upon political persona:
no politician had ever received as many votes in the center municipality.
There is a reason why the growing popular discontent became channeled into an old,
concrete, socialist mall rather than coalescing around politicians. The emergence of a post-human
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political subject signals the critical discontent of middle-class Skopjotes with authoritarian
financialization as applied by the VMRO, as well as with the privatization process that had been
supervised by the SDSM. Contrary to other postsocialist contexts such as Poland (Halawa 2014)
or China (Zhang 2010), the VMRO regime has not empowered the middle class. Rather, it has
banked, both symbolically and economically, on an aspiring rentier class drawn from the provinces
and often from a working-class background. The VMRO built its success upon the quiet
acquiescence and fear of Skopje's middle class, too disoriented from its downward trajectory and
fragmented by its attempts to save its own meager spatial benefits to be able to come together and
fight against its own oppression.
Such an outcome has been made possible by the specific form that urban politics took under
the VMRO's authoritarian financialization. Compared to the urban theatrics of other authoritarian
regimes, such as Ceausescu's Romania or Mussolini's Italy, no citizen of Skopje has been displaced
by new urban development. Skopje 2014 largely focused on redeveloping empty lots and, when it
touched residential buildings, it was only to change their facade. Such theatrics, however, did not
have the goal of creating a completely new urban public, a new "mass" directly connected to the
leader—as in Nazi Germany. It was quite explicitly based upon a project of antiquization that had
very tenuous grounds in the collective imaginary. Facades, rather than connecting the nation,
emphasized its disconnectedness and frail nature. I suggest that such facades and plans instead had
the objective of covering and hiding the political realm from that of the civil society—that is,
facades prevented citizens from accessing the spaces where political decisions were made and
financial flows managed.
From the perspective of the middle class, Skopje's urban theatrics do not project an attempt
to modernize the city, as was the case with twentieth-century authoritarian regimes, nor promise
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an attractive future in the way that contemporary financialization projects and aesthetics might
(Brash 2011). Rather, they exclude urban middle classes from accessing the benefits of
financialization, whose potential for investment is instead reserved to individuals and companies
connected to the VMRO. Those who find themselves on the right side of the facade (or the plan)
can then reapportion risks onto the shoulders of the rest of the population. In this sense, facades
and plans are the reified reality of authoritarian financialization as a thing, to paraphrase Caprotti
(2005). Material and impactful, facades disclose authoritarian financialization as the presence of
an absence, as the material and bureaucratic packaging that justifies oppression in the name of
future benefits that never come.
Ironically, while the Skopje 2014 facades promise future benefits (such as tourism and
financial investment), they recast the city towards a past of political control. The solidarity of
middle-class interlocutors towards the GTC, a thing rather than an image, signals the limitation of
such urban theatrics. In voting for the GTC, Skopjotes were, in my view, rejecting classical models
of liberal politics based on representation. Further, I see a willingness to delegate political
aspirations to a material object, one that cannot be pressured or confused, as middle-class
professionals are, into supporting the VMRO, or be twisted into an illusory promise that will
strangle the economic destiny of a city. Contrary to facades and plans, the GTC is outside of the
waltz of packaging and repackaging that determines urban financialization, in both its Wall Street
and its Eastern European incarnation. It is precisely its perceived solidity, borne out of socialist
solidarity and construction techniques, that make it the perfect champion for urban middle classes
subjugated by authoritarian financialization.
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6. Conclusion, or the Political Economy of Subjection
On May 17, 2015, over fifty thousand people marched in the streets of Skopje, demanding the
resignation of Gruevski. These protests started soon after I finished my research, in October of
2014, with a wide mobilization by students against higher education reform. The VMRO
government had passed a bill forcing students who finished at universities to take an additional
state examination to validate their diplomas. The official reason was the university system was
widely corrupt and the computer-based examination would insure the quality of the degrees.
Students, and soon after faculty members, argued that these new tests challenged professors'
competences and independence, declaring professors' work irrelevant and leaving the decisions
about who would get diplomas to a committee appointed by politicians. A close analysis conducted
by some colleagues and friends showed that the new law consolidated the control that VMRO
already had on the public university system. Yet the law also empowered businessmen close to the
government. They had already bought and organized the testing rooms, to be paid for very dearly
by the already meager funds of public universities.
Student protests turned into massive marches through the streets of Skopje, which then led
to the occupation of universities. As professors also mobilized (albeit in much smaller numbers),
a new scandal hit the media. On January 31, 2015, Zoran Zaev, leader of the SDSM opposition
party, was publicly accused by Gruevski of conspiring with foreign powers to overthrow the
government. His passport was seized and he and other officials from the Ministry of the Interior
were accused of spying against the country. Soon after, Zaev and the SDSM initiated the campaign
"Truth for Macedonia." In a series of public events, they released recordings of phone
conversations between high-ranking officials of the VMRO, including Gruevski. Their very
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recognizable voices openly discuss the bribes they had taken from Chinese construction companies
to build the new highway; the pressure applied to change planning in the city center; the demolition
of a building financed by a businessman who did not support the VMRO; the various tactics
employed to intimidate (and later arrest) a famous local politician who had broken ties with the
VMRO; multiple examples of pressure over the judiciary; the use of thugs from the security
services for the private intimidation of non-friendly businessmen; the cover up of the murder of a
teenage supporter of the VMRO, beaten to death by one of Prime Minister Gruevski's bodyguards
while celebrating his re-election; and finally a conversation of Gruevski with his fortune teller,
who had an apparently prominent role in shaping his political decisions, including in urban matters.
It is unclear who released these tapes to the SDSM. The VMRO suggested it was the work
of foreign intelligence, while the SDSM suggested it was patriots from within the Macedonian
intelligence community. While these "bombs," as they were called, were made available through
YouTube and circulated widely on Facebook, television stations and newspapers completely
ignored them. It took several months for the wider population to realize what was happening. When
the conversation about the death of the young teenager was released, thousands of angry citizens
spontaneously took to the streets and rushed towards the government building, an older socialist
jewel that had just recently been covered by a completely white Neo-Baroque facade. Protesters,
led by the mother and family of the murdered boy, broke through the police lines—even forcing
one policeman to leave his post in frustration. Soon, the crowed started throwing eggs onto the
facade, which they saw as a symbol of the hypocrisy of the VMRO government and a
concretization of their own subjection.
This spontaneous protest was a turning point. Many citizens who were not active until then
suddenly became eager to voice their frustration. My young urbanite friends and interlocutors in
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Skopje spoke about a new energy in town which had superseded the climate of fear that burdened
them. The opposition called for a gigantic march on May 17th and started organizing with other
advocacy groups and activists from civil society; members of the international community began
speaking out in favor of free speech. It seemed that the VMRO's days were over.
Some days after, on May 9th, the protests came to a sudden halt after news of a gun battle
between ethnic Albanians and police forces in the town of Kumanovo that left five members of
the special forces and fourteen so-called terrorists killed and an entire neighborhood in ruins.
Suddenly, what had been covered only sporadically in international media made the front page of
the New York Times and many other global newspapers. While the rise to power or protests against
an authoritarian regime were not relevant for global news agencies, ethnic conflict in the Balkans
certainly was.
Confused by the chaotic information, protesters suspended the demonstrations, while a few
met for collective and public discussions. In the following days, many different theories were
brought forward, but most of my interlocutors suggested that the "terrorist" group has appeared at
a suspiciously convenient moment to stop the protest's momentum. In the following days, Gruevski
met with the ambassadors of Italy, Germany, France, the US, and the UK, who, in a joint
conference, extended their condolences to the fallen soldiers, but also reminded Gruevski that the
Macedonian political crisis was not about ethnicity. In fact, the pressure from the international
community augmented steadily after the incident, leading to the resignation of two major players
in the Gruevski government, Saso Mijalkov, head of the secret security services, and Jordana
Jankulova, Minister of the Interior.
Despite being internationally isolated, Gruevski managed to remain in power; spontaneous
protests slowed down and picked up again only once the opposition party, the SDSM, conjured
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once again all its forces together on May 17th. Eventually, Gruevski and the leader of the
opposition, Zaev, together with the mediation from the EU, brokered an agreement for an interim
government, temporarily controlled by Gruevski, that would manage the country until early
elections, scheduled for April 2016. Yet as the date of the elections approached, it appeared
obvious that very little had been done to ensure fair and democratic voting. Voter lists, for instance,
still displayed absurd situations where up to sixty voters were registered as residents in apartments
of fifty square meters.
Eventually, the election was postponed until June 2016, and then to the fall. In the
meantime, the crimes revealed by the recordings remain unaccounted for. A special team of
prosecutors screened the materials and proceeded to request the arrest of various members of the
former government, whose identity the team preferred not to disclose to the media for fear of
retaliation. At the press conference, local journalists immediately asked the prosecutors vicious
questions, doubting their legitimacy and motives for doing their job. Soon after, the tribunal in
Skopje turned down the request to proceed and arrest the suspects. In this climate, one of the top
EU negotiators left Skopje, declaring that there was no hope to achieve regime change through fair
elections, as the current climate of fear and intimidation did not allow for democratic voting. Many
members of civil society who had been crucial in organizing the spontaneous protests were left out
of the deal-brokering process; meanwhile, many common citizens, disillusioned by Gruevski's
resilience, concluded that he and his party would win again.

6.1: The Deep Roots of Subjection
The resilience of Gruevski's regime, even in the aftermath of such an international crisis, is as
admirable as it is dramatic. I believe that my dissertation has provided the materials to understand
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why Gruevki's authoritarian power is so pervasive. Macedonia's authoritarianism is not based
solely upon electoral events (and fraud) or elite cooptation (Ganev 2007). It is not simply a case
of "mafia" infiltration of the state apparatus (Strazzari 2007). It is not only based upon a widespread
fear of violence. Instead, the VMRO regime is based upon a process of authoritarian subjection
that emerges from the condition of illiquidity generated by the financialization of the country. It is
the rooting of illiquidity into people's personhood that grants Gruevski, even after having resigned
in January 2016, significant power, based in the deep reaches of his political economy. In what
follows, I will summarize the implications of my analysis of authoritarian financialization for
various theoretical debates.
Debate 1: The EU is either a colonial structure or a harbinger of democracy. During the
2007-2012 crisis, the hegemonic presentation of the EU as a champion of democracy and dialogue
has been disputed both in the public sphere and in scholarly circles. At present, two strands of
theory describe the EU in antithetical terms. On the one hand, authors who focus on newly
peripheralized parts of Europe such as the PIIGS or Eastern Europe suggest that the EU is driving
these regions down. This argument is made on multiple levels and echoes former dependency
theories (Amin 1979). Böröcz (2014) suggests that the very idea of an eastern enlargement denotes
the racialized hierarchies that drive it. Horvat and Sticks (2015) make the case that the EU forces
countries with lower economic capacity to sustain overvalued currencies, which results in lower
export capacity and excessive debt. Authors such as Stockhammer (2011) suggest that wage
suppression in Germany and other places in Europe has not only severely impaired local working
classes, but also generated the kind of floating financial capital that has promoted economic
bubbles and financial speculation in the region.
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Opposite to this perspective are those theorists who envision the EU as a guarantor of
peace, prosperity and solidarity. Backed by a solid official discourse that originates in Brussels
and echoes through the words of the likes of Schauble, scholars such as Schimmelfenning and
Schiltz (2008) suggest that, while not perfect, the EU project remains a benchmark for democracy
and development. The fact that more and more people do not seem to want the kind of Europe that
is proposed from Brussels, so-called "enlargement fatigue," is then blamed on creeping
nationalisms or populisms of member states (O'Brennan 2014). Similarly, the failure of peripheral
areas to reach targets of development and homogenization is analyzed in terms of a national
propensity for corruption and clientelism (Börzel 2011). Even the Greek crisis is recast in terms of
the persistence of local problems (i.e., corruption) that are transmitted on to other members of the
union (Bechev 2012). In such narratives, European countries are underdeveloped not because of
their Europeanization, but because they did not Europeanize enough.
My data show a complex reality. Macedonian elite capitalize on their capacity to attract
EU funding to fuel political patronage and outright bribery. Yet they are not alone in promoting
such "un-European" behaviors. Italian EUrocrats and entrepreneurs I conducted research with did
exactly the same thing. They did not act alone but under direct supervision from Rome: in one
case, the seat of the Ministry, and in the other, the company's headquarters. This helps explain why
Macedonia's regime, today so harshly condemned by European ambassadors and mediators, has
been developing for a decade without much reaction from EU institutions. Authoritarian elites and
EUrocrats share very similar behaviors and understand the EU as a source of funding, a rent
mechanism that can be utilized for different political projects.
EUrocrats, just like Southern and Eastern European elites, use the EU as a tool to generate
revenues. Yet those at the margins of the EU are stigmatized and the rent they extract is considered
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to be unproductive or a symptom of moral decay. This dissertation shows that rent, however, can
be very productive in the case of authoritarian financialization. Macedonia and other authoritarian
regimes have built an entire political system upon a social class's aspiration to extract rent. In
addition, these regimes navigated the 2007-2012 crisis far better than many other financialized
democracies. Macedonia, Russia, Poland, and Hungary were shielded from international
speculation by their regimes. Investors have found it easier to speculate in countries like Ireland
compared to Macedonia; banks have been able to foreclose homes more easily in the US compared
to Hungary. While this decoupling of authoritarian societies from global finance was, and
ultimately is, a liability for most citizens, in the circumstances of the global financial crisis, it
proved to be a positive factor.
Debate 2: Financialization: performative, abstract, or political? An exciting field of
research in anthropology and sociology, the study of finance has greatly enlarged our
understanding of Wall Street. The spectrum of contributions is too wide to be exhaustively
summarized here, but one can broadly say that by examining labor practices (Ho 2009), forms of
temporality and subjectivity (Miyazaki 2006, Zaloom 2004) or gender relations (Fisher 2012) we
have a very solid insight into the cultural formations that drive finance. This matters, because as
Poon (2009) and others (Leyshon and Thrift 1999, Callon, Millo and Muniesa 2007) have shown,
financial markets perform their own existence by evoking into being new forms of calculation or
modes of thinking.
Graeber (2012) has pointed out, however, that such a world of financial abstractions
revolves around a central mechanism: debt. Financial debt today is, in Graeber's theorization, an
elusive object. One the one hand, debt articulates moral claims. One has to pay one's debts. On the
other, debt derives from a legacy of violence that has seen European armies colonize other societies
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and continue their colonization by means of debt. There is much to learn from Graeber's incredibly
erudite and brazen discussion of 5,000 years of human history, and his book has made an important
contribution by introducing discussions of violence and domination within the anthropology of
finance. Yet one wonders: are human economies and debt economies that different? My data show
that political domination and violence do not need to reside in either of these two models of
financing. On the contrary, as I demonstrated in Chapter 2, it can be generated by the
interpenetration of financial and in-kind credit.
I am not sure if this goes against or confirms Graeber's theories: his work is so eclectic that
I have a hard time pinpointing whether he draws the aforementioned difference for the sake of
clarity, or whether it is crucial to his theorization. Be that as it may, I believe that my dissertation
directs a productive line of inquiry towards the intersection of different kinds of payments, and the
processes that allow (or not) the generation of credit by connecting disparate objects and people.
Seen from this perspective, the VMRO's capacity to draw from international credits is
complemented by its ability to bank upon kompenzacija—a set of in kind-exchanges that devalue
objects with increasing political distance from the center of the state. In this way, money acquired
through international credit is monopolized and rationed, while at the same time companies and
individuals have a significant incentive in joining the ranks of the VMRO so as to avoid being paid
with depreciating goods.
Debate 3: What does financialization do to human agency? Is financial precariousness
any different from other historical experiences of flexibility? There is no doubt that
financialization spreads flexibility and risks. Karen Ho (2009) has shown that, in the very New
York financial firms that influence financial markets, flexibility is perceived as a risky game
balanced by high rewards. High salaries and bonuses normalize risk, job insecurity, and overwork
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for white-collar financial professionals. But what about other professions that are also touched by
finance, but not by their bonuses? Harvey (1989b) and Bauman (2000) suggest that other strata of
the population experience financialization as an increase in the speed of everyday life and work.
This, in turn, translates into shorter permanence of capital in fixed locations—that is, into the
increased possibility of being asked to be flexible with one's residency or simply to change jobs
because of offshoring.
Such debates do not seem to capture the starting point of a society that has lived through a
postsocialist transition. In fact, most of the above is everyday experience for citizens of Skopje.
Work was uncertain during socialism, during the transition, and today. So how do people cope
with such a rooted experience of precariousness? In Chapter 3, I explain that uncertainty in
Macedonia can constitute a space of action, whereby increasingly impossible economic conditions
can be negotiated. Among other data, I present the example of an inspector, and I show how the
rhetorical timing employed by her and the site's supervisor shows a complex play of recognition.
Ultimately, I suggest, if one looks at the process of producing uncertainty one realizes that it
constitutes an aspiration to agency, an invitation to "weave time" with others. Often, that is only
an illusion, but it allows individuals to regain some of the agency they had lost as a consequence
of financialization.
Debate 4: What is the gender of finance? In the literature, there is a large consensus that
financial hierarchies rest upon male domination. Ho (2009) shows that women, especially of color,
have to constantly demonstrate their professional expertise. If female investment bankers sit too
close to the tray during a Wall Street meeting, they might be asked to bring it around and serve the
men at the table. If they dress in too feminine a fashion, they will be confused with secretaries. If
they do not dress sexily enough, they will be teased for looking like grandmothers. In addition,
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women are one of the few categories for whom working too hard is a disadvantage. By showing
too much compliance with the hierarchy, women are understood by (male) senior partners as
naturally predisposed to conduct tedious tasks that will never grant them career promotions.
But what about the impact of finance on manhood? There is surprisingly little scrutiny over
the ways in which becoming a man in financialized settings is in and of itself a form of violence,
although sugar-coated by high salaries and the possibility of exploiting women. Those scholars
(Kim 2015, Ness 2012) who have studied the transformation of manhood in different workplaces,
and especially on construction sites, have stressed the aggressiveness and misogyny that permeated
construction in the age of finance. I relate to that, insofar as I was often made uncomfortable by
workers who teased me and challenged my sexuality and rhetorical skills. Yet workers at Construx
were also very respectful of women and were particularly docile with the management. In Chapter
4, I demonstrate that such an ambivalent behavior stems from the challenges that financialization
posed to workers. Not being paid for a long time, workers were structurally prevented from
fulfilling patriarchal and heteronormative models and found themselves unable to trust each other
or the management.
Yet identifying as successful men was important for them, not only because the VMRO
rhetoric diffused aggressive masculinity as the new hegemonic norm, but also because Albanian
men were not affected by illiquidity in the same way as ethnic Macedonians. Albanians, in fact,
had access to remittances and were not as dependent upon government money. This put Albanian
men on an upward trajectory, which also included success in sexual conquests. By discussing the
various challenges faced by Macedonian men in being real men, Chapter 4 shows the emergence
of the VMRO as an existential anchor for fragmented and individualized workers.
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Debate 5: What is the political impact of financialization on the urban classes? Public
spaces are crucial to our understanding of politics (Arendt 1959) and to the very possibility of
organizing together and producing social changes (Low 2004). Yet in global cities such as New
York City, London, or Mumbai (Whitehead 2008, Brash 2011), the financialization of space has
dramatically shrunk public spaces and replaced them with new private buildings destined to
maximize developers' profit. Such a trend has been observed since early studies of gentrification
(Susser 1982) where the expansion of financial speculation co-opted desires of belonging to the
middle class and resulted in the displacement of working class and low income families from
coveted urban zones. Yet what are the political consequences of urban financialization in cases
like Macedonia, where investments do not necessarily displace a large section of the population
and consist of public spaces, such as the Skopje 2014 project?
Current studies of China (Zhang 2011) and of those European countries hit hard by the
economic crisis since 2007 (Halawa 2014, Palomera 2014) show that the political implications of
urban financialization go beyond the use of space. They often revolve around middle-class hopes
and aspirations, crucial components in fueling speculative investments (Smart and Lee 2003). In
the case of China, Borenstein's (forthcoming) ethnographic feature explores the connection among
rent, urban form, and middle-class dreams. In cities like Chongqing or Chengdu, middle-class
buyers are conned by astute Chinese developers into buying properties that resemble famous
European landmarks, such as German castles, through the performances of foreigners who
generally pose as professional athletes or singers. Providing technical and ethnographic assistance
to Borenstein during his filming, I became a famous rafting champion from the Congo for a day
and was paid 75 USD. Yet such a scenario whereby urban imaginaries fuel speculation seems to
fit societies where cash is abundant. The Macedonian middle class, however, has lost, rather than
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gained, professional and economic relevance after socialism, and is not on the same path of
economic growth like in China, Spain, or Hungary before the crisis.
Stuck in this position, citizens in the middle class have been extremely ambivalent towards
the VMRO. While many hated the VMRO's urban aesthetics and plans, they also longed to
transform the aesthetics and planned reality of Skopje. For a while, my middle-class interlocutors
felt squeezed between having too little economic security, and yet enough to lose, in order to
openly criticize the party. What convinced many of them to take to the streets in 2014 and 2015
was not the heightening of the crisis, as some scholars (Gonick 2015) observed in Spain during
the 2007-2012 crisis. My data show that in a postsocialist and peripheral country like Macedonia,
where the crisis has been protracted in different forms for twenty years (Belojevikj and Mattioli
forthcoming), middle-class citizens came together in an urban space, the GTC. The GTC was a
socialist space of consumption, one that had been built to embody the solidarity of the socialist
urban fabric. Yet in 2014 and 2015, it became more than a symbol of socialism: it emerged as the
most voted-on political actor in the history of the country. I believe this is significant for
understanding middle-class positions. Individually, members of the middle class felt unable to
stand up to the VMRO. Yet they identified with the stability and resilience of the GTC commercial
center, which came to embody their quest for autonomy. The GTC, as a public space, could not be
intimidated or subjected to illiquidity—that made it the perfect political actor to stand up against
the VMRO regime.

6.2 Beyond Macedonia, or Beyond Financialization?
Much more needs to be done to fully develop a critical but deeply hermeneutic understanding of
financialization in cities, especially given the wide layers of meanings and processes in which
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financialization can manifest itself. Within the temporal and methodological limitation of a oneyear-long ethnographic study corroborated by longitudinal observations and quantitative economic
data, this dissertation argues that financialization can find surprising allies in authoritarian regimes
and produce unexpected political landscapes as well as authoritarian subjects.
I want to stress here two interconnected conclusions that I think move forward
contemporary understanding of financialization. The first one is banal: the financialization of
Skopje is significantly different from that of New York or other global cities. This is not just a
question of Neo-Baroque aesthetics against glass skyscrapers. In a capital-poor country like
Macedonia, without natural resources or even extensive industry or productive sectors to attract
offshoring, financialization needs to be actively groomed and captured. The Gruevski regime was
very aggressive in branding Macedonia and positioning the country as a prime destination for
investments, but with a specific agenda in mind. The VMRO was interested in more than simply
opening the Macedonian market to international investors; rather, it wanted to utilize the market
to generate political support and state power. That peculiar way of understanding financialization
ultimately led to the opposition of European financial elites, who were capable of coexisting with
a dictator, but not on his own terms. But what else could Macedonia have done? What other
economic forms were available to the country? Without the political connections to the EU of
Luxembourg or Switzerland, the size and labor force of Romania or Poland, or the direct links to
the Silicon Valley of Taiwan, how could Macedonia have developed differently?
Gruevski engaged in, and encouraged the expansion of, forms of rent extraction whereby
people and businessmen close to him were able to extract wealth from the rest of society. In fact,
Gruevski implicitly utilized socialist-era instruments, such as social benefits and massive
employment in stable public-sector jobs, to fuel the illusion that every citizen could become part
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of a rentier class. Yet the lived reality of such a rentier class was not particularly comfortable. The
scarcity of money, partly generated by Gruevski's monopoly over financial and domestic credit,
pitted workers across business sectors against each other. At the same time, such a system of rent
was definitely not unproductive, as some theorists have it. Not only did it push individuals and
companies to join the VMRO party, but it also expanded the effect of international credit through
in-kind exchanges or other forms of informal credit. Ultimately, I suggest that this might have been
one of the reasons why Macedonia, a country without surpluses in the trade balance or national
account, was able to navigate the 2007-2012 crisis better than other, more powerful and successful
nations in the region. Given the overall peripheral condition of Macedonia, rent seems to have far
more productive social functions than classic economists would concede.
This is not an endorsement of the Gruevski regime. I have seen my interlocutors alternate
between desperation, resignation, and engagement in a game in which they had no aces. It is also
not an attempt to blame Macedonia's failure on the EU or evil international forces, a conspiracy
theory common among many leftists. Instead, I believe that my exposition of people's dilemmas
with regard to a tightening financial landscape and their increasing reliance on models of
personhood that emanate from a party makes the case for bringing back the political aspect of
financial technologies and urban infrastructures. This means going beyond the prevailing
understanding of finance as a technological and cultural product of Wall Street that proliferates
through networks of human and non-human actors. In their current articulation, such theories have
offered very little that can help us not only to understand but also to engage politically with the
lived reality of oppression experienced in Macedonia and in many other small societies affected
by financialization. Urban and financial anthropologists specifically cannot limit themselves to
describing different ontologies or modes of being, as some proponents of the existential turn

316

suggest (Strathern 1988, De Castro 2015); cities around the world are being transformed at an
incredible pace by financial processes and so are our ways of being together. Unless we want to
redefine our discipline to a catalogue of diversity, even financial anthropology has to analyze the
minutiae of power and inequality in a nuanced and practical way. This might require a theoretical
shift from a paradigm based on finance and financialization to a framework that focuses on
financing, embracing the intersection of different ways to generate, procure, and apportion wealth
in societies across the globe.

6.3 After the Posts: What Comes after the Financialization of Postsocialist Societies?
Can the authoritarian subjection and regime that I describe be qualified as postsocialist? This
question requires two kinds of answers. First, how significant are Macedonia's results in
comparison with other countries in the region? Is Macedonia a unique case, or does it reflect some
of the broader trends experienced by other authoritarian states? Second, are there any theoretical
aspects that distinguish the authoritarian regimes that emerge through financialization from
postsocialist and socialist societies?
Let me start by addressing the last question. Gruevski's regime had a certain appeal because
it evoked some of the characteristics of socialism in the eyes of my interlocutors. In fact, some of
the working rhythms observed on the workplace resembled and were dealt with in ways not
completely different from those recorded by anthropologists working in socialist societies. Just
like socialism, the VMRO regime provided people with a framework of meaning through which
they could navigate chaotic times. This existential space was also rooted into a political economy
that exchanged forms of redistribution for political support.
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Instead of representing social fragmentation and political "feudalisms" (Verdery 1996,
Humphrey 2000), the VMRO political economy controls the capacity to realize financial value.
This suggests that postsocialism as a paradigm that describes a social condition of chaos and
fragmentation might have become insufficient for capturing the vertical forms of power that
articulate societies of Eastern Europe. This epochal shift, what my interlocutors have described as
a second transition and what I have suggested corresponds to the unequal and peripheral insertion
of Macedonia into global finance, is a shift of value, in both an economic and a moral sense. It
occurs, however, beyond Macedonia, and beyond Eastern Europe. Workers and middle classes in
Europe, Asia, Latin America, and North America have had a hard time realizing the value of their
work, which is increasingly siphoned towards financial elites.
Yet while Gruevski's regime was interested in controlling citizens through the market, it
was not quite as interested in working out forms of existential and economic security that would
go beyond propaganda and would be sustainable on an everyday basis. Just like any other
financialized institution, the VMRO centralized wealth and passed down risks. This left those
groups of the population that did not have political protection vulnerable, as neither socialist nor
transitional sensibilities, moralities, or strategies fit very well with the current authoritarian
financialization. Patriarchal heteronormativity and solidarity in the workplace are seriously
impaired by the lack of money. In a financialized economy, in fact, getting the job done is not
enough. In addition, the informal networks that used to circumvent legality during the transition
are not horizontal anymore. Under financialized conditions, one needs money and profit, and
today, that means navigating an increasingly powerful and structured state system.
I do not know if this a strong enough case to claim that Macedonia is not postsocialist, or
that the overall paradigm is obsolete. What I believe is that by considering the political
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consequences of financialization, my dissertation creates an intellectual space to draw comparisons
beyond the postsocialist region. It is certainly not a coincidence that so many citizens in Europe
and the United States are dissatisfied with traditional elites, especially in relation to how they
handled financialization processes. After all, if the US is seeing a self-proclaimed socialist and a
real estate speculator as serious contenders for the presidential nomination, the Macedonian case
not only makes sense but also becomes a good example for making sense of global politics. Only
by understanding financialization as a complex interaction between financial markets and various
kinds of social relations can we begin to grasp the impact of financialization on people's lives.

319

REFERENCES
Aalbers, Manuel. 2008. "The Financialization of Home and the Mortgage Market Crisis."
Competition and Change 12: 148–166.
Abram, Marco. 2015. "Building the Capital City of the Peoples of Yugoslavia: Representations of
Socialist Yugoslavism in Belgrade's Public Space 1944-1961." Croatian Political Science
Review 51: 36–57.
Agapiou, Andrew. 2002. "Perceptions of Gender Roles and Attitudes toward Work among Male
and Female Operatives in the Scottish Construction Industry." Construction Management
and Economics 20: 697–705.
Agier, Michel. 2002. "Between War and City: Towards an Urban Anthropology of Refugee
Camps." Ethnography 3: 317–341.
Aglietta, Michael. 2000. "Shareholder Value and Corporate Governance: Some Tricky Questions."
Economy and Society 29:146–159.
Agnew, John. 2001. "How Many Europes? The European Union, Eastward Enlargement and
Uneven Development." European Urban and Regional Studies 8: 29–38.
Alic, Dijana, and Maryam Gusheh. 1999. "Reconciling National Narratives in Socialist Bosnia and
Herzegovina: The Bashcharshija Project, 1948-1953." Journal of the Society of
Architectural Historians 58: 6–25.
Allison, Anne. 2013. Precarious Japan. Durham: Duke University Press Books.
Aman, Robert. 2012. "The EU and the Recycling of Colonialism: Formation of Europeans through
Intercultural Dialogue." Educational Philosophy and Theory 44: 10–23.
Amin, Samir. 1976. Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral
Capitalism. New York: Monthly Review Press.
Arendt, Hannah. 1958. The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago.
Arrighi, Giovanni. 1994. The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of our
Times. London: Verso.
----. 2002. "Lineages of Empire." Historical Materialism 10:3–16.
Arvith, Karthick. 2015. "Greek Debt Crisis: Germany's Wolfgang Schäuble Says Greece May Be
Better off Leaving Euro." International Business Times. Accessed April 1st, 2016.
320

http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/greek-debt-crisis-germanys-wolfgang-schauble-says-greecemay-be-better-off-leaving-euro-1511248.
Asad, Talal. 2003. Formations of the Secular. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Atkinson, David, and Denis Cosgrove. 1998. "Urban Rhetoric and Embodied Identities: City,
Nation, and Empire at the Vittorio Emanuele II Monument in Rome, 1870–1945." Annals
of the Association of American Geographers 88: 28–49.
Atkinson, David. 1998. "Totalitarism and the Street in Fascist Rome." In Images of the Street:
Planning, Identity, and Control in Public Space, edited by Nicholas Fyfle, 13-30. New
York: Routledge.
Augé, Marc. 1992. Non-lieux: introduction a une antropologie de la surmodernite. Paris: Seuil.
Bakalchev, Minas, Violeta Bakalchev, and Saša Tasić. 2015. "Forgetting the City: Tactics of
Transformation of the City in Motion." Open Urban Studies and Demography Journal
1:72-83.
Barker, Alex. 2016. "Tusk Fears 'Populist' Wave of EU Referendums." The Financial Times,
February 10. Accessed April 1st, 2016. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/67f2bd1c-d03711e5-986a62c79fcbcead.html#axzz44ictqpLh.
Barrell, Ray, Philip Davis, Tatiana Fic, and Ali Orazgani. 2009. "Household Debt and Foreign
Currency Borrowing in New Member States of the EU." Working Paper 09/23. Accessed
April 1st 2016. https://www.brunel.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0015/82113/0923.pdf.
Barth, Fredrik. 1969. Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture
Difference. Long Grove: Waveland Press.
Bartlett, Frederik. 1997. "The Transformation and Demise of Self-Managed Firms in Croatia,
Macedonia FRY and Slovenia." In Restructuring Eastern Europe: The Microeconomics of
the Transition Process, edited by Soumitra Sharma, 139-158. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Baumann, Zygmund. 2000. Liquid Modernity. Cambridge: Polity.
BBC. 2014. "Romania and Bulgaria: EU Migration Restrictions Lifted." Accessed April 1st, 2016.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25565302.
Bechev, Dimitar. 2012. "The Periphery of the Periphery: The Western Balkans and the Euro
Crisis." ECFR Policy Brief, European Council on Foreign Relations.
Bellamy Foster, John. 2008. "The Financialization of Capital and the Crisis." Monthly Review,
April 1. Accessed April 1st, 2016. http://monthlyreview.org/2008/04/01/thefinancialization-of-capital-and-the-crisis/.

321

Belojevikj, Bela, and Fabio Mattioli. Forthcoming. "Etnografia di una crisi normale: crisiscape,
vrski e riflessione antropologica a Skopje, Macedonia." In Ne vicino ne lontano: etnografie
italiane del Sud-Est Europa, edited by Antonio Pusceddu and Tiziana Lanfranco. Firenze:
SEID.
Benjamin, Walter. 1969. Illuminations: Essays and Reflections. New York: Schocken Books.
Berdahl, Daphne. 2010. On the Social Life of Postsocialism: Memory, Consumption, Germany
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Bertsch, Gary. 1977. "Ethnicity and Politics in Socialist Yugoslavia." The Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science 433: 88–99.
BIRN. 2015. "Da ne se rodeshe 'Skopje2014,'ke se prerodeshe cela economija Да не се родеше
'Скопје 2014,' ќе се преродеше цела економија (If Skopje 2014 Had Not Been Born, the
Whole Economy Would Have Been Reborn)." Prizma. Accessed April 1st, 2016.
http://prizma.birn.eu.com/мк/стории/да-не-се-родеше-скопје-2014-ќе-се-преродешецела-економија.
Bjorklund Larsen, Lotta. 2013. "Buy or barter? Illegal yet Licit Purchases of Work in
Contemporary Sweden." Focaal: European Journal of Anthropology 66:75-87.
Bletzer, Keith. 2004. "Open Towns and Manipulated Indebtedness among Agricultural Workers
in the New South." American Ethnologist 31: 530–551.
Blim, Michael. 1990. Made in Italy: Small-Scale Industrialization and Its Consequences. New
York: Praeger.
Bobick, Michael, and Elizabeth Dunn. 2014. "The Empire Strikes Back: War without War and
Occupation without Occupation in the Russian Sphere of Influence." American Ethnologist
41: 405–413.
Bofiger, Peter. 2015. "German Wage Moderation and the Eurozone Crisis." Social Europe,
December 1st. Accessed April 1st, 2016. https://www.socialeurope.eu/2015/12/germanwage-moderation-and-the-eurozone-crisis.
Bohannan, Paul, and Laura Bohannan. 1968. Tiv Economy. Chicago: Northwestern University
Press.
Bohannan, Paul. 1959. "The Impact of Money on an African Subsistence Economy." The Journal
of Economic History 19:491-503.
Bonfiglioli, Chiara. 2014. "Gender, Labour and Precarity in the South East European Periphery."
Contemporary Southeastern Europe 1: 7-23.

322

Boone, Catherine. 1990. "The Making of the Rentier Class: Wealth Accumulation and Political
Control in Senegal." Journal of Development Studies 26: 425-457.
Borenstein, David. forthcoming. "Chinese Dreamland." House of Real. Accessed June 5th, 2016.
www.chinesedreamland.com.
Borenstein, Eliot. 2008. Overkill: Sex and Violence in Contemporary Russian Popular Culture.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Borioni, Paolo. 2013. "Italy: From Recession to a New Socio-Economic Identity." Accessed
August 26 2015. http://www.socialeurope.eu/2012/12/italy-from-recession-to-a-newsocio-economic-identity.
Borocz, Jozsef, and Mahua Sarkar. 2005. "What Is the EU?" International Sociology 20: 153–173.
Borocz, Jozsef. 2001. "Introduction: Empire and Coloniality in the 'Eastern Enlargement' of the
European Union." In Empire's New Clothes: Unveiling European Enlargement, edited by
Jozsef Borocz and Melinda Kovacs, 1-51. Holly Cottage: Central European Review.
---. 2014. "Regimes of Remittance Dependency: Global Structures and Trajectories of the Former
Soviet 'Bloc'."Demografia 57:5-37.
Borzel, Tanja. "When Europeanisation Hits Limited Statehood: The Western Balkans as a Testcase
for the Transformative Power of Europe." KFG Working Paper. Accessed April 1st, 2011.
http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/kfgeu/kfgwp/wpseries/WorkingPaperKFG _30.pdf.
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1977. Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
---.2002. The Bachelors' Ball: The Crisis of Peasant Society in Bearn. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Boyer, Robert. 2000. "Is a Finance-Led Growth Regime a Viable Alternative to Fordism? A
Preliminary Analysis." Economy and Society 29: 111–45.
Brainerd, Elizabeth. 2000. "Women in Transition: Changes in Gender Wage Differentials in
Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union." Industrial & Labor Relations Review 54:
138–62.
Brandes, Stanley. 1980. Metaphors of Masculinity: Sex and Status in Andalusian Folklore.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Brash, Julian. 2011. Bloomberg's New York: Class and Governance in the Luxury City. Athens:
University of Georgia Press.
Braun, Lesley Nicole. 2016. "'Débrouillez-Vous': Women's Work, Transactional Sex, and the
Politics of Social Networks." Ethnos (March, 02). doi:10.1080/00141844.2015.1134611
323

Bringa, Tone. 1995. Being Muslim the Bosnian Way. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Brkovic, Crna. 2015. "Brokering the Grey Zones: Pursuits of Favors in a Bosnian Town." In
Ethnographies of Grey Zones in Eastern Europe, edited by Ida Harboe Knudsen and Martin
Demant Frederiksen, 70-97. London: Anthem Press.
Brown, Keith. 2003. The Past in Question: Modern Macedonia and the Uncertainties of Nation.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Brubaker, Rogers. 2006. Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Brumfiel, Elizabeth. 1997. "Tribute Cloth Production and Compliance in Aztec and Colonial
Mexico." Museum anthropology 21:55-71.
Brunnbauer, Ulf. 2004. "Fertility, Families and Ethnic Conflict: Macedonians and Albanians in
the Republic of Macedonia, 1944–2002." Nationalities Papers 32:565-598.
---. 2005. "Ancient Nationhood and the Struggle for Statehood. Historiographic Myths in the
Republic of Macedonia." In Myths and Boundaries in South-Eastern Europe, edited by Pal
Kolsto, 262-296. London: Hurst & Company.
Bryan, Dick, and Michael Rafferty. 2006. Capitalism with Derivatives: A Political Economy of
Financial Derivatives, Capital, and Class. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Bryer, Rob. 2016. "Socialism, Accounting, and the Creation of 'Consensus Capitalism' in America,
Circa.1935–1955." Critical Perspectives on Accounting 34:1-35.
Buckley, Michelle. 2013. "Locating Neoliberalism in Dubai: Migrant Workers and Class Struggle
in the Autocratic City." Antipode 45: 256–274.
Burawoy, Michael, Pavel Krotov, and Tatyana Lytkina. 2000. "Involution and Destitution in
Capitalist Russia." Ethnography 1:43-65.
Burawoy, Michael, and Katherine Verdery, eds. 1999. Uncertain Transitions: Ethnographies of
Change in the Postsocialist World. New York: Rowan and Littlefield.
Burawoy, Michael. 1992. The Radiant Past. Ideology and Reality in Hungary's Road to
Capitalism. Chicago: University of Chicago.
Bureychak, Tetyana. 2012. "Masculinity in Soviet and Post-Soviet Ukraine: Models and Their
Implications." In Gender, Politics, and Society in Ukraine, edited by Olena Hankivksy and
Anastasiya Salnykova, 325-361. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

324

Burgio, Alberto, ed. 1999. Nel nome della razza. Il razzismo nella storia d'Italia 1870-1945.
Bologna: Il Mulino.
Butler, Judith. 2006. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New York:
Routledge.
Buyandelgeriyn, Manduhai. 2007. "Dealing with Uncertainty: Shamans, Marginal Capitalism, and
the Remaking of History in Postsocialist Mongolia." American Ethnologist 34: 127–147.
Caffentzis, George. 1989. Clipped Coins, Abused Words, Civil Government: John Locke's
Philosophy of Money. Brooklyn: Autonomedia.
Calıskan, Koray, and Michel Callon. 2009. "Economization, Part 1: Shifting Attention from the
Economy Towards Processes of Economization." Economy and Society 38: 369–398.
Callon, Michel, Yuval Millo, and Fabian Muniesa, eds. 2007. Market Devices. London: WileyBlackwell.
Campbell, Duncan, and Ian Traynor. 2006. Fashion Tycoon and Tennis Partner Charged with
Keeping New Tories Afloat. The Guardian. Accessed April 1st, 2016. http://www.
theguardian.com/politics/2006/apr/01/uk.conservatives.
Caprotti, Federico. 2005. "Italian Fascism Between Ideology and Spectacle." Fast Capitalism 1.2.
Accessed April 1st, 2016. https://www.uta.edu/huma/agger/fastcapitalism/1_2/
caprotti.html.
---. 2007. Mussolini's Cities: Internal Colonialism in Italy, 1930-1939. Youngstown: Cambria
Press.
Cavalcanti, Maria De Betania Uchoa. 1997. "Urban Reconstruction and Autocratic Regimes:
Ceausescu's Bucharest in Its Historic Context." Planning Perspectives 12: 71–109.
Ceka, Besir. 2015. "Tug of War in Macedonia." Foreign Affairs. Accessed April 1st, 2016.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/macedonia/2015-06-03/tug-war-macedonia.
Cellarius, Barbara. 2000. "You can Buy Almost Anything with Potatoes: An Examination of Barter
during Economic Crisis in Bulgaria." Ethnology 39: 73-92.
Cervinkova, Hana. 2013. "The Kidnapping of Wroclaw's Dwarves: The Symbolic Politics of
Neoliberalism in Urban East-Central Europe." East European Politics & Societies 27: 743–
56.
Channell-Justice, Emily. 2016. "Left of Maidan: Self-Organization and the Ukrainian State on the
Edge of Europe." PhD dissertation, Department of Anthropology, CUNY Graduate Center.

325

---. Forthcoming. "'We're not just Sandwiches:' Gender, Nation and Feminist (im)Possiblities on
Ukraine's Maidan." Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society.
Charnock, Greig, Thomas Purcell, and Ramon Ribera-Fumaz. 2014. "City of Rents: The Limits to
the Barcelona Model of Urban Competitiveness." International Journal of Urban and
Regional Research 38: 198–217.
Clayer, Nathalie. 2001. "Islam et identite nationale dans l'espace albanais (Albanie, Macédoine,
Kosovo) 1989-1998." Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions 115: 161–190.
Cojocaru, Claudia. 2015. "Sex Trafficking, Captivity, and Narrative: Constructing Victimhood
with the Goal of Salvation." Dialectical Anthropology 39: 183–94.
Coles, Kimberley. 2007. Democratic Designs: International Intervention and Electoral Practices
in Postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Congleton, Roger, Arye Hillman, and Kai Konrad, eds. 2008. Forty Years of Research on Rent
Seeking: An Overview. Berlin: Springer.
Connell, Robert, and James Messerschmidt. 2005. "Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the
Concept." Gender & Society 19: 829–859.
Connolly, Bernard. 1995. The Rotten Heart of Europe: The Dirty War for Europe's Money.
London: Faber and Faber.
Coronil, Fernando. 1997. The Magical State: Nature, Money, and Modernity in Venezuela.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Crapanzano, Vincent. 1985. Waiting: The Whites of South Africa. New York: Random House.
Crawford, Beverly, and Lipschutz, Ronnie. 1998. "The Myth of 'Ethnic Conflict': Politics,
Economics, and 'Cultural' Violence Location: Global, Area, and International Archive."
Research Series. Accessed April 1st, 2016 https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7hc733q3.
Creed, Gerald. 2011. Masquerade and Postsocialism: Ritual and Cultural Dispossession in
Bulgaria. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Croft, Stuart, John Redmond, Wynn Rees, and Mark Webber, eds. 1999. The Enlargement of
Europe. New York: St Martin's Press.
Crotty, James. 2009. "Structural Causes of the Global Financial Crisis: A Critical Assessment of
the 'New Financial Architecture.'" Cambridge Journal of Economics 33: 563–80.
Cvetkovska, Saska, and Pavla Holcova. 2014. "The Landlord Spy." OCCRP. Accessed on April
1st, 2016. https://www.occrp.org/en/investigations/2437-the-landlord-spy.

326

Cvetkovska, Saska, Meri Jordanovska, and Vlado Apostolov. 2014. "Web Portals in the Off-Shore
Claws of the Macedonian Government-Oriented Tycoons." SouthEastEuropean Media
Observatory April 24. Accessed April 1st, 2016. http://mediaobservatory.net
/radar/web-portals-shore-claws-macedonian-government-oriented-tycoons.
Da Costa, Lamartine, and Plinio Labriola. 1999. "Bodies from Brazil: Fascist Aesthetics in a South
American Setting." The International Journal of the History of Sport 16: 163–80.
Davis, Angela. 1983. Women, Race and Class. New York: Vintage Books.
Davis, Catriona. 2011. "Is Macedonia's Capital Being Turned into a Theme Park?" CNN. Accessed
April 1st, 2016. http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/04/world/europe/ macedonia-skopje-2014/.
Davis, Deborah. 2003. "From Welfare Benefit to Capitalized Asset: The Re-Commodification of
Residential Space in Urban China." In Chinese Urban Housing Reform, edited by Ralph
Forrest and John Lee, 183-196. London: Routledge.
Dawisha, Karen. 2014. Putin's Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia? New York: Simon & Schuster.
De Castro, Eduardo Viveiros. 2015. "Who Is Afraid of the Existential Wolf? Some Comments on
an Ongoing Anthropological Debate." Cambridge Anthropology 33: 2–17.
Debord, Guy. 2000. Society of the Spectacle. Detroit: Black & Red.
Del Boca, Angelo. 2005. Italiani brava gente? Milano: Neri Pozza.
Delors, Jacques. 1991. Le nouveau concert europeen. Paris: Odile Jacob.
Despeyroux, Jean. 1968. "Le seisme de Skopje: ses enseignements en matiere de protection
antisismique—aperçu des problemes de la construction antisismique en Yougoslavie et de
la reconstruction de Skopje." In The Earthquake in Skopje: Its Teachings Regarding
Antiseismic Protection: Summary of the Problems of the Antiseismic Construction in
Yugoslavia and in Skopje, edited by UNESCO Assistance Mission, 145–177. Amsterdam:
UNESCO Press.
Deutsche Bank. 2015. Macedonia: Frontier Country Report. Accessed April 1st, 2016.
https://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD/PROD000000000036
1469/Macedonia.pdf.
Dimova, Rozita. 2013. Ethno-Baroque: Materiality, Aesthetics and Conflict in Modern-Day
Macedonia. New York: Berghahn Books.
Dimovski, Sase. 2013. "Secretive Takeover Leaves Macedonian TV's Fate in Dark." Balkan
Insight. Accessed April 1st, 2016. http://www.balkaninsight.com/ en/article/secretivetakeover-leaves-macedonian-tv-s-fate-in-dark.

327

Donadio, Rachel, and Elisabetta Povoledo. 2011. Berlusconi Steps down and Italy Pulses with
Change. The New York Times. Accessed April 1st, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2011
/11/13/world/europe/silvio-berlusconi-resign-italy-austerity-measures.html.
Dore, Elizabeth. 2003. "Debt Peonage in Granada, Nicaragua, 1870-1930: Labor in a Noncapitalist
Transition." Hispanic American Historical Review 83: 521–559.
Duman, Alper. "Household Debt in Turkey: The Critical Threshold for the Next Crisis." Ecomod.
Accessed
April
1,
2016.
http://ecomod.net/system/files/Household
DebtinTurkeyAlperDuman.pdf.
Dunn, Elizabeth. 2004. Privatizing Poland: Baby Food, Big Business, and the Remaking of Labor.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
---. 2008. "Postsocialist Spores: Disease, Bodies, and the State in the Republic of Georgia."
American Ethnologist 35: 243–58.
Dunn, William. 1975. "Communal Federalism: Dialectics of Decentralization in Socialist
Yugoslavia." Publius 5: 127–50.
Eddy, Kester. 2016. "What Price the Hungarian Government's 'Kiss' for the Housing Market?"
BNE Intellinews. Accessed April 1st, 2016. http://www.intellinews.com/ what-price-thehungarian-government-s-kiss-for-the-housing-market-90637/?source= hungary.
Efremovski, Martin. 2015. "Stokovna kuka 'NAMA' Skopje: Slavko Brezovski 1959 Стоковна
куќа "НАМА" Скопје: Славко Брезовски 1959." MARH. Accessed on August 23rd,
2016. http://marh.mk/стоковна-куќа-нама-скопје-славко-б/.
Ehrlich, Kornelia, Agnes Kriszan, and Thilo Lang. 2012. "Urban Development in Central and
Eastern Europe: Between Peripheralization and Centralization?" DisP-The Planning
Review 48: 77–92.
Ellis, Burcu. 2003. Shadow Genealogies: Memory and Identity among Urban Muslims in
Macedonia. New York: Columbia University Press.
Elyachar, Julia. 2005. Markets of Dispossession: NGOs, Economic Development, and the State in
Cairo. Durham: Duke University Press Books.
Emigh, Rebecca Jean, and Ivan Szelenyi, eds. 2001. Poverty, Ethnicity, and Gender in Eastern
Europe during the Market Transition. Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group.
Engstrom, Erika. 2008. "Unraveling the Knot: Political Economy and Cultural Hegemony in
Bridal Media." Journal of Communication Inquiry 32: 60-82.
Estrin, Saul. 1991. "Yugoslavia: The Case of Self Managing Socialism." The Journal of Economic
Perspective 5: 187-194.
328

European Stability Initiative. 2005. "Islamic Calvinists. Change and Conservation in Central
Anatolia." Accessed April 1st, 2016. http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_document_id_69.pdf.
Fehervary, Krisztina. 2002. "American Kitchens, Luxury Bathrooms, and the Search for a 'Normal'
Life in Postsocialist Hungary." Ethnos 67: 369–400.
---. 2009. "Goods and States: The Political Logic of State-Socialist Material Culture." Comparative
Studies in Society and History 51: 426–459.
Ferguson, James. 2013. "Declarations of Dependence: Labor, Personhood, and Welfare in
Southern Africa." Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 19:223-242.
Ferry, Elizabeth. 2005. "Geologies of Power: Value Transformations of Mineral Specimens from
Guanajuato, Mexico." American Ethnologist 32: 420–436.
Fields, Desiree. 2015. "Contesting the Financialization of Urban Space: Community Organizations
and the Struggle to Preserve Affordable Rental Housing in New York City." Journal of
Urban Affairs 37: 144–165.
Firth, Raymond. 1959. Economics of the New Zealand Maori. Auckland: R.E. Owen, Governor
Printer.
Fischer, Brendt, eds. 2007. Balkan Strongmen: Dictators and Authoritarian Rulers of South
Eastern Europe. West Lafayette: Purdue University Press.
Fisher, Melissa. 2012. Wall Street Women. Durham: Duke University Press.
Fodor, Eva and Daniel Horn. 2015. "Economic Development and Gender Equality: Explaining
Variations in the Gender Poverty Gap after Socialism." Social Problems 62: 286–308.
Fodor, Eva. 2002. "Smiling Women and Fighting Men: The Gender of the Communist Subject in
State Socialist Hungary." Gender & Society 16: 240–63.
Franke, Anja, Andrea Gawrich, and Gurban Alakbarov. 2009. "Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan as
Post-Soviet Rentier States: Resource Incomes and Autocracy as a Double 'Curse' in PostSoviet Regimes." Europe-Asia Studies 61: 109–140.
Freedom House. 2016. "Freedom in the World 2016." Accessed April 1st, 2016. https://freedom
house.org/sites/default/files/FH_FITW_Report_2016.pdf.
Freeman, Joshua. 1993. "Hardhats: Construction Workers, Manliness, and the 1970 Pro-War
Demonstrations." Journal of Social History 26: 725–44.

329

Furubotn, Erik, and Svetozar Pejovich. 1973. "Property Rights, Economic Decentralization, and
the Evolution of the Yugoslav Firm, 1965-1972." Journal of Law and Economics 16: 275–
302.
Gagnon, Chip. 2004. The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press.
Gal, Susan, and, Gail Kligman. 2000. The Politics of Gender after Socialism. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Gambarotto, Francesca, and Stefano Solari. 2015. "The Peripheralization of Southern European
Capitalism within the EMU." Review of International Political Economy 4: 788-812.
Ganev, Venelin. 2007. Preying on the State: The Transformation of Bulgaria after 1989. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press.
Gellner, Ernest. 1997. Nationalism. New York: NYU Press.
Gendelman, Irina, and Giorgia Aiello. 2010. "Faces of Places: Facades as Global Communication
in Post-Eastern Bloc Urban Renewal." In Semiotic Landscapes: Language Image Place,
edited by Adam Jaworski and Crispin Thurlow, 256-273. London: Continuum
International.
Gessen, Masha. 2013. The Man Without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin. New York:
Riverhead Books.
Ghannam, Farha. 2013. Live and Die Like a Man: Gender Dynamics in Urban Egypt. Stanford:
Stanford University Press.
Ghodsee, Kristen. 2005. The Red Riviera: Gender, Tourism, and Postsocialism on the Black Sea.
Durham: Duke University Press Books.
---. 2004. "Red Nostalgia? Communism, Women's Emancipation, and Economic Transformation
in Bulgaria." L'Homme 15:26-36.
---. 2009. Muslim Lives in Eastern Europe: Gender, Ethnicity, and the Transformation of Islam in
Postsocialist Bulgaria. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Gille, Zsuzsa. 2007. From the Cult of Waste to the Trash Heap of History: The Politics of Waste
in Socialist and Postsocialist Hungary. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Gluckman, Max. 1968. Essays on Lozi Land and Royal Property. Manchester: University of
Manchester Press.

330

Gokariksel, Saygun. 2015. "Of Truths, Secrets, and Loyalties: Political Belonging and State
Building in Poland after State Socialism." Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Anthropology,
CUNY Graduate Center.
Gonick, Sophie. 2015. "Indignation and Inclusion: Activism, Difference, and Emergent Urban
Politics in Postcrash Madrid." Environment and Planning D: Society and Space (October
4). doi: 10.1177/0263775815608852.
Goscilo, Helena. 1996. Dehexing Sex: Russian Womanhood during and after Glasnost. Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press.
Goven, Joanna. 1993. The Gendered Foundations of Hungarian Socialism: State, Society, and the
Anti-Politics of Anti-Feminism, 1948-1990. Berkeley: University of California.
Graan, Andrew. 2010. "On the Politics of "Imidz": European Integration and the Trials of
Recognition in Postconflict Macedonia." Slavic Review 69: 835–858.
---. 2013. "Counterfeiting the Nation? Skopje 2014 and the Politics of Nation Branding in
Macedonia." Cultural Anthropology 28: 161–179.
Graeber, David. 2001. Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value: The False Coin of our Own
Dreams. London: Palgrave.
---. 2011. Debt: The First 5,000 Years. Brooklyn: Melville House.
---. 2012. "On Social Currencies and Human Economies: Some Notes on the Violence of
Equivalence." Social Anthropology 20: 411–428.
Green, Sarah. 2013. "Borders and the Relocation of Europe." Annual Review of Anthropology 42:
345–361.
Greenberg, Jessica. 2006. "Nationalism, Masculinity and Multicultural Citizenship in Serbia."
Nationalities Papers 34: 321–341.
---. 2014. After the Revolution: Youth, Democracy, and the Politics of Disappointment in Serbia.
Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Greenberg, Marija, and Kara MacDonald. 2000. "Women's Political Participation in the Republic
of Macedonia: Opportunities to Support Women in Upcoming Elections—and Beyond."
Accessed April 1st,2016. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/ Pnacm344.pdf.
Gregory, Mary. 1973. "Regional Economic Development in Yugoslavia." Soviet Studies 25: 213–
28.
Guardian. 2013. "Hungary: Orban wasteland." Accessed April 1st, 2016. http://www.theguardian
.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/14/hungary-viktor-orban-wasteland-leader.
331

Guerin, Isabelle. 2014. "Juggling with Debts, Social Ties and Values: The Everyday Use of
Microfinance." Current Anthropology 55:40-50.
Gulcur, Leyla, and Pınar Ilkkaracan. 2002. "The 'Natasha' Experience: Migrant Sex Workers from
the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in Turkey." Women's Studies International
Forum 25: 411–21.
Gutmann, Matthew. 1996. The Meanings of Macho: Being a Man in Mexico City. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Guyer, Jane. 2004. Marginal Gains: Monetary Transactions in Atlantic Africa. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
----. 2007. "Prophecy and the Near Future: Thoughts on Macroeconomic, Evangelical, and
Punctuated Time." American Ethnologist 34: 409–421.
Hafez, Sherine. 2012. "No Longer a Bargain: Women, Masculinity, and the Egyptian Uprising."
American Ethnologist 39: 37–42.
Halawa, Mateusz. 2015. "In New Warsaw: Mortgage Credit and the Unfolding of Space and
Time." Cultural Studies, 29:707-732.
Han, Clara. 2012. Life in Debt: Times of Care and Violence in Neoliberal Chile. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Hansen, Peo, and Stefan Jonsson. 2014. Eurafrica: The Untold History of European Integration
and Colonialism. New York: Bloomsbury.
Hansen, Peo. 2002. "European Integration, European Identity and the Colonial Connection."
European Journal of Social Theory 5:483-498.
Hardt, Michael, and Antonio Negri. 2000. Empire. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Hardy, Sally, Mark Hart, Luis Albrechts, and Anastatios Katos, eds. 1995. An Enlarged Europe:
Regions in Competition? London: Jessica Kingsle.
Harmati, Laszlo. 2005. "Mortgage Funding in Hungary: A Case Study." Working Paper. Accessed
April
1st
2016.
https://www.pfandbrief.de/cms/_internet.nsf/0/1C47AEF03
FCDF615C1257FA0003A2332/$FILE/eur_vortr_mepfl_budap4_Harmati_question.pdf?
OpenElement.
Hart, Keith, and Oracio Hortiz. 2014. "The Anthropology of Money and Finance: Between
Ethnography and World History." Annual Review of Anthropology 43:465-482.

332

Harvey, David. 1978. "The Urban Process under Capitalism: A Framework for Analysis."
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 2: 101–131.
---. 1989a. "From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The Transformation in Urban Governance
in Late Capitalism." Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography 71:3–17.
---. 1989b. The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change.
Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
---. 2005. Paris, Capital of Modernity. New York: Routledge.
Hayden, Robert. 1992. "Constitutional Nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav Republics." Slavic
Review 51: 654–673.
Haynes, John. 2003. New Soviet Man: Gender and Masculinity in Stalinist Soviet Cinema.
Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Helms, Elissa. 2013. Innocence and Victimhood: Gender, Nation, and Women's Activism in
Postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
Hemment, Julie. 2007. Empowering Women in Russia: Activism, Aid, and NGOs. Bloomington:
Indiana University Press.
Herzfeld, Michael. 1985. The Poetics of Manhood: Contest and Identity in a Cretan Mountain
Village. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
---. 2009. Evicted from Eternity: The Restructuring of Modern Rome. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Hirsch, Francine. 2005. Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet
Union. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Hirst, Tomas. 2015. "Russia's Central Bank Is Encouraging Banks to Accept Losses as Crisis
Deepens." Business Insider. Accessed April 1st, 2016. http://www.wsj.com/ articles/polishplan-to-convert-mortgage-loans-threatens-banking-stability-central-bank-says1455097669.
Hitchcock, William. 1997. "France, the Western Alliance, and the Origins of the Schuman Plan,
1948–1950." Diplomatic History 21: 603-630.
Ho, Giang, and Anthony Pennington-Cross. 2006. "The Impact of Local Predatory Lending Laws
on the Flow of Subprime Credit." Journal of Urban Economics 60: 210–28.
Ho, Karen. 2009. Liquidated: An Ethnography of Wall Street. Durham: Duke University Press.

333

Horvat, Srecko, and Igor Stiks. 2015. Welcome to the Desert of Postsocialism: Radical Politics
after Yugoslavia. New York: Verso.
Horvat, Robert, and Bojana Korosec. 2015. "The Role of Accounting in a Society: Only a
Techn(olog)ical Solution for the Problem of Economic Measurement or also a Tool of
Social Ideology?" Our Economy 61:32-40.
Hudson, Michael. 2012. The Bubble and Beyond: Fictitious Capital, Debt Deflation and Global
Crisis. Dresden: Islet.
Human Rights Watch. 2016. "Macedonia: Police Violent at a Protest." Accessed April 1st, 2016.
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/22/macedonia-police-violence-protest.
Humphrey, Caroline, and Stephen Hugh-Jones, eds. 1992. Barter, Exchange and Value: An
Anthropological Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Humphrey, Caroline. 1985. "Barter and Economic Disintegration." Man 20: 48–72.
---. 2000. How is Barter Done? The Social Relations of Barter in Provincial Russia. In The
Vanishing Ruble: Barter Networks and Non-Monetary Transactions in Post-Soviet
Societies, edited by Paul Seabright, 259-298. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
---. 2002. The Unmaking of Soviet Life: Everyday Economies after Socialism. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press.
Hungarian National Bank. 2015. "Financial Stability Report: November 2015." Accessed April 1st,
2016.
https://www.mnb.hu/en/publications/reports/financial-stability-report/financialstability-report-november-2015.
Ibroscheva, Elza. 2007. "Caught Between East and West? Portrayals of Gender in Bulgarian
Television Advertisements." Sex Roles 57: 409–18.
International Monetary Fund. 2014. Country Report N0. 14/231: The Former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia. Washington: International Monetary Fund.
---. 2015. The Western Balkans: 15 years of Economic Transition. Washington: International
Monetary Fund.
Iseni, Bashkim. 2008. La question nationale en Europe du Sud-Est: genese, emergence et
developpement de l'identite nationale albanaise au Kosovo et en Macedoine. Bern: Peter
Lang.
Italian Ministry of Economic Development. 2012. "Italy in the World Economy." Accessed April
1st, 2016. http://www.italtrade.com/italy/ice_report2012_summary.pdf.

334

Ivanovski, Jovan. 2008. "Decoding Postsocialist Transition on the Case of Skopje: Housing in the
Arena of Private Interest and the Emergence of New Urban Prototypes." MA thesis,
Department of Architecture, Dessau Institute of Architecture.
James, Deborah. 2012. "Money-Go-Round: Personal Economies of Wealth, Aspiration and
Indebtedness." Africa: The Journal of the International African Institute 82:20-40.
Janev, Aleksandar. 2015. "1,25 Milijardi evra ke se Zadolzi Makedonija vo Slednite Dve Godini
1,25 милијарди евра ќе се задолжи Македонија во следните две години! (Macedonia
Will Contract Debt for 1.25 Billion Euro in the next Two Years)." Kapital. Accessed April
1st, 2016. http://kapital.mk/1-25-milijardi-evra-ke-se-zadolzhi-makedonija-vo-slednitedve-godini/.
Janev, Goran. 2011. "Ethnocratic Remaking of Public Space: Skopje 2014." EFLA Journal:
Political Implications of the Urban Landscape 33–36.
Jansen, Stef. 2009. "After the Red Passport: Towards an Anthropology of the Everyday
Geopolitics of Entrapment in the EU's immediate 'Outside'." Journal of the Royal
Anthropological Institute 15: 815–832.
----. 2014. "On Not Moving Well Enough: Temporal Reasoning in Sarajevo Yearnings for 'Normal
Lives'." Current Anthropology 55: 74–84.
Johnson, Ericka. 2007. Dreaming of a Mail-Order Husband: Russian-American Internet Romance.
Durham: Duke University Press Books.
Jordanovska, Meri. "Macedonia Protesters Return to Streets After Clashes." BalkanInsight.
Accessed April 1st, 2016. http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonia-stageanother-protest-against-police-brutality#sthash.HiDXM5M2.dpuf.
Jovanovic, Branimir, 2015. "When is there a Kuznets Curve?" Working Papers 201550. Accessed
on April 1st 2016. https://ideas.repec.org/f/pjo203.html.
Kalb, Don, and Gabor Halmai, eds. 2011. Headlines of Nations, Subtexts of Class: Working-Class
Populism and the Return of the Repressed in Neoliberal Europe. New York: Berghan.
Kapital. 2015. " Za Devet Godini Dvojno Poveke Vraboteni vo Javnite Predprijatija ЗА ДЕВЕТ
ГОДИНИ ДВОЈНО ПОВЕЌЕ ВРАБОТЕНИ ВО ЈАВНИТЕ ПРЕТПРИЈАТИЈА (In
Nine Years the Number of Employees in Public Companies Doubled)." Kapital. Accessed
April 1st, 2016. http://kapital.mk/za-devet-godini-dvojno-poveke-vraboteni-vo-javnitepretprijatija/.
Karajkov, Risto. 2013. "Macedonia, il mattone dal boom alla crisi." Balcani e Caucaso. Accessed
April 1st, 2016.http://www.balcanicaucaso.org/aree/Macedonia/Macedonia-il-mattonedal-boom-alla-crisi-140451.

335

Karim, Lamia. 2011. Microfinance and its Discontents: Women in Debt in Bangladesh.
Mineapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Kelan, Elisabeth. 2010. "Gender Logic and (Un)doing Gender at Work." Gender, Work &
Organization 17: 174–94.
Keynes, John Maynard. 1936. The General Theory of Employement, Interest and Money. New
York: Harcourt.
Keys, Tracy, and Thomas Malnight. 2012. "The Exploding Business of Bartering." Harvard
Business Review. Accessed April 1st, 2016. https://hbr.org/2012/09/the-explodingbusiness-of-bart.
Kim, Jaesok. 2015. "From 'Country Bumpkins' to 'Tough Workers': The Pursuit of Masculinity
Among Male Factory Workers in China." Anthropological Quarterly 88: 133–161.
King, Anthony. 1997. "The Lads: Masculinity and the New Consumption of Football." Sociology
31: 329–346.
Kirisci, Kemal. 1995. "Post Second World War Immigration from Balkan Countries to Turkey."
New Perspectives on Turkey 12: 61–77.
Kjuka, Deana. 2013. "Urban Renewal or Nationalist Kitsch? Skopje 2014 Stirs Controversy."
Radio Free Europe. Accessed April 1st, 2016. http://www.rferl.org/ content/skopje-kitschrenewal-statues/25187521.html.
Klanjsek, Rudi, and Sergej Flere. 2011. "Exit Yugoslavia: Longing for Mononational States or
Entrepreneurial Manipulation?" Nationalities Papers 39: 791–810.
Klumbytė, Neringa. 2010. "The Soviet Sausage Renaissance." American Anthropologist 112: 22–
37.
Knorr-Cetina, Karin, and Alex Preda. 2007. "The Temporalization of Financial Markets: From
Network to Flow." Theory, Culture & Society 24: 116–138.
Koczan, Zsoka. 2015. "Fiscal Deficit and Public Debt in the Western Balkans: 15 Years of
Economic Transition." IMF Working Paper 172:1-20.
Kornai, Janos. 1992. The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Kowsmann, Patricia. 2015. "Portugal President Reappoints Prime Minister, Despite Lack of
Majority." The Wall Street Journal. Accessed April 1st, 2016. http://www.wsj.com/
articles/portugal-president-reappoints-prime-minister-despite-lack-of-majority1445544988.

336

Krippner, Greta. 2005. "The Financialization of the American Economy." Socio-Economic Review
3:173–208.
Krstikj, Aleksandra. 2011. "Morphological Analysis of the Vernacular Architectonic Design Code
as a Resource of Urban Regeneration: Case Study in Skopje's Old Bazaar, Macedonia."
MA thesis, Department of Architecture and Design, Kyoto Institute of Technology.
Krueger, Anne. 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society." American Economic
Review 64: 291–303.
Kruglova, Anna. 2013. "Sensory Utopia in the Times of 'Cultural Revolution': On Art, Public
Space, and the Moral Ontology of Class." Laboratorium: Russian Review of Social
Research 5: 25–51.
Kulick, Don. 1998. Travesti: Sex, Gender, and Culture among Brazilian Transgendered
Prostitutes. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kurtović, Larisa. 2012. "Politics of Impasse: Specters of Socialism and the Struggles for the Future
in Postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina." Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Anthropology,
University of California, Berkeley.
Labanca, Nicola. 2007. Oltremare: storia dell'espansione coloniale italiana. Bologna: Il Mulino.
LaFont, Suzanne. 2001. "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Women in the Post-Communist
States." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 34: 203–20.
Lambert, Sean. 2015. "Orban Administration: Measures to Reduce Household Foreign-Currency
Debt." The Orange Files. Accessed April 1st, 2016. http://theorangefiles.hu/ orbanadministration-measures-to-reduce-household-foreign-currency-loan-debt/.
Lampland, Martha. 1995. The Object of Labor: Commodification in Socialist Hungary. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Lang, Thilo. 2012. "Shrinkage, Metropolization and Peripheralization in East Germany."
European Planning Studies 20: 1747–1754.
Langdon, Steven. 1981. Multinational Corporations in the Political Economy of Kenya. New
York: St. Martin's.
Lapavitsas, Costas. 2009. "Financialised Capitalism: Crisis and Financial Expropriation."
Historical Materialism 17:114-149.
Laszek, Jacek, Hanna Augustyniak, and Krzysztof Olszewski. 2015. "FX Mortgages, Housing
Boom and Financial Stability: A Case Study for Poland." Working Paper. Accessed April
1st,
2016.
http://www.nbp.pl/badania/konferencje/2015/realestateworkshop/pdf
/Augustyniak_Hanna_Participant_Presentation.pdf.
337

Le Normand, Brigitte. 2008. "The House that Socialism Built: Reform, Consumption and
Inequality in Socialist Yugoslavia." EUI Working Papers MWP 2008/33.
Ledeneva, Alena. 1998. Russia's Economy of Favours: Blat, Networking, and Informal Exchange.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lees, Lorraine. 2005. Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War.
University Park: Penn State University Press.
Leyshon, Andrew, and Nigel Thrift. 1999. "Lists Come Alive: Electronic Systems of Knowledge
and the Rise of Credit-scoring in Retail Banking." Economy and Society 28: 434–466.
--- 2007. "The Capitalization of Almost Everything: The Future of Finance and Capitalism."
Theory, Culture, and Society 24: 97–115.
Low, Setha. 2004. Behind the Gates: Life, Security, and the Pursuit of Happiness in Fortress
America. New York: Routledge.
Lyon, Aisling. 2011. "Municipal Decentralisation in the Republic of Macedonia: Preserving a
Multi- Ethnic State?" Federal Governance 8:28-49.
Macedonian Ministry of Finance. 2014. "Annual Report on Public Debt Management of the
Republic of Macedonia for 2013." Accessed April 1st, 2016. http://www.finance.gov.mk/
files/u252/Annual%20Report%20on%20Public%20Debt%20Management%20of%20the
%20Republic%20of%20Macedonia%20for%202013_web.pdf.
Magdoff, Paul, and Harry Sweezy. 1987. Stagnation and the Financial Explosion. New York:
Monthly Review Press.
Malarek, Victor. 2004. The Natashas: The New Global Sex Trade. Toronto: Penguin Books.
Malinowski, Bronislav. 1978. Argonauts of the Western Pacific: An Account of Native Enterprise
and Adventure in the Archipelagoes of Melanesian New Guinea. New York: Routledge.
Mandoki, Katya. 1999. "Terror and Aesthetics: Nazi Strategies for Mass Organization."
Renaissance and Modern Studies 42: 64–81.
Marin, Dalia. 2006. "A New International Division of Labor in Europe: Outsourcing and
Offshoring to Eastern Europe." Journal of the European Economic Association 4: 612–
622.
Marina, Ognen, and Pencic, Divna. 2009. "Urban Transformations of Skopje, Fragmented CityLegacy of History." In The Spatial Planning in South Eastern Europe, edited by Branko
Miljkovic-Katic, 359-375. Belgrade: Institute of History.

338

Marusic, Sinsa. "Macedonian Divorce Rate Blamed on Women's Rights." BalkanInsight. Accessed
April 1st, 2016. http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/women-s-emancipation-blamedfor-divorces-in-macedonia.
Marx, Karl. 1993 [1894]. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 3. New York: Penguin.
Mason, Joshua William, and Arjun Jayadev. "'Fisher Dynamics' in US Household Debt, 19292011" American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 6:2014-34.
Mattioli, Fabio. 2014a. "Regimes of Aesthetics: Competing Performances Surrounding the Skopje
2014 Plan." In Mirroring Europe: Ideas of Europe and Europeanization in Balkan
Societies, edited by Tanja Petrovic, 64–88. Leiden: BRILL.
---. 2014b. "Unchanging Boundaries: The Reconstruction of Skopje and the Politics of Heritage."
International Journal of Heritage Studies 20: 599–615.
Maurer, Bill. 2005. Mutual Life, Limited: Islamic Banking, Alternative Currencies, Lateral
Reason. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
---. 2006. "The Anthropology of Money." Annual Review of Anthropology 35:15-36.
---. 2007. "Incalculable Payments: Money, Scale, and the South African Offshore Grey Money
Amnesty." African Studies Review 50: 125–38.
---. 2012. "Payment: Forms and Functions of Value Transfer in Contemporary Society."
Cambridge Anthropology 30: 15–35.
---. 2015. How Would You Like to Pay? How Technology Is Changing the Future of Money.
Durham: Duke University Press.
Mauss, Marcel. 2007. Essai sur le don: forme et raison de l'echange dans les societes archaiques.
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Mayer, Tamar, ed. 2000. Gender Ironies of Nationalism: Sexing the Nation. New York: Routledge.
Mayer, Till. 2013. "Macedonian Makeover: Europe's Flailing Capital of Kitsch." Spiegel Online
International. Accessed April 1st, 2016. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/
macedonian-capital-skopje-gets-kitsch-makeover -via-skopje2014-project-a-933154.html.
Meckler, Laura. 2016. "Clinton Campaign Attacks Donald Trump for Housing Bubble
Comments." The Wall Street Journal. Accessed July, 5th. http://blogs.wsj.
com/washwire/2016/05/24/clinton-campaign-attacks-donald-trump-for-housing-bubblecomments.

339

Meznarić, Silva. 1985. "Theory and Reality: The Status of Employed Women in Yugoslavia." In
Women, State and Party in Eastern Europe, edited by Sharon Wolchik and Alfred Meyer.
Durham: Duke University Press.
Mies, Maria. 1999. Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale: Women in the International
Division of Labour. London: Zed Books.
Mijalkovic, Milan, and Katharina Urbanek. 2011. Skopje, the World Bastard. Klagenfurt: Wieser
Verlag.
Millar, Kathleen. 2015. The Tempo of Wageless Work: E. P. Thompson's Time-Sense at the Edges
of Rio de Janeiro. Focaal--Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology 73: 28-40.
Milosevic, Aleksandar. 2013. "Le banche, l'Est Europa e la gallina dalle uova d'oro." Osservatorio
Balcani e Caucaso. Accessed April 1st, 2016. http://www.balcanicaucaso.
org/aree/Balcani/Le-banche-l-est-Europa-e-la-gallina-dalle-uova-d-oro-129663.
Ministry of Finance of Macedonia. 2014. Annual Report on Public Debt Management of the
Republic of Macedonia for 2014. Accessed on June 17th, 2016. http://www.finance.gov
.mk/files/u252/Annual%20Report%20on%20Public%20Debt%20Managemnt%20of%20t
he%20Republic%20of%20Macedonia%20for%202014x.pdf.
Mintz, Sidney. 1985. Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History. New York:
Penguin Books.
Miyazaki, Hirokazu. 2006. The Method of Hope: Anthropology, Philosophy, and Fijian
Knowledge. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Mollona, Massimiliano. 2009. Made in Sheffield: An Ethnography of Industrial Work and Politics.
Oxford: Berghahn.
Moore, Barrington. 1993. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the
Making of the Modern World. Boston: Beacon Press.
Mostov, Julie. 2000. "Sexing the Nation/Desexing the Body: Politics of National Identity in the
Former Yugoslavia." In Gender Ironies of Nationalism: Sexing the Nation, edited by Tamar
Mayer, 150-177. Routledge: London.
Mudde, Cas. 2015. "The Problem with Populism." The Guardian. Accessed on April 1st, 2016.
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/feb/17/problem-populism-syrizapodemos-dark-side-europe.
Muehlebach, Andrea. 2011. "On Affective Labor in Post-Fordist Italy." Cultural Anthropology 26:
59–82.

340

Mullings, Leith. 2002. "The Sojourner Syndrome: Race, Class, and Gender in Health and Illness."
Voices 6: 32-36.
Musaraj, Smoki. 2012. "Tales from Albarado: Pyramid Schemes and Ponzi Logics of
Accumulation in Postsocialist Albania." PhD dissertation, Department of Anthropology,
New School for Social Research.
Nagel, Joane. 1998. "Masculinity and Nationalism: Gender and Sexuality in the Making of
Nations." Ethnic and Racial Studies 21: 242–269.
National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia. 2015. Financial Stability Report for the Republic of
Macedonia 2014. Accessed June 18th, 2016. http://www.nbrm.mk/WBStorage/Files/
Regulativa_FSR_2014_ENG.pdf.
Nayak, Anoop. 2003. "Last of the 'Real Geordies'? White Masculinities and the Subcultural
Response to Deindustrialisation." Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 21: 7–
25.
Neofotistos, Vasiliki. 2009. "Rethinking 'Make Do': Action 'From the Side' and the Politics of
Segmentation in the Republic of Macedonia." American Ethnologist 36: 40–51.
----. 2010. "Cultural Intimacy and Subversive Disorder: The Politics of Romance in the Republic
of Macedonia." Anthropological Quarterly 83: 279–315.
Neoline. 2016. "EU Mediator Peter Vanhoutte Told DW that 'Regime Change by Elections is not
an Option Anymore'." New Europe. Accessed April 1st, 2016. https://neurope.eu/
article/eu-diplomat-skopje-regime-change-elections-not-option-anymore/.
Ness, Kate. 2012. "Constructing Masculinity in the Building Trades: Most Jobs in the Construction
Industry Can Be Done by Women." Gender, Work & Organization 19: 654–76.
New York Times. 2016. "Poland Deviates from Democracy." The New York Times. Accessed April
1st,
2016http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/13/opinion/poland-deviatesfromdemocracy.html? _r=0.
Nuttal, Clare. 2016. "Milo Djukanovic: Montenegro's Chameleon King." Bne Intellinews.
Accessed April 1st. 2016. http://www.intellinews.com/milo-djukanovic-montenegro-schameleon-king-90671/.
O' Brennan, John. 2014. "'On the Slow Train to Nowhere?' The European Union, 'Enlargement
Fatigue' and the Western Balkans." European Foreign Affairs Review 2: 221–241.
Oates-Indruchová, Libora. 2006. "The Void of Acceptable Masculinity During Czech State
Socialism: The Case of Radek John's Memento." Men and Masculinities 8: 428–50.

341

Oberschall, Anthony. 2000. "The Manipulation of Ethnicity: From Ethnic Cooperation to Violence
and War in Yugoslavia." Ethnic and Racial Studies 23: 982–1001.
Ong, Aihwa. 1987. Spirits of Resistance and Capitalist Discipline: Factory Women in Malaysia.
Albany: State University of New York Press.
Ong, Aiwha, and Stephen Collier, eds. 2005. Global Assemblages: Technology, Politics, and
Ethics as Anthropological Problems. New York: Wiley-Blackwell.
Orazem, Peter, and Milan Vodopivec. 1995. "Winners and Losers in Transition: Returns to
Education, Experience, and Gender in Slovenia." The World Bank Economic Review 9:
201–30.
Orsi, Luigi, and Stefano Solari. 2010. "Financialisation in Southern European Economies."
Economie Appliquée 63: 5-34.
Ott, Katarina. 1988. The Yugoslav Banking System. Zagreb: Institut za Iavni Financii.
Ozkan, Behlul. 2015. "Turkey's Erdoğan Is Hanging on for Dear Life." The World Post. Accessed
April
1st,
2016.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/behlal-azkan/turkeyErdogan
_b_ 8135610.html.
Palairet, Michael. 1997. "Metallurgical Kombinat Smedervo 1960-1990: A Case Study in the
Economic Decline of Yugoslavia." Europe-Asia Studies 49: 1071-1101.
Palomera, Jaime. 2014. "How Did Finance Capital Infiltrate the World of the Urban Poor?
Homeownership and Social Fragmentation in a Spanish Neighborhood." International
Journal of Urban and Regional Research 38: 218-235.
Pandolfi, Mariella. 2003. "Contract of Mutual (In)Difference: Governance and the Humanitarian
Apparatus in Contemporary Albania and Kosovo." Indiana Journal of Global Legal
Studies 10:369–381.
---. 2010. "From Paradox to Paradigm: The Permanent State of Emergency in the Balkans." In
Contemporary States of Emergency: The Politics of Military and Humanitarian
Intervention, edited by Didier Fassin and Mariella Pandolfi, 153–172. London: Zone.
Papic, Zarana. 1994. "From State Socialism to State Nationalism: The Case of Serbia in Gender
Perspective." Refuge 14:10-14.
Parry, Jonathan, and Maurice Bloch, eds. 1989. Money and the Morality of Exchange. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Patico, Jennifer. 2005. "To Be Happy in a Mercedes: Tropes of Value and Ambivalent Visions of
Marketization." American Ethnologist 32: 479–496.

342

---. 2008. Consumption and Social Change in a Post-Soviet Middle Class. Stanford: Stanford
University Press.
Pedersen, David. 2012. American Value: Migrants, Money and Meaning in El Salvador and the
United States. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Pedersen, Morten. 2007. "From Public to Private Markets in Postsocialist Mongolia." The
Anthropology of East Europe Review 25: 66-71.
Peebles, Gustav. 2010 . "The Anthropology of Credit and Debt." Annual Review of Anthropology
39: 225–40.
---. 2011. The Euro and its Rivals: Currency and the Construction of a Transnational City.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Petrusheva, Ana, and Mitko Jovanov. 2005. "Macedonian Gays Come Out from Shadows." Global
Voices Balkans. Accessed April 1st, 2016. https://iwpr.net/global-voices/
macedonian-gays-come-out-from-shadows.
Pine, Frances. 1998. "Dealing with Fragmentation: Consequences of Privatization for Rural
Women in Central and Southern Poland". In Surviving Post-Socialism: Local Strategies
and Regional Responses in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, edited by Sue
Bridge and Frances Pine, 106-123. London: Routledge.
Pojani, Dorina. 2015. "Urban Design, Ideology, and Power: Use of the Central Square in Tirana
during One Century of Political Transformations." Planning Perspectives 30: 67–94.
Poon, Martha. 2009. "From New Deal Institutions to Capital Markets: Commercial Consumer Risk
Scores and the Making of Subprime Mortgage Finance." Accounting, Organization, and
Society 35: 654–674.
Poulton, Hugh. The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict. London: Minority Rights
Publications.
Quinn, Stephen, and Williams Roberds. 2008. "The Evolution of the Check as a Means of
Payment: A Historical Survey." Economic Review 4:1-28.
Raiffeisen. 2015. "CEE Banking Sector Report." Accessed April 1st, 2016. http://www.
rbinternational.com/eBusiness/services/resources/media/829189266947841370829189181316930732_829602947997338151_829603177241218127-11431463
21166842713-1-2-EN.pdf.
Rajkovic, Nikolina. 2012. "The Post-Second World War Immigration of the Yugoslav Muslims to
Turkey (1953-1968)." MA thesis, Department of History, Central European University.

343

Rathery, Alain. 2003. "Tourism, Trade and Traffic Prospects between the Enlarged EU and nonEU Countries on the Eurasian Continent." International Road Transport Union. Accessed
April 1st, 2016. https://www.iru.org/en_events_2003_budapest_alain_rathery.
Reactor, and Arhitrektri. 2013. "Policy Study on the Effects of the Urban Planning Methodology
and Practice in Skopje: The Case Studies of Debar Maalo and Bunjakovec." Accessed April
1st,
2016.
http://www.reactor.org.mk/cms/files/publications/documents/
skopjeraste.pdf.
Redfield, Peter. 2012. "The Unbearable Lightness of Ex-pats: Double Binds of Humanitarian
Mobility." Cultural Anthropology 27: 358–382.
Reporters Without Borders. 2011. "Disastrous summer for Macedonian media, with TV station
and three dailies closed." Accessed April 1st, 2016. https://rsf.org/en/news/disastroussummer-macedonian-media-tv-station-and-three-dailies-closed.
Ribnikar, Ivan. 1989. "Money and Finance in Yugoslavia." Slovene Studies 11: 223-230.
Ricardo, David. 2004 [1817]. The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. Mineola: Dover
Publications.
Ries, Nancy. 2009. "Potato Ontology: Surviving Postsocialism in Russia." Cultural Anthropology
24: 181–212.
Riles, Annelise. 2010. "Collateral Expertise: Legal Knowledge in the Global Financial Market."
Current Anthropology 51: 795:818.
Rivkin-Fish, Michelle. 2005. "Bribes, Gifts and Unofficial Payments: Re-Thinking Corruption in
Post-Soviet Health Care". In Corruption: Anthropological Perspectives, edited by Haller
Dieter and Chris Shore, 47-64. London: Pluto Press.
Robertson, James. 1998. "Manufacturing Men: Working Class Masculinities in Japan."
Hitotsubashi Journal of Social Studies 30: 45-59.
Rogers, Douglas. 2005. "Moonshine, Money, and the Politics of Liquidity in Rural Russia."
American Ethnologist 32: 63-81.
---. 2014. "Petrobarter: Oil, Inequality, and the Political Imagination in and after the Cold War."
Current Anthropology 55: 131–153.
Royrvik, Emil. 2011. The Allure of Capitalism: An Ethnography of Management and the Global
Economy in Crisis. Oxford: Berghahn.
Rubin, Gayle. 1975. "The Traffic in Women: Notes on the 'Political Economy' of Sex." In Towards
an Anthropology of Women, edited by Rayna Reiter, 157–210. New York: Monthly Review
Press.
344

Rupnik, Jacques. 2007. "Populism in Eastern Central Europe." Eurozine. Accessed April 1st, 2016.
http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2007-09-10-rupnik-en.html.
Rutland, Ted. 2010. "The Financialization of Urban Redevelopment." Geography Compass 4:
1167–1178.
Sacchioli, Michela. 2015. "Il Lavoro negli anni della crisi: l'Italia paga il conto, la disoccupazione
è cresciuta del 108%." La Repubblica. Accessed April 1st, 2016. http://
www.repubblica.it/economia/2015/04/29/news/il_lavoro_negli_anni_della_crisi_l_italia_
paga_il_conto_la_disoccupazione_e_cresciuta_del_108_-112996138/.
Said, Edward. 1978. Orientalism. London: Penguin.
Sakellaropoulos, Spyros, and Panagiotis Sotiris. 2014. "Postcards from the Future: The Greek Debt
Crisis, the Struggle against the EU-IMF Austerity Package and the Open Question for Left
Strategy." Constellations 21: 262-273.
Salzinger, Leslie. 2003. Genders in Production: Making Workers in Mexico's Global Factories.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Sampson, Steven. 2005. "Integrity Warriors: Global Morality and the Anti-Corruption Movement
in the Balkans." In Corruption: Anthropological Perspectives, edited by Haller Dieter and
Chris Shore, 145-178. London: Pluto Press.
Santander Bank. 2015. "Hungary, Poland: Foreign Investment." Accessed April 1st, 2016.
https://en.santandertrade.com/establish-overseas/hungary/foreign-investment.
Schatzberg, Michael. 1988. The Dialectics of Oppression in Zaire. Bloomington: Indiana
University Press.
Schimmelfennig, Frank, and Hanno Scholtz. 2008. "EU Democracy Promotion in the European
Neighborhood: Political Conditionality, Economic Development and Transnational
Exchange." European Union Politics 9: 187–215.
Scott, James. 1987. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. New Haven:
Yale University Press.
Seabright, Paul, ed. 2000. The Vanishing Ruble: Barter Networks and Non-Monetary Transactions
in Post-Soviet Societies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Secolo XIX. 2016. "Unicredit punta sull'Est Europa: 20 miliardi destinati a nuovo credito."
Accessed April 1st, 2016. http://www.ilsecoloxix.it/p/economia/ 2016/01/20/ASxbSwFBunicredit_miliardi_destinati.shtml.

345

Shajnoski, Slobodan. 2015. "Privatization and Organized Crime in Macedonia." European Journal
on Criminal Policy and Research 1-14.
Sharp, Deen, and Claire Panetta, eds. forthcoming. Beyond the Square: Urbanism and the Arab
Uprisings. New York: Urban Research.
Shevchenko, Olga. 2008. Crisis and the Everyday in Postsocialist Moscow. Bloomington: Indiana
University Press.
Shore, Chris. 2000. Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration. London:
Routledge.
Shott, Briant. 2000. "Space and Society in the Southern Balkans: Understanding the Charshija in
Skopje, Macedonia." PhD dissertation, Department of Anthropology, University of
Virginia.
Siegelbaum, Lewis. 1998. "Dear Comrade, You Ask What We Need: Socialist Paternalism and
Soviet Rural 'Notables' in the Mid-1930s." Slavic Review 57: 107–132.
Simmel, Georg. 2011[1907]. The Philosophy of Money. London: Routledge.
Simoes Alexander, and Cesar Hidalgo. 2011. "The Economic Complexity Observatory: An
Analytical Tool for Understanding the Dynamics of Economic Development." Workshops
at the Twenty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Accessed April 1st.
http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/.
Sinn, Hans-Werner. 2014. "Austerity, Growth and Inflation: Remarks on the Eurozone's
Unresolved Competitiveness Problem." The World Economy 37: 1-13.
Skidelsky, Robert. 2014. "Cameron is Right to Warn of Another Recession, but Wrong to Blame
the World." The Guardian. Accessed on April 1st, 2016. http://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2014/nov/18/david-cameron-recession-policies-cut-deficits.
Slavevski, Trajko. 1997. "Privatization in the Republic of Macedonia: Five Years After." Eastern
European Economics 35:31-51.
Slezkine, Yuri. 1994. "The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or how a Socialist State Promoted
Ethnic Particularism." Slavic Review 53: 414–52.
Smart, Alan, and James Lee. 2003. "Financialization and the Role of Real Estate in Hong Kong's
Regime of Accumulation." Economic Geography 79: 153–71.
Smith, Neil. 1979. "Toward a Theory of Gentrification." Journal of the American Planning
Association 45:538-48.

346

Snajdr, Edward. 2007. "Ethnicizing the Subject: Domestic Violence and the Politics of
Primordialism in Kazakhstan." Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 13: 603.
Sobczyk, Martin. 2016. "Polish Plan to Convert Mortgage Loans Threatens Banking Stability,
Central Bank Says." The Wall Street Journal. Accessed April 1st, 2016. http://
www.wsj.com/
articles/polish-plan-to-convert-mortgage-loans-threatens-bankingstability-central-bank-says-1455097669.
Sofos, Spyros. 1996. "Inter-Ethnic Violence and Gendered Constructions of Ethnicity in Former
Yugoslavia." Social Identities 2: 73–92.
Sokol, Martin. 2013. "Towards a 'Newer' Economic Geography? Injecting Finance and
Financialization into Economic Geographies." Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy
and Society 3: 501-515.
Solari, Stefano, and GianDemetrio Marangoni. 2012. "The Making of the New European
Periphery: The Evolving Capitalisms within the Monetary Union." Paper presented at the
Euromemorandum conference, Vienna, September 16-18.
Solt, Frederick. 2014. "The Standardized World Income Inequality Database." Working paper.
SWIID Version 5.0, October 2014.
Sopranzetti, Claudio. 2014. "Owners of the Map: Mobility and Mobilization among Motorcycle
Taxi Drivers in Bangkok." City & Society 26: 120–143.
Ssorin-Chaikov, Nikolai. 2000. "Bear Skins and Macaroni: The Social Life of Things at the
Margins of a Siberian State Collective." In The Vanishing Rouble: Barter Networks and
Non-Monetary Transactions in Post-Soviet Societies, edited by Paul Seabright, 345-361.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stiglitz, Joseph. 2015. The Great Divide: Unequal Societies and What Can We Do About Them?
New York: Norton & Company.
Stockhammer, Engelbert. 2011. "Peripheral Europe's Debt and German Wages: The Role of Wage
Policy in the Euro Area." Research in Money and Finance Discussion Paper 29: 1-26.
Stone, Marla. 1993. "Staging Fascism: The Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution." Journal of
Contemporary History 28: 215–43.
Storm, Servaas, and C.W.M. Naastepad. 2015. "Europe's Hunger Games: Income Distribution,
Cost Competitiveness and Crisis." Cambridge Journal of Economics 39: 959-986.
Strathern, Marilyn. 1988. The Gender of the Gift. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Strazzari, Francesco. 2007. "The Decade Horribilis: Organized Violence and Organized Crime
along the Balkan Peripheries, 1991–2001." Mediterranean Politics 12: 185-209.
347

Susser, Ida. 1982. Norman Street: Poverty and Politics in an Urban Neighborhood. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
--- 2009. AIDS, Sex, and Culture: Global Culture and Survival in Southern Africa. London: WileyBlackwell.
Szelenyi, Ivan, and Tamas Csillag. 2015. "Drifting from Liberal Democracy: Neo-Conservative
Ideology of Managed Illiberal Democratic Capitalism in Post-Communist Europe."
Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics 1: 25-45.
Tamburini, Francesco. 2013. "Crisi, la grande fuga delle aziende italiane a caccia di manodopera
low cost." Il Fatto Quotidiano. Accessed April 1st, 2016. http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.
it/2013/12/30/crisi-la-grande-fuga-delle-aziende-italiane-a-caccia-di-manodopera-lowcost/700006/.
Thiessen, Ilká. 2007. Waiting on Macedonia: Identity in a Changing World. Toronto: Broadview.
Tlostanova, Madina, and Walter Mignolo. 2012. Learning to Unlearn: Decolonial Reflections
from Eurasia and the Americas. Columbus: The Ohio State University Press.
Todorov, Petar. 2013. "Skopje, od pochetok na XIX vek do krajot na osmanlinskoto vladeenje
Скопје од почетокот на XIX век до крајот на османлиското владеење (Skopje, from
the Beginning of the XIX Century until the end of the Ottoman Rule)." PhD Dissertation,
Institute of History, University of Ss Cyril and Methodius.
Todorova, Maria. 1997. Imagining the Balkans. New York: Oxford University Press.
Tolic, Ines. 2011. Dopo il terremoto: la politica della ricostruzione negli anni della guerra fredda
a Skopje. Reggio Emilia: Diabasis.
Torsello, Davide. 2010. "Corruption and the Economic Crisis: Empirical Indications from Eastern
Europe." Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs 19: 65-75.
Tridico, Pasquale. 2013. "Italy, from Economic Decline to the Current Crisis." Working paper 173.
Dipartimento di Economia dell'Universita' degli Studi di Roma Tre.
Tugal, Cihan. 2016. "In Turkey, the Regime Slides from Soft to Hard Totalitarianism." Open
Democracy. Accessed April 1st 2016. https://www.opendemocracy.net/ cihantugal/turkey-hard-totalitarianism-erdogan-authoritarian.
Tullock, Gordon, 1974. The Social Dilemma: The Economics of War and Revolution. Blacksburg:
University Publications.
Tunc, Cengiz, and Abdullah Yavas. 2015. "Not All Credit is Created Equal: Mortgage vs NonMortgage Debt and Private Saving Rate in Turkey." Working Paper 15/24. Accessed April
348

1st,
2016.
http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/wps/wcm/connect/6c55f063-0899-4e6b-9b95976de3d93129/wp1524.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=ROOTWORKSPACE6c55f0
63-0899-4e6b-9b95-976de3d93129.
Unicredit Bank. 2016. "UniCredit continua a investire nell'Europa Centro Orientale (CEE)."
Accessed on April 1st, 2016 https://www.unicreditgroup.eu/it/press-media/pressreleases/2016/ unicredit-continua-a-investire-nelleuropa-centro-orientale--cee.html.
UNWOMEN. 2012. "Writing Women into the Budget: FYR Macedonia Welcomes its First
Strategy on Gender-Responsive Budgeting." Accessed April 1st, 2016. http://www.
unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2012/8/writing-women-into-the-budget-fyr-macedoniawelcomes-its-first-strategy-on-gender-responsive-budget.
USAID. 2009. "Macedonia's Electoral Quota System is a Model for Gender Participation."
Accessed April 1st, 2016. http://wdn.org/media/PDFs/MacedondiaUSAIDUganda.pdf.
Van der Pijl, Kees, Otto Holman, and Or Raviv. 2011. "The Resurgence of German Capital in
Europe: EU Integration and the Restructuring of Atlantic Networks of Interlocking
Directorates after 1991." Review of International Political Economy 18: 384-408.
Veblen, Thorstein, 1934 (1899). The Theory of the Leisure Class. New York: Modern Library.
Vejvoda, Ivan. 1996. "Yugoslavia 1945-91: From Decentralization without Democracy to
Dissolution." In Yugoslavia after War: A Study in Fragmentation Despair and Rebirth,
edited by David Dryker and Ivan Vejvoda, 9-25. London: Routledge.
Verdery, Katherine. 1991. National Ideology under Socialism. Berkeley: University of California
Press.
---. 1996 What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next? Princeton: Princeton University Press.
---. 2003. The Vanishing Hectare: Property and Value in Postsocialist Transylvania. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press.
---. 2014. Secrets and Truths: Ethnography in the Archive of Romania's Secret Police. Budapest:
Central European University Press.
Vesentini, Ilaria. 2014. "In Italia chiudono due imprese ogni ora: in cinque anni perse 60mila
aziende." Il Sole 24 Ore. Accessed April 1st, 2016. http://www.ilsole24ore. com/art/
impresa-e-territori/2014-01-23/in-italia-chiudono-due-imprese-ogni-ora-cinque-anniperse-60mila-aziende-174528.shtml?uuid=ABjyzjr.
Vetta, Theodora. 2011. "Nationalism is Back! Radikali and Privatization in Serbia." In Headlines
of Nations, Subtexts of Class: Working Class Populism and the Return of the Repressed in
Neoliberal Europe, edited by Don Kalb and Halmai Gabor. New York: Berghahn Books.

349

Vliegenthart, Arjan. 2010. "Bringing Dependency Back in: The Economic Crisis in Post-Socialist
Europe and the Continued Relevance of Dependent Development." Historical Social
Research 35: 242-265.
Vuckovic, Milos. 1963. "The Recent Development of the Money and Banking System of
Yugoslavia." Journal of Political Economy 71: 363-377.
Walker, Shaun. 2015. "He Shoots, He Scores: Vladimir Putin Celebrity Cult Achieves New
Goals." The Guardian. Accessed April 1st, 2016. http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2015/may/17/he-shoots-he-scores-vladmir-putin-celebrity-cult-achieves-newgoals.
Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1979. The Capitalist World-Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Walsh, Fintan. 2016. Male Trouble: Masculinity and the Performance of Crisis. London: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Watson, Peggy. 1993. "Eastern Europe's Silent Revolution: Gender." Sociology 27: 471–87.
Watts, Jacqueline. 2009. "Leaders of Men: Women 'Managing' in Construction." Work,
Employment & Society 23: 512–30.
Weber, Rachel. 2010. "Selling City Futures: The Financialization of Urban Redevelopment
Policy." Economic Geography 86: 251–74.
Weiner, Annette. 1992. Inalienable Possessions: The Paradox of Keeping-While-Giving.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Westervelt, Eric. 2012. "For Hungarian Borrowers, a Mortgage Nightmare." NPR, January 31.
Accessed April 1st, 2016. http://www.npr.org/2012/01/31/146140750/for-hungarianborrowers-a-mortgage-nightmare.
Whitehead, Judy. 2008. "Rent Gaps, Revanchism and Regimes of Accumulation in Mumbai."
Anthropologica 50: 269–82.
Williams, Brett. 2005. Debt for Sale: A Social History of the Credit Trap. Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press.
Willis, Paul. 1981. Learning to Labor: How Working Class Kids Get Working Class Jobs. New
York: Columbia University Press.
Wolff, Larry. 1994. Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the
Enlightenment. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

350

Woodruff, David. 1999. Money Unmade: Barter and the Fate of Russian Capitalism. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press.
Woodward, Susan. 1995. Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War.
Washington: Brookings Institution Press.
---. 2003. "The Political Economy of Ethno-nationalism in Yugoslavia." Socialist Register: 39-76.
World Economic Forum. 2015. "Global Gender Gap Report 2015." Accessed April 1st, 2016.
https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-gender-gap-report-2015.
Yates, Douglas. 1996. The Rentier State in Africa: Oil Rent Dependency and Necolonialism in the
Republc of Gabon. Trenton: Africa World Press.
Zabic, Sarah. "Praxis, Student Protest, and the Purporsive Social Action. The Humanist Critique
of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, 1964-1975." MA thesis, Department of
History, Kent State University.
Zaloom, Caitlin. 2004. "The Productive Life of Risk." Cultural Anthropology 19: 365–391.
---. 2006. Out of the Pits: Traders and Technology from Chicago to London. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
Zantvoort Joris. 2014. "Skopje 2014: Tragedy or Farce?" Balkanist. Accessed April 1st, 2016.
http://balkanist.net/skopje-2014-tragedy-or-farce/.
Zarkov, Dubravka. 2003. "Feminism and the Disintegration of Yugoslavia: On the Politics of
Gender and Ethnicity." Social Development Issues: 1–19.
Zavisca, Jane. 2012. Housing the New Russia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Zhang, Li. 2010. In Search of Paradise: Middle-Class Living in a Chinese Metropolis. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press.
Zontini, Elisabetta. 2008. "Resisting Fortress Europe: The Everyday Politics of Female
Transnational Migrants." Focaal 8:13-27.
Zukin, Sharon. 1991. Landscapes of Power: From Detroit to Disneyland. Berkeley: University of
California Press.

351

